Hearsay; Adoptive admission; MRE 801(d)(2)(B); Sufficiency of the evidence; Delivery of a controlled substance; MCL 333.7401(2)(b)(ii); Delivery of Suboxone; MCL 333.7401; People v Collins; Intent; “Deliver” & “delivery”; MCL 333.7105(1); People v Maleski; Sentencing; Principle that a trial court cannot base a sentence on a defendant’s refusal to admit guilt; People v Carlson; Resentencing before a different judge; People v Dixon-Bey

The court held that “[a]lthough the trial court erred by finding out-of-court statements were admissible as adoptive admissions under MRE 801(d)(2)(B), because the statements are not hearsay, they were properly admitted.” It also held that there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant knowingly delivered a controlled substance. Finally, it held that “although defendant is entitled to resentencing because the trial court impermissibly relied on her refusal to admit guilt when imposing her sentence,” she was not entitled to a different judge. She was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance for bringing drugs to her husband in prison in a glasses case. The trial court sentenced her to 2 years’ probation and 300 days in jail. As to her argument that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence as an adoptive admission by defendant, the court noted that although “the evidence was not admissible as adoptive admissions,” they were admissible because they were not hearsay. The court also rejected her claim that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. “Based on [the] evidence, the jury could have found that it was unlikely that defendant did not know there was something unusual about the glasses case before delivering it.” Finally, the court agreed that defendant was entitled to resentencing because the trial court judge improperly based her sentence on her failure to admit guilt. But it found she was not entitled to sentencing before a different judge. It noted that because the trial court’s actions did “not demonstrate any prejudice against defendant and nothing the record suggests that the trial court would have substantial difficulty putting out of its mind any previously expressed views or erroneous findings,” remand for resentencing before a new judge was unnecessary. Affirmed, but remanded for resentencing.