Breach of contract; Valid contract; Burden of proof; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(10); Discovery supplementation; MCR 2.302(E); Contradictory affidavit; Bakeman v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest; Sanctions; Frivolous claim; MCL 600.2591; MCR 1.109(E); Attorney fees

The court held that plaintiff-LLC failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an enforceable contract and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning plaintiff and its agent. Plaintiff alleged defendant owed it 10% of defendant’s estate settlement under a written agreement that plaintiff’s agent, nonparty-T, claimed defendant signed by hand at his kitchen table. Both parties’ handwriting experts later agreed defendant’s signature on the alleged agreement was a “cut-and-paste transference” from another document. The court held that plaintiff could not rely on T’s later affidavit suggesting a different sequence of events because it directly conflicted with plaintiff’s discovery responses and deposition testimony, and plaintiff never corrected its responses as required by MCR 2.302(E). The court reasoned that plaintiff could not “‘manufacture a question of material fact’” through an affidavit contradicting prior testimony. With the record “devoid of any valid copy” of the alleged contract plaintiff sought to enforce, or sufficient other evidence establishing its terms, summary disposition was proper. The court also upheld sanctions under MCL 600.2591 and MCR 1.109(E) because the trial court did not err by finding plaintiff and T knew they lacked “a valid signature on a contract” but continued pursuing the case after the invalidity was exposed. The complaint was not “well grounded in fact,” and plaintiff’s continued litigation needlessly increased defendant’s costs. Affirmed.

Breach of fiduciary duty claims arising from an employment relationship; Witness testimony about fiduciary duty; MRE 701; Employment contract breach; Implied covenant of good faith & fair dealing; Jury instructions; Fraudulent inducement; Civil conspiracy; Harmless error; Motion in limine to exclude damages testimony; Severe discovery sanctions; Judicial bias; Control of courtroom proceedings; MRE 611(a); Disqualification grounds; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b); The trial court’s motion practice; A trial court’s inherent authority to control its own docket

The court held that the trial court did not err in denying a motion to dismiss defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, a directed verdict was properly denied as to breach of contract and fraudulent inducement counterclaims. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion in limine that “was essentially a motion to penalize defendants by disallowing monetary damages.” Finally, it rejected claims of judicial bias and challenges to the trial court’s motion practice. Plaintiff-Titan is a financial services firm owned by the third-party defendants (referred to collectively as the Titan parties). Three of the defendants (collectively referred to as the advisors) were employed as financial advisors by Titan, with employment contracts containing noncompete and nonsolicitation provisions. After defendants resigned from Titan, the Titan parties sued them, asserting “claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and related business torts. Defendants filed a counterclaim against Titan and a third-party complaint against” its owners, asserting, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent inducement claims. On appeal, the court first determined that defendants’ allegations were sufficient for their “breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim to withstand a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). They alleged more than the existence of an employment relationship; they alleged that the Titan parties received commission payments that included amounts to which the advisors were entitled. This placed the Titan parties in a position of trust and confidence because it was up to them to ensure that the commissions were properly distributed. This was not an ordinary employment relationship in which the employer paid a set salary to employees. Instead, the employment relationship involved receiving payments that the advisors earned out of money received from” a nonparty (S), and then passed to a third-party defendant. The same analysis applied “to the trial court’s denial of the Titan parties’ motion for a directed verdict.” The court further concluded that “the trial court did not err in accepting defendants’ argument that they could claim breach of” a group production agreement with S “based on an implied-covenant breach.” Affirmed.

First-degree premeditated murder; Aiding & abetting; MCL 767.39; Conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder; MCL 750.157a(a); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Unavailable codefendant testimony; MRE 804(b)(1); Right to testify; Sufficiency of the evidence; Great weight of the evidence; Mandatory life without parole; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Fernandez

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, that sufficient evidence supported her first-degree murder and conspiracy convictions, and that she was not entitled to sentencing relief. She was convicted on the theory that she remotely disarmed the home security system so her boyfriend could enter the house and kill her husband with an ax. The court first rejected her claim that counsel should have introduced the boyfriend’s prior testimony because, although some of it was favorable, it “potentially inculpated defendant in several respects,” including by showing she turned off the alarm for him and knew he had purchased an ax. The court also held that she failed to show prejudice from counsel’s alleged failure to communicate the defense strategy because her proposed testimony would have “effectively conceded” that her boyfriend killed the victim and that she took affirmative steps to let him enter the home. The court next held that sufficient evidence supported aiding and abetting where messages showed the boyfriend threatened to harm or kill the victim, defendant disabled the alarm, delayed returning home with her children, and researched deletion of phone data shortly before the murder. It reasoned that “while any single piece of evidence might have an innocent explanation on its own,” the evidence as a whole supported reasonable inferences of guilt. The conspiracy conviction was also supported because defendant’s conduct allowed the jury to infer she worked with her boyfriend to plan the murder. The court further rejected her great-weight challenge, and held that Fernandez foreclosed her cruel-or-unusual-punishment argument as to her mandatory life without parole sentence. Affirmed.

Motion for a new trial; Sufficiency of the evidence to rebut a self-defense claim; The Self-Defense Act; MCL 780.972(1)(a); Exclusion of a defense expert witness; MRE 702; People v Kowalski (Kowalski II); Jury instructions; M Crim JI 4.1; Giving of both M Crim JI 7.15 & 7.16; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Trial strategy

The court held that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to rebut defendant-Chambers’s self-defense theory, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding a defense expert’s testimony. It also rejected his jury instruction arguments and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, it found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial. He was convicted of second-degree murder. To rebut the self-defense claim, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant knew the victim (H) “well for several years and that [H] never displayed any hostility toward” him, even when defendant’s friend (J) let H “into the house seconds before Chambers killed him. [J] testified that he did not see that [H] had any signs of aggression, and he heard no altercation during the 10 to 15 seconds that [H] and Chambers were alone in the kitchen. Other witnesses who were in the house at the time of the shooting also testified that they did not hear any yelling or sounds of a struggle before they heard gunshots.” In addition, the prosecution “presented evidence that Chambers was a competitive heavyweight boxer and knew how to physically fight an opponent. Chambers admitted that he was the only person who was allowed to have a gun inside [J’s] house, and [H] did not display a gun or threaten to shoot before he shot him. Evidence also showed that Chambers was near another door of the house and that he could have left in his running car; he could have yelled for help; or he could have walked to” a room where others were located. J “and the other witnesses in the house testified that, unlike Chambers, they did not see [H] with a gun or know him to regularly carry” one. The prosecution also presented evidence that H “had a reputation for being nonviolent.” Further, it showed that defendant shot H “in the back of the head and that [H] did not continue forward toward Chambers because blood evidence showed that Chambers fired at least two of the three shots when [H] was on the landing near the door of the house rather than in the kitchen.” As to the exclusion of his expert’s testimony (which was based on personal, anecdotal experience), the trial court did not err in ruling that it “would not assist the jury on a matter beyond the common understanding of the average juror.” Affirmed.

Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 1, 3, 8, 10, & 13; MCL 777.31(1)(a); MCL 777.33(1)(a); MCL 777.38(1)(a); People v Barrera; MCL 777.40(1)(a); “Predatory conduct” (MCL 777.40(3)(a)); People v Baskerville; MCL 777.43(1)(c); Alleged reliance on acquitted conduct; People v Beck; People v Ventour; Whether an error entitled defendant to resentencing

The court held that the trial court did not err in scoring OVs 1, 3, 8, and 10 in sentencing defendant. While it did err in scoring OV 13, he was not entitled to resentencing because correcting that score did not change his guidelines range. He was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and assault with intent to rob while armed. He was resentenced to 25 to 50 years, a within-guidelines sentence. As to the scoring of 25 points for OV 1 and 100 points for OV 3, while a “trial court may not rely on acquitted conduct when imposing a sentence, ‘Beck does not prohibit the trial court from adhering to the clear statutory instructions for assessing points under OV 1 . . . .’” The court noted that his “acquittal of first-degree felony murder has no bearing on the trial court’s finding that a co-offender discharged a firearm toward a human being.” Trial evidence indicated that a co-offender (G) shot victim-H “three times with a firearm. By its plain terms, OV 1 applies regardless of whether defendant or [G] discharged the firearm, and it does not require that the defendant actually discharge a firearm or be convicted of discharging a firearm toward a human being.” Likewise, his “acquittal of first-degree felony murder had no bearing on the trial court’s finding that a victim was killed by another offender. [H] died after suffering from the gunshot wounds. Like OV 1, OV 3 applies regardless of whether defendant or [G] killed the victim, and it did not require that defendant commit murder or be convicted of murder.” The court also upheld the 15-point scores for both OVs 8 and 10. As to OV 13, because “defendant’s conspiracy convictions were crimes against public safety, the trial court was not permitted to consider them for purposes of OV 13.” Further, none of his “history qualified as conduct that could establish ‘a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more crimes against a person.’” And his assault with intent to rob while armed “offense alone did not establish a pattern of criminal activity. Thus, the trial court erred when it assessed 25 points for OV 13.” But he was not entitled to relief because the “error did not affect the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Affirmed.

Breach of contract; Valid contract; Burden of proof; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(10); Discovery supplementation; MCR 2.302(E); Contradictory affidavit; Bakeman v Citizens Ins Co of the Midwest; Sanctions; Frivolous claim; MCL 600.2591; MCR 1.109(E); Attorney fees

The court held that plaintiff-LLC failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an enforceable contract and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sanctioning plaintiff and its agent. Plaintiff alleged defendant owed it 10% of defendant’s estate settlement under a written agreement that plaintiff’s agent, nonparty-T, claimed defendant signed by hand at his kitchen table. Both parties’ handwriting experts later agreed defendant’s signature on the alleged agreement was a “cut-and-paste transference” from another document. The court held that plaintiff could not rely on T’s later affidavit suggesting a different sequence of events because it directly conflicted with plaintiff’s discovery responses and deposition testimony, and plaintiff never corrected its responses as required by MCR 2.302(E). The court reasoned that plaintiff could not “‘manufacture a question of material fact’” through an affidavit contradicting prior testimony. With the record “devoid of any valid copy” of the alleged contract plaintiff sought to enforce, or sufficient other evidence establishing its terms, summary disposition was proper. The court also upheld sanctions under MCL 600.2591 and MCR 1.109(E) because the trial court did not err by finding plaintiff and T knew they lacked “a valid signature on a contract” but continued pursuing the case after the invalidity was exposed. The complaint was not “well grounded in fact,” and plaintiff’s continued litigation needlessly increased defendant’s costs. Affirmed.

Failure to appear for trial; Dismissal; MCR 2.504(B)(1); Inherent authority to sanction; Maldonado v Ford Motor Co; Lesser sanctions; Vicencio v Ramirez; Woods v SLB Prop Mgmt, LLC; Judicial bias; Waiver

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing plaintiff’s negligence action after he failed to appear for trial. Plaintiff proceeded in propria persona after remand from an earlier appeal, repeatedly failed to comply with discovery, refused to appear for his deposition, and did not appear at the pretrial or trial. The court first held that plaintiff waived any implied judicial-bias claim because he did not seek disqualification below and made no showing that review was necessary to prevent a “miscarriage of justice.” Turning to dismissal, the court recognized that dismissal is “‘a drastic step that should be taken cautiously,’” but held that the Vicencio and Woods considerations supported the trial court’s ruling. Plaintiff had notice that trial was scheduled, told the clerk he had filed an appeal and therefore would not appear, and refused even after the trial court offered him the option of appearing by Zoom. The court reasoned that plaintiff’s absence was “willful and deliberate,” that he had a history of discovery noncompliance and delay, and that prior orders had not secured compliance. Because a “lesser sanction would not better serve the interests of justice[,]” the trial court acted within its discretion by dismissing the case. Affirmed.

Limited license to enter adjoining property; MCL 600.2944; Construction access; Easement; Stay pending appeal; Mootness; Actual controversy; Barrow v Detroit Election Comm’n; Public-significance exception; Gleason v Kincaid

The court held that defendants’ appeal from an order granting plaintiff a limited construction-access license under MCL 600.2944 was moot. Plaintiff owned property adjoining defendants’ property and sought a limited license to enter defendants’ easement on vacated Walbridge Street during a renovation project. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the license, but defendants obtained a stay pending appeal, and plaintiff completed the project through an alternative access route without entering defendants’ portion of the vacated street. The court held that the appeal was moot because “the license was never used” and the construction was complete, leaving “no license left to use, no ongoing entry to enjoin or permit, and no relief left” for the court to grant either party. The court also declined to apply the public-significance exception. It reasoned that disputes over MCL 600.2944 construction licenses are not “inherently incapable of appellate review,” as shown by defendants’ ability to obtain a stay, and that mootness resulted from a “case-specific factual development” rather than a structural timing problem likely to evade review. The court further held that the dispute was private and fact-specific because it involved particular adjoining owners, a particular construction project, and a particular unused license. Dismissed.

Ordinary negligence; Premises liability; Contractor duty; Common-law duty to avoid unreasonable risk of harm; Breach; Comparative fault; MCL 600.2957; MCL 600.2959; Residential leases; Common areas; MCL 554.139(1)(a); Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP; Fit for the use intended by the parties; Elderly & disabled tenants; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(10); Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc

The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant-contractor breached its common-law duty to plaintiff and whether defendant-property manager breached MCL 554.139(1)(a). Plaintiff fractured her ankle when she stepped into an uncovered, unmarked trench near her apartment building’s trash-disposal area. The trial court granted summary disposition to the contractor (Westveld) and the property manager (Red Oak). The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court first held that plaintiff’s claim against Westveld sounded in ordinary negligence, not premises liability, because Westveld no longer possessed or controlled the area when plaintiff fell, and the claim was based on Westveld’s alleged failure to conform its conduct to an applicable standard of care. The court explained that ordinary-negligence claims arise from a duty to conform one’s conduct to a standard of care when “undertaking an activity.” It then found a jury could conclude Westveld created an unreasonable risk of harm by digging the 10-foot-long, four-inch-deep trench and leaving it uncovered and unmarked after departing the property, especially where Westveld’s owner acknowledged the trench could pose a tripping hazard and testified workers typically marked such conditions with cones or caution tape. The court rejected reliance on plaintiff’s own knowledge and conduct because those facts related to comparative fault and did “not establish, as a matter of law,” that Westveld acted with due care. The court next held that a factual issue existed as to Red Oak’s statutory covenant because MCL 554.139(1)(a) required Red Oak to ensure elderly and disabled tenants had reasonable access to dispose of trash. The court noted that the apartment complex “held itself out as specifically housing elderly and disabled tenants.” Given evidence the trench remained uncovered and unmarked, no warnings or visual aids were installed, and the area was allegedly underlit, a jury could find the hazard rendered the trash-disposal area unfit for the use intended by the parties. The court clarified that the “[m]ere inconvenience” language from Allison is not the controlling test, and that the starting point remains whether the common area was “fit for the use intended by the parties.” Reversed and remanded.

Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed that fact questions existed on plaintiff’s negligence claim against Westveld, but disagreed that a fact question existed under MCL 554.139(1)(a) as to Red Oak. In her view, the majority wrongly treated the covenant of fitness as equivalent to whether a condition created an “unreasonable risk of harm” and blurred the covenant of fitness with the covenant of reasonable repair.

Justice Bolden dissented, joined by Justice Zahra. She would have affirmed summary disposition for both Westveld and Red Oak. As to Westveld, she concluded plaintiff’s claim sounded in premises liability because the injury was caused by a condition of the land, and Westveld owed no duty because it lacked possession and control after completing its work nine days earlier. She also reasoned that even under ordinary-negligence principles, a contractor’s common-law duties are tied to the “execution of its undertakings,” not an indefinite period after the work is complete. As to Red Oak, she would have applied Allison’s “[m]ere inconvenience of access” rule because there were multiple ways to reach the dumpster, plaintiff knew of the trench, and she had previously avoided it.

Breach of fiduciary duty claims arising from an employment relationship; Witness testimony about fiduciary duty; MRE 701; Employment contract breach; Implied covenant of good faith & fair dealing; Jury instructions; Fraudulent inducement; Civil conspiracy; Harmless error; Motion in limine to exclude damages testimony; Severe discovery sanctions; Judicial bias; Control of courtroom proceedings; MRE 611(a); Disqualification grounds; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(b); The trial court’s motion practice; A trial court’s inherent authority to control its own docket

The court held that the trial court did not err in denying a motion to dismiss defendants/third-party plaintiffs’ counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, a directed verdict was properly denied as to breach of contract and fraudulent inducement counterclaims. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion in limine that “was essentially a motion to penalize defendants by disallowing monetary damages.” Finally, it rejected claims of judicial bias and challenges to the trial court’s motion practice. Plaintiff-Titan is a financial services firm owned by the third-party defendants (referred to collectively as the Titan parties). Three of the defendants (collectively referred to as the advisors) were employed as financial advisors by Titan, with employment contracts containing noncompete and nonsolicitation provisions. After defendants resigned from Titan, the Titan parties sued them, asserting “claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and related business torts. Defendants filed a counterclaim against Titan and a third-party complaint against” its owners, asserting, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent inducement claims. On appeal, the court first determined that defendants’ allegations were sufficient for their “breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim to withstand a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). They alleged more than the existence of an employment relationship; they alleged that the Titan parties received commission payments that included amounts to which the advisors were entitled. This placed the Titan parties in a position of trust and confidence because it was up to them to ensure that the commissions were properly distributed. This was not an ordinary employment relationship in which the employer paid a set salary to employees. Instead, the employment relationship involved receiving payments that the advisors earned out of money received from” a nonparty (S), and then passed to a third-party defendant. The same analysis applied “to the trial court’s denial of the Titan parties’ motion for a directed verdict.” The court further concluded that “the trial court did not err in accepting defendants’ argument that they could claim breach of” a group production agreement with S “based on an implied-covenant breach.” Affirmed.

Motion to terminate an ex parte personal protection order (PPO); Domestic PPOs; MCL 600.2950; Reasonable cause; Sufficiency of the trial court’s findings; MCR 2.613(A) & (C)

Holding that the trial court did not err in “finding reasonable cause to believe that respondent committed a prohibited act under MCL 600.2950(1)[,]” the court concluded he was not entitled to relief. He appealed the order denying his motion to terminate the ex parte PPO obtained by petitioner. The court noted that “the trial court was statutorily mandated to consider if [he] had previously committed a prohibited act,” and as a result, “the trial court did not err by finding that petitioner met her burden to continue the PPO because respondent ‘did commit,’ i.e., previously committed, a prohibited act. A series of incidents were alleged to have occurred between” 1/24 and 1/25 that the court determined “supported the trial court finding that reasonable cause existed to continue the ex parte PPO. There was reasonable cause to believe that respondent may commit an act listed in Subsection (1) because petitioner alleged and provided transcripts representing that respondent threatened several times to kill petitioner, [her] attorney, and their children. Given the allegations and documents attached to the petition, the trial court properly found reasonable cause to believe that respondent may commit one of the prohibited acts in MCL 600.2950(1), given that he previously did commit one of the prohibited acts.” As to his challenge to the sufficiency of the trial court’s findings, while it “could have made more explicit findings as to why continuation of the PPO was proven, a full review of the transcripts show that the trial court applied the correct standards and burdens but failed to expansively articulate its rationale on the record or in its written opinion.” The court found that, given the termination hearing testimony “and the trial court’s unique position to determine witness credibility and the weight given to evidence, [its] failure to state more complete reasoning on the record is not inconsistent with substantial justice.” Affirmed.

Ordinary negligence; Premises liability; Contractor duty; Common-law duty to avoid unreasonable risk of harm; Breach; Comparative fault; MCL 600.2957; MCL 600.2959; Residential leases; Common areas; MCL 554.139(1)(a); Allison v AEW Capital Mgt, LLP; Fit for the use intended by the parties; Elderly & disabled tenants; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(10); Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc

The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant-contractor breached its common-law duty to plaintiff and whether defendant-property manager breached MCL 554.139(1)(a). Plaintiff fractured her ankle when she stepped into an uncovered, unmarked trench near her apartment building’s trash-disposal area. The trial court granted summary disposition to the contractor (Westveld) and the property manager (Red Oak). The Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the court first held that plaintiff’s claim against Westveld sounded in ordinary negligence, not premises liability, because Westveld no longer possessed or controlled the area when plaintiff fell, and the claim was based on Westveld’s alleged failure to conform its conduct to an applicable standard of care. The court explained that ordinary-negligence claims arise from a duty to conform one’s conduct to a standard of care when “undertaking an activity.” It then found a jury could conclude Westveld created an unreasonable risk of harm by digging the 10-foot-long, four-inch-deep trench and leaving it uncovered and unmarked after departing the property, especially where Westveld’s owner acknowledged the trench could pose a tripping hazard and testified workers typically marked such conditions with cones or caution tape. The court rejected reliance on plaintiff’s own knowledge and conduct because those facts related to comparative fault and did “not establish, as a matter of law,” that Westveld acted with due care. The court next held that a factual issue existed as to Red Oak’s statutory covenant because MCL 554.139(1)(a) required Red Oak to ensure elderly and disabled tenants had reasonable access to dispose of trash. The court noted that the apartment complex “held itself out as specifically housing elderly and disabled tenants.” Given evidence the trench remained uncovered and unmarked, no warnings or visual aids were installed, and the area was allegedly underlit, a jury could find the hazard rendered the trash-disposal area unfit for the use intended by the parties. The court clarified that the “[m]ere inconvenience” language from Allison is not the controlling test, and that the starting point remains whether the common area was “fit for the use intended by the parties.” Reversed and remanded.

Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed that fact questions existed on plaintiff’s negligence claim against Westveld, but disagreed that a fact question existed under MCL 554.139(1)(a) as to Red Oak. In her view, the majority wrongly treated the covenant of fitness as equivalent to whether a condition created an “unreasonable risk of harm” and blurred the covenant of fitness with the covenant of reasonable repair.

Justice Bolden dissented, joined by Justice Zahra. She would have affirmed summary disposition for both Westveld and Red Oak. As to Westveld, she concluded plaintiff’s claim sounded in premises liability because the injury was caused by a condition of the land, and Westveld owed no duty because it lacked possession and control after completing its work nine days earlier. She also reasoned that even under ordinary-negligence principles, a contractor’s common-law duties are tied to the “execution of its undertakings,” not an indefinite period after the work is complete. As to Red Oak, she would have applied Allison’s “[m]ere inconvenience of access” rule because there were multiple ways to reach the dumpster, plaintiff knew of the trench, and she had previously avoided it.

Limited license to enter adjoining property; MCL 600.2944; Construction access; Easement; Stay pending appeal; Mootness; Actual controversy; Barrow v Detroit Election Comm’n; Public-significance exception; Gleason v Kincaid

The court held that defendants’ appeal from an order granting plaintiff a limited construction-access license under MCL 600.2944 was moot. Plaintiff owned property adjoining defendants’ property and sought a limited license to enter defendants’ easement on vacated Walbridge Street during a renovation project. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the license, but defendants obtained a stay pending appeal, and plaintiff completed the project through an alternative access route without entering defendants’ portion of the vacated street. The court held that the appeal was moot because “the license was never used” and the construction was complete, leaving “no license left to use, no ongoing entry to enjoin or permit, and no relief left” for the court to grant either party. The court also declined to apply the public-significance exception. It reasoned that disputes over MCL 600.2944 construction licenses are not “inherently incapable of appellate review,” as shown by defendants’ ability to obtain a stay, and that mootness resulted from a “case-specific factual development” rather than a structural timing problem likely to evade review. The court further held that the dispute was private and fact-specific because it involved particular adjoining owners, a particular construction project, and a particular unused license. Dismissed.

Children’s best interests; In re White

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. The record showed that she had a bond with each child. But “her inconsistent participation in services and ongoing mental-health issues prevented her from providing [them] with the care that they needed.” Two of them “had mental-health issues stemming from trauma sustained in [her] care, and the youngest child had been diagnosed with autism. The children’s needs—including their mental-health needs—were being met by their foster parents, they were bonded with their foster parents, and their foster parents were willing to adopt them.” The trial court repeatedly noted “that each child needed permanency, stability, and finality. Respondent could not meet those needs. She was rude and combative with the caseworkers, law-enforcement had to be called in response to her behavior, and [she] consistently tested positive for marijuana even though it negatively impacted her psychiatric medications.” She admitted “she was ‘triggered’ whenever she was ‘cut off’ or ‘treated unfairly.’ Her psychologist testified that respondent’s mental-health disorder meant that [she] had a ‘low tolerance for frustration,’ which would cause her to ‘lash out’ at others, including children.”

A revocable trust’s liability for claims against the decedent’s insolvent estate; MCL 700.7506(1)(b); MCL 700.7605(1); Effect of the trust being rendered irrevocable by the decedent’s death; Whether trust assets in the form of 401(k) & life insurance proceeds are exempt under MCL 700.7605(2) or (4); MCL 500.2207(2); “Executors or administrators”

The court held that while the trust at issue was rendered irrevocable upon the decedent’s (Jennifer) death, because it was revocable by her up to her death, all the property held or proceeds received by the trust were “subject to creditor claims that cannot be satisfied by her estate subject to the exceptions stated in MCL 700.7605(2) through (4).” But it also held that the trust assets at issue, 401(k) and life insurance proceeds, were exempt from creditor reach under MCL 700.7605(2) and (4), respectively. The probate court ruled that the life insurance proceeds were subject to creditor claims but that the 401(k) proceeds were exempt. The Court of Appeals, in a published opinion, affirmed as to the life insurance proceeds but reversed as to the 401(k) proceeds. On appeal, the court first considered how it “should categorize a trust and its property—including assets that are payable to the trust upon the death of the settlor—where the trust was revocable by the settlor but can no longer be revoked following the settlor’s death.” It concluded that the text of the relevant “statutes relies on the trust’s status as a ‘revocable trust’ at the time of the decedent’s death rather than at any other point in time. To hold otherwise would require [it] to read additional words into each statute, which” it cannot do. Turning to the exemption issue, the court found that because “MCL 700.7605(2)’s exemption from Subsection (1) declares that ‘all payments from’ a 401(k) plan ‘shall not be considered to be a trust described in subsection (1),’ the Legislature exempted such payments from the claims of creditors of a deceased settlor. The disbursement from Jennifer’s 401(k) plan to her revocable trust is necessarily one of those payments exempt from creditor claims.” As to the life insurance proceeds, the court disagreed “with the probate court and the Court of Appeals in concluding that a trustee is ‘akin to an executor or administrator.’ A trustee, therefore, is not excluded as a protected beneficiary under MCL 500.2207(2).” It held that this statute “places life insurance proceeds outside the reach of the insured-decedent’s creditors unless the proceeds are paid to their estate (i.e., to ‘the insured’ or their ‘executors or administrators’). This falls within MCL 700.7605(4)’s exemption for trust proceeds that would be outside the reach of creditors if ‘paid . . . other than to the settlor’s estate.’”