Jurisdiction; Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re Kellogg & In re LaFrance; Reasonable reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2)(c); Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Children’s best interests

The court rejected respondent-mother’s “argument that the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, and conclude[d] that the trial court did not clearly err by exercising its jurisdiction over ES.” In addition, “the trial court did not err by finding that the DHHS did not have to make reasonable efforts toward reunification” under MCL 712A.19a(2)(c). Further, the statutory ground for termination was established and the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent's parental rights was in ES’s best interests. She argued “that the trial court erred by exercising jurisdiction over ES because the doctrine of anticipatory neglect did not apply in light of the significant differences between ES” and a different child, PG. Respondent argued that this case was like Kellogg and LaFrance “in that there were marked and significant differences between ES and PG, but the record indicates otherwise.” The CPS “investigator in ES’s case testified that PG was approximately one month old when he sustained serious injuries and was diagnosed with shaken baby syndrome. ES was one day old when the DHHS removed him from respondent’s care, and the trial court recognized that both ES and PG were infants entirely dependent on [her] for care at the time of removal. [She] testified in her prior termination proceedings that she needed help caring for a child and could not do so without assistance.” While she “lived with her mother when ES was born, [her] mother informed the DHHS that she frequently traveled for work and would not help respondent care for ES. Respondent provided no evidence that she had additional support or was capable of caring for ES on her own. Further, the clinical psychologist who performed [her] psychological evaluation in her prior child-protective proceeding testified in this case that [her] cognitive impairments prevented her from caring for a child on a regular or consistent basis and making appropriate decisions to ensure a child’s welfare. In addition to the psychologist’s testimony that respondent’s impairments were chronic and could not be rectified with medication, [she] acknowledged that she still had cognitive impairments.” Thus, the evidence reflected “that there were no significant differences between ES’s and PG’s needs or respondent’s circumstances with each child.” Affirmed.