Partnership formation; MCL 449.6; MCL 449.7; Byker v Mannes; Unjust enrichment; Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc; Equitable property award

The court held that the trial court did not err by finding no partnership between the parties, rejecting plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claims, and limiting the equitable campground award to the property defendant promised at trial. The parties were formerly in a long-term relationship, owned properties, and operated small businesses. Plaintiff later deeded all properties to defendant during a period of serious medical issues. After the relationship ended, defendant returned several parcels and paid off associated mortgages. Plaintiff sued, alleging a business partnership and unjust enrichment. The trial court rejected those claims after a bench trial. On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings were paramount, noting “there was no testimony presented about profit-sharing” and no partnership records. It further found no inequitable retention of benefits because defendant “paid all [plaintiff’s] bills and provided his housing free of charge for the past 12 years.” The court also found no error regarding personal property plaintiff failed to retrieve and no basis for a life estate in a property where plaintiff had been living. Finally, the court upheld the award of two campground parcels because it reflected defendant’s “promise during trial,” which the court could enforce in equity. Affirmed.

Common-law & statutory conversion; Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc (Aroma Wines I & II); Whether the tort claims were barred because any action necessarily lie in contract; Hart v Ludwig; Treble damages, costs, & attorney fees under MCL 600.2919a; Whether such damages are discretionary or mandatory; Comparing the damages provision in the Right to Farm Act (MCL 286.473b); Breach of a bailment contract

The court held that plaintiff’s (HMC) tort claims were not barred under Hart, and that the trial court did not err in determining by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant (RMI) was liable for conversion. Because it was “compelled to follow Aroma Wines I,” the court also held “that the award of damages under MCL 600.2919a falls under the” trial court’s discretion. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding HMC treble damages, costs, and attorney fees under the statute. Finally, the trial court did not err in ruling after the bench trial that RMI breached its bailment contract with HMC. This case involved the bailment of large machinery. As to the conversion claims, the court first found that the record belied RMI’s assertion that it was entitled to summary disposition due to the lack of a demand on HMC’s part. In addition, “RMI’s explicit refusal to allow others to come on the property to quote the removal of the equipment, coupled with RMI’s failure to provide a quote of its own to remove the equipment, is sufficient to allow a fact-finder to conclude that RMI’s actions constituted a ‘refusal’ to relinquish the property.” As to RMI’s reliance on Hart in contending HMC’s tort claims were barred on the basis any action necessarily lie in contract, the court found that RMI misrepresented Hart’s holding. “Hart does not hold that actions between contracting parties always lie in contract.” The court added that, in any event, it was “clear that RMI had a separate and distinct legal duty under the common law to not exercise dominion and control over the Ajax equipment that was inconsistent with HMC’s right to possession.” The court next concluded that the trial court did not err in relying on Aroma Wines II and finding that RMI’s owner put the “equipment to his own use.” As to the issue of treble damages under MCL 600.2919a, the court agreed with HMC “that a proper interpretation of MCL 600.2919a(1) shows that it does not imbue a trial court with discretion to deny treble damages, costs, and attorney fees to a party who prevails on a statutory-conversion claim.” But while it determined “that Aroma Wines I was incorrectly decided on this issue,” it was bound to follow that decision. As to the breach of bailment contract, assuming a demand was necessary in this context, “HMC sufficiently demanded the return of the property.” Affirmed.

Sentencing of juvenile & 18-year-old offenders; Proportionality; Miller v Alabama; People v Parks; People v Eads; People v Echols; Redaction of testimony; Prosecutorial misconduct; Comparisons to Nazis & Lebanese terrorists; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the use of redacted testimony & to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct; Life without parole (LWOP)

The court found “no error warranting reversal of defendant’s convictions.” But it concluded that the recent evolution of the law as to “juvenile and 18-year-old offenders has rendered defendant’s term-of-years sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment for his second-degree murder and AWIM convictions invalid under the principle of proportionality because the sentencing court failed to consider defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors.” Thus, it affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court order denying his motion for relief from judgment, vacated his sentences for second-degree murder and AWIM, and remanded for resentencing. Defendant’s minimum sentence range under the sentencing guidelines was 10 years to life for the second-degree murder convictions. The court concluded that it was “clear from the record that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors of defendant’s youth during sentencing. In explaining its concurrent sentences of 65 to 100 years’ imprisonment, the trial court focused on primarily on the nature of the offense, noting that it was ‘savage,’ ‘inhumane,’ and ‘disgusting.’ The trial court remarked that it was hard ‘to imagine the emptiness of soul that must occupy [defendant’s] spirit,’ and expressed that it was ‘shocked and dismayed and disgusted by [defendant’s] behavior.’ But the trial court did not consider this behavior in light of the mitigating factors of youth announced in Miller and its progeny.” The court found that similar “to the sentences at issue in Eads and Echols, defendant’s term-of-years sentences are more severe than generally authorized for offenders who were juveniles or between 18 and 20 years old when they committed first-degree murder. The default sentence for such offenders is now a minimum term of 25 to 40 years’ imprisonment with a maximum of at least 60 years’ imprisonment if the court decides not to sentence the defendant to LWOP.” His minimum “sentence of 65 years for second-degree murder exceeds the suggested maximum sentence for an offender who was 18 years old when he committed first-degree murder. Although the defendant in Eads was a juvenile when he committed second-degree murder, this Court’s reasoning and conclusion that the defendant’s 50-to-75-year sentence violated the principle of proportionality is persuasive here when viewed alongside the Parks Court’s recognition that juvenile and 18-year-old offenders are not meaningfully distinguishable for sentencing purposes.” Thus, the court found that he “was entitled to be sentenced in a manner that duly accounted for the individualized circumstances of defendant and the offenses, which included his ‘youth and its attendant characteristics as potentially mitigating factors.’”

Sentencing; Scoring of OV 8 (asportation); MCL 777.38(1); People v Barrera; People v Chelmicki

Holding that the trial court did not err in scoring 15 points for OV 8 in sentencing defendant, the court affirmed. He pled guilty to CSC III. He contended that 0 points should have been scored for OV 8 “because he did not asport the victim to the garage with the promise of vaping, as vaping was meant to bribe the victim to stay quiet about defendant’s crimes, not as a way to move her to the garage.” But the court found that this “argument misunderstands the law” and was unsupported by the record. The victim clearly stated in her forensic interview that he “offered to let her use his vape, she went out to the garage with defendant to use the vape, and once she was in the garage, defendant sexually assaulted her. Even though [he] did not use force to move the victim, defendant used [her] desire to vape and fear of being caught vaping to move her to another location, which satisfies the movement requirement of asportation.” He also asserted “the garage was not a place of greater danger because the victim’s mother was out of the house or asleep when the crimes occurred, so defendant’s crime was no less likely to be discovered in the garage than it was in the house.” But the court noted that for the purposes of OV 8, “a place of greater danger includes a place ‘away from the presence or observation of others,’ or ‘where others [are] less likely to see defendant committing a crime.’” It concluded that under “the circumstances, the garage was clearly a place of greater danger. Even if the victim’s mother was asleep or out of the house, the victim’s brother lived in the house as well, and the garage remained a place where defendant’s crime was less likely to be discovered by others because it was away from the main living area of the house. The trial court properly found that the garage was a place of greater danger.”

Reasonable suspicion for traffic stop; Kansas v Glover; Use of dashcam video; Credibility findings; MCL 257.649; People v Kavanaugh; Plain view seizure of firearm in vehicle; MCL 750.227; People v Champion

The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop and that the handgun and magazine were properly seized under the plain view doctrine, so the trial court correctly denied defendant’s motion to suppress and her conviction for carrying a pistol in a vehicle without a license was affirmed. Defendant turned left from a side street into the officers’ lane, allegedly rolling through a stop sign and forcing the patrol car to brake abruptly, and during the resulting stop the officers saw a handgun in a stack of papers and a magazine in the glove box when defendant retrieved paperwork for her registration and insurance. The trial court reviewed the dashcam footage, found that defendant failed to stop and to yield, credited the officers’ testimony, and ruled that the stop and seizure were lawful. On appeal, the court reviewed the same video and agreed it did not clearly show whether defendant came to a complete stop but noted that it corroborated the officers by showing abrupt braking and a vehicle moving at a constant speed through the intersection. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings, the court concluded that the trial court did not “err by finding that the officers observed [defendant] ignore a stop sign and fail to yield to oncoming traffic,” and that “the traffic stop was at least justified by reasonable suspicion that defendant committed a civil infraction.” Turning to the seizure, the court emphasized that the officers were lawfully present during a valid stop, that the firearm and magazine were plainly visible when defendant opened the glove box, and that their incriminating character was immediately apparent because it is illegal to carry a pistol in a vehicle without a license. It held that “the warrantless seizure of the magazine and firearm did not violate” defendant’s “rights, and the trial court did not err when it denied her motion to suppress.”

Controlled substance possession; MCL 333.7403; People v Armstrong; Carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle; MCL 750.227; People v White; Ineffective assistance of counsel

The court held that defendant failed to show that his lawyer’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that any alleged errors undermined confidence in the outcome. Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police, where an officer recognized him, believed he was under the influence, and discovered cocaine on his person and a loaded pistol on the seat he had occupied. Defendant testified that he acted under duress because the driver pointed a gun at him and forced him to hide both the gun and narcotics. The jury rejected this defense and convicted him. On appeal, the court held that counsel reasonably declined to elicit cumulative testimony from the officer, noting the officer already stated that felons commonly “push” firearms onto others. The court also found that decisions regarding closing argument were strategic because “focusing on a small number of key points may be more persuasive than a shotgun approach.” It further held that counsel reasonably avoided introducing body-camera footage that contradicted defendant’s testimony, and that excluding statements by passengers or the driver avoided prejudicial inferences that could weaken the duress theory. The court also found no prejudice because the omitted evidence was cumulative or potentially harmful to the defense. Affirmed.

Civil commitment; Whether the trial court erred by not confirming with respondent whether she met with her attorney before the hearing as required by MCL 330.1454

Disagreeing “that the trial court erred by not confirming with respondent whether she met with her attorney before the hearing as required by MCL 330.1454[,]” the court affirmed the “order requiring her to undergo involuntary mental-health treatment[.]” On appeal, respondent did “not argue that the trial court erred by finding that she was a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (c).” Rather, she contended, “for the first time on appeal, that she did not meet with her attorney before the hearing as required by MCL 330.1454 and that the trial court erred by failing to confirm whether she met with counsel before the hearing.” The court concluded “that the trial court did not err by ordering respondent to undergo mental-health treatment without doing more to confirm that she met with her attorney before the hearing on the petition.” Respondent argued “that the trial court should have explicitly asked her whether she met with her attorney before the hearing, but MCL 330.1454 does not contain any such requirement and respondent does not point to any caselaw that supports such an interpretation of the statutory requirements.” Thus, the court held that she “failed to establish that the trial court plainly erred by ordering respondent to mental-health treatment without explicitly asking her to confirm that she met with her attorney before the hearing on the petition.”

Partnership formation; MCL 449.6; MCL 449.7; Byker v Mannes; Unjust enrichment; Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc; Equitable property award

The court held that the trial court did not err by finding no partnership between the parties, rejecting plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claims, and limiting the equitable campground award to the property defendant promised at trial. The parties were formerly in a long-term relationship, owned properties, and operated small businesses. Plaintiff later deeded all properties to defendant during a period of serious medical issues. After the relationship ended, defendant returned several parcels and paid off associated mortgages. Plaintiff sued, alleging a business partnership and unjust enrichment. The trial court rejected those claims after a bench trial. On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings were paramount, noting “there was no testimony presented about profit-sharing” and no partnership records. It further found no inequitable retention of benefits because defendant “paid all [plaintiff’s] bills and provided his housing free of charge for the past 12 years.” The court also found no error regarding personal property plaintiff failed to retrieve and no basis for a life estate in a property where plaintiff had been living. Finally, the court upheld the award of two campground parcels because it reflected defendant’s “promise during trial,” which the court could enforce in equity. Affirmed.

Property partition; MCL 600.3332; MCR 3.401 & 3.402; Inverse condemnation; Gym 24/7 Fitness, LLC v Michigan; Mays v Governor; A property owner’s right to access their property from public highways; Scholma v Ottawa Cnty Rd Comm’n; Property value decline element; Complaint amendment under MCR 2.116(I)(5)

In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court did not err in (1) partitioning the real property in question and (2) granting defendant-Road Commission summary disposition of plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim. A “portion in the northeastern corner of the Property was effectively cut off from the rest of the Property by” flooding. On the eastern side, the Property is bordered “by 105th Avenue, which has historically provided access to” it. Defendant-Evart Land Holdings’ owner (who also owns property adjacent to each side of the Property) “petitioned the Road Commission to abandon a portion of” 105th Avenue. Plaintiff objected. The Road Commission conducted an investigation and, pursuant to its inspector’s recommendation, it “voted to abandon the requested portion of 105th Avenue.” Plaintiff sued. As to the partition proceedings, the trial court appointed a partition commissioner under MCR 3.402. But it did not agree with the commissioner’s determination and instead “split the Property into two halves, with plaintiff receiving the eastern portion and Evart receiving the western portion.” Evart argued that it erred in reversing the commissioner’s recommendation and in partitioning the Property. As to the first argument, the court noted there “are no requirements for the [trial] court to follow the commissioner’s report. In fact, [it] may choose to reject the report, and there are no requirements for any findings to be made if this occurs.” As to the partitioning decision, “awarding plaintiff the eastern portion, which bordered 105th Avenue, would provide easier access for plaintiff, and met the parties’ plans for their respective parcels, made equitable sense based on the circumstances for both sides.” Further, as to a sale in lieu of partition, the court found no error in the trial court’s determination “that Evart failed to overcome the burden in favor of partition[.]” As to plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim, while the trial court erred in granting the Road Commission summary disposition under (C)(8), summary disposition under (C)(10) was proper. The claim failed because plaintiff did not show “a vested property right under state law that has been substantially interfered with by the Road Commission’s abandonment [of] portions of 105th Avenue.” Affirmed.

Common-law & statutory conversion; Aroma Wines & Equip, Inc v Columbian Distrib Servs, Inc (Aroma Wines I & II); Whether the tort claims were barred because any action necessarily lie in contract; Hart v Ludwig; Treble damages, costs, & attorney fees under MCL 600.2919a; Whether such damages are discretionary or mandatory; Comparing the damages provision in the Right to Farm Act (MCL 286.473b); Breach of a bailment contract

The court held that plaintiff’s (HMC) tort claims were not barred under Hart, and that the trial court did not err in determining by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant (RMI) was liable for conversion. Because it was “compelled to follow Aroma Wines I,” the court also held “that the award of damages under MCL 600.2919a falls under the” trial court’s discretion. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding HMC treble damages, costs, and attorney fees under the statute. Finally, the trial court did not err in ruling after the bench trial that RMI breached its bailment contract with HMC. This case involved the bailment of large machinery. As to the conversion claims, the court first found that the record belied RMI’s assertion that it was entitled to summary disposition due to the lack of a demand on HMC’s part. In addition, “RMI’s explicit refusal to allow others to come on the property to quote the removal of the equipment, coupled with RMI’s failure to provide a quote of its own to remove the equipment, is sufficient to allow a fact-finder to conclude that RMI’s actions constituted a ‘refusal’ to relinquish the property.” As to RMI’s reliance on Hart in contending HMC’s tort claims were barred on the basis any action necessarily lie in contract, the court found that RMI misrepresented Hart’s holding. “Hart does not hold that actions between contracting parties always lie in contract.” The court added that, in any event, it was “clear that RMI had a separate and distinct legal duty under the common law to not exercise dominion and control over the Ajax equipment that was inconsistent with HMC’s right to possession.” The court next concluded that the trial court did not err in relying on Aroma Wines II and finding that RMI’s owner put the “equipment to his own use.” As to the issue of treble damages under MCL 600.2919a, the court agreed with HMC “that a proper interpretation of MCL 600.2919a(1) shows that it does not imbue a trial court with discretion to deny treble damages, costs, and attorney fees to a party who prevails on a statutory-conversion claim.” But while it determined “that Aroma Wines I was incorrectly decided on this issue,” it was bound to follow that decision. As to the breach of bailment contract, assuming a demand was necessary in this context, “HMC sufficiently demanded the return of the property.” Affirmed.

Auto negligence; Sudden-emergency doctrine; Presumption of negligence; MCL 257.402(a); MCL 257.627; Distinguishing Petrosky v Dziurman & White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; Questions of fact

In this negligence case arising from a motor vehicle accident, the court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ (Singh and GIGG Express, Inc) “motion for summary disposition because it properly applied the sudden-emergency doctrine to the extent that reasonable minds could not differ that Singh was not negligent.” Singh, in his capacity as an employee of GIGG Express, “was driving a semitruck northbound in the middle lane of the I-75 expressway when he rear-ended a vehicle in which plaintiff was the passenger.” The court found the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. It noted that in “this case, Singh could not have reasonably expected a nearly stopped vehicle in the middle lane of a dark expressway at night, particularly given that the vehicle did not activate its brake lights to indicate its slow rate of speed until Singh’s semitruck was already upon it, and there were no indications of a traffic stoppage or other impediments along the expressway.” On appeal, plaintiff relied largely on Petrosky and White, but both cases are distinguishable. In Petrosky, “the defendant in a lawsuit involving a rear-end collision claimed 18 months after the accident that he had experienced a sudden brake failure, but this contradicted his account at the time of the accident as well as other evidence in the case, creating a question of fact for the jury to resolve.” Similarly, in White, “the defendant rear-ended a vehicle after blacking out while driving, but there was evidence that he had been feeling ill for some time and chose to drive anyway, raising a question of fact for the jury about whether his emergency was truly unexpected.” By contrast, in this case, there were “no disputes of fact, defendant’s credibility is not in question, and his testimony is corroborated by video evidence. And on this record, a reasonable jury could only conclude that Singh ‘acted as a reasonably prudent person when facing the emergency.’” As such, it found that the ‘“clear, positive, and credible’ evidence in the record overcomes the presumption of negligence in MCL 257.402(a).” Thus, the court held that MCL 257.627 was inapplicable. Affirmed.

Civil commitment; Whether the trial court erred by not confirming with respondent whether she met with her attorney before the hearing as required by MCL 330.1454

Disagreeing “that the trial court erred by not confirming with respondent whether she met with her attorney before the hearing as required by MCL 330.1454[,]” the court affirmed the “order requiring her to undergo involuntary mental-health treatment[.]” On appeal, respondent did “not argue that the trial court erred by finding that she was a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (c).” Rather, she contended, “for the first time on appeal, that she did not meet with her attorney before the hearing as required by MCL 330.1454 and that the trial court erred by failing to confirm whether she met with counsel before the hearing.” The court concluded “that the trial court did not err by ordering respondent to undergo mental-health treatment without doing more to confirm that she met with her attorney before the hearing on the petition.” Respondent argued “that the trial court should have explicitly asked her whether she met with her attorney before the hearing, but MCL 330.1454 does not contain any such requirement and respondent does not point to any caselaw that supports such an interpretation of the statutory requirements.” Thus, the court held that she “failed to establish that the trial court plainly erred by ordering respondent to mental-health treatment without explicitly asking her to confirm that she met with her attorney before the hearing on the petition.”

Property partition; MCL 600.3332; MCR 3.401 & 3.402; Inverse condemnation; Gym 24/7 Fitness, LLC v Michigan; Mays v Governor; A property owner’s right to access their property from public highways; Scholma v Ottawa Cnty Rd Comm’n; Property value decline element; Complaint amendment under MCR 2.116(I)(5)

In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court did not err in (1) partitioning the real property in question and (2) granting defendant-Road Commission summary disposition of plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim. A “portion in the northeastern corner of the Property was effectively cut off from the rest of the Property by” flooding. On the eastern side, the Property is bordered “by 105th Avenue, which has historically provided access to” it. Defendant-Evart Land Holdings’ owner (who also owns property adjacent to each side of the Property) “petitioned the Road Commission to abandon a portion of” 105th Avenue. Plaintiff objected. The Road Commission conducted an investigation and, pursuant to its inspector’s recommendation, it “voted to abandon the requested portion of 105th Avenue.” Plaintiff sued. As to the partition proceedings, the trial court appointed a partition commissioner under MCR 3.402. But it did not agree with the commissioner’s determination and instead “split the Property into two halves, with plaintiff receiving the eastern portion and Evart receiving the western portion.” Evart argued that it erred in reversing the commissioner’s recommendation and in partitioning the Property. As to the first argument, the court noted there “are no requirements for the [trial] court to follow the commissioner’s report. In fact, [it] may choose to reject the report, and there are no requirements for any findings to be made if this occurs.” As to the partitioning decision, “awarding plaintiff the eastern portion, which bordered 105th Avenue, would provide easier access for plaintiff, and met the parties’ plans for their respective parcels, made equitable sense based on the circumstances for both sides.” Further, as to a sale in lieu of partition, the court found no error in the trial court’s determination “that Evart failed to overcome the burden in favor of partition[.]” As to plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim, while the trial court erred in granting the Road Commission summary disposition under (C)(8), summary disposition under (C)(10) was proper. The claim failed because plaintiff did not show “a vested property right under state law that has been substantially interfered with by the Road Commission’s abandonment [of] portions of 105th Avenue.” Affirmed.

Whether a medical marijuana facility fits the statutory definition of “marihuana establishment” for deduction of expenses (MCL 333.27953(l)); The Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA); MCL 333.27962; Medical Marihuana Facilities Licensing Act (MMFLA); Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA)

In this dispute over a tax deduction, the court held “that the Court of Claims correctly viewed the MRTMA in the context of the entire legislative scheme, including the MMMA and MMFLA, and correctly denied plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and granted defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition under” 2.116(I)(5). Plaintiff argued that the Court of Claims erred by concluding that § 12 of the MRTMA, “which allows ‘marihuana establishments’ to deduct from net income ‘all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying out a trade or business,’ does not apply to medical marijuana provisioning centers licensed under the” MMFLA. The central issue was “whether plaintiff’s medical marijuana facility fits the statutory definition of ‘marihuana establishment’ under MCL 333.27953(l), and thus may deduct its ordinary and necessary business expenses from its net income.” Plaintiff asserted “that if the Legislature had intended for the MRTMA’s tax deduction provision to apply only to recreational facilities licensed under the MRTMA, then it could have limited the catch-all phrase at the end of the provision to that effect.” Plaintiff further argued the Legislature “obviously knew when to limit the scope of the MRTMA’s provisions to adult-use facilities, and it deliberately chose not to when defining the term ‘marihuana establishment.’” The court was not persuaded. “First, because the MRTMA was enacted through initiative, at issue is the intent of the electors, not the Legislature, and the electors’ clearly expressed intent was that the MRTMA be concerned with adults’ general (i.e., nonmedical) use of marijuana. Second, as the Court of Claims concluded, it is equally plausible that the drafters of the MRTMA could have expressly included medical marijuana facilities or provisioning centers within the definition of ‘marihuana establishment.’ [They] knew how to address medical marijuana in other sections of the MRTMA.” Plaintiff also contended “there would be no need to specifically exempt medical marijuana facilities from the excise tax if they were clearly not included as ‘marihuana establishments’ in the first instance, therefore rendering the exemption surplusage.” The court held that viewing “the exemption of medical marijuana facilities from the excise tax in the context of the MRTMA as a whole, and mindful of our ‘duty of judicial restraint’ when interpreting initiatives,” it declined “to interpret the MRTMA’s definition of ‘marihuana establishment’ as encompassing medical marijuana facilities.” Affirmed.

Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g), (j), & (k)(iii); Anticipatory neglect doctrine; Children’s best interests; Relative placement

The court held that §§ (g), (j), and (k)(iii) existed as to respondent-mother, and the trial court did not err in finding that terminating her parental rights was in her children’s best interests. Also, the trial court properly “terminated respondent-father’s parental rights under the same statutory grounds it relied on to terminate” the mother’s parental rights. Finally, the court concluded that the DHHS complied with its statutory obligations to explore relative placement. In challenging the existence of statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights to her children, AB, TV, CV, and JV, respondent only argued “there was no evidence implicating her in any abuse of the children.” But her argument was “belied by the extensive record in this case, and is devoid of legal merit.” The court noted that “it was not necessary for DHHS to establish that she herself had physically abused her children.” The evidence established that the mother allowed the father “to severely physically abuse a child in the home, exposed other children in the home to the violent assaults, and severely neglected the children by permitting them to live in almost unimaginable filth.” In addition, she “was complicit in keeping [the] father’s abuse from being discovered, and failed to cooperate with the investigation and medical treatment when the abuse of AB came to light. From this record, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that the children would be harmed if returned to [her] care and custody, warranting the termination of her parental rights.” The father argued that the trial “court improperly relied on the anticipatory neglect doctrine to find statutory grounds to terminate his parental rights to TV, CV, and JV.” Contrary to his assertion, the evidence did not show that he treated his stepson-AB “differently than his biological children because of the lack of biological relation. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it applied the anticipatory neglect doctrine to find that there existed statutory grounds to terminate [his] parental rights to his biological children.” The court held that in “any event, there was significant evidence presented that [the] father emotionally harmed and severely neglected TV and CV.” Similarly, it found that “the trial court could have inferred that JV would suffer this same harm based on the treatment of his siblings.” Affirmed.

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re Williams; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Frey; Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts

Holding that (1) reasonable reunification efforts were made, (2) clear and convincing evidence supported termination under § (c)(i), and (3) terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. It noted that respondent’s “service plan was created to address substance abuse, inappropriate supervision, and domestic violence. Her failure to consistently drug test or benefit from substance abuse treatment meant that the issue of substance abuse was left mostly unaddressed.” In addition, and perhaps due to “her absences from court hearings and treatment, respondent was not able to show that she benefited from the ordered services in which she did participate.” While she “participated in therapy, anger management, and parenting courses, she had not improved her ability to parent.” Further, the court concluded the trial court did not plainly err in finding that the DHHS provided reasonable modifications to respondent’s service plan “and she still did not fully comply with” it. As to § (c)(i), she “had over two years to remedy the conditions that led to adjudication: inappropriate supervision, substance abuse, and domestic violence. The evidence presented in the trial court supported a finding that there had not been a meaningful change in these conditions.” She tested positive for meth multiple times during the proceedings “and missed approximately half of her drug screens, each of which is considered a positive screen.” The court noted that at “the time of the initial petition, the main concern related to domestic violence was respondent’s violence against her family members. [She] participated in a domestic violence prevention course” but new concerns about domestic violence between her and the father of one of the children “arose. The police were called over 20 times regarding incidents between” the two from 8/22 to 12/23. Improper supervision also continued to be a concern. Finally, the “trial court appropriately considered the best interests of” the two children separately and “did not clearly err in finding that termination” was in each child’s best interests.

Reasonable reunification efforts; Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i)

The court held that (1) the trial court did not err in finding that DHHS “made reasonable efforts toward reunification even though respondent[-father] did not participate in those services[”] and (2) the trial court did not clearly err in finding clear and convincing evidence supported § (c)(i) for termination. The reunification services offered to him “were minimal because the Arkansas prison system was uncooperative with [DHHS’s] efforts to allow virtual parenting time and it did not offer any parenting classes or other services.” Thus, DHHS’s “efforts toward reunification were limited to mailing defendant educational materials about parenting, anger management, and substance abuse. [DHHS] also investigated two possible relative placements for the child while respondent was imprisoned, but the relative placements were not suitable due to factors outside of petitioner’s control.” Respondent argued that DHHS’s “reasonable efforts toward reunification should have included waiting for [his] release and return to Michigan so that [he] could more fully engage with reunification services. However, it was not reasonable to continue waiting under the circumstances given that the child had been in foster care for more than half of her life (839 days).” Further, respondent “did not fully participate in the reunification services that he was offered because, even after being told that he needed to complete and return the educational materials, he failed to do so. ‘In addition to DHHS’s duty to offer services to the respondent-parent, the respondent-parent has a duty to participate in and benefit from the services.’” As to § (c)(i), respondent argued “that he would have overcome the barriers to reunification within a reasonable time because respondent was likely to be released from prison in less than 45 days and could have demonstrated progress if given another 30 to 60 days to obtain in-person services.” However, his “lack of parenting skills and anger management issues remained unaddressed due to his nonparticipation in reunification services. [His] failure to provide care, supervision, or a viable care plan for the child was also unaddressed. Respondent was still incarcerated without a set release date, had no stable housing upon his release, and had offered no viable alternative placement for the child.” The child “had already been in foster care for 839 days and would have had to wait an additional indeterminate amount of time for respondent to address the issues that led to her removal.” Affirmed.

Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) confidentiality exception for workers’ compensation claims; MCL 421.11(b)(1)(i); Paschke v Retool Indus; Storey v Meijer, Inc.; Interested-party definition; MI Admin Code, R 421.201(1); Subpoenas in workers’ compensation proceedings; MCL 418.583; Limits, costs & confidentiality; MCL 421.11(b)(6); Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA); Workers’ Disability Compensation Appeals Commission (WDCAC); Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA)

In an issue of first impression, the court held that MCL 421.11(b)(1)(i) requires the UIA to make unemployment records available to employers in workers’ compensation proceedings as “interested parties,” and it affirmed the WDCAC’s orders denying the UIA’s motions to quash. In three consolidated WDCA matters, defendants-employers subpoenaed UIA records concerning their employee-claimants. UIA moved to quash on the ground that MESA confidentiality barred disclosure or, alternatively, that the subpoenas were overbroad and burdensome. Magistrates denied the motions (and in two cases found UIA in contempt). The WDCAC reversed the contempt findings but otherwise affirmed, reasoning that UIA “essentially points to the parts of the MESA that encourage confidentiality and ignores the provisions that permit disclosure when, as here, demanded,” and that MCL 421.11(b)(1)(i) is a “statutory mandate” requiring that information that “might—not would, but might—affect a workers’ compensation claim” must be available. On appeal, the court agreed, emphasizing that Storey and Paschke construed the pre-1996 statute in the context of using unemployment determinations in later civil litigation. It concluded the Legislature’s 1996 addition of a specific WDCA exception after Paschke signaled an intent to allow disclosure for workers’ compensation purposes even when UIA is not a party, particularly because the statute uses the broad term “might affect” and commands that information “must be available” regardless of “whether the unemployment agency is a party.” The court further held that employers defending WDCA claims are “interested parties” under Rule 421.201(1) because their “statutory rights or obligations might be affected,” and limiting “interested party” to chargeable employers in unemployment proceedings would render the WDCA exception largely nugatory. As such, it rejected UIA’s attempt to cabin Rule 421.201(3) to defeat disclosure in the workers’ compensation context and reiterated that when a rule conflicts with clear statutory language “the statute controls.” Finally, the court upheld the WDCAC’s refusal to narrow production or to add explicit cost and confidentiality directives because UIA did not substantiate undue burden, the subpoenas were not improper “fishing expedition[s]” given the potential relevance of work-search and employment-capacity evidence, and MCL 421.11(b)(6) already restricts use and redisclosure while the court rules provide mechanisms for copying costs and protective orders that UIA did not meaningfully pursue.