Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D)(3); “Good cause”; A retroactive change to the law; People v Poole; Registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Actual prejudice; People v Betts; People v Lymon

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that defendant failed to show good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a), and in concluding he did not cite “sufficient authority to potentially establish actual prejudice.” Thus, it vacated the trial court’s opinion and order denying his motion for relief from judgment related to his 1995 guilty plea conviction for CSC II and remanded. He “asked the trial court to enter an order stating that he was no longer required to register under SORA because he had completed his original 25-year SORA-registration requirement, and the 2011 SORA and the current version of SORA enacted by 2020 PA 295 (the 2021 SORA) constituted impermissible ex post facto laws that lengthened his sentence.” In determining that he did not establish good cause, the trial court provided two grounds, both which the court found “legally deficient. First, [it] reasoned that defendant had not established good cause because he was ‘not currently required to comply with the registration requirement as he is not a Michigan Resident.’ By so reasoning, the [trial] court conflated whether defendant was presently required to register with Michigan authorities pursuant to SORA with whether” he was subject to SORA’s requirements. Second, it stated that his “‘conviction alone, not an order of this Court, has subjected him to sex offender registries in other jurisdictions.’ This, too, was incorrect as a matter of law.” Defendant moved to Florida at some point after his conviction. He was “subject to Florida’s registration requirements because he was convicted and remains subject to registration in Michigan as if he were a resident of Michigan. While the trial court was correct that it could not remove [him] from Florida’s registry,” he was correct that it could remove him “from the SORA-registration requirement he is currently subjected to, which was what he (at least in part) requested.” As to actual prejudice, the court found he sufficiently briefed the issue, and when the trial court issued its opinion, there was “binding authority finding the 2021 SORA unconstitutional (albeit the relevant portion of Lymon has since been vacated), and defendant had cited relevant authority bringing into question the retroactive application of the 2021 SORA.” On remand, the trial court is to address the merits of his claim “that his sentence was invalid, i.e., whether [he] established actual prejudice under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iv).”