PIP benefits; Waived special jury instruction issue; Attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(2); Amount of fees; Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Rafferty v Markovitz; McAuley v General Motors Corp; “Reasonable amount”; MRPC 1.5(a) factors; Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n

The court rejected “plaintiff’s challenges to the trial court’s allowance of the special jury instruction and to the [trial] court’s decision to award defendant attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(2), but” it vacated the award of $47,212.50 in fees and remanded. The court disagreed that “the trial court erred when it allowed defendant’s special jury instruction at trial.” Plaintiff failed to raise below the challenge it now sought to raise on appeal and, as a result, it waived appellate review of this challenge. Further, the court found that even if it “were to look past this waiver and reach the merits of plaintiff’s argument, a review of the jury instructions demonstrates that the trial court ‘adequately and fairly conveyed the applicable law and theories of the parties to the jury.’” The court also held that plaintiff “failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that an award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(2) was warranted in this case.” Next, while it disagreed “with plaintiff that the trial court was categorically precluded from awarding an amount to defendant in excess of its actual attorney fees,” it agreed “that the trial court failed to adequately articulate the basis for the amount of fees it awarded.” It concluded plaintiff “failed to show that the trial court’s fee award was necessarily improper solely because it exceeded the amount actually paid by defendant to defense counsel.” The court did not “read the statute’s plain terms to categorically foreclose that possibility, nor do we see anything in McAuley or Rafferty to require otherwise.” But the court found that “the trial court failed to adequately articulate the basis for the ‘reasonable amount’ it awarded to defendant under MCL 500.2148(2).” As a result, it vacated “the award and remand for the trial court to fully address the Pirgu framework and factors, including how the discounted rate charged by defense counsel in this case may impact the requisite reasonableness assessment.”

Other acts evidence; Sexual assault; MCL 768.27b; People v Cameron; Hearsay; Medical treatment statements; MRE 803(4); People v Mahone; Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Posey; Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE)

The court held that the trial court did not reversibly err in its evidentiary rulings, did not deny defendant a fair trial by refusing videoconference testimony from a defense witness, and did not impose a disproportionate sentence. The case arose from a 2012 sexual assault in which JP, then 17, testified that defendant forced vaginal penetration after she repeatedly said no, and afterward followed her outside while masturbating as she fled. A SANE exam documented genital abrasions and bruising, and DNA testing later identified defendant as a possible contributor to the cervical-swab evidence. The jury convicted defendant of CSC I. On appeal, the court held that evidence involving JP, JN, and EH was admissible under MCL 768.27b because the statute permits relevant other acts of sexual assault “for any purpose,” subject to MRE 403, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the evidence was highly probative and not unfairly prejudicial. The court next held that other-acts evidence involving HC, CM, and RL was properly admitted under MRE 404(b) because it showed a distinctive pattern of sexually predatory conduct, including following women and masturbating in front of them, which bolstered JP’s credibility about defendant’s conduct immediately after the charged assault. The court also held that the SANE’s testimony recounting JP’s statements was admissible under MRE 803(4) because JP sought treatment two days after the assault and the history was necessary to diagnosis and care. It further held that defendant was not entitled to relief based on expert testimony or testimony about fear of reprisal. Finally, the court held that the trial court acted within its discretion by refusing to allow a defense witness to testify by videoconference and that defendant failed to rebut the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was proportionate. Affirmed.

Habeas corpus; 28 USC § 2254(d); The Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); Denial of a jury instruction on “defense of others”; The Michigan Self Defense Act; Whether petitioner could prevail on mixed questions of law & fact; § 2254(d)(1) versus (2); Keahey v Marquis; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Prejudice; Prosecutorial misconduct

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court erred by granting habeas relief based on a failure to give the defense-of-others jury instruction because the claim was barred under the AEDPA. The claim presented “a mixed question of law and fact that falls under § 2254(d)(1), not under § 2254(d)(2)” and there was “no viable legal theory for relief under” § (d)(1). A state jury convicted petitioner-Mercer of second-degree murder, tampering with evidence, and third-degree arson as a principal under an aiding and abetting theory. She was tried with a codefendant. At the close of proofs, she requested a defense-of-others jury instruction on one of the two killings, which the state trial court denied. After unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings in state court, Mercer filed a petition for habeas corpus. The district court granted her relief on her jury-instruction claim under § 2254(d)(2) but denied relief on her other claims. The court held that the district court erred by granting habeas relief for the failure to give the defense-of-others instruction. It concluded that the sort of reasoning used by the Michigan Court of Appeals here “–applying a legal standard to a set of historical facts—presents a ‘mixed question’ of fact and law.” And the court has “held that, in the AEDPA context, that sort of ‘mixed question[] fall[s] within § 2254(d)(1) rather than § 2254(d)(2).’” Analyzing the issue under § 2254(d)(1), the court explained that Mercer had conceded that its decision in Keahey eliminated “‘§ 2254(d)(1) as a viable legal theory’ in her case.” The court found that “concession decides the issue[.]” In Keahey, it “concluded that the Supreme Court had never clearly established a constitutional right to a self-defense instruction; so, the defendant had no basis for habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1).” It also held there “that a state court’s failure to provide self-defense jury instructions cannot create an unreasonable application of federal law.” Thus, the court reversed the grant of habeas relief based on the jury instruction claim. It affirmed the denial of habeas relief based on her claims of ineffective assistance claim and prosecutorial misconduct.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by excusing an ill juror during deliberations; FedRCrimP 23(b)(3); Whether “multiplicitous” counts were allowed to go to the jury; Sentencing; “Obstruction of justice” enhancement based on pre-investigation conduct; USSG § 3C1.1; Effect of the 2006 amendment; “Abduction” enhancement (§ 2A3.1(b)(5)); Impermissible “double counting”

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excusing an ill juror during deliberations and allowing an 11-member jury to reach a verdict. It also rejected defendant-Golobic’s multiplicitous counts argument and his sentencing challenges. When Golobic worked as an Immigration and Customs Enforcement agent, he used his authority to coerce immigrants for sex. He also “impeded investigations into his behavior by exchanging lenient supervision measures for other supervisees’ silence and by destroying evidence.” He was convicted of several federal crimes, and sentenced to 144 months. As to the excused juror, the court explained that Rule 23(b)(3) permits a district court to allow an 11-member hurry to return a verdict upon “good cause.” The juror went to the ER and “received abnormal test results that required further investigation.” He was admitted to the hospital. The jury had already deliberated for five days, and awaiting a diagnosis “would have burdened the remaining jurors with uncertain benefit.” The court also rejected Golobic’s claim that the district court allowed multiplicitous counts to go to the jury, violating his double jeopardy rights. He failed to identify any precedents to support his claim, and “each count required proof of facts that the other did not.” He next challenged his obstruction sentence enhancement for “pre-investigation conduct.” The court acknowledged that it “previously limited the obstruction of justice enhancement to conduct taken after a formal investigation had commenced.” However, in 2026, § 3C1.1 was amended “to require only that a defendant impede justice ‘with respect to the investigation.’” It also upheld the abduction enhancement. The jury’s response to a kidnapping interrogatory did not constitute an acquittal because the response “could merely reflect that a single juror disagreed that kidnapping occurred. The jury did not unanimously find, as it must for an acquittal, that the government could not prove a charged offense and thus did not make a decision about criminal liability for kidnapping.” Lastly, it held that the district court did not engage in impermissible double counting where the enhancements “punish[ed] distinct wrongs: his abuse of his governmental authority, the vulnerability of the victim, and the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim and its potential for coercion and abuse.” Affirmed.

Whether a federal court may apply state claim preclusion rules to federal Affidavits of Support made as part of a U.S. residency application; 8 USC § 1183a(e); The Full Faith & Credit Act (FFCA); Whether the district court correctly applied Michigan’s claim preclusion principles; The district court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim for support; Applicability of Rooker v Fidelity Trust Co & District of Columbia Court of Appeals v Feldman

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The district court correctly applied Michigan’s claim preclusion rules in concluding that the parties’ divorce judgment precluded plaintiff-Ramgoolam’s claim for financial support from defendant-Gupta (his ex-wife) based on the Affidavit of Support filed during Ramgoolam’s residency proceedings. Gupta, an American, married Ramgoolam, a Canadian, in 2017. Ramgoolam later applied for U.S. residency. In support of that application, Gupta signed an Affidavit of Support, in which she committed to ensure that Ramgoolam’s yearly income remained above 125% of the federal poverty line. If she failed to do so, § 1183a(e) empowered him to sue her for support. His application was approved but the parties divorced in Michigan in 2022. The divorce settlement specified neither would pay spousal support and contained a mutual release of all claims or potential claims. In 2024, Ramgoolam filed this suit, seeking to have Gupta support him because his income no longer met the mark set in the Affidavit. The district court dismissed the case based on the divorce judgment. On appeal, the court first determined that Rooker and Feldman did not bar the district court from having jurisdiction. Turning to Ramgoolam's arguments, the court held that a federal court may apply state claim preclusion rules to federal Affidavits of Support. The FFCA “requires federal courts to give a state court’s judgments the same preclusive effect they would enjoy under that State’s law.” In this case, determining “whether the Michigan divorce judgment barred Ramgoolam’s federal lawsuit thus required the district court to apply Michigan claim preclusion law.” The fact that “the Affidavit of Support is a creature of federal law” did not change things. The court rejected Ramgoolam’s federal preemption argument, holding that Gupta’s preclusion defense originated in federal law – the FFCA. Even though the Affidavit provided that the obligation survived divorce, Gupta’s claim-preclusion defense did not arise from the divorce but “from Ramgoolam’s failure to raise his enforcement claim before or during the divorce proceedings.” The court also held that the district court properly applied Michigan law. The parties only disputed the third element of Michigan’s res judicata rule, and “Ramgoolam could have brought his claim before the Michigan family court.” Affirmed.

PIP benefits; Waived special jury instruction issue; Attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(2); Amount of fees; Wood v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Rafferty v Markovitz; McAuley v General Motors Corp; “Reasonable amount”; MRPC 1.5(a) factors; Pirgu v United Servs Auto Ass’n

The court rejected “plaintiff’s challenges to the trial court’s allowance of the special jury instruction and to the [trial] court’s decision to award defendant attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(2), but” it vacated the award of $47,212.50 in fees and remanded. The court disagreed that “the trial court erred when it allowed defendant’s special jury instruction at trial.” Plaintiff failed to raise below the challenge it now sought to raise on appeal and, as a result, it waived appellate review of this challenge. Further, the court found that even if it “were to look past this waiver and reach the merits of plaintiff’s argument, a review of the jury instructions demonstrates that the trial court ‘adequately and fairly conveyed the applicable law and theories of the parties to the jury.’” The court also held that plaintiff “failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that an award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(2) was warranted in this case.” Next, while it disagreed “with plaintiff that the trial court was categorically precluded from awarding an amount to defendant in excess of its actual attorney fees,” it agreed “that the trial court failed to adequately articulate the basis for the amount of fees it awarded.” It concluded plaintiff “failed to show that the trial court’s fee award was necessarily improper solely because it exceeded the amount actually paid by defendant to defense counsel.” The court did not “read the statute’s plain terms to categorically foreclose that possibility, nor do we see anything in McAuley or Rafferty to require otherwise.” But the court found that “the trial court failed to adequately articulate the basis for the ‘reasonable amount’ it awarded to defendant under MCL 500.2148(2).” As a result, it vacated “the award and remand for the trial court to fully address the Pirgu framework and factors, including how the discounted rate charged by defense counsel in this case may impact the requisite reasonableness assessment.”

Whether a federal court may apply state claim preclusion rules to federal Affidavits of Support made as part of a U.S. residency application; 8 USC § 1183a(e); The Full Faith & Credit Act (FFCA); Whether the district court correctly applied Michigan’s claim preclusion principles; The district court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim for support; Applicability of Rooker v Fidelity Trust Co & District of Columbia Court of Appeals v Feldman

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The district court correctly applied Michigan’s claim preclusion rules in concluding that the parties’ divorce judgment precluded plaintiff-Ramgoolam’s claim for financial support from defendant-Gupta (his ex-wife) based on the Affidavit of Support filed during Ramgoolam’s residency proceedings. Gupta, an American, married Ramgoolam, a Canadian, in 2017. Ramgoolam later applied for U.S. residency. In support of that application, Gupta signed an Affidavit of Support, in which she committed to ensure that Ramgoolam’s yearly income remained above 125% of the federal poverty line. If she failed to do so, § 1183a(e) empowered him to sue her for support. His application was approved but the parties divorced in Michigan in 2022. The divorce settlement specified neither would pay spousal support and contained a mutual release of all claims or potential claims. In 2024, Ramgoolam filed this suit, seeking to have Gupta support him because his income no longer met the mark set in the Affidavit. The district court dismissed the case based on the divorce judgment. On appeal, the court first determined that Rooker and Feldman did not bar the district court from having jurisdiction. Turning to Ramgoolam's arguments, the court held that a federal court may apply state claim preclusion rules to federal Affidavits of Support. The FFCA “requires federal courts to give a state court’s judgments the same preclusive effect they would enjoy under that State’s law.” In this case, determining “whether the Michigan divorce judgment barred Ramgoolam’s federal lawsuit thus required the district court to apply Michigan claim preclusion law.” The fact that “the Affidavit of Support is a creature of federal law” did not change things. The court rejected Ramgoolam’s federal preemption argument, holding that Gupta’s preclusion defense originated in federal law – the FFCA. Even though the Affidavit provided that the obligation survived divorce, Gupta’s claim-preclusion defense did not arise from the divorce but “from Ramgoolam’s failure to raise his enforcement claim before or during the divorce proceedings.” The court also held that the district court properly applied Michigan law. The parties only disputed the third element of Michigan’s res judicata rule, and “Ramgoolam could have brought his claim before the Michigan family court.” Affirmed.

Children’s best interests; In re Atchley

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. It noted that both “children have significant developmental delays due, at least in part, to the neglect and trauma they experienced as young children. Because [they] have extensive special needs, the trial court ordered respondent to participate in the children’s medical and behavioral health appointments.” A foster care specialist (P) “testified that after years of services, respondent had not attended any of the children’s appointments to learn about their development and the care [they] required. [P] testified that even when the possibility of losing her children approached, respondent continued to demonstrate a lack of interest in [their] lives and failed to attend” the appointments. P also testified that while “there was a bond between respondent and the children,” it was not strong. P observed that their visits “appeared to be merely part of the children’s routine and were ‘very transactional’ rather than emotional.” The children “had been in the custody of someone other than respondent for approximately 80% of their lives as of the date of the best-interest hearing. During that time, [they] were with their foster families in long-term placements, and the foster families were willing to adopt them. The” referee found their “progress in their foster homes was critically important, and that further time spent attempting to reunify respondent with the children actually would be detrimental to” them. The trial court “considered respondent’s failure to adhere to the treatment plan, [her] limited parenting ability, [her] lack of interest in the children’s developmental and mental health progress, the advantages of [their] foster-care placements, and that the bond between respondent and her children was not strong.” The court noted that their “need for permanency, stability, and finality with their foster families, where they are thriving, is paramount.”