Sufficiency of the evidence for an assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer conviction; MCL 750.81d(1); Great weight of the evidence; Admission of the arrest warrants for defendant’s son & daughter; Description of the warrants as “felony warrants”; Testimony that defendant was an “American National”; Admissions of a party opponent under MRE 801(d)(2)(A); Relevance; Ineffective assistance of counsel

The court held that “the actions of defendant and her husband ‘basically being human blockades’ constituted violations of MCL 750.81d(1) and” supported her convictions of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer. Further, (1) the arrest warrants for her son and daughter were properly admitted at her trial, (2) there was no error in allowing the prosecution to refer to them as felony warrants, and (3) the trial court properly deemed statements she and her husband made in police body-cam footage about “being ‘American National’ or American Nationals” relevant. Finally, the court rejected her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The case arose after defendant physically blocked “officers to keep them away from her children, so they both were able to escape arrest.” She asserted “that, at her advanced age, she could not block the officers, but all the evidence in the record” showed that she stood in their way to help her two children escape arrest. A deputy “commented that he ‘had to physically move [defendant] backwards’ to get past her as she blocked the officers, and when he saw defendant’s daughter ‘at one point inside the house,’ the officers ‘were blocked again by defendant and’” another individual (T), which enabled “defendant’s daughter ‘to exit out the back door with [T].’” The court concluded that “defendant’s efforts to block the officers from performing their duties enabled [her] daughter to evade arrest on a valid warrant. The jury apparently believed the officers’ testimony that defendant did not comply with their commands or allow them to perform their jobs. At no point in the trial court or on appeal has [she] asserted that the police officers were not lawfully engaged in the exercise of their official duties or that she did not know or have reason to know that they were” officers. The court further concluded that “the arrest warrants provided significant evidence that the officers acted lawfully when they entered the house to execute the arrest warrants for defendant’s son and daughter.” As to the American Nationals statements, the prosecution had to prove that she “purposefully or voluntarily performed the wrongful act.” The court found this “evidence was relevant because it made it more likely that defendant intentionally stood in the hallway to obstruct the officers’ attempts to arrest [her] son and daughter because she believed the law did not apply to her.” Affirmed.

Sentencing; Retroactive application of the 2021 Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Ex post facto laws; People v Betts; People v Lymon (Lymon I & II); People v Kiczenski

Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by holding that defendant-Cole was not entitled to removal from SORA, the court affirmed. He pled guilty to CSC I and kidnapping in 1995. He argued “that applying the 2021 SORA retroactively to him for his conduct in 1995 violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Specifically, he asserted that the court’s holding in Lymon “required the trial court to remove the SORA registration requirement in his sentence.” The court concluded in Kiczenski that, ‘“[l]imiting the class of offender to those with CSC-I convictions,’ the defendant failed to demonstrate by ‘the clearest proof that the 2021 SORA is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.’ This Court ultimately held that ‘the 2021 SORA does not constitute punishment as applied to CSC-I offenders’ and that ‘there is no ex post facto violation’ in the retroactive application of the 2021 SORA to the defendant, a sexual offender.” In this case, “Cole filed his brief on appeal before the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Lymon II and this Court’s decision in Kiczenski were released.” In Lymon II, “the Supreme Court vacated this Court’s opinion in Lymon I ‘insofar as its conclusions went beyond the consideration of non-sexual offenders’ and held that only ‘offenders whose crimes lacked a sexual component are entitled to removal from the sex-offender registry.’” In Kiczenski, the court “held that ‘the 2021 SORA does not constitute punishment as applied to CSC-I offenders’ and that ‘there is no ex post facto violation’ in the retroactive application of the 2021 SORA as to sexual offenders. Cole, who was convicted of CSC-I, is a sexual offender.” Thus, he was “not entitled to removal from the sex-offender registry.” The court noted that the trial court’s opinion and order here was issued before the court “issued its decision in Kiczenski. But we ‘will affirm a lower court’s ruling when the court reaches the right result, albeit for the wrong reason.’”

Divorce; Custody; The Child Custody Act; Existence of an established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Child’s best interests; The MCL 722.23 factors; Factors (k), (c), & (h); Parenting-time factor (e) (MCL 722.27a(7)(e)); Review of a trial court’s order in a custody dispute; MCL 722.28; Child support; The Michigan Child Support Formula

The court held that the trial court did not err in finding the parties’ child (KD) had an ECE “with both parents and that it was in KD’s best interests for” them to share joint legal and physical custody with equal parenting time. It also rejected plaintiff-mother’s claim that the trial court erred in not awarding her back child support or ordering defendant-father to reimburse her for payments she made for his travel expenses that enabled him to exercise parenting time with KD. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s orders as to custody, parenting time, and child support. It first disagreed “with plaintiff’s claim that the trial court’s findings on” the child’s ECE were against the great weight of the evidence. She emphasized that the child “spent 21 months living in Houston” while the case was pending. But while she “had more time with KD in Texas because defendant lived in Michigan, defendant flew to Texas to visit KD every other weekend as allowed by the trial court’s parenting-time order, and he also had video calls with KD twice a week.” The court concluded “ample evidence showed that KD looked to both plaintiff and defendant for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. . . . Although KD saw defendant less often, she spent time with him regularly, looked at him as her father, and enjoyed her time with him. Evidence also showed that [he] was committed to forging a permanent relationship with KD through his dedicated efforts to visit KD despite having to travel by plane to do so.” The court also disagreed with plaintiff’s assertion that “the trial court’s best-interest and parenting-time findings were against the great weight of the evidence.” As to best-interest factor (k), “the trial court had the discretion to accept defendant’s explanation of the incidents cited by plaintiff[.]” In addition, “the evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had the capacity and disposition to provide medical care to KD under MCL 722.23(c).” And while plaintiff contended it “should have given greater consideration to best-interest factor (h)” and parenting-time factor (e), “the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court’s fact findings, and expert testimony established that children can adapt well to scheduled travel to spend time with both parents.” Thus, the court found that plaintiff was “not entitled to relief on this issue.”

Domicile; MCL 722.27; Affidavit of parentage (AOP); Established custodial environment (ECE)

On remand “following our Supreme Court’s order vacating Part IV(A) of our opinion and remanding to consider the issue of domicile[,]” the court found that Part IV(A) “erroneously instructed the trial court to apply MCL 722.31 to determine the child’s domicile.” The court noted that when the child was born, the parties executed an AOP that gave initial custody to defendant-mother. “But this AOP did not constitute an initial custody order.” The court noted that “MCL 722.31 applies only to children whose custody is governed by court order. Thus, the trial court should instead apply MCL 722.27 in determining domicile because this custody dispute was submitted as an original action.” The trial court found, and the court affirmed, that the child had an ECE with both parents. Thus, “the trial court must first consider whether issuing an order designating the child’s domicile as Michigan or Florida would change the ECE of the child.” If not, “the trial court may issue a new order.” If the decision does change the ECE, “the trial court must determine whether there is ‘clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child’ to support its decision.” The court noted that the “best interest of the child is determined by evaluating each of the factors set forth in MCL 722.23.” Vacated and remanded.

Governmental immunity; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(8)(a); The motor vehicle exception; MCL 691.1405; Serious impairment of body function; Sudden emergency doctrine; Proximate cause; Comparative negligence; MCL 500.3135(2)(b); Swartz Creek Community Schools (SCCS); Independent medical exam (IME)

The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying summary disposition to defendant-Richards under MCR 2.116(C)(7), but affirmed its denial of summary disposition to defendant-SCCS under (C)(7) and (10), and remanded for further proceedings solely against SCCS. Richards was driving a truck owned by SCCS when it collided with plaintiff’s vehicle. As to gross negligence, the court found that the “evidence viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, shows there was little, if any, snow on that section of Miller Road. Reasonable minds could not find that the condition of Miller Road at the time of the collision was so treacherous that Richards’s driving just under the speed limit amounted to ‘conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.’” Thus, the court held that Richards should have been granted summary disposition under MCL 2.116(C)(7). As to the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, defendants insisted “that plaintiff failed to establish that, as a result of the accident, he suffered a” serious impairment of body function. The court held that the IME “merely reflects conflicts among the medical records plaintiff offered, and such conflict renders the award of summary disposition inappropriate.” The medical records showed “consistent complaints of left-shoulder pain with the first documented complaint made within three days of the collision, and aside from” the opinion of the doctor who performed an IME, “nothing in the records suggests that plaintiff had a pre-existing left-shoulder injury or suffered such an injury after the collision. Therefore, at the very least, those records establish a genuine issue of fact whether [his] left-shoulder injury was caused by the collision.” The court further held that there was “a genuine issue of material fact whether there was a sudden emergency—i.e., whether the movement of the black truck, or lack thereof, constituted a sudden emergency—and whether Richards’s reaction to ‘jam[] on the breaks,’ which caused him to lose control of his vehicle, was that of a reasonably prudent person. Resolution of those issues likely hinges on minor details” and the record did “not sufficiently establish those details in a manner that would enable the trial court to decide” the question as a matter of law. And there was “a genuine issue of material fact whether Richards was negligent in driving just under the speed limit given the road conditions, and whether that purported negligence brought about the sudden emergency.” In addition, his negligence could “be a proximate cause of the crash if it was a substantial factor in bringing” it about. The trial court correctly denied summary disposition on this issue. It also “did not err when it left the determination of comparative negligence to the trier of fact.”

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Frey; Children’s best interests; In re Simpson; Effect of relative placement

The court held that (1) the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, (2) terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was warranted under § (c)(i), and (3) terminating her rights was in the children’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s termination order. As to reunification efforts, the court noted that the “DHHS cannot accommodate a disability of which it is unaware[.]” Respondent failed to “specify her diagnosis, if any, and she failed to comply with the DHHS requirement to obtain a psychological evaluation.” While the record showed that she struggled “with substance abuse, she does not assert that she has opioid-use disorder or provide proof that she was diagnosed with opioid-use disorder or other mental health issues. Respondent does not argue that the services that were provided were somehow deficient or unreasonable. She objected to some and participated in others.” Rather, she simply asserted “that she needed ‘extra help’ to complete them. Respondent initially wanted and participated in outpatient substance-abuse treatment. However, inpatient substance-abuse treatment was recommended throughout the proceedings given the severity of her substance-abuse problem, and it would have helped [her] to make the most progress toward reunification. [She] did not make the commensurate reasonable effort to participate in” such therapy. She also failed to “consistently complete the 184 drug screens offered throughout this case, and of the 14” she did complete, “she often tested positive for a combination of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl.” As to a statutory ground for termination, one “of the conditions that led to adjudication was respondent’s drug use.” The last drug screen she completed, in 3/23, “was positive for fentanyl and cocaine. Thus, [her] substance-abuse issues that led to adjudication in 2019 continued to exist in 2023” and the court concluded there “was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would rectify her substance-abuse problems within a reasonable amount of time.” Finally, it was in her “children’s best interests to have a sober parent who can provide unsupervised care. By failing to show that she could remain sober at any point during the four years that this matter was pending, respondent has not proven that she could be that parent, and there was no likelihood that [they] could be returned to a safe, drug-free, stable home with [her] within the foreseeable future.”