Attorney fees for court appointed counsel; In re Ujlaky; In re Foster

Concluding that the trial court erred by denying appellant’s “full fee request without making any findings” as to their reasonableness, the court vacated the attorney fee award and remanded “for the trial court to either award appellant the full amount of the requested fees or articulate its basis for concluding that the amount was not reasonable.” Defendant-Bell appealed his convictions and sentences. The court affirmed his convictions but remanded for resentencing. Appellant, his court appointed appellate counsel, “submitted an attorney fee request and itemized bill to the trial court for his work on defendant’s appeal, and the trial court awarded some, but not all, of the attorney fees requested.” The court held that as in Foster and Ujlaky, the trial court here “was not permitted to merely reduce appellant’s requested attorney fees based on a fee schedule or fee cap. Rather, it was required to consider whether the hours billed by appellant were reasonable. Because the trial court did not award the full amount of attorney fees requested, or in the alternative make findings concerning the reasonableness of the fees in relation to the actual services rendered, it abused its discretion.”