Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination in education; 20 USC § 1681(a); 45 CFR § 86.41(c); 34 CFR § 106.41(c); The district court’s finding that defendant could not form new Division I teams from the female students interested in & able to compete in the sports at issue; The three “safe harbors” for colleges & universities provided in the Department of Education’s interpretive guidance (1979 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418); Exclusion of an expert witness; FRE 702

The court affirmed judgment for defendant-University of Kentucky in this Title IX case, holding that the University was protected under a “safe harbor” provision in the statute’s interpretive guidance because plaintiffs failed to show that there were sufficient numbers of female students interested and able to compete in the sports in question to form teams at the Division I level. Plaintiffs sued the University under Title IX for failing to provide Division I sports teams for women in equestrian, field hockey, and lacrosse. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had failed to show that there was a sufficient number of students who wanted to and could compete in these sports at the Division I level. As an initial matter, the court considered “what to do about the rules promulgated under the statute and the interpretive guidance offered with respect to those rules.” While the University urged it to invalidate the guidance, the court determined that plaintiffs could not “satisfy the third prong of the interpretive guidance, as the district court correctly concluded,” and this sufficed to resolve the dispute in this case. This prong provides that “a university satisfies Title IX by providing athletics programs that ‘fully and effectively accommodate[]’ the athletic ‘interests and abilities’ of both sexes.” The court held that plaintiffs failed to overcome this “safe harbor” where they could not “prove that ‘sufficient numbers of individuals’ with ‘interest and ability’ exist at the University ‘to form teams to compete.’” It found that “the conditions of the existing equestrian, field hockey, and lacrosse club teams do not show that the University could ‘sustain a viable team’ for varsity competitions in these women’s sports.” As to the student surveys cited by plaintiffs, by themselves they could not “make up for the absence of evidence of individuals who want to play these varsity sports and have shown an ability to do so.” The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the district court erred by excluding their expert’s testimony where the witness “acknowledged that Title IX survey design falls outside the ambit of her expertise.”

Juvenile resentencing; People v Boykin; Youth as mitigating factor; People v Snow; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Reassignment on remand; People v Walker

The court held that defendant’s 40-to-60-year sentence must be vacated because the trial court again failed to “treat [youth] as a mitigating factor” through the Snow framework, and it ordered resentencing before a different judge under Walker. Defendant, who was 17 when convicted of felony murder, returned for a third resentencing after prior remands. The panel reiterated that a court must “consider the defendant’s youth” and “treat it as a mitigating factor,” and that youth must be applied “in light of” the Snow considerations. Although the trial court stated that youth was “clearly a mitigating circumstance,” the panel found the analysis largely “bare references” and “factual observations,” not a substantive explanation of how youth mitigated rehabilitation, protection of society, punishment, or deterrence. For example, the trial court discussed mental-health issues and LSD use, misconduct history, and the offense details, yet still concluded that “the punishment component still inures against the defendant” without showing mitigation. Because the record again fell “short of creating a record of a substantive, individualized analysis” that could be meaningfully reviewed, the panel vacated the sentence and remanded. Applying the Walker reassignment factors, it held reassignment was warranted because the same judge had presided over three resentencings and twice failed to comply with remand instructions on youth-mitigation, making it unreasonable to expect the judge to set aside prior views without substantial difficulty. Reassignment would preserve the appearance of justice, and duplication would be limited because the record was already developed through the Miller hearing and prior proceedings.

Sentencing; Procedural reasonableness; Drug amount calculation; Reliance on a codefendant’s statement included in the presentence investigation report (PSR); Clear error; “Minimum indicia of reliability” standard; Application of the 18 USC § 3553(a) factors; Substantive reasonableness

In this consolidated appeal, the court reversed defendant-Hawkins’s sentence as procedurally unreasonable, holding that it was clear error for the district court to accept the PSR’s drug amount calculation that relied on defendant-Crafton’s statement to calculate the bulk of the drugs attributable to Hawkins. Both defendants were charged with crimes for participating in a meth distribution conspiracy. Hawkins pled guilty to distribution of a substance containing a detectable amount of meth. The PSR calculated her offense level at 31 and a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. The district court lowered her offense level to 28, denied her request for a variance, and sentenced her to 98 months. She argued that her sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district court erred by relying on Crafton’s statement in the PSR to calculate the estimated quantity of meth that she allegedly distributed. To succeed in her challenge, she was required to show that the district court clearly erred in “relying on Crafton’s statement to calculate the drug amount attributable to” her. The court held that Crafton’s statement did not exhibit the required “minimum indicia of reliability” where the government’s evidence and the PSR did not corroborate the statement. “Crafton’s statement is precisely the kind of mere allegation that the district court cannot rely on.” The court noted that it has never “recognized that testimonial evidence in the form of statements merely relayed by the PSR, without any testimony whatsoever and with no other supporting evidence, may be sufficient.” Thus, it reversed Hawkins’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, instructing the district court to limit its review to quantity information in the current record. The court rejected Crafton’s procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges and affirmed his 210-month sentence, holding among other things that the district court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors.

Petition to terminate guardianship of a child; The best-interest factors in MCL 700.5101(a); Lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL)

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying respondent-mother’s petition to terminate petitioners-grandparents’ guardianship of her child (JM), the court affirmed. It previously twice remanded the case to the trial court for articulation of findings and conclusions on the best-interest factors in MCL 700.5101(a). As an initial matter here, it rejected the mother’s assertion that the trial court failed to comply with its second remand order because its “findings of fact were impermissibly based on a 2023 report prepared by JM’s” LGAL. The record did not support this. As to the best-interest factors, the trial court made detailed findings under each one, and “stated whether each factor favored mother or grandparents, even going so far as to assign a numerical value to its findings under each factor indicating the degree to which it favored each party. The trial court was certainly not required to create or use such a numerical scoring system” but the court could not fault it “for erring on the side of completeness.” The court found no clear error in the trial court’s findings on the factors the mother challenged on appeal. As to factors (i) and (ii), it noted that “the trial court acknowledged the recent progress of the relationship between mother and JM, but found” that these factors nonetheless favored the grandparents. The court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that” it made a mistake in doing so. As to factor (ix), the mother claimed “that the trial court erroneously gave ‘extreme weight’ to this factor, especially in light of JM’s special needs and difficulties with emotional regulation.” The court disagreed, noting that “the trial court found that the majority of the best-interest factors favored grandparents, with some factors either neutral or inapplicable. This is not a situation in which the trial court impermissibly prioritized JM’s preference over other factors that favored mother.” Her challenges to the findings on factors (iii)-(v), (vii)-(viii), (x), and (xii) also failed. “The trial court concluded that the best-interest factors favored the denial of mother’s petition to terminate the guardianship” and the court determined that “its factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and supported that conclusion[.]”

Independent contractor vs an employee; Economic reality test; McKissic v Bodine; Adanalic v Harco Nat’l Ins Co; MCL 500.3114(3)’s applicability

The court concluded in this consolidated appeal that the economic-reality test factors indicated that plaintiff-Knight was an employee of his grandmother’s company. Thus. it affirmed the Wayne County trial court’s denial of summary disposition and reversed the Washtenaw County trial court’s grant of summary disposition. Defendants-GEICO and State Farm argued “that the Washtenaw County trial court erred in finding that Knight was an independent contractor, granting” defendant-Auto Owners’ summary disposition motion, and dismissing it as a party. In contrast, Auto Owners, as appellant in the Wayne County case, argued “that the Wayne County trial court erred in finding that Knight was an employee, denying Auto Owners’ motion for summary disposition, and dismissing GEICO and State Farm as parties.” The court found that most “importantly, the second McKissic factor and the fourth Adanalic factor indicate that Knight is an employee: Knight was performing work that was an integral part of the business when he was injured.” Auto Owners argued that he “was not integral because he performed other job duties, such as lawn and fish care, and because [the company] did not replace him after his accident.” Auto Owners focused on the wrong circumstance here. “‘The question is not whether the particular worker is integral to the business but instead whether the type of work is integral to the business.’” The court noted that “Knight was returning from a meet where he sold [the company’s] products, which was integral to [its] business as a merchant. Although Knight performed some work that might not be integral, significant weight should be given to the evidence that he was performing integral work when the accident occurred. Therefore, this factor, in combination with the other factors, supports a finding that Knight was an employee.” Because the factors indicated that he was an employee, the court affirmed the Wayne County trial court and reversed the Washtenaw’s County trial court. The court noted that the “Washtenaw County trial court displayed apprehension to elevate what it saw as an informal family relationship to an employee relationship. But, the trial court cannot forgo an analysis under the economic-reality test when deciding whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor simply because there are familial ties between the worker and the employer.” The court found that “Knight was an employee of [the company] at the time of the accident for purposes of MCL 500.3114(3).” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) & Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA); Notice requirements; 25 USC § 1912(a); 25 CFR § 23.107(b); In re Morris; In re Jones

Because the record did not show that the notice required by the ICWA and MIFPA was provided to the relevant tribes, the court conditionally reversed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights and remanded to the trial court for compliance with the ICWA and MIFPA. “The trial court did not confirm with DHHS that it used diligence to verify that the child was a member of a tribe, did not treat the child as an Indian child, and did not determine on the record that the child does or does not meet the definition of an Indian child.” The DHHS recognized on appeal that the trial court erred as to the statutory notice requirements and asked the court “to reverse conditionally and remand to the trial court so that the issue can be addressed.” Consistent with this request as well as with Morris and Jones, the court did so. “On remand, if the trial court establishes that the notice provisions of ICWA and MIFPA do not apply or were otherwise satisfied, the order terminating respondent’s parental rights should be reinstated. Alternatively, if the notice provisions of ICWA and MIFPA do apply and were not satisfied,” the termination order “must be vacated and all proceedings must begin anew in accord with those statutes.” The court retained jurisdiction and issued an order as to the proceedings on remand.

Title IX’s prohibition on sex discrimination in education; 20 USC § 1681(a); 45 CFR § 86.41(c); 34 CFR § 106.41(c); The district court’s finding that defendant could not form new Division I teams from the female students interested in & able to compete in the sports at issue; The three “safe harbors” for colleges & universities provided in the Department of Education’s interpretive guidance (1979 Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418); Exclusion of an expert witness; FRE 702

The court affirmed judgment for defendant-University of Kentucky in this Title IX case, holding that the University was protected under a “safe harbor” provision in the statute’s interpretive guidance because plaintiffs failed to show that there were sufficient numbers of female students interested and able to compete in the sports in question to form teams at the Division I level. Plaintiffs sued the University under Title IX for failing to provide Division I sports teams for women in equestrian, field hockey, and lacrosse. After a bench trial, the district court ruled that plaintiffs had failed to show that there was a sufficient number of students who wanted to and could compete in these sports at the Division I level. As an initial matter, the court considered “what to do about the rules promulgated under the statute and the interpretive guidance offered with respect to those rules.” While the University urged it to invalidate the guidance, the court determined that plaintiffs could not “satisfy the third prong of the interpretive guidance, as the district court correctly concluded,” and this sufficed to resolve the dispute in this case. This prong provides that “a university satisfies Title IX by providing athletics programs that ‘fully and effectively accommodate[]’ the athletic ‘interests and abilities’ of both sexes.” The court held that plaintiffs failed to overcome this “safe harbor” where they could not “prove that ‘sufficient numbers of individuals’ with ‘interest and ability’ exist at the University ‘to form teams to compete.’” It found that “the conditions of the existing equestrian, field hockey, and lacrosse club teams do not show that the University could ‘sustain a viable team’ for varsity competitions in these women’s sports.” As to the student surveys cited by plaintiffs, by themselves they could not “make up for the absence of evidence of individuals who want to play these varsity sports and have shown an ability to do so.” The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the district court erred by excluding their expert’s testimony where the witness “acknowledged that Title IX survey design falls outside the ambit of her expertise.”

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) & Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA); Notice requirements; 25 USC § 1912(a); 25 CFR § 23.107(b); In re Morris; In re Jones

Because the record did not show that the notice required by the ICWA and MIFPA was provided to the relevant tribes, the court conditionally reversed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights and remanded to the trial court for compliance with the ICWA and MIFPA. “The trial court did not confirm with DHHS that it used diligence to verify that the child was a member of a tribe, did not treat the child as an Indian child, and did not determine on the record that the child does or does not meet the definition of an Indian child.” The DHHS recognized on appeal that the trial court erred as to the statutory notice requirements and asked the court “to reverse conditionally and remand to the trial court so that the issue can be addressed.” Consistent with this request as well as with Morris and Jones, the court did so. “On remand, if the trial court establishes that the notice provisions of ICWA and MIFPA do not apply or were otherwise satisfied, the order terminating respondent’s parental rights should be reinstated. Alternatively, if the notice provisions of ICWA and MIFPA do apply and were not satisfied,” the termination order “must be vacated and all proceedings must begin anew in accord with those statutes.” The court retained jurisdiction and issued an order as to the proceedings on remand.