Prisoner misconduct disciplinary proceedings; Due process; Whether the hearing investigator performed an investigation; Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Hearing Handbook; Denial of an adjournment; Effect of petitioner being found not guilty of two subsequent alleged misconducts; Administrative law judge (ALJ); Corrections officer (CO)

The court affirmed the circuit court’s opinion and order affirming an ALJ’s finding that petitioner-prisoner “was guilty of a major misconduct violation for disobeying a” CO’s direct order. Petitioner argued “that he was denied due process because the hearing investigator did not perform an investigation.” The court found that given “the little information provided by petitioner and the straightforward nature of the underlying misconduct—disobeying a direct order by refusing to leave segregation and return to the general population—it is not surprising that the report was brief and that the hearing investigator found no further investigation necessary at that time.” As respondent argued “on appeal, the hearing investigator cannot be faulted for failing to interview witnesses that petitioner did not identify. The hearing investigator is meant to assist prisoner’s in gathering evidence and is not an advocate for either party or required to conduct an independent investigation in support of a prisoner’s defense.” Petitioner also argued “that the ALJ erred by failing to adjourn the hearing to investigate witnesses he identified at the misconduct hearing.” The court held that “the ALJ was within his discretion to decline to adjourn the hearing because petitioner did not meaningfully participate in the investigative process.” Petitioner further argued “that the circuit court erred by not considering that he was found not guilty of two subsequent, similar disobeying a direct order misconducts, which” he alleged showed “that he was in fear for his life and justified in disobeying the” CO’s order. That argument was “unpersuasive. Expansion of the record to consider the subsequent misconducts was not warranted, and the ALJ’s decision was supported by the available evidence.” As the circuit court concluded, “on the record before the ALJ at the time of the initial misconduct hearing, there was no dispute that petitioner disobeyed a direct order.” Although he claimed that his fear justified his refusal to comply, petitioner did not provide any “evidence to support his defense beyond his own testimony. When interviewed by the hearing investigator, [he] did not identify witnesses to the alleged threats and did not request any documents to support his claims.” Thus, the record showed “that the ALJ’s finding that petitioner disobeyed a direct order and that [he] was not at significant risk of harm by complying with the order was supported by the competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.”

Prisoner misconduct disciplinary proceedings; Due process; Whether the hearing investigator performed an investigation; Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Hearing Handbook; Denial of an adjournment; Effect of petitioner being found not guilty of two subsequent alleged misconducts; Administrative law judge (ALJ); Corrections officer (CO)

The court affirmed the circuit court’s opinion and order affirming an ALJ’s finding that petitioner-prisoner “was guilty of a major misconduct violation for disobeying a” CO’s direct order. Petitioner argued “that he was denied due process because the hearing investigator did not perform an investigation.” The court found that given “the little information provided by petitioner and the straightforward nature of the underlying misconduct—disobeying a direct order by refusing to leave segregation and return to the general population—it is not surprising that the report was brief and that the hearing investigator found no further investigation necessary at that time.” As respondent argued “on appeal, the hearing investigator cannot be faulted for failing to interview witnesses that petitioner did not identify. The hearing investigator is meant to assist prisoner’s in gathering evidence and is not an advocate for either party or required to conduct an independent investigation in support of a prisoner’s defense.” Petitioner also argued “that the ALJ erred by failing to adjourn the hearing to investigate witnesses he identified at the misconduct hearing.” The court held that “the ALJ was within his discretion to decline to adjourn the hearing because petitioner did not meaningfully participate in the investigative process.” Petitioner further argued “that the circuit court erred by not considering that he was found not guilty of two subsequent, similar disobeying a direct order misconducts, which” he alleged showed “that he was in fear for his life and justified in disobeying the” CO’s order. That argument was “unpersuasive. Expansion of the record to consider the subsequent misconducts was not warranted, and the ALJ’s decision was supported by the available evidence.” As the circuit court concluded, “on the record before the ALJ at the time of the initial misconduct hearing, there was no dispute that petitioner disobeyed a direct order.” Although he claimed that his fear justified his refusal to comply, petitioner did not provide any “evidence to support his defense beyond his own testimony. When interviewed by the hearing investigator, [he] did not identify witnesses to the alleged threats and did not request any documents to support his claims.” Thus, the record showed “that the ALJ’s finding that petitioner disobeyed a direct order and that [he] was not at significant risk of harm by complying with the order was supported by the competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.”

Sentencing; Dangers & disadvantages of self-representation; MCR 6.005(D); People v Anderson; Waiver of right to counsel; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

The court vacated the trial court’s JOS and remanded for resentencing. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, felony-firearm, and possession of a short-barreled shotgun or rifle. He “received a sentence of life imprisonment (with the possibility of parole)” for second-degree murder, 2 years for his felony-firearm, and 3 to 5 years for short-barreled firearm. This appeal followed a resentencing. Defendant argued, the prosecution conceded, and the court agreed, “that the trial court did not inform him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and thus did not comply with the second Anderson requirement.” The court “need not thoroughly analyze the sufficiency of a warning of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation here, however, because there was no such warning at all.” The trial court “simply granted defendant’s request without assuring itself that [he] was asserting this right knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. [He] hence ineffectively waived his right to counsel.” Because he “proceeded without counsel through the remainder of his resentencing proceedings, a critical stage of criminal proceedings, defendant’s invalid waiver requires that he be resentenced.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Opening statement; Failure to expedite defendant’s pro se motion to dismiss; Failure to assist him with an interlocutory appeal; Due process; Ruling on the motion to dismiss; Motion to suppress recording of defendant’s police interview; Right to remain silent; Distinguishing interrogation & other questions or statements by law enforcement; People v. White; Voluntariness of a defendant’s statements; People v Cipriano; Unlawful driving away an automobile (UDAA)

The court rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, found no due process violation, and held that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress the recording of his police interview. Thus, it affirmed his AWIM, first-degree home invasion, and UDAA convictions. As to his ineffective assistance claim related to opening statements, the record did not suggest that he “expressly informed defense counsel that he did not approve of the strategy of conceding some guilt at trial.” The court noted that defense “counsel explained that he attempted to mirror defendant’s own statements from the police interview in opening statement and believed that he had accurately done so. Although defendant provided an unsigned, undated, unnotarized alleged affidavit regarding his discussions with defense counsel to his motion for remand, he did not state that he informed defense counsel of his desire to maintain his unqualified innocence at trial.” Further, he “refused to respond or otherwise participate when given an opportunity to proclaim his innocence or explain that defense counsel suppressed his desire to maintain his unqualified innocence at trial.” Thus, the record did not support his “contention that defense counsel overrode his autonomy by disregarding a direction to not admit any criminal conduct at trial.” It also did not support his claim “that defense counsel was ineffective for conceding defendant’s guilt during opening statements.” The court found that he failed to show that defense counsel’s concession that defendant was guilty of AWIGBH while arguing “the prosecution had failed to prove the intent necessary for AWIM” fell below an objective standard of reasonableness given the evidence against defendant. It also rejected his ineffective assistance claims related to his pro se motion to dismiss and failure “to assist him with an interlocutory appeal.” Further, it concluded that he abandoned his due process claim related to his motion to dismiss, and even if it considered the claim, he was given “the opportunity to be heard when [the trial court] took up his motion and he did not respond.” And its denial of the motion “was proper for the reasons it stated on the record.” Finally, the trial court did not clearly err in “finding that the police scrupulously honored his right to remain silent” and he could not show that his police statements “were not voluntary.”

Search & seizure; Warrant timing; MCL 780.651(5); People v Armstrong; Warrant validity; Franks v Delaware; Blood-test foundation; MCL 257.625a(6)(c); People v Cords; Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Posey

The court held that the trial court properly denied suppression of defendant’s blood-test results and that her within-guidelines sentence was proportionate. She drove the wrong way on a highway while intoxicated, causing a multicar crash that killed one person and injured others. Her blood later tested at 0.151 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters. The trial court denied defendant’s motions to quash the warrant and suppress the blood-test results. After a jury convicted her of operating while intoxicated causing death and reckless driving causing death, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 86 to 180 months. On appeal, the court held that the record supported the finding that the warrant was signed and received before the blood draw because the timestamps placed the warrant at about 11:00 p.m. and the draw between 11:30 p.m. and 11:38 p.m., while witnesses confirmed officers showed hospital staff a warrant before the draw began. The court next found no basis to invalidate the warrant under Franks because, at the suppression stage, there was no evidence that Trooper L lied or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Further, the information that defendant drank vodka and smelled of alcohol was enough to establish probable cause. The court also found that minor timing discrepancies in the blood-draw paperwork did not undermine reliability because the testimony explained the “‘chaotic’” draw and defendant did not dispute that the sample was hers. The court finally held that defendant failed to rebut the presumption that her top-of-the-guidelines sentence was proportionate. Affirmed.

Negligence claim arising from a fall on a car trailer; Duty; Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co; Whether a special relationship existed; The No-Fault Act; Excess wage loss claim; MCL 500.3107(1)(b)

The court held that (1) defendants owed “no duty to plaintiff to protect him from falling off the car trailer” that gave rise to his injuries, and (2) the record did not support the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact that he sustained excess wage loss as a result of their negligence. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of his negligence and excess wage loss claims. Plaintiff worked as a mechanic at an auto sales business he owned. Defendant-Achkar asked him to inspect some vehicles Achkar had purchased at an auction to determine if they needed any repairs. Plaintiff was injured after he climbed onto the trailer. He argued that “Achkar’s words and actions created a risk of foreseeable harm to plaintiff, such that defendants had a duty to protect him from falling off the trailer.” He alternatively asserted “the parties had a special relationship that created such a duty.” The court disagreed, noting that the “mere fact that an event may be foreseeable . . . is insufficient to impose a duty upon a defendant.” Further, defendants were “not in an existing category of special relationships (e.g., a common carrier or plaintiff’s employer)” and the court could not “find any legal basis for recognizing a new special relationship based on defendants’ level of control over plaintiff.” It appeared that the nature of the relationship was “a casual business relationship, in which Achkar occasionally pays plaintiff to repair his cars. And plaintiff’s testimony establishes that Achkar, although a persistent customer, had no actual control over plaintiff. [He] testified that he did not want to climb on the trailer to inspect the car” but that Achkar asked him to do so repeatedly “and stayed ‘very very very persistent.’” The court found that neither “Achkar’s statements nor the parties’ relationship created a legal duty to plaintiff. . . . Achkar did not force plaintiff to climb on the trailer. Additionally, Achkar’s statements that ‘nothing will happen,’ ‘I’ll be right behind you,’ and ‘you’ll be okay’ are not legally significant.” Further, while plaintiff’s testimony indicated “he may have assumed that Achkar had some special knowledge or expertise that could prevent a fall or injury,” this assumption was not supported. “Finally, although Achkar may have made statements accepting fault for plaintiff’s fall, Achkar’s willingness to take moral blame does not confirm the existence of a legal duty.”

Negligence claim arising from a fall on a car trailer; Duty; Hill v Sears, Roebuck & Co; Whether a special relationship existed; The No-Fault Act; Excess wage loss claim; MCL 500.3107(1)(b)

The court held that (1) defendants owed “no duty to plaintiff to protect him from falling off the car trailer” that gave rise to his injuries, and (2) the record did not support the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact that he sustained excess wage loss as a result of their negligence. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of his negligence and excess wage loss claims. Plaintiff worked as a mechanic at an auto sales business he owned. Defendant-Achkar asked him to inspect some vehicles Achkar had purchased at an auction to determine if they needed any repairs. Plaintiff was injured after he climbed onto the trailer. He argued that “Achkar’s words and actions created a risk of foreseeable harm to plaintiff, such that defendants had a duty to protect him from falling off the trailer.” He alternatively asserted “the parties had a special relationship that created such a duty.” The court disagreed, noting that the “mere fact that an event may be foreseeable . . . is insufficient to impose a duty upon a defendant.” Further, defendants were “not in an existing category of special relationships (e.g., a common carrier or plaintiff’s employer)” and the court could not “find any legal basis for recognizing a new special relationship based on defendants’ level of control over plaintiff.” It appeared that the nature of the relationship was “a casual business relationship, in which Achkar occasionally pays plaintiff to repair his cars. And plaintiff’s testimony establishes that Achkar, although a persistent customer, had no actual control over plaintiff. [He] testified that he did not want to climb on the trailer to inspect the car” but that Achkar asked him to do so repeatedly “and stayed ‘very very very persistent.’” The court found that neither “Achkar’s statements nor the parties’ relationship created a legal duty to plaintiff. . . . Achkar did not force plaintiff to climb on the trailer. Additionally, Achkar’s statements that ‘nothing will happen,’ ‘I’ll be right behind you,’ and ‘you’ll be okay’ are not legally significant.” Further, while plaintiff’s testimony indicated “he may have assumed that Achkar had some special knowledge or expertise that could prevent a fall or injury,” this assumption was not supported. “Finally, although Achkar may have made statements accepting fault for plaintiff’s fall, Achkar’s willingness to take moral blame does not confirm the existence of a legal duty.”

Child protective proceeding; Pretrial removal; MCL 712A.13a(9); MCR 3.965(C)(2); In re Williams; Reasonable efforts to prevent removal; In re Benavides

The court held that the trial court did not err by removing the children from respondent-mother’s care pending completion of the preliminary hearing because the statutory pretrial-placement factors were satisfied. The DHHS sought removal after a series of incidents. These included the mother testing positive for THC after the youngest child’s birth, repeated domestic violence in the home, an episode in which she admitted using the youngest child “as a shield,” a later hammer assault by her boyfriend in the children’s presence, and a Dairy Queen incident in which she intentionally backed into another vehicle while the youngest child was on her lap. The trial court adjourned the preliminary hearing, and ordered temporary placement in foster care. On appeal, the court held that the record supported the findings that custody with the mother presented “a substantial risk of harm” and that continued residence in the home was contrary to the children’s welfare. The trial court emphasized “‘the unsafe conditions in the home,’” especially the domestic-violence history. It also described the Dairy Queen incident as “‘inherently dangerous’” and one that “‘puts into question’” the mother’s judgment and emotional stability. Given the evidence, the court found no clear error. It next held that removal was the only reasonably available means to safeguard the children because the DHHS had already provided services, including family team meetings, safety plans, domestic-violence resources, and outreach services, yet the risk continued. The court also held “that the conditions of custody away from respondent would adequately safeguard their health and welfare[,]” and that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to prevent removal. Affirmed.

Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b); Necessary medical care

The court affirmed the trial court’s subsequent “jury trial on a new petition at the adjudication stage, and the jury [finding] grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction over the children under MCL 712A.2(b).” On appeal, respondent-father contended “that no reasonable juror could have found that the circuit court had jurisdiction over his children because he placed the children with their custodians and ensured” they received proper medical care. After father “placed his children with their custodians, he refused to sign a medical power of attorney that would have furnished the custodians with the legal authority to act on the children’s behalf, including scheduling or approving medical treatment.” After he “refused to do so, the children’s custodians were not able to schedule medical appointments for the children. [He] acknowledged that the custodians had been unable to schedule medical appointments for the children for almost a month.” The court believed “that a reasonable jury could have found that a preponderance of the evidence established that respondent-father did not provide the children with necessary medical care. Petitioner further alleged other statutory grounds for jurisdiction, including abandonment and failure to provide housing and other necessary care. We emphasize that a child is not without proper custody or guardianship when ‘a parent has placed the juvenile with another person who is legally responsible for the care and maintenance of the juvenile and who is able to and does provide the juvenile with proper care and maintenance.’” The court held that the DHHS “need not prove all possible statutory grounds to support the exercise of jurisdiction.” Thus, its decision was “based solely on a reasonable jury’s ability to find that [father] failed to provide the children with necessary medical care.”

Termination under § 19b(3)(j); Termination at the initial dispositional hearing; In re AMAC; Reasonable reunification efforts; Aggravated circumstances; In re Simonetta; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii)

The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that an aggravating circumstance existed making reasonable reunification efforts unnecessary, or in terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights under § (j) at the initial dispositional hearing. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. One of respondent’s children (LS) testified that respondent’s boyfriend (D) “grabbed the back of his neck, threw him against the wall and onto the ground, put his knee on LS’s chest, slapped him, and choked him, resulting in LS needing surgery to rehabilitate a broken arm. The trial court noted that LS’s testimony was ‘extremely credible’ in this case,” and the court defers “‘to the trial court’s special opportunity to judge the’” witnesses’ credibility. D’s “infliction of serious harm on LS constituted an aggravating circumstance under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii).” As to a statutory ground for terminating respondent’s rights, the court concluded that her “choice of romantic partners placed the children in danger.” It noted that despite D’s “abuse against LS, respondent: (1) conspired with [D] to discredit LS’s disclosure and lie about how LS sustained his injuries, (2) continued a romantic relationship with [D], and (3) continued to allow [D] around the children.” Further, in 2019, the parental rights of the father of two of the children were terminated due to “his sexual and physical abuse against the children[.]” In addition, in 2024 another child was “removed from respondent’s care, and concerns had been raised about [D’s] hostility and inappropriateness in that case.” The court held that given “respondent’s history of choosing romantic partners that placed her children in danger, [her] refusal to sign or comply with a case service plan, and the fact that none of the children reported feeling safe in [her] home, the trial court did not clearly err” in finding that § (j) was established.