Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i), (j), & (k)(iii); Admission of a child’s statements regarding sexual abuse; Hearsay; The “tender years exception”; MCR 3.972(C)(2)(a); In re Snyder; Reliability; Best interests of the child; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection

Holding that (1) respondent-father’s substantial rights were not affected by the trial court’s error in holding the tender years hearing after the adjudication and termination hearing, (2) §§ (b)(ii), (j), and (k)(iii) were met, and (3) termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of his parental rights. His rights were terminated based on his sexual abuse of his young son. The court agreed with respondent that the trial court erred by not holding the tender-years hearing at the proper time, but found this error did not affect his substantial rights. “The trial court conducted the hearing after the termination hearing and gave respondent an opportunity to challenge the evidence and argue that it should be excluded.” In addition, it “did not make any determination regarding termination until after it resolved the evidentiary issue.” And it did not err by finding the child’s statements, admitted through other witnesses, “bore sufficient indicia of trustworthiness.” The court noted the child’s statements “were spontaneous and repeated consistently.” Moreover, he “exhibited behavior that was atypical for his age and no evidence suggested that he had a motive to fabricate the allegations.” Because the trial court did not err by admitting the testimony, it “properly relied on the evidence to support its determination that the statutory grounds for termination had been proven.” And because respondent conceded “that the statutory grounds were met if the evidence was admissible, he is not entitled to relief on this issue.” The court also rejected his claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests, noting the trial court thoroughly explained its reasoning. It “discussed the disorganized attachment between [them], concerns about [the child’s] safety if returned to [his care], [his] failure to take any steps to rectify the circumstances, the danger of allowing [the child] to have any contact with [him] because of [his] failure to rectify the circumstances, the sexual abuse itself, and the mother’s ability to provide care for” the child. The evidence supported its reasoning. Finally, the court rejected his contention that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by “failing to request that the tender-years hearing be held before the adjudication trial, failing to object to the hearsay testimony presented at the adjudication trial and termination hearing, and failing to argue that the trial court’s findings” about the child’s “best interests were insufficient.” Respondent’s trial counsel was not ineffective for “failing to raise meritless arguments or make futile objections.”