Exclusion of evidence of the victim’s Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) levels; Relevance; People v. Bergman; Probative value; People v. Feezel; MRE 401; Operating while intoxicated (OWI) causing death (MCL 257.625(4)); Operating with license suspended, revoked, or denied (OWSL) causing death (MCL 257.904(4)); Sentencing; Review of a departure sentence for reasonableness; People v. Steanhouse; Advisory nature of the guidelines; People v. Lockridge; Relevant factors in determining if a sentence is proportionate; People v. Dixon-Bey; Whether the trial court relied on acquitted conduct in imposing sentence; People v. Beck 

Concluding that Bergman was similar, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the victim’s THC levels in this case arising from a fatal motor vehicle crash. It also upheld defendant’s upward departure sentence, finding that it was proportionate to the offender and the offense, and rejecting his claim that the trial court relied on acquitted conduct. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, first-degree fleeing and eluding an officer, OWI causing death, and OWSL causing death. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 25 to 50 years for each offense. As to the evidentiary issue, defendant suggested “that the victim’s ‘decision to drive out into traffic’ created a question of fact for the jury to determine the reasonableness of that decision.” He contended that her “THC levels were probative of her gross negligence because it ‘diminished [her] capacity to react to the world around [her].’” But the trial court found “that there was ‘no evidence that the victim was driving recklessly or in a grossly negligent manner.’ It further held that ‘[t]he toxicology results aren’t probative of any intervening or superseding cause sufficient to break the causal link between the defendant’s alleged actions and the victim’s death.’” Thus, this case was distinguishable from Feezel. Rather, it was similar to Bergman, and applying the same rationale to the facts here led to the same conclusion. The evidence showed “that defendant drove in the center turn lane of a two-lane highway at speeds upward of” 90 mph. It also showed that he hit “the victim’s driver-side door while traveling at approximately 91 [mph], killing her instantly.” However, the evidence did not show that she was driving improperly, and there was no evidence that her “vehicle would not have safely passed the northbound and center turn lanes if defendant had not been speeding down the center turn lane ‘presenting a serious and unexpected hazard.’” There was no evidence that she “contributed to the collision in a way that would establish that she was even negligent, let alone grossly negligent.” The court also agreed with the trial court that the guidelines range did not accurately reflect defendant’s criminal history and warranted a higher sentence. Affirmed.