Negligent operation of an ambulance; Governmental immunity; The motor-vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405; Circumstances under which an ambulance driver can drive through a red light &/or exceed the posted speed limit; MCL 257.603(3)(b) & (c); MCL 257.603(3) & (4); Flanagin v Kalkaska Cnty Rd Comm’n; Distinguishing Ferriole v City of Detroit (Unpub)

The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendants’ (city and ambulance driver-Baugh) motion for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff’s claims were barred by governmental immunity. Plaintiff sued defendants alleging Baugh was negligent or grossly negligent in his operation of the ambulance he was driving, which caused the collision in which her mother suffered a traumatic brain injury that eventually led to her death. The trial court found “there were several issues of fact whether Baugh drove appropriately under the circumstances, including discrepancies in what speed [he] was traveling, whether [the other driver, N] observed the ambulance’s lights and sirens, and whether Baugh operated the ambulance safely in a way to prevent injuries.” On appeal, the court rejected defendants’ argument that the trial court erred by denying their summary disposition motion because plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to Baugh’s negligent operation of an ambulance. “Contrary to defendants’ argument, there is a question of fact whether the exceptions in MCL 257.603(3) even apply because there is a question of fact whether Baugh’s ambulance’s lights were flashing before the accident.” Although Baugh and a witness said that they were, N sharply disputed this, insisting “during his deposition that the ambulance’s lights were not flashing because, if they were, he would have seen them as it was dark outside at the time of the crash.” However, even if “the exceptions in MCL 257.603(b) and (c) applied, there remain questions of fact whether Baugh’s operation of the ambulance was negligent.” A trier of fact could find “Baugh did not ensure that it was safe to proceed through the red light before doing so (despite reducing his speed), and was thus negligent in his operation of the ambulance.” If N was “driving within the speed limit before the accident and merely proceeded through a green light, and Baugh simply failed to see him, then a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Baugh did not ensure that it was, in fact, safe to proceed through the red light before doing so, and was thus negligent in his operation of the ambulance.” The court noted that, here, “unlike in Ferriole, the disputes in the evidence cannot be resolved by reviewing a video of what happened. Instead, we must rely on testimony, witness statements, and reports about what may or may not have occurred. That evidence is rife with discrepancies[.]” Affirmed.