Motion to suppress evidence; Chemical analysis results; Compliance with MCL 257.625a(6)(e); The exclusionary rule; People v Hawkins; Constitutionality of MCL 257.625a(6)(e); People v Perlos; Operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI); Operating a motor vehicle with a suspended or revoked license (OWSL)

The court held that the trial court erred in granting defendant-Barton’s motion to suppress the results of a chemical analysis of his blood based on an alleged lack of compliance with MCL 257.625a(6)(e). It found that even “if the prosecuting attorney’s request that the medical facility provide the chemical analysis to” an officer (L) constituted “a technical violation of MCL 257.625a(6)(e), exclusion was not the proper remedy.” Finally, under Perlos, defendant’s challenge to the constitutionality of MCL 257.625a(6)(e) failed. He was charged with OWI, third offense and OWSL, second offense. “MCL 257.625a(6)(e) permits the admission of chemical analysis from blood samples taken for medical treatment following an accident and requires the medical facility to disclose the information to a prosecuting attorney.” It appeared the analysis here would “fall squarely within the statute, but for the fact that [L] testified that he, not the prosecuting attorney, requested the analysis results.” The trial court granted the “motion to suppress under the belief that [L] testified accurately that he was the person responsible for seeking Barton’s chemical analysis results. Although it was the prosecution, not the defense, that elicited this testimony during the suppression hearing, that factual representation is incorrect. In its motion for reconsideration, the prosecution submitted new evidence that the prosecuting attorney was the party responsible for contacting the hospital and requesting Barton’s medical record, as required under MCL 257.625a(6)(e).” The court noted the statute “also provides that the medical facility must provide the chemical analysis results to a prosecuting attorney, as opposed to law enforcement, after the prosecuting attorney requests a defendant’s results from the” facility. There was no question that the facility here “provided the chemical analysis to [L], not the prosecuting attorney. But it did so at the prosecuting attorney’s request.” The court found that a “hypertechnical reading of MCL 257.625a(6)(e) would put the prosecuting attorney in the chain of custody for critical evidence in many drunk driving cases, effectively making the prosecutor a witness. This cannot be what the statute contemplates.” Reversed and remanded.