Termination under § 19b(3)(j); The doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Whether parental rights were terminated at the initial dispositional hearing; Applicability of MCR 3.977(E); Reasonable reunification efforts

Concluding that MCR 3.977(E) did not apply, the court held that reasonable reunification efforts were made and that § (j) supported terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to the child (MJA). While respondent asserted the trial court terminated her “rights under MCR 3.977(E) at the initial dispositional hearing[,]” it in fact did so “a little over two months later during a termination hearing.” The initial dispositional hearing was conducted in March and the termination hearing in May. “While the dispositional hearing was essentially contemporaneous with the adjudication trial, it was unambiguously a different proceeding from the termination hearing.” In addition, the trial court did not excuse the DHHS “from making reasonable efforts. The order following the preliminary hearing expressly ordered that ‘[r]easonable efforts shall be made to preserve and reunify the family to make it possible for the child(ren) to safely return home.’ At the adjudication trial, the trial court refused to consider [DHHS’s] previous efforts to reunify respondent with her other children sufficient to ‘satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement,’ and it again ordered that reasonable efforts must be made for reunification with MJA.” It also ordered that if respondent “could show as little as a month of consistent attendance at mental health appointments, [her] parenting time could be resumed.” The court further found that the DHHS “actually made reasonable efforts.” As to a statutory ground for termination, her “failure to participate in or benefit from services, persistent combativeness, and inability to parent her children safely provided evidence that she would likely treat MJA similarly. The trial court did not terminate her” rights on the basis “she necessarily would treat MJA similarly merely because she had treated the older children in a particular way. Rather, [it] gave her a meaningful opportunity to show that she could safely parent MJA.” The court found “no reason to believe MJA was situated differently from the other children.” In addition, there was sufficient evidence specifically as to MJA that respondent “was incapable of providing for MJA, still failed to understand how to parent safely, was homeless and not making meaningful efforts to find housing, was belligerent and violent, was failing to take medications, and showed no insight into her mental health challenges.” Affirmed.