Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407; Intentional torts; Using reasonable force on students; MCL 380.1312(5); Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(8)(a); Good faith; Vicarious liability

Concluding that MCL 691.1407 and 380.1312(5) entitled defendants to immunity from plaintiff-QC’s guardian’s tort claims, the court affirmed. QC’s guardian alleged that defendant-Lukes’s (Dean of Students) conduct against QC “constituted ‘the torts of assault and battery’ and gross negligence.” Plaintiff later filed an amended complaint adding defendant-school district, “asserting that it was liable for Lukes’s torts on a respondeat superior theory, and adding a new claim against Lukes alleging excessive force and unlawful search and seizure.” Defendants successfully moved for summary disposition based on immunity under “MCL 691.1407 (Lukes’s conduct did not arise to statutory gross negligence, nor as to the intentional torts, was his conduct in bad faith) and MCL 380.1312(5) (providing immunity to school personnel who use reasonable force to maintain control in the school).” On appeal, the court disagreed “with plaintiff’s argument that whether Lukes’s use of force was reasonable is a question of fact for a jury.” It held that in “light of the circumstances facing Lukes, which required immediate action to quell a large, on-going and chaotic situation (of which QC was a significant player), his grabbing and ‘taking down’ QC while she was struggling with him to get away (and to potentially get to her target, another student), was a reasonable, good faith judgment to use this physical force. No reasonable juror could conclude otherwise given these facts, particularly so because of the required deference that must be given to Lukes under MCL 380.1312(7) (‘deference shall be given to reasonable good-faith judgments made by that person’).” The court noted that certainly “other actions could have been taken by Lukes, but given QC’s repeated attempts to engage with the other student, her disregard of Lukes’s instructions, her attempts to get out of his control, the seemingly similar size between QC and Lukes, and the chaotic and dangerous situation ongoing in front of him, Lukes’s forceable action towards QC was reasonable, and entitles him to immunity on the negligence and assault and battery claims for his use of reasonable force.” Plaintiff also argued “that whether Lukes was grossly negligent and whether his conduct was the proximate cause of QC’s injury are questions of fact for a jury and” the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition. But neither argument could “succeed under these facts.” The court held that “reasonable minds could not differ as to whether Lukes’s conduct constituted gross negligence that was the proximate cause of QC’s injury,” and there was “no factual dispute on this question.” Finally, it concluded that “reasonable minds could not differ as to whether Lukes was acting in good faith,” and the trial court did not err by holding that he “was entitled to governmental immunity as to plaintiff’s claims of assault and battery.”