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Sentencing; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP); Equal protection; MCL 750.316; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Lorentzen; People v Parks; People v Adamowicz; People v Czarnecki; Miller v Alabama
The court noted it was “bound by our Supreme Court’s decision in Parks, as well as this Court’s decisions in Adamowicz and Czarnecki, to conclude that defendant’s sentence of mandatory LWOP [was] not cruel nor unusual punishment under the law and as applied to defendant because [he] was 22 years old at the time he committed these crimes.” Defendant claimed “that treating defendants aged 19 to 25 differently than 18-year-olds for sentencing purposes is arbitrary.” The court held that he “must show that there is no rational basis for treating those aged 19-25 differently under the law.” It concluded that while he “has shown that he is treated differently than 18-year-old defendants when it comes to mandatory LWOP, he has not shown that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” The court noted that as “stated in Parks, a defendant aged 18 or younger may still be sentenced to LWOP, but it is not mandatory under MCL 769.25, as it is for those over the age of 18.” Rather, a “sentencing judge must consider the Miller factors before sentencing a defendant aged 18 or younger to LWOP.” This classification is “rationally related to the state’s interest in individualized consideration of the mitigating factors of youth when a defendant is 18 and under.” The court held that defendant “has not shown that MCL 750.316 violates equal protection.” Defendant next argued “that MCL 750.316, providing for mandatory LWOP for defendants 19 years old and older, is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him.” He argued “that the Michigan Constitution also prohibits mandatory LWOP for defendants up to age 25. But the holding in Parks was specifically limited to defendants age 18 and under, (‘[O]ur opinion only applies to 18-year-olds.’).” Further, the court “has held that mandatory LWOP for 19-year-olds is constitutional,” as well as for 21-year-olds. Thus, defendant’s facial challenge found no support in case law. But the court noted that “even if the Supreme Court extended Parks to 20-year-olds, defendant would not be among that class of offenders because he was 22 years old at the time he committed the crimes. And until the Supreme Court extends Parks to those 22 years old at the time of their offenses, we are bound to conclude that mandatory LWOP is constitutional for defendants over the age of 18.” The court concluded that when “defendant’s claim of cruel or unusual punishment is analyzed as applied to him, according to the Lorentzen factors, it also fails.” In sum, it found that “the Lorentzen factors do not favor finding defendant’s sentence of mandatory LWOP as violative of the Cruel or Unusual Punishment Clause.” Affirmed.
Indemnification & unjust enrichment claims related to payment of a tax lien; Common-law indemnification; Transfer by quitclaim deed rather than warranty deed; Counterclaim for vehicle storage fees; Timeliness; Accrual; Personal representative (PR)
The court held that plaintiff-estate could not recover the amount it paid for a “tax lien from defendant under a theory of common-law indemnification” or the theory of unjust enrichment. It also concluded that defendant’s counterclaim for vehicle storage fees was untimely. Thus, it reversed the judgment for plaintiff on its claims for indemnification or unjust enrichment but affirmed the dismissal of defendant’s counterclaim. Plaintiff’s decedent “was given a quitclaim deed to real property by his mother, defendant, when the decedent was still alive. After” he passed away, plaintiff “acquired title to the property, and the decedent’s children” were named the co-PRs. They “decided to sell the property, but unbeknownst to them,” a federal tax lien was recorded against the property while defendant still owned it. “Plaintiff paid off the tax lien using proceeds from the property sale, then sued defendant for indemnification and unjust enrichment. [It] also alleged that [she] was liable for claim and delivery when she refused to turn over to plaintiff a vehicle that was owned by the decedent. Defendant counterclaimed” for storage fees for keeping it on her property. On appeal, the court noted that she did not grant the decedent a warranty deed. By passing title to him via quitclaim deed, she gave him “only her interest in the property” which was subject to the recorded tax lien. The court found that plaintiff could not recover under common-law indemnification because (1) it “was not required to pay the tax lien as a result of defendant’s wrongful conduct” and (2) it only became potentially “liable for the tax lien after plaintiff agreed to provide a warranty deed as part of a purchase agreement for the sale of the property.” Thus, to the extent it “was liable for the tax lien, it was at least partially (if not entirely) plaintiff’s fault.” As to its unjust enrichment theory, it could not show “that defendant was unjustly enriched when plaintiff paid the tax lien.” While plaintiff paying it relieved her of this obligation, she “did not request this benefit, nor did [she] mislead the parties to the purchase agreement. There is no evidence that [she] assured plaintiff that she would repay [it] for satisfying the lien, nor any evidence that [she] was involved in plaintiff’s decision to enter into the purchase agreement that obligated [it] to satisfy the lien. Defendant was simply a third party who received a benefit from the purchase agreement. On such facts, plaintiff cannot establish that defendant was unjustly enriched.”
Civil forfeiture proceedings; Immunity from prosecution pursuant to the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA); Claim seeking the fair market value of marijuana destroyed by the Michigan State Police (MSP); “Claim”; CAM Constr v Lake Edgewood Condo Ass’n; Subject-matter jurisdiction; MCL 600.605; Bowie v Arder; Court of Claims jurisdiction; Ancillary jurisdiction
The court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order the Prosecutor’s Office to reimburse claimant for the fair market value of marijuana seized during a traffic stop and destroyed by the MSP. The MSP seized $11,213 and 15 pounds of marijuana during the stop. But the charges were dropped when it was determined claimant was immune under the MMMA. He then filed this action seeking the return of the money and the fair market value of the marijuana. The trial court found it lacked the authority to order the MSP to pay claimant for the destruction of his property, but it believed he was nevertheless entitled to compensation, so it ordered the Prosecutor’s Office, which brought this action, to pay him $66,328 for the destroyed marijuana. On appeal, the court found the trial court lacked jurisdiction. “[B]ecause the MSP was a necessary party to resolve claimant’s claim for compensation for the destroyed marijuana, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the claim. This in turn deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to resolve claimant’s claim. Because it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claimant’s claim for compensation for the destroyed marijuana, the trial court should have dismissed the claim rather than holding the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office liable for it.” Reversed.
Divorce; Property division; Determining whether property is marital property; Cunningham v Cunningham; Imputing income in determining support obligations; The 2021 Michigan Child Support Formula Manual (MCSF); Attorney fees; MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a)
The court found no error in the trial court’s determination of whether certain property constituted part of the marital estate or in its division of the martial estate. It further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to defendant-ex-husband to determine his support obligations or in its award of attorney fees to plaintiff-ex-wife. Thus, the court affirmed the divorce judgment. Defendant asserted that property in Yemen should have been considered his separate property because he inherited it. The court disagreed. “The trial court, crediting plaintiff’s testimony, appropriately distinguished the inherited property (the land) from improvements made to the inherited property (the house defendant built on the land). From there, [it] appropriately limited the possible award to plaintiff to a portion of the improvements to the property.” The court found no error in “this reasoning given that the house was built during the parties’ marriage, and if defendant used money he earned during the marriage (i.e., marital funds) to build the house, it is likely marital property subject to division.” Defendant also generally challenged the property division as inequitable because it favored plaintiff. The “trial court explained why it believed such an award was equitable under the circumstances. It explained that the parties had been married for 20 years, and that plaintiff married defendant while she was ‘fairly young’; she was 35 years old at the time of trial. [It] also considered plaintiff’s contributions to the marriage—she had always been a ‘stay at home wife,’ and after the parties had children, she was tasked with caring for [them] while defendant traveled for work.” It also considered her earning ability, noting “she could learn ‘some training and skills’ to be able to provide for herself but that would take time. In contrast, [it] believed that defendant had ‘extensive knowledge’ about business and had proven himself ‘quite resourceful’ when ‘finding ways to earn income.’” In addition, it found that his “testimony about ‘his income and business’ to be especially ‘concerning.’ Given these considerations, it is hardly surprising that [it] determined that plaintiff was entitled to a larger share of the marital estate.” Further, based on the record, the “decision to impute income to defendant, and the amount of income imputed, was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes . . . .” Finally, the court was “not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court erred by finding that plaintiff did not have the ability to pay her attorney fees” and that defendant did.
Collateral estoppel; Privity; Claim for first-party benefits under the No-Fault Act; Material misrepresentations in policy procurement; Compliance with MCL 500.3020 in cancelling the policy on the basis of nonpayment; MCL 500.3020(1)(b); Rescission; Balancing of the equities; Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF); USA Underwriters (USAU)
In Docket Nos. 364945, 364946, and 364947, the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant-USAU under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on collateral estoppel was reversed. The orders granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) as to defendants-Austin and Crutch’s policies were vacated, and the cases were remanded to the trial court for a balancing of the equities. As to defendant-MAIPF’s claim the trial court erred in granting USAU summary disposition based on collateral estoppel, the court held that “USAU was not successful in raising the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” It found that “the parties were not so closely aligned in their interests that they could be said to be in privity with each other” in the prior case. MAIPF next argued that “genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to whether (1) Austin and Crutch engaged in fraud in the procurement of the policies, (2) USAU complied with applicable law in cancelling Austin’s policy on the basis of nonpayment of premiums, and (3) the trial court erred in rescinding the no-fault policies as to” plaintiff/defendant-DMA “without first conducting a balancing of the equities.” The court concluded that “because the alleged fraud of Austin and Crutch related to the procurement of their respective no-fault policies with USAU, it was appropriate for USAU to seek rescission of its no-fault policies both on the basis of the contractual provision in its policies as well as under the common law.” Also, it held that there were no factual disputes as to “whether Crutch and Austin knowingly made false misrepresentations on their policy applications, and that these misrepresentations were made with the intention that USAU would issue no-fault policies.” Finally, the evidence did “not indicate that when Austin and Crutch procured their policies, USAU was aware of the fraudulent misrepresentations, and” there was testimony “that the policies would not have issued had USAU been aware of” their fraud. Among other things, MAIPF also challenged “USAU’s notice of cancellation on the basis that USAU did not provide evidence . . . that it complied with the 10-day-written-notice requirement of MCL 500.3020(1)(b).” Given that the notice was mailed on 10/13/20, and the cancellation date was 10/23/20, the court was “of the view that the mailing to Austin did not comply with the statutory standard.” The court also held that while the trial court “did not conduct a balancing of the equities with respect to DMA before extending the rescission of the no-fault policies to him as well, . . . [it] was required to engage in this analysis.”
Effect of failing to dispute the basis for a trial court’s ruling
Concluding plaintiffs’ appellate arguments relied on their erroneous assertion that the trial court granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I), the court declined to consider their claims. The case arose from plaintiffs’ arrangement for defendants to handle the cremation of a deceased family member. They appealed “the trial court’s order dismissing the case as a sanction for spoliation.” They contended the trial court erred in dismissing the “case because (1) it did not provide them with proper notice that it may dismiss the case at the evidentiary hearing, and (2) it improperly granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I) because defendants failed to prove they were entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law or that there was no genuine issue of material fact for all the counts listed in plaintiffs’ complaint.” But the court concluded they misunderstood “the trial court’s legal basis for dismissing their case.” It did not grant defendants summary disposition “under MCR 2.116(I); it dismissed the case as a sanction for plaintiffs’ spoliation of crucial evidence—decedent’s cremains and the tracking medallion. The trial court did not grant summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(I), and plaintiffs fail to allege any errors pertaining to [its] dismissal of this case as a sanction for spoliation.” Affirmed.
Premises liability; Slip on water on a bathroom floor; Duty; Failure to warn about a wet floor; Causation
The court concluded there was “a question of fact whether there were signs warning about the wet floor in defendant’s bathroom, and” as a result, there was a question of fact whether it “breached its duty to plaintiff.” Further, a question of fact existed as to whether its failure to warn her “about the dangerous condition on defendant’s land (i.e., the breach of defendant’s duty) was a cause in fact of” her injuries. Thus, the court reversed summary disposition for defendant and remanded. The primary issue was “whether defendant breached its duty to plaintiff by failing to warn her about this danger.” Defendant presented the affidavit of its employee (J), in which J “attested that she was mopping the bathroom’s floor when plaintiff entered the bathroom, and had placed ‘three wet floor signs prior to mopping the floor,’ so the signs were present when plaintiff fell. This evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant warned invitees like plaintiff about the dangerous condition on [its] land—the wet floor. This shifted the burden to plaintiff to establish a question of fact whether defendant had breached its duty to warn invitees like [her] about the wet floor. To do so, [she] relied on her deposition testimony in which she testified that she did not recall seeing any wet-floor signs on the ground or posted on the walls of the restroom before she fell. This established a question of fact” as to whether such signs were present. The “trial court reasoned that ‘[w]hether the Plaintiff saw the signs does not go to whether they were there.’ It is not apparent how this distinction makes a difference in this context. If [she] testified that ‘there were no wet-floor signs’ when she walked into the bathroom and someone asked [her] how she knew that, plaintiff would inevitably have to say that the basis for her belief was that she did not see any such signs. So, while the trial court’s distinction may be significant in other contexts, it is a distinction without a difference in the context of whether plaintiff’s testimony that she did not see any wet-floor signs established a question of fact as to whether such signs were placed.” As to the trial court’s alternative reasoning “that [her] testimony was ‘too tentative’ and ‘too equivocal[,]’” the court noted that she “clearly testified that she did not see any signs warning about the water on the floor of the bathroom. Whether testimony is equivocal or tentative generally goes to” its weight and evidence is not to be weighed at the summary-disposition stage.
Challenge to the assessed taxable value (TV) & state equalized value (SEV) of an apartment complex; Uniformity in taxation; True cash value (TCV); MCL 211.27a(1); Detroit Lions, Inc v City of Dearborn; TV; MCL 211.27a(2); Principle that the purchase price is not the presumptive TCV; MCL 211.27(6); Tax Tribunal (TT)
The court held that the TT erred by granting respondent-city summary disposition of plaintiff’s challenges to the assessed TV and SEV of its apartment complex. Petitioner filed a petition in the TT challenging the increases in the values at which the property was assessed. The TT, after first denying both parties’ motions for summary disposition, reconsidered and granted summary disposition for respondent, finding its decision was supported primarily by the property record cards submitted by both parties. On appeal, petitioner argued that the TT erred by finding respondent’s assessor did not violate MCL 211.27(6). “Although the purchase price is not the presumptive TCV, it is also not presumptively excluded as the TCV, contrary to what the petitioner argues. At its core, this is a dispute regarding the proper valuation of the property.” The court noted the TT “cannot simply accept the municipality’s assessment as correct, which is essentially what it did in this case.” Here, there was “at least a question of fact as to whether the assessor treated the purchase price as the presumptive TCV of the subject property and manipulated variables in the assessment methodology without sufficient justification or current inspection to arrive at the same value. We are not deciding that the TCV cannot equal the purchase price; the statute clarifies that the purchase price is not presumptively the TCV.” The court was also “not concluding that the city’s assessment was improper or arbitrary. We merely determine that, in this instance, the []TT did not fulfill its duty to determine the TCV independently and effectively rubber-stamped the city’s assessment.” Reversed and remanded.
Termination; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; Exception for aggravating circumstances; MCL 712A.19a(2); MCL 722.638; In re Mason; “Child abuse”; MCL 722.622(g); Best interests of the children; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re White
The court held that the trial court erred by finding the DHHS was relieved of its obligation to provide reunification efforts as to respondent-mother, but did not err by finding the trial court was relived of this duty as to respondent-father (who was the father to one of the children). It also held that the trial court did not err in finding termination of the father’s parental rights was in his child’s best interests. The mother’s parental rights to the children were terminated on the basis of untreated mental illness, hospitalizations, and improper supervision, while the father’s rights to his child were terminated on the basis of child abuse and abandonment. On appeal, they both argued that the trial court erred by finding reasonable efforts were not required. The court determined the trial court erred by finding the DHHS was relieved of its obligations to provide reasonable efforts as to the mother because untreated mental illness, hospitalizations, and improper supervision are circumstances “not contemplated by MCL 712A.19a(2) or MCL 722.638.” As to the father, however, the trial court did not err because he abandoned the child years earlier. The court also rejected the father’s claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests, finding the trial court “properly weighed the appropriate factors when considering [the child’s] best interests, and on balance, a preponderance of the evidence weighed in favor of terminating [his] parental rights.” Affirmed as to the father, reversed and remanded as to the mother.
New pro hac vice rules now in effect
New rules governing pro hac vice admission that are designed to improve the process and increase access to justice in Michigan went into effect January 1, 2025.
SBM Members to Receive Special Rate at ABA TECHSHOW 2025
Michigan attorneys have the opportunity to attend the upcoming ABA TECHSHOW at a special reduced rate through the State Bar of Michigan.
Volunteers needed for high school mock trial competition
The Michigan Center for Civic Education is seeking volunteers to support Michigan’s 2024-2025 High School Mock Trial competition.