Unfair labor practices (ULPs); The National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) adjudicatory authority; Cemex Constr Materials Pac, LLC (NLRB); NLRB v Gissel Packing Co; Whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the finding of ULPs; Whether the Board properly considered “pre-petition conduct”; Extraordinary remedy of a bargaining order; Administrative law judge (ALJ)

On petition for review and cross-application for enforcement, in an issue of first impression the court held that the standard set forth in respondent-NLRB’s decision in Cemex was created through an improper exercise of its adjudicatory authority and thus, could not serve as the basis for a bargaining order. As a result, the court granted petitioner-Brown-Forman’s petition for review, denied the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded. An ALJ ruled that Brown-Forman committed ULPs “and interfered with its employees’ attempts to unionize.” The ALJ recommended issuing a bargaining order under the standards articulated in Cemex and Gissel. Although the Board adopted the ALJ’s factual findings and recommended remedy, “it modified the reasoning. Rather than consider whether a new election could be held by applying the Gissel standard, the Board relied solely on the standard articulated in Cemex (a previous Board decision that upended over 50 years of precedent and called for the Board to issue a bargaining order as the default remedy once it set aside an election).” The court first held that there was “substantial evidence” to support the Board’s factual findings as to ULP violations, “and that the Board properly considered pre-petition conduct.” But it denied “the Board’s petition for enforcement because in issuing the bargaining order against Brown-Forman, the Board relied solely on the Cemex standard, which was created through an unlawful exercise of adjudicatory authority.” It found that the Board had “announced this significant policy change via an adjudication, and it did so without respecting the bounds of its adjudicatory authority. The Cemex standard was not derived from the case-specific facts of the contemporaneous adjudication, and the Cemex Board did not create the standard in furtherance of resolving the parties’ dispute.” As a result, the court held that “the Cemex standard was improperly promulgated, so it cannot serve as the basis for future orders.”

Sentencing proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Within-guidelines presumption; People v Posey; Departure sentencing extent; People v Milbourn; Request for reassignment on remand; People v Hill; Sufficiency of the evidence for a prisoner in possession of a weapon (PPW) conviction; Constitutional & statutory rights to a speedy trial; Operating while intoxicated third offense (OWI-3rd); Blood alcohol content (BAC)

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s convictions and that his rights to a speedy trial were not violated, but that both sentences were disproportionate and required resentencing. Defendant was convicted in two consolidated cases after a jury found him guilty of PPW (for possessing a dismantled razor blade in jail) and OWI-3rd (after crashing a vehicle with a 0.2266 BAC and then fleeing into a river). The trial court imposed a top-of-the-guidelines minimum of 58 months for PPW and an upward-departure minimum of 25 years for OWI-3rd, reasoning the PPW conduct created a “serious risk of harm” and that prior OWI sentences “have not kept th[e] community safe” from defendant. On appeal, the court first held that sufficient evidence was offered to support his PPW conviction and that both his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were not violated. As to his sentences, it concluded the PPW minimum, though within the 14-to-58-month range, was unreasonable because the “circumstances of the offense” were atypically mitigating, including that defendant “‘did not actually harm anybody other than [him]self,’” that he had “discarded” the blade, he had no cellmate, and he “lacked intent and opportunity to harm another.” These facts created “unusual circumstances” sufficient to overcome the presumption of proportionality. The court next held that the OWI-3rd sentence was disproportionate because the 25-year minimum was “nearly four times” the top of the 19-to-76-month range and the trial court’s analogy to habitual violent offenders did not justify the extent of the departure. The court explained that even if some departure could be supported, its extent embodied a proportionality violation. The court rejected his request for reassignment, finding no showing under the Hill factors that resentencing by the same judge was necessary to preserve the appearance of justice. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Whether defendants were entitled to a new trial under FedRCrimP 33 where the jury was given unadmitted exhibits (& not given some admitted ones) during deliberations; Whether the error was “structural error”; Weaver v Massachusetts; Remmer v United States; Bruton v United States; “Harmless error” review; “Overwhelming evidence” of guilt

Noting that it had not previously considered whether an error such as the one at issue here is structural, the court held that a jury’s exposure to unadmitted exhibits during deliberations with no curative instruction was not structural error. Applying harmless error review, it further held that the district court erred by granting defendants-Maund, Carey, and Brockway a new trial. A jury convicted them of several offenses connected to a murder-for-hire scheme. Months after their conviction, the district court informed defendants that it had mistakenly given the jury 10 unadmitted exhibits during their deliberation and failed to give them 3 admitted exhibits. The appeal primarily concerned two statements related to “Carey’s knowledge of the crimes,” one of which was in testimony proffered outside the jury’s presence by a participant in the scheme who pled guilty. After a Remmer hearing, the district court ruled that these errors were structural under Weaver’s “too hard to measure” standard and granted them a new trial. The government argued “that the error was not structural, the harmless-error standard applies instead, and the error was harmless.” The court agreed. The “jury inappropriately received unadmitted evidence containing a nontestifying codefendant’s statement identifying another codefendant by name. This implicates both Remmer and Bruton. But” it did not have to “specifically decide which type of error occurred, because both Remmer and Bruton errors require harmless-error analysis.” The court noted that “very few errors meet” the Weaver “too hard to measure” threshold. And the court frequently expects “lower courts to measure the effects of Bruton and Remmer errors via harmless-error analysis.” Applying that analysis, the court concluded the error was “most clearly harmless to Carey because the government presented significant other evidence of guilt and the error arguably helped, rather than prejudiced, him.” Given that the evidence did “not directly inculpate Maund, and because the government presented significant other evidence of guilt,” it also found the error harmless to Maund. Finally, as to Brockway, “the significance of the government’s evidence also overwhelms any possible prejudice from the error, making it harmless.” Reversed and remanded.

Unfair labor practices (ULPs); The National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) adjudicatory authority; Cemex Constr Materials Pac, LLC (NLRB); NLRB v Gissel Packing Co; Whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the finding of ULPs; Whether the Board properly considered “pre-petition conduct”; Extraordinary remedy of a bargaining order; Administrative law judge (ALJ)

On petition for review and cross-application for enforcement, in an issue of first impression the court held that the standard set forth in respondent-NLRB’s decision in Cemex was created through an improper exercise of its adjudicatory authority and thus, could not serve as the basis for a bargaining order. As a result, the court granted petitioner-Brown-Forman’s petition for review, denied the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement, and remanded. An ALJ ruled that Brown-Forman committed ULPs “and interfered with its employees’ attempts to unionize.” The ALJ recommended issuing a bargaining order under the standards articulated in Cemex and Gissel. Although the Board adopted the ALJ’s factual findings and recommended remedy, “it modified the reasoning. Rather than consider whether a new election could be held by applying the Gissel standard, the Board relied solely on the standard articulated in Cemex (a previous Board decision that upended over 50 years of precedent and called for the Board to issue a bargaining order as the default remedy once it set aside an election).” The court first held that there was “substantial evidence” to support the Board’s factual findings as to ULP violations, “and that the Board properly considered pre-petition conduct.” But it denied “the Board’s petition for enforcement because in issuing the bargaining order against Brown-Forman, the Board relied solely on the Cemex standard, which was created through an unlawful exercise of adjudicatory authority.” It found that the Board had “announced this significant policy change via an adjudication, and it did so without respecting the bounds of its adjudicatory authority. The Cemex standard was not derived from the case-specific facts of the contemporaneous adjudication, and the Cemex Board did not create the standard in furtherance of resolving the parties’ dispute.” As a result, the court held that “the Cemex standard was improperly promulgated, so it cannot serve as the basis for future orders.”

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); Whether the Michigan Department of Corrections’ (MDOC) responses requesting good-faith deposits constituted final determinations; MCL 15.234 & 235; Arabo v Michigan Gaming Control Bd; Appeal for a fee reduction; MCL 15.240a(1)(a); Timeliness of charged fees

In this case involving FOIA requests, the court held that “there were no final determinations for plaintiff to challenge, plaintiff did not properly appeal the fees, and plaintiff failed to commence an action in the Court of Claims within the statutorily-mandated 45 days after receipt of the notices.” Thus, summary disposition and dismissal was proper. The “complaint alleged that the MDOC violated the FOIA by withholding the requested records, by neglecting to list the applicable exemptions, and by charging the fees.” Plaintiff argued “that the MDOC’s responses constituted a final determination and thereby allowed plaintiff to challenge the MDOC’s alleged” FOIA violations. Plaintiff further argued “that its lawsuit challenging the charged fees was timely.” The court concluded that “the contested MDOC responses were not final determinations under MCL 15.235, rather, they were requests for good-faith deposits under MCL 15.234. Thus, the MDOC was not obligated to respond with a final determination until after the deposits were paid. Without a final determination, any lawsuit premised on such a determination was improper.” Plaintiff also asserted “that Arabo was an inappropriate precedent for the Court of Claims to ground its decision in.” Plaintiff sought “to distinguish Arabo on the basis that it addressed a former version of the FOIA, particularly MCL 15.234 and MCL 15.235. However, a juxtaposition of the current versions of” these statutes to the pre-2015 versions the court applied in Arabo indicated “that Arabo remains controlling.” The court noted that there was “no provision suggesting that a public body must issue a final determination while withholding the requested records.” It found that because “the MDOC’s responses were not final determinations, plaintiff’s sole option was to contest the fee determinations themselves.” But while it “appealed the MDOC’s responses, these appeals were not premised on the fees; rather, plaintiff challenged the MDOC’s alleged failure to identify exemptions, to render the requested material publicly accessible, and to separate exempt from nonexempt material.” The court noted that “MCL 15.240a(1)(a) mandates that ‘a written appeal for a fee reduction’ must identify ‘how the required fee exceeds the amount permitted under the public body’s available procedures and guidelines or [MCL 15.234].’” The court held that plaintiff’s “appeals failed to do so, and it is undisputed that plaintiff did not pay the good-faith deposits. Thus, under MCL 15.234(14), because [it] omitted the deposits and neglected to appeal the deposits’ amounts pursuant to MCL 15.240a with a 45-day time frame, the FOIA requests were deemed abandoned, and the MDOC was no longer obligated to fulfill” the requests. The court added that even “assuming that plaintiff initiated appeals of the fees under MCL 15.240a(1)(a), its complaint remained untimely.” Affirmed.

Accounting malpractice; Claim for attorney fees as damages; The “American rule”; Applicability of Hark Orchids, LP v Buie

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 84172 in the 8/26/25 edition), and remanded the case to the trial court. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling “that the American rule barred plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees” in this accounting malpractice action. The Court of Appeals found that the court’s recent decision in Hark Orchids did not apply here, concluding “Hark Orchids was limited only to claims for attorney fees as damages for legal malpractice and declining to apply it to claims for attorney fees as damages for accounting malpractice as well.” But the court clarified that its “decision in Hark Orchids is not so limited[,]” noting that the same principles applied there “hold true for accounting malpractice.” Pursuant to that decision, the court held “that plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees simply ‘does not implicate the American rule.’” However, as it “cautioned in Hark Orchids, ‘the client cannot recover any and all fees that the client incurred in attempted mitigation. Attorney fees subject to recovery must be reasonable and necessary to mitigate the harm from malpractice.’”

Class certification; Whether plaintiff had standing; FedRCivP 23(b)(3)’s “predominance prong”; The district court’s failure to conduct an Erie analysis regarding five states & to consider plaintiff’s cited case precedent; Generation Changers Church (GCC)

In this class action dispute, the court held that plaintiff-GCC had standing and that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting an Erie analysis with respect to five of the states involved when addressing Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance prong. GCC alleged that defendant-Church Mutual failed to pay the “actual cash value” (ACV) of its losses when covering its tornado damages. It “also asserted that Church Mutual’s practice of subtracting depreciation for non-material costs when calculating the ACV violates the laws of” multiple states. Thus, it “sought class certification of similarly situated policyholders in these states who had also filed claims with Church Mutual and received improperly reduced” payments. The district court ruled that GCC had standing and certified a class as “to class members from four states but not the remaining six.” The court noted that there is a “‘question whether the relevance of [] variation’ between a named plaintiff’s claims and the putative class’s claims ‘is a matter of Article III standing at all or whether it goes to the propriety of class certification pursuant to’” Rule 23(a). There are two approaches “to address this question: the ‘standing approach’ and the ‘class certification approach.’” The court concluded that neither approach barred “GCC from pursuing its claims,” so it did not decide which one is appropriate. It then turned to the district court’s partial denial of class certification. The district court “declined to certify a class that included claims arising under the laws of Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, Mississippi, Texas, and Vermont.” The court held that this was error, except for Vermont. The district court was required to conduct an Erie analysis for each state and erred by not considering the “intermediate state appellate court decisions, decisions of federal courts discerning state law, and non-binding regulatory guidance” GCC presented, refusing to analyze any authority but state supreme court decisions or statutes. The court held that “GCC presented both binding and persuasive authorities interpreting the laws of Kentucky, Ohio, Mississippi, Texas, and Missouri. The district court” abused its discretion by not conducting an Erie analysis as to each state. On remand, it should conduct this analysis as to these states “and predict how each state’s highest court would address the ACV issue to determine whether class certification for putative class members from these states would be appropriate.” But the court found no abuse of discretion as to the Vermont putative class members. Vacated in part and remanded.

Subject-matter jurisdiction; Applicability of 28 USC § 1257(a); Rooker v Fidelity Trust Co; District of Columbia Court of Appeals v Feldman; Exxon Mobil Corp v Saudi Basic Indus Corp; Whether the suit sought district court review & rejection of a state-court judgment

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because plaintiff-HPIL’s suit did not challenge an underlying state-court order appointing a receiver itself, but rather raised issues about wrongdoing in the proceedings. Thus, it reversed the district court’s dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1257(a), and remanded. Minority shareholders in HPIL successfully sought the appointment of a receiver in state court, and three years later, HPIL filed this suit alleging that they “looted the corporation during the receivership proceeding.” The district court ruled that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under “§ 1257(a), which permits disappointed state litigants to seek review of state-court decisions in the United States Supreme Court but does not permit them to appeal such decisions to a federal district court.” However, the court concluded that Rooker and Feldman only “stand for the straightforward proposition that a lower federal court may not entertain a direct appeal ‘to reverse or modify’ the ‘judgment’ of a state court.” Those cases do “not alter or eliminate the grants of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with the jurisdiction of state tribunals.” It noted that the Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine narrowly and repeatedly declined to apply it. The court held that § 1257(a) eliminates “jurisdiction only over ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” And it concluded that HPIL’s suit did not fit within this category where “[c]hallenges to wrongdoing in the proceedings leading to a judgment do not challenge the judgment itself.” This suit did “not appeal anything or for that matter seek a writ of certiorari over anything.” Rather, it challenged “different wrongs from the previous state-court lawsuits” and it requested “different forms of relief.” Thus, the court found that “neither Rooker nor Feldman nor § 1257 has anything to do with this case.”

Accounting malpractice; Claim for attorney fees as damages; The “American rule”; Applicability of Hark Orchids, LP v Buie

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 84172 in the 8/26/25 edition), and remanded the case to the trial court. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling “that the American rule barred plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees” in this accounting malpractice action. The Court of Appeals found that the court’s recent decision in Hark Orchids did not apply here, concluding “Hark Orchids was limited only to claims for attorney fees as damages for legal malpractice and declining to apply it to claims for attorney fees as damages for accounting malpractice as well.” But the court clarified that its “decision in Hark Orchids is not so limited[,]” noting that the same principles applied there “hold true for accounting malpractice.” Pursuant to that decision, the court held “that plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees simply ‘does not implicate the American rule.’” However, as it “cautioned in Hark Orchids, ‘the client cannot recover any and all fees that the client incurred in attempted mitigation. Attorney fees subject to recovery must be reasonable and necessary to mitigate the harm from malpractice.’”

Claims against a county road commission related to the design of a culvert & failure to remove it when the road was relocated; Immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act; The “highway exception” (MCL 691.1402); Nawrocki v Macomb Cnty Rd Comm’n; Effect of a road abandonment; Design defects; Hanson v Board of Cnty Rd Comm’rs of Cnty of Mecosta; Lack of evidence of a failure to maintain; Inverse-condemnation claim; Wiggins v City of Burton; Causation; Trespass & related declaratory relief claims; Failure to plead intentionality

In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the highway exception to governmental immunity did not apply to plaintiffs’ tort claims against defendant-Road Commission (the RC). Further, the RC was entitled to summary disposition on their inverse-condemnation claim because no record facts supported plaintiffs’ claim that its “actions substantially caused the decline of the value of” their property. Finally, defendant-property owners association (the Association) was entitled to summary disposition on plaintiffs’ trespass and related declaratory relief claims because they failed to allege intentionality and thus, did not plead a trespass claim on which relief could be granted. The foundation of plaintiffs’ claim was that the RC “improperly designed the old culvert and should have removed it when it relocated Green Road. That is a fatal theory for governmental-immunity purposes for three independent reasons. First, the public’s travel safety animates the highway exception.” But the old culvert on plaintiffs’ property “is neither open to the public nor facilitates travel. Second, the public-safety duties imposed by MCL 691.1402 and MCL 224.21 make equally clear those highway, road, and culvert duties apply to governmental agencies having ‘jurisdiction over’ or ‘under its care and control.’” In this case, the RC “abandoned the old Green Road running across the eastern portion of plaintiffs’ property in 1971, and thus it” was no longer within the RC’s “jurisdiction, care and control.” And third, under Hanson, “a ‘road commission’s duty under the highway exception does not include a duty to design, or to correct defects arising from the original design or construction of highways.’” The design of the old culvert (it was too small) “is exactly what plaintiffs allege is wrong here.” The court also found that governmental immunity applied to plaintiffs’ allegations as to the other culverts involved in the case. As to the inverse-condemnation claim, as plaintiffs “failed to establish any causal connection between the [RC] and the flooding,” they also failed to show a connection between the RC “and the diminution in their property’s value.” Finally, they “did not allege that the Association acted with an intent to direct water onto” their property. They “did not allege intentionality at all[.]” Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the RC and the Association.

Claims against a county road commission related to the design of a culvert & failure to remove it when the road was relocated; Immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act; The “highway exception” (MCL 691.1402); Nawrocki v Macomb Cnty Rd Comm’n; Effect of a road abandonment; Design defects; Hanson v Board of Cnty Rd Comm’rs of Cnty of Mecosta; Lack of evidence of a failure to maintain; Inverse-condemnation claim; Wiggins v City of Burton; Causation; Trespass & related declaratory relief claims; Failure to plead intentionality

In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the highway exception to governmental immunity did not apply to plaintiffs’ tort claims against defendant-Road Commission (the RC). Further, the RC was entitled to summary disposition on their inverse-condemnation claim because no record facts supported plaintiffs’ claim that its “actions substantially caused the decline of the value of” their property. Finally, defendant-property owners association (the Association) was entitled to summary disposition on plaintiffs’ trespass and related declaratory relief claims because they failed to allege intentionality and thus, did not plead a trespass claim on which relief could be granted. The foundation of plaintiffs’ claim was that the RC “improperly designed the old culvert and should have removed it when it relocated Green Road. That is a fatal theory for governmental-immunity purposes for three independent reasons. First, the public’s travel safety animates the highway exception.” But the old culvert on plaintiffs’ property “is neither open to the public nor facilitates travel. Second, the public-safety duties imposed by MCL 691.1402 and MCL 224.21 make equally clear those highway, road, and culvert duties apply to governmental agencies having ‘jurisdiction over’ or ‘under its care and control.’” In this case, the RC “abandoned the old Green Road running across the eastern portion of plaintiffs’ property in 1971, and thus it” was no longer within the RC’s “jurisdiction, care and control.” And third, under Hanson, “a ‘road commission’s duty under the highway exception does not include a duty to design, or to correct defects arising from the original design or construction of highways.’” The design of the old culvert (it was too small) “is exactly what plaintiffs allege is wrong here.” The court also found that governmental immunity applied to plaintiffs’ allegations as to the other culverts involved in the case. As to the inverse-condemnation claim, as plaintiffs “failed to establish any causal connection between the [RC] and the flooding,” they also failed to show a connection between the RC “and the diminution in their property’s value.” Finally, they “did not allege that the Association acted with an intent to direct water onto” their property. They “did not allege intentionality at all[.]” Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for the RC and the Association.

Auto negligence; Causation; Proximate cause; Remoteness; Ray v Swager; Comparing Deaton by Deaton v Baker & Derbeck v Ward; Distinguishing Dillon v Tamminga & Davis v Thornton

The court held that defendant’s negligence in causing the initial collision was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s later crash as a matter of law because the connection between the two events was too attenuated for reasonable minds to differ. Defendant allegedly lost control while intoxicated and caused a three-car crash around 6:30 p.m. on 1/1/23, after which police parked on the right shoulder with emergency lights so traffic slowed and merged left. Plaintiff pulled onto the left shoulder, waited about 9 to 10 minutes, then attempted to merge back into the left lane around 6:45 p.m. She was rear-ended by another driver who stated that cars were “changing lanes suddenly” away from the police activity and that plaintiff pulled out in front of her. Plaintiff sued defendant on the theory that his initial crash and the policing it required “proximately caused” her later collision and catastrophic injuries. The trial court granted defendant summary disposition on proximate cause. On appeal, the court explained that proximate cause asks “‘whether a defendant should be held legally responsible’” for the consequences and is distinct from cause in fact. It reiterated that proximate cause is for the jury “‘unless reasonable minds could not differ.’” Relying on Deaton and Derbeck, the court held that “‘prior negligent acts in operating’” a vehicle that cause an initial crash do not, standing alone, remain a “‘substantial factor’” in a later collision when the later event is separated by time and intervening decisions. Defendant’s alleged negligence here was “limited to his conduct in causing the first collision[.]” The court agreed with the trial court that plaintiff’s decision to wait nearly 10 minutes before reentering traffic and the other driver’s contemporaneous lane change made the causal chain “so attenuated” that the later crash could not be treated as a foreseeable, legally attributable result of the first crash. The court distinguished cases involving a more direct hazard created by the first incident, including an unattended vehicle taken for a joyride and a destroyed stop sign that remained unrepaired. It concluded that, on these undisputed facts, the remoteness question could be decided as a matter of law. Affirmed.

Children’s removal; MCL 712A.13a(9); MCR 3.965(C)(2)-(4); Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination; Conditioning parenting time on a respondent’s negative drug screens; Distinguishing In re Blakeman; Comparing In re Simpson; Due process; Denial of an adjournment; MCR 3.965(B)(1) & (11); Preliminary hearing procedural requirements

Upholding the trial court’s finding that respondent-mother’s “children were at an imminent risk of harm in her care[,]” the court affirmed its pretrial removal of the children. It also rejected her claim that the order requiring her to “provide negative drug and alcohol screens to have visitation” violated her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Finally, it found that the referee did not violate respondent’s due process rights by declining to adjourn a preliminary hearing. “After the trial court authorized the initial petition while ordering that the children remain in” respondent’s care, she tested positive twice for amphetamines, meth, and THC, which she “attributed to her having consumed a substance she believed was Adderall (amphetamine-dextroamphetamine), despite not having a prescription for” it. She also left two of the children (CA and JA) home alone while the eldest (15-year-old HA) “was sleeping without any adult present. Although there was no evidence that HA was generally incapable of caring for the children, her failure to do so in that instance necessitated police involvement to ensure [their] safety. In addition, the CPS worker reported that the pertinent safety plan required respondent[] to ensure that a sober caregiver was available to supervise her children, that all illicit substances were out of the children’s reach, and that CA and JA had appropriate adult supervision.” And CPS learned that the adult respondent insisted she had planned to have watch the children “also had a history of substance abuse.” In light of respondent’s “substance abuse, improper supervision of the children with regard to illicit substances, and the violation of her CPS safety plan, the trial court’s findings” did not leave the court “with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake” was made. As to her Fifth Amendment argument, while she relied on Blakeman, the court found that case factually and legally distinguishable. Rather, Simpson was factually similar as this case did “not involve a coercive choice between admitting to criminal conduct and reunification with her children.” Lastly, the court did not “see how any procedural deficiency in the handling of the” preliminary hearing constituted reversible error.