One-year notice or filing period following accrual of a claim against a state entity; MCL 600.6431(1); Whether Christie v Wayne State Univ should be applied retroactively to post-Tyrrell v University of MI/pre-Christie cases; League of Women Voters of MI v Secretary of State

The court held “that Christie does not apply retroactively to circuit court cases that were in a procedural posture wherein Tyrrell’s interpretation of MCL 600.6431 was the law in Michigan during the one-year notice or filing period following accrual of a claim.” Because that was the situation with plaintiff’s case against defendant-DHHS, the court reversed and remanded. The resolution of this appeal hinged “on whether Christie must be applied retroactively such that plaintiffs whose cases were governed by Tyrrell during the relevant notice period are subject to dismissal for failing to comply with the one-year notice or filing requirement of MCL 600.6431(1).” The court first concluded “that the holding in Christie that a party suing the state must comply with MCL 600.6431(1) even if the action is pursued in circuit court constituted a new rule or principle of law as to those cases filed when the holding in Tyrrell constituted binding precedent. It is clear that Christie overruled precedent established in Tyrrell, and although our Supreme Court in Christie, ‘expressed that it was giving effect to the intent of the Legislature as inferred from the text of MCL 600.6431(1), the correction of the erroneous interpretation by the panel in Tyrrell effectively announced a new rule of law as to those cases to which Tyrrell applied.’” The court held that the “precedent set by Tyrrell was clear and unambiguous, i.e., there is no need to comply with MCL 600.6431(1) in a circuit court action against the state, and the ruling in Christie was just as clear and unambiguous, i.e., compliance with MCL 600.6431(1) is required regardless of the judicial forum. The distinction between these two holdings was not vague, hazy, or indefinite; rather, Christie reflected a 180-degree change in the law, in relation to the governing law defined in Tyrrell.” Finding the threshold issue was fully satisfied, the court proceeded with its examination of the three pertinent factors from League of Women Voters. As “to the purpose to be served by the new rule, the Christie Court did not specifically engage in an assessment of the purpose to be served by its ruling outside of simply determining the intent of the Legislature and giving effect to that intent.” Finally, as “to the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice, we conclude that this factor strongly favors plaintiff considering that retroactive application of Christie’s construction of MCL 600.6431(1) would be patently unjust and inequitable.” In sum, the court concluded “that upon weighing the three pertinent factors, they weigh against applying Christie retroactively to cases in which plaintiffs reasonably relied on Tyrrell in making the decision not to provide the notice in MCL 600.6431(1).” Thus, it concluded “that because Tyrrell, despite being wrongly decided, was binding precedent at the relevant time in this case, the decision in Christie was a new rule of law as to it and similarly-situated cases.” It further held “that plaintiff’s reliance interest was such that the Christie decision should not be applied retroactively as to her.”