News & Notices

From the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions February 2025

February 2025

Michigan Bar Journal

From the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions

The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions solicits comment on the following proposal by May 1, 2025. Comments may be sent in writing to Christopher M. Smith, Reporter, Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions, Michigan Hall of Justice, P.O. Box 30052, Lansing, MI 48909-7604, or electronically to MCrimJI@courts.mi.gov.

PROPOSED

The Committee proposes amending M Crim JI 13.1 (Assaulting, Resisting, or Obstructing a Police Officer or Person Performing Duties) and M Crim JI 13.2 (Assaulting or Obstructing Officer or Official Performing Duties) to place more emphasis on the requirement that the jury receive instructions on the legal framework for assessing whether the officers’ actions were lawful. See People v Carroll, ___ Mich ___; 8 NW3d 576 (July 19, 2024) (Docket No. 166092). For each instruction, the proposed amendments would move the information currently conveyed in Use Note 4 into the body of the instruction. Deletions are in ~~strikethrough~~, and new language is underlined.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 13.1

Assaulting, Resisting, or Obstructing a Police Officer or Person Performing Duties

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering¹ a [police officer/(state authorized person)]² who was performing [his/her] duties. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered1 [name complainant], who was a [police officer/(state authorized person)]. [“Obstruct” includes the use or threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.]3 [The defendant must have actually resisted by what (he/she) said or did, but physical violence is not necessary.]³

(3) Second, that the defendant knew or had reason to know that [name complainant] was a [police officer/(state authorized person)] performing [his/her] duties at the time.

(4) Third, that [name complainant] gave the defendant a lawful command, was making a lawful arrest, or was otherwise performing a lawful act.⁴ [Provide detailed legal instructions regarding the applicable law governing the officer’s or official’s legal authority to act.]4

[Use the following paragraphs as warranted by the charge and proofs.:]

(5) Fourth, that the defendant’s act in assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering¹ a [police officer/(state authorized person)] caused the death of [name complainant].

(6) Fourth, that the defendant’s act in assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering¹ a [police officer/(state authorized person)] caused [name complainant] to suffer serious impairment of a body function.⁵

(7) Fourth, that the defendant’s act in assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering¹ a [police officer/(state authorized person)] caused a bodily injury requiring medical attention or medical care to [name complainant].

Use Note

This instruction should be used when the defendant is charged with violating MCL 750.81d. A defendant could be charged under MCL 750.479 with assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer or duly authorized person. In that event, use M Crim JI 13.2.

MCL 750.81d prohibits “assault[ing], batter[ing], wound[ing], resist[ing], obstruct[ing], oppos[ing], or endanger[ing]” certain officers or officials. The court may read all of that phrase or may read whatever portions it finds appropriate according to the charge and the evidence.
~~“Person”~~ Person for purposes of this statute is defined to include police officers, deputy sheriffs, firefighters, and emergency medical service personnel, among others. MCL 750.81d(7)(b).
The court may include this sentence where necessary.
~~The court should provide detailed legal instructions regarding the applicable law governing the officer’s legal authority to act.~~ See People v Carroll, ___ Mich ___; 8 NW3d 576 (2024) (holding that trial court must provide jury with “a legal framework for assessing whether the officers’ actions were lawful”); M Crim JI 13.5.
~~MCL 750.479(8)(b)~~ MCL 750.81d(7)(c) defines ~~“serious impairment of a body function”~~ serious impairment of a body function according to MCL 257.58c in the Michigan ~~vehicle~~ Vehicle ~~code~~ Code. See M Crim JI ~~15.12~~15.2a.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 13.2

Assaulting or Obstructing Officer or Official Performing Duties

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering¹ a [state authorized person]² who was acting in the performance of [his/her] duties. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant assaulted, battered, wounded, resisted, obstructed, opposed, or endangered1 [name complainant], who was a [state authorized person] performing [his/her] duties. [“Obstruct” includes the use or threatened use of physical interference or force or a knowing failure to comply with a lawful command.]³

(3) Second, that the defendant knew or had reason to know that [name complainant] was then a [state authorized person] performing [his/her] duties at the time.

(5) Fourth, that the defendant’s actions were intended by the defendant, that is, not accidental.

[Use the following paragraphs as warranted by the charge and proofs.:]

(6) Fifth, that the defendant’s act in assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering¹ a [state authorized person] caused the death of [name complainant].

(7) Fifth, that the defendant’s act in assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering¹ a [state authorized person] caused serious impairment of a body function⁵ to [name complainant].

(8) Fifth, that the defendant’s act in assaulting, battering, wounding, resisting, obstructing, opposing, or endangering1 a [state authorized person] caused a bodily injury requiring medical attention or medical care to [name complainant].⁶

Use Note

This instruction should be used when the defendant is charged with violating MCL 750.479. A defendant could be charged under MCL 750.81d with assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer. In that event, ~~see~~ use M Crim JI 13.1.

MCL 750.479 prohibits “assault[ing], batter[ing], wound[ing], resist[ing], obstruct[ing], oppos[ing], or endanger[ing]” certain officers or officials. The court may read all of that phrase or may read whatever portions it finds appropriate according to the charge and the evidence.
The statute lists authorized persons as medical examiners, township treasurers, judges, magistrates, probation officers, parole officers, prosecutors, city attorneys, court employees, court officers, or other officers or duly authorized persons. MCL 750.479(1)(a).
~~“Obstruct”~~ Obstruct is defined in MCL 750.479(8)(a), as amended in 2002.
~~The court should provide detailed legal instructions regarding the applicable law governing the official’s legal authority to act.~~ See People v Carroll, ___ Mich ___; 8 NW3d 576 (2024) (holding that trial court must provide jury with “a legal framework for assessing whether the officers’ actions were lawful”); M Crim JI 13.5.
MCL 750.479(8)(b) defines ~~“serious impairment of a body function”~~ serious impairment of a body function according to MCL 257.58c in the Michigan ~~vehicle~~ Vehicle ~~code~~ Code. See M Crim JI ~~15.12~~15.2a.
This aggravating circumstance could be the charged offense or a lesser offense, if warranted by the evidence.

PROPOSED

The Committee proposes amending M Crim JI 20.6 (Aiders and Abettors – Complainant Mentally Incapable, Mentally Incapacitated, or Physically Helpless) and M Crim JI 20.16 (Complainant Mentally Incapable, Mentally Incapacitated, or Physically Helpless) to reflect a recent change to the statutory definition of “mentally incapacitated.” See MCL 750.520a(k), as amended by 2023 PA 65. Deletions are in ~~strikethrough~~, and new language is underlined.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 20.6

Aiders and Abettors – Complainant Mentally Incapable, Mentally Incapacitated, or Physically Helpless

(1) [Second/Third], that before or during the alleged sexual act, the defendant was assisted by another person, who either did something or gave encouragement to assist the commission of the crime.

(2) [Third/Fourth], that [name complainant] was [mentally incapable/mentally incapacitated/physically helpless] at the time of the alleged act.

[Choose one or more of ~~(3)~~(a), ~~(4)~~(b), or ~~(5)~~(c):]

~~(3)~~ (a) “Mentally incapable” means that [name complainant] was suffering from a mental disease or defect that made [him/her] incapable of appraising either the physical or moral nature of [his/her] conduct.

~~(4)~~ (b) “Mentally incapacitated” means that [name complainant] was unable to understand or control what [he/she] was doing because of [~~drugs or alcohol given to (him/her)~~ drugs/alcohol/ (identify intoxicant)/something done to (him/her) without (his/ her) consent]. [It does not matter if (name complainant) voluntarily consumed the (drugs/alcohol/[identify intoxicant]).]¹

~~(5)~~ (c) “Physically helpless” means that [name complainant] was unconscious, asleep, or physically unable to communicate that [he/she] did not want to take part in the alleged act.

~~(6)~~ (3) [Fourth/Fifth], that the defendant knew or should have known that [name complainant] was [mentally incapable/ mentally incapacitated/physically helpless] at the time of the alleged act.

Use Note

Use this instruction in conjunction with M Crim JI 20.1, Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First Degree, M Crim JI 20.2, Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree, or M Crim JI 20.18, Assault with Intent to Commit Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree (Contact).

1. This sentence does not need to be read where the consumption of an intoxicating substance is not at issue.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 20.16

Complainant Mentally Incapable, Mentally Incapacitated, or Physically Helpless

(1) [Second/Third], that [name complainant] was [mentally incapable/mentally incapacitated/physically helpless] at the time of the alleged act.

[Choose one or more of (a), (b), or (c):]

(a) “Mentally incapable” means that [name complainant] was suffering from a mental disease or defect that made [him/ her] incapable of appraising either the physical or moral nature of [his/her] conduct.

(b) “Mentally incapacitated” means that [name complainant] was unable to understand or control what [he/she] was doing because of [~~drugs or alcohol given to (him/her)~~ drugs/ alcohol/(identify intoxicant)/something done to (him/her) without (his/her) consent]. [It does not matter if (name complainant) voluntarily consumed the (drugs/alcohol/[identify intoxicant]).]¹

(c) “Physically helpless” means that [name complainant] was unconscious, asleep, or physically unable to communicate that [he/she] did not want to take part in the alleged act.

(2) [Third/Fourth], that the defendant knew or should have known that [name complainant] was [mentally incapable/mentally incapacitated/physically helpless] at the time of the alleged act.

Use Note

Use this instruction in conjunction with M Crim JI 20.12, Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Third Degree, or M Crim JI 20.13, Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Fourth Degree.

This sentence does not need to be read where the consumption of an intoxicating substance is not at issue.

PROPOSED

The Committee proposes new jury instructions for six election-related crimes found in MCL 168.931(1) and MCL 168.932(a): M Crim JI 43.1 (Offering an Incentive to Influence Voting), M Crim JI 43.1a (Bribing or Menacing an Elector), M Crim JI 43.2 (Accepting or Agreeing to Accept an Incentive Regarding Voting), M Crim JI 43.2a (Seeking an Incentive from a Candidate), M Crim JI 43.3 (Voter Coercion – Employment Threat), and M Crim JI 43.3a (Voter Coercion – Religious Threat). These instructions are entirely new.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.1

Offering an Incentive to Influence Voting

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of offering an incentive to influence voting. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant [gave/loaned/promised] [name valuable consideration]¹ to or for the benefit of any individual. It does not matter if the defendant did so [himself/herself] directly or did so indirectly through another person or method. A [gift of/loan of/promise to give] [name valuable consideration] must be specific to an individual and does not include purely political speech that promises benefits to the public in general.

(3) Second, that when the defendant [gave/loaned/promised] [name valuable consideration], [he/she] intended [to influence how any individual would vote/to reward any individual for not voting].²

Use Note

MCL 168.931(4) defines valuable consideration as including but not limited to “money, property, a gift, a prize or chance for a prize, a fee, a loan, an office, a position, an appointment, or employment.”
This is a specific intent crime.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.1a

Bribing or Menacing an Elector

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of bribing or menacing an elector. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that [name targeted elector] was an elector¹ who had a right to vote in [identify location where the targeted elector would be voting]² in the [date of election] election. To be qualified as an elector, a person must be a citizen of the United States, at least 18 years of age, a resident of the state of Michigan for at least 6 months, and a resident of [identify location where the targeted elector would be voting] for at least 30 days.³

(3) Second, that the defendant attempted to [influence how (name targeted elector) would vote/discourage or prevent (name targeted elector) from voting/interrupt (name targeted elector) in giving (his/her) vote] in the [date of election] election through the use of [bribery/menacing conduct/(describe other corrupt conduct)].

It does not matter whether the defendant [himself/herself] directly [bribed/menaced/(describe other corrupt conduct)] [name targeted elector] or did so indirectly through another person or method.

[Read the following paragraph when the allegation is that the defendant menaced or threatened the elector or engaged in other corrupt conduct involving speech:]⁴

[Menacing conduct includes verbal or nonverbal threats to cause any kind of harm whether physical or nonphysical. Where menacing conduct involves only spoken words, it must have been a true threat and not something like idle talk, a statement made in jest, or a political comment. It must have been made under circumstances where a reasonable person would think that others may take the threat seriously as expressing an intent to inflict harm or damage. The menacing conduct must have caused (name targeted elector) to reasonably believe that the person making the threat would carry out the threat or would have it carried out on (his/her) behalf.]

[Read the following paragraph when the allegation is that the defendant’s corrupt conduct against the elector consisted entirely of nonthreatening false speech:]⁴

[The defendant must have knowingly made a false statement or statements related to voting requirements or voting procedures in an attempt to deter or influence an elector’s vote.]

(4) Third, that the defendant intended to [influence how (name targeted elector) would vote/influence whether (name targeted elector) would vote/interrupt (name targeted elector) while voting or about to vote] in the [identify election] by using [bribery/threatening conduct/(identify other corrupt conduct)].⁵

Use Note

In MCL 168.10 of the Michigan Election Law Act, the phrase qualified elector means “a person who possesses the qualifications of an elector as prescribed in section 1 of article II of the state constitution of 1963 and who has resided in the city or township 30 days.” Mich Const 1963 art 2, §1, defines elector as “[e]very citizen of the United States who has attained the age of 21 years, who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the requirements of local residence provided by law.” U.S. Const amend XXVI, §1, provides, “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.”
E.g., “the City of Detroit” or “Ada Township.”
Add any other requirements of local residence provided by law per Mich Const 1963 art 2, §1, if there are any such requirements.
See People v Burkman, 513 Mich 300; ___ NW3d ___ (2024), for requirements where menacing behavior is involved or the “corrupt conduct” involved speech.
This is a specific intent crime.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.2

Accepting or Agreeing to Accept an Incentive Regarding Voting

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of accepting or agreeing to accept an incentive regarding voting. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant received or made an agreement to receive [name valuable consideration]¹ for [his/her] own benefit or for the benefit of someone else.

(3) Second, that when the defendant received or agreed to receive [name valuable consideration], the defendant did so intentionally² in exchange for

[Provide any of the following that apply according to the charges and evidence:]

(a) voting or agreeing to vote at an election.

(b) influencing or attempting to influence someone else to vote at an election.

(d) influencing or attempting to influence someone else not to vote at an election.

(e) [Identify other violation.]

(f) both distributing absent voter ballot applications to voters and receiving signed applications from voters for delivery to the appropriate clerk or assistant of the clerk.

Use Note

MCL 168.931(4) defines valuable consideration as including but not limited to “money, property, a gift, a prize or chance for a prize, a fee, a loan, an office, a position, an appointment, or employment.”
This is a specific intent crime.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.2a

Seeking an Incentive from a Candidate

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of seeking an incentive from a candidate. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant requested that [identify candidate] provide [him/her] with [identify valuable consideration]¹

(3) Second, that when the defendant requested that [identify candidate] provide the [identify valuable consideration], the defendant did so intentionally in exchange for the securing of votes or the influencing of voters with respect to the candidate’s [nomination for/election to] the office of [insert name of office described in the Michigan Election Law Act as stated in the complaint]. This does not include a regular business transaction.

Use Note

MCL 168.931(4) defines valuable consideration as including but not limited to “money, property, a gift, a prize or chance for a prize, a fee, a loan, an office, a position, an appointment, or employment.”

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.3

Voter Coercion – Employment Threat

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of voter coercion by an employer. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that [name complainant] was an employee of the defendant.

(3) Second, that the defendant discharged or threatened to discharge [name complainant] or caused [him/her] to be discharged or to be threatened with being discharged.

(4) Third, that the defendant intended to influence [name complainant]’s vote at an election when [he/she] discharged or threatened to discharge [name complainant] or caused [name complainant] to be discharged or to be threatened with being discharged.¹

Use Note

This is a specific intent crime.

[NEW] M Crim JI 43.3a

Voter Coercion – Religious Threat

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of coercing a voter by religious threat. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant was a [priest/pastor/curate/(identify the office held by the defendant within the religious society)].

(3) Second, that the defendant [(excommunicated/dismissed/expelled) (name complainant) from the (name religious society)/told (name complainant) that (he/she) would suffer religious disapproval/threatened that (name complainant) would be (excommunicated/dismissed/expelled) from the (name religious society)].

(4) Third, that the defendant intended to influence [name complainant]’s vote at an election when [he/she] [(excommunicated/dismissed/expelled) (name complainant) from the (name religious society)/told (name complainant) that (he/she) would suffer religious disapproval/threatened to (excommunicate/dismiss/expel) (name complainant) from the (name religious society)].¹

Use Note

This is a specific intent crime.

The Committee has adopted a new jury instruction, M Crim JI 17.26 (Unlawfully Posting a Message), for the offense set forth in MCL 750.411s. The new instruction is effective May 1, 2025.

[NEW] M Crim JI 17.26

Unlawfully Posting a Message

(1) [The defendant is charged with unlawfully posting a message./You may consider the lesser offense of unlawfully posting a message that (was not in violation of a court order/did not result in a credible threat/was not posted about a person less than 18 with the defendant being 5 or more years older).]¹ To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant posted a message through any medium of communication, including on the Internet, a computer, a computer program, a computer system, a computer network, or another electronic medium of communication.²

(3) Second, that the message was posted without [name complainant]’s consent.

(4) Third, that the defendant knew or had reason to know that posting the message could cause two or more separate non-continuous acts of unconsented contact with [name complainant] by another person.³

(5) Fourth, that the defendant posted the message with the intent that it would cause conduct that would make [name complainant] feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.

(6) Fifth, that the conduct arising from posting the message is the type that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress and to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.

(7) Sixth, that the conduct arising from posting the message did cause [name complainant] to suffer emotional distress and to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.

[For aggravated message posting, select any that apply from the following according to the charges and the evidence:]4

(8) Seventh, that the message

(a) was posted [in violation of a restraining order of which the defendant had actual notice/in violation of an injunction/in violation of (a court order/a condition of parole)]; [or]

(b) resulted in a credible threat being made to [name complainant], a member of [his/her] family, or someone living in [his/her] household. A credible threat is a threat to kill or physically injure a person made in a manner or context that causes the person hearing or receiving it to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of another person;⁵ [or]

(c) was posted when [name complainant] was less than 18 years of age and the defendant was 5 or more years older than [name complainant].

Use Note MCL 750.411s(7) permits prosecution of this crime where some elements of the offense may not have occurred in the state of Michigan or in the same county. The “venue” instruction, M Crim JI 3.10 (Time and Place), may have to be modified accordingly.

This alternative sentence is for use as a lesser included offense where an aggravating factor is charged and the defendant challenges whether the prosecution has proven the aggravating factor.
Definitions for these terms can be found at MCL 750.411s(8).
Unconsented contact is defined at MCL 750.411s(8)(j) and is not limited to the forms of conduct described in that definition. If the jury requests a definition of the phrase, the court may read all of the types of contact mentioned in the statute or may select those that apply according to the charge and the evidence, or the court may describe similar conduct that it finds is included under the purview of the statute.
If the basis for aggravated message posting is a prior conviction, do not read this element.
Credible threat is defined at MCL 750.411s(8)(e). By this definition, a “credible threat” appears to meet the “true threat” standard of Virginia v. Black, 538 US 343, 359 (2003).

The Committee has adopted amendments to six instructions defining arson-based offenses: M Crim JI 31.2 (Arson in the First Degree – Multiunit Building), M Crim JI 31.3 (Arson in the First Degree – Building and Physical Injury), M Crim JI 31.4 (Arson in the Second Degree), M Crim JI 31.5 (Arson in the Third Degree – Building/Structure/Real Property), M Crim JI 31.8 (Arson of Insured Property – Dwelling), and M Crim JI 31.9 (Arson of Insured Property – Building/Real Property). For each of these instructions, the first element

has been modified to refer not just to the burning of a structure, but also to the burning of “any of its contents.” These changes have been made for internal consistency and for consistency with the controlling statutory language. Because these changes are relatively minor, the Committee voted to adopt the amended instructions without first submitting them for public comment. The amended instructions are effective May 1, 2025.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 31.2

Arson in the First Degree – Multiunit Building

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of arson in the first degree. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant burned, damaged, or destroyed by fire or explosive [describe property alleged] or any of its contents. If any part of the [describe property] or any of its contents is burned, [no matter how small,] that is all that is necessary to count as a burning; the property does not have to be completely destroyed. [The (describe property) or any of its contents is not burned if it is merely blackened by smoke. The (describe property) or any of its contents is burned if it is charred so that any part of it is destroyed.]

[Burn means setting fire to or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.]

[Damage, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes, but is not limited to, charring, melting, scorching, burning, or breaking.]

(3) Second, that the property that was burned, damaged, or destroyed was a multiunit building or structure in which one or more units of the building were dwellings. It does not matter whether any of the units were occupied, unoccupied, or vacant at the time of the fire or explosion.*

[Building includes any structure regardless of class or character and any building or structure that is within the curtilage of that building or structure or that is appurtenant to or connected to that building or structure.]

[Dwelling includes, but is not limited to, any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the time of the fire or explosion and any building or structure that is within the curtilage of that dwelling or that is appurtenant to or connected to that dwelling.]

[It does not matter whether the defendant owned the property or its contents.]

(4) Third, that when the defendant burned, damaged, or destroyed the property or any of its contents, [he/she] intended to burn, damage, or destroy the property or its contents or intentionally committed an act that created a very high risk of burning the property or its contents and that, while committing the act, the defendant knew of that risk and disregarded it.

Use Note * If the alleged arson occurs at a mine, substitute “a mine” for “a multiunit building or structure in which one or more units of the building were dwellings.”

Use bracketed material when applicable. Provide a “curtilage” or “appurtenance” instruction if necessary.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 31.3

Arson in the First Degree – Building and Physical Injury

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of arson in the first degree. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Burn means setting fire to or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.]

[Damage, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes, but is not limited to, charring, melting, scorching, burning, or breaking.]

(3) Second, that the property that was burned, damaged, or destroyed was a building, structure, or other real property or any of its contents. [It does not matter whether the defendant owned or used the property.]

(5) Fourth, that as a result of the fire or explosion, an individual was physically injured.

[Physical injury means an injury that includes, but is not limited to, the loss of a limb or use of a limb; loss of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb or loss of use of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb; loss of an eye or ear or loss of use of an eye or ear; loss or substantial impairment of a bodily function; serious, visible disfigurement; a comatose state that lasts for more than three days; measurable brain or mental impairment; a skull fracture or other serious bone fracture; subdural hemorrhage or subdural hematoma; loss of an organ; heart attack; heat stroke; heat exhaustion; smoke inhalation; a burn including a chemical burn; or poisoning.]

[Individual means any person and includes, but is not limited to, a firefighter, a law enforcement officer, or other emergency responder, whether paid or volunteer, performing his or her duties in relation to a violation of this chapter or performing an investigation.]

Use Note

Use bracketed material when applicable. Provide a “curtilage” or “appurtenance” instruction if necessary.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 31.4

Arson in the Second Degree

(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime of/You may also consider the lesser charge of] arson in the second degree. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Burn means setting fire to or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.]

[Damage, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes, but is not limited to, charring, melting, scorching, burning, or breaking.]

(3) Second, that at the time of the burning, damaging, or destroying, the property that was burned, damaged, or destroyed was a dwelling or any of its contents.

[Dwelling includes, but is not limited to, any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the time of the fire or explosion and any building or structure that is on the grounds around that dwelling or that is connected to that dwelling.]

[A business that is located very close to and used in connection with a dwelling may be considered to be a dwelling.] [It does not matter whether the defendant owned or used the dwelling.]

(4) Third, that when the defendant burned, damaged, or destroyed the dwelling or any of its contents, [he/she] intended to burn, damage, or destroy the dwelling or its contents or intentionally committed an act that created a very high risk of burning, damaging, or destroying the dwelling or its contents and that, while committing the act, the defendant knew of that risk and disregarded it.

Use Note Use bracketed material when applicable. Provide a “curtilage” or “appurtenance” instruction if necessary.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 31.5

Arson in the Third Degree – Building/Structure/Real Property

(1) [The defendant is charged with the crime of/You may also consider the lesser charge of] arson in the third degree. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Burn means setting fire to or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.]

[Damage, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes, but is not limited to, charring, melting, scorching, burning, or breaking.]

(3) Second, that at the time of the burning, damaging, or destroying, the property was a building, structure, or other real property or its contents.

[Building includes any structure, regardless of class or character, and any building or structure that is on the grounds around that building or structure or that is connected to that building or structure.] [It does not matter whether the building was occupied, unoccupied, or vacant at the time of the fire or explosion.] [It does not matter whether the defendant owned or used the building.]

(4) Third, that when the defendant burned, damaged, or destroyed the building or any of its contents, [he/she] intended to burn, damage, or destroy the building or contents or intentionally committed an act that created a very high risk of burning, damaging, or destroying the building or contents and that, while committing the act, the defendant knew of that risk and disregarded it.

Use Note

Use bracketed material when applicable. Provide a definition of real property if appropriate. Provide a “curtilage” or “appurtenance” instruction if necessary.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 31.8

Arson of Insured Property – Dwelling

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of arson of insured property. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Burn means setting fire to or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.]

[Damage, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes, but is not limited to, charring, melting, scorching, burning, or breaking.]

(3) Second, that the property burned, damaged, or destroyed by fire or explosive was a dwelling or any of its contents.

[Dwelling includes, but is not limited to, any building, structure, vehicle, watercraft, or trailer adapted for human habitation that was actually lived in or reasonably could have been lived in at the time of the fire or explosion and any building or structure that is on the grounds around that dwelling or connected to that dwelling.]

[A business that is located very close to and used in connection with a dwelling may be considered to be a dwelling.] [It does not matter whether the defendant owned or used the dwelling.]

(4) Third, that at the time of the burning, damaging, or destroying, the property was insured against loss or damage by fire or explosion. [It does not matter whether this was the defendant’s property or someone else’s.]

(5) Fourth, that at the time of the burning, damaging, or destroying, the defendant knew that the property was insured against loss or damage by fire or explosion.

(6) Fifth, that when the defendant burned, damaged, or destroyed the property, [he/she] intended to set a fire or explosion, knowing that this would cause injury or damage to another person or to property, and that the defendant did it without just cause or excuse.

(7) Sixth, that when the defendant burned, damaged, or destroyed the property, [he/she] intended to defraud or cheat the insurer.

Use Note

Use bracketed material when applicable. Provide an instruction on “curtilage” or “appurtenance” if appropriate.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 31.9

Arson of Insured Property – Building/Real Property

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of arson of insured property. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

[Burn means setting fire to or doing any act that results in the starting of a fire, or aiding, counseling, inducing, persuading, or procuring another to do such an act.]

[Damage, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes, but is not limited to, charring, melting, scorching, burning, or breaking.]

(3) Second, that the property burned, damaged, or destroyed by fire or explosive was a structure, building, or other real property or its contents.

(5) Fourth, that at the time of the burning, damaging, or destroying, the defendant knew that the property was insured against loss or damage by fire or explosion.

(7) Sixth, that when the defendant burned the property, [he/she] intended to defraud or cheat the insurer.

Use Note

Use bracketed material when applicable. Provide a definition of real property if appropriate. Provide a “curtilage” or “appurtenance” instruction if necessary.

The Committee has adopted two new instructions, M Crim JI 33.3 (Assaulting or Harassing a Service Animal) and M Crim JI 33.3a (Interfering with a Service Animal Performing Its Duties), for the offenses found at MCL 750.50a. The new instructions are effective May 1, 2025.

[NEW] M Crim JI 33.3

Assaulting or Harassing a Service Animal

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of assaulting or harassing a service animal. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant intentionally assaulted, beat, harassed, injured, or attempted to assault, beat, harass, or injure a service animal.

A “service animal” means a dog or miniature horse that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of a person with a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the person’s disability.¹

(3) Second, that the defendant knew or should have known that the animal was a service animal.

(4) Third, that the defendant knew or should have known that the service animal was used by a person with a disability. The prosecutor alleges that [name complainant] is a person with a disability.

A person with a disability is an individual who has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, including, but not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working. [This includes an armed services veteran who has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, or another service-related disability.]²

(5) Fourth, that when the defendant assaulted, beat, harassed, or injured the service animal, or attempted to so, [he/she] did so maliciously.

“Maliciously” means that

[Provide any that may apply:]

(a) the defendant knew that [he/she] was assaulting, beating, harassing, or injuring the service animal, or the defendant intended to do so, or

(b) the defendant knew that [his/her] conduct would or be likely to disturb, endanger, or cause emotional distress to [name complainant], or the defendant intended to do so.

(6) You may, but you do not have to, infer that the defendant acted maliciously if you find that [name complainant] asked the defendant to avoid or to quit assaulting or harassing the service animal but the defendant continued to do so.

You should weigh all of the evidence in this case in determining whether the defendant acted maliciously, including this inference, if you choose to make it. The prosecutor still bears the burden of proving all of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

Use Note

1. Service animal is defined at MCL 750.50a(5)(f) to include both the term as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations, 28 CFR 36.104, as well as a “miniature horse that has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks as described in 28 CFR 36.104 for the benefit of a person with a disability.” 28 CFR 36.104 states:

Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition. (Emphasis added.)

2. This sentence does not need to be read where the person with a disability is not a veteran.

[NEW] M Crim JI 33.3a

Interfering with a Service Animal Performing Its Duties

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of interfering with a service animal performing its duties. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that [name complainant] was a person with a disability who used a service animal for work or tasks directly related to [his/her] disability.

(3) Second, that the service animal was performing duties for [name complainant].

(4) Third, that the defendant knew or should have known that the animal was a service animal being used by [name complainant].

(5) Fourth, that the defendant intentionally impeded or interfered with the service animal when it was performing its duties or attempted to impede or interfere with the animal when it was performing its duties.

(6) Fifth, that when the defendant impeded or interfered with the service animal’s duties, or attempted to do so, [he/she] did so maliciously.

“Maliciously” means that

[Provide any that may apply:]

(a) the defendant knew that [he/she] was impeding or interfering with duties performed by the service animal, or the defendant intended to do so, or

(b) the defendant knew that [his/her] conduct would or be likely to disturb, endanger, or cause emotional distress to [name complainant], or the defendant intended to do so.

(7) You may, but you do not have to, infer that the defendant acted maliciously if you find that [name complainant] asked the defendant to avoid or to quit impeding or interfering with the service animal as it was performing its duties but the defendant continued to do so.

Use Note

This sentence does not need to be read where the person with a disability is not a veteran.
Service animal is defined at MCL 750.50a(5)(f) to include both the term as defined in the Code of Federal Regulations, 28 CFR 36.104, as well as a “miniature horse that has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks as described in 28 CFR 36.104 for the benefit of a person with a disability.” 28 CFR 36.104 states:
Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition. (Emphasis added.)

The Committee has adopted an amendment to M Crim JI 35.1a (Malicious Use of a Telecommunications Service to Frighten, Threaten, Harass, or Annoy), for the offense found at MCL 750.540e. The amendment (1) refines the title and first paragraph of the instruction to include the possible intents required under the statute, (2) adds language addressing the “malicious” wording in the statute that had not been included when the instruction was originally adopted, (3) reformats the second element to make it more user friendly, and (4) accounts for recent legislative changes to the statute. The amended instruction is effective May 1, 2025.

[AMENDED] M Crim JI 35.1a

Malicious Use of a Telecommunications Service to Frighten, Threaten, Harass, or Annoy

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of malicious use of a telecommunications service to frighten, threaten, harass, or annoy another person. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant used [identify service provider] to communicate with [identify complainant].

(3) Second, that, when communicating with [identify complainant], the defendant

[Provide any of the following that apply according to the charges and evidence:]

(a) [threatened physical harm to any person or damage to any property in the course of a conversation or message.]

(b) [made a false and deliberate report by message that a person had (been injured/suddenly taken ill/died/been the victim of a crime or an accident) knowing it was false.]

(c) [deliberately refused or deliberately failed to disengage a connection between (his/her) (cellphone/[identify telecommunication device]) and another (cellphone/[identify telecommunication device]) or between a (cellphone/[identify telecommunication device]) and other equipment that sends messages through the use of a telecommunications service or device.]¹

(d) [used vulgar, indecent, obscene, or offensive language or proposed any lewd or lascivious act during a conversation or message.]

(e) [repeatedly initiated a telephone call and, without speaking, deliberately hung up or broke the telephone connection when or after the telephone call was answered.]

(f) [made an unsolicited commercial telephone call between the hours of 9 p.m. and 9 a.m.

An unsolicited commercial telephone call is one made by a person or recording device, on behalf of a person, corporation, or other entity, soliciting business or contributions.]

(g) [caused an interruption in ([identify complainant]/another person)’s telecommunications service or prevented ([identify complainant]/another person) from using (his/her) telecommunications service or device through the deliberate and repeated use of a telecommunications service or device.]

(4) Third, that the defendant knew [his/her] actions were wrong but acted intentionally to terrorize, frighten, intimidate, threaten, harass, molest, annoy, or disturb the peace and quiet of [identify complainant].

[Read paragraph (5) only where the defendant has been charged with violating MCL 750.540e(1)(h).]

(5) Fourth, that at the time [name complainant]

[Select any of the following that apply:]

(a) was the defendant’s spouse.

(b) was the defendant’s former spouse.

(d) was a resident or former resident of the same household as the defendant.

(e) was a person with whom the defendant had or previously had a dating relationship. A “dating relationship” means frequent, intimate association primarily characterized by the expectation of affectional involvement. It does not include a casual relationship or an ordinary fraternization between two individuals in a business or social context.

Use Note This is a specific intent crime.

1. If the jury has not been provided with the definition of a telecommunications service provider, a telecommunications service, or a telecommunications device and the court finds that it would be appropriate to do so, the following are suggested based on the wording of MCL 750.219a:

A telecommunications service provider is a person or organization providing a telecommunications service, such as a cellular, paging, or other wireless communications company, or a facility, cell site, mobile telephone switching office, or other equipment for a telecommunications service, including any fiber optic, cable television, satellite, Internet-based system, telephone, wireless, microwave, data transmission or radio distribution system, network, or facility, whether the service is provided directly by the provider or indirectly through any distribution system, network, or facility.

A telecommunications service is a system for transmitting information by any method, including electronic, electromagnetic, magnetic, optical, photo-optical, digital, or analog technologies.

A telecommunications device is any instrument, including a computer circuit, a smart card, a computer chip, a pager, a cellular telephone, a personal communications device, a modem, or other component that can be used to receive or send information by any means through a telecommunications service.

The malicious-use statute, MCL 750.540e(3), defines telecommunication device with reference to MCL 750.540c, which in turn defines telecommunications access device with reference to MCL 750.219a. The Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions is of the view that the legislature intended these two terms to be synonymous.

The Committee has adopted a new jury instruction, M Crim JI 42.1 (Misconduct in Office), for the common-law offense of misconduct in office. The new instruction is effective May 1, 2025.

[NEW] M Crim JI 42.1

Misconduct in Office

(1) The defendant is charged with the crime of misconduct in office. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

(2) First, that the defendant was [a/an/the] [identify public office held by the defendant] [on/between] [date(s) of offense].

(3) Second, that the defendant [describe wrongful conduct alleged by the prosecutor].

(4) Third, that the defendant’s conduct was [malfeasance/misfeasance]. [Malfeasance is illegal or wrongful conduct/Misfeasance is a legal act but done in an illegal or wrongful manner].

(5) Fourth, that the defendant was performing [his/her] duties as [a/an/the] [identify public office held by the defendant] or was acting under the color of [his/her] office.

(6) “Acting under the color of office” means that the defendant performed the acts in [his/her] role as a public officer or official or was able to perform the acts because being a public officer or official gave the defendant the opportunity to perform the acts.

(7) Fifth, that the defendant acted with corrupt intent.

The word “corrupt” is defined as depraved, perverse, or tainted.¹ Corrupt intent includes intentional or purposeful misbehavior related to the requirements or duties of the defendant as a public officer, contrary to the powers and privileges granted to the defendant as a public officer, or against the trust placed in the defendant to perform as expected as a public officer. Corrupt intent does not include erroneous acts made in good faith or honest mistakes committed or made in the discharge of duties. Corrupt intent does not require that the defendant receive money or property in profit for the conduct.

Use Note

These three terms are further defined in People v. Coutu (on remand), 235 Mich App 695, 706-707; 599 NW2d 556 (1999).