Action to void a real property conveyance; Insanity for purposes of MCL 600.5851 (tolling the statute of limitations); Insane defined; MCL 600.5851(2); Lemmerman v. Fealk; Makarow v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.; Hill v. Clark Equip. Co.; Davidson v. Baker-Vander Veen Constr. Co.; Burden of proof; Warren Consol. Sch. v. W R Grace & Co.; Undue influence; In re Erickson Estate; Public policy argument; Terrien v. Zwit; Respecting the plain language of a statute; McQueer v. Perfect Fence Co.

The court held that ample evidence existed that plaintiff was continuously insane for purposes of MCL 600.5851 from 1976 until 2017, when she filed this action, and that defendant unduly influenced her as to the 1976 real property conveyance at issue. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order voiding the property transfer. “Plaintiff suffers from mental illnesses, the most significant of which are bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder, which have affected her throughout her life.” Her grandmother conveyed the property (farmland) to her in 1974. Plaintiff suffered a mental breakdown in 1976 and was hospitalized for weeks. After she was discharged the next month, she conveyed the property to defendant, her mother. Plaintiff asserted that “defendant unduly influenced her to convey the property.” As to the tolling of the statute of limitations, defendant argued that plaintiff tried “to ‘tack’ successive disabilities in violation of MCL 600.5851(4).” But while she was correct that plaintiff’s diagnoses changed over time, two medical “experts explained that bipolar disorder and schizoaffective disorder were similar and often difficult to distinguish from each other, which would explain why some diagnoses since 1976 included only one or the other. Thus, there was evidence that plaintiff had an ongoing mental illness[.]” The court also rejected “defendant’s contentions that plaintiff was not continuously insane and thus there were periods in which” she could have filed suit. It concluded that the record evidence supported the trial court’s findings as to her insanity. Plaintiff also established a presumption of undue influence. Testimony showed that she “was entirely dependent on her parents during” the period surrounding the transfer. She “had recently been hospitalized and she was in a vulnerable state of mind.” Defendant clearly benefited from the transfer. “Plaintiff testified that she was under the effects of potent antipsychotic drugs, and she did not remember how she arrived at or left the attorney’s office” where she executed the conveyance. Both doctors testified that those “drugs were extremely powerful and capable of causing cognitive impairment.” Defendant did not offer sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.