Constructively fraudulent transfer; 11 USC § 548(a)(1)(B)(i); Reasonably equivalent value; Contract interpretation; Michigan law; Personal guaranty; Signature blocks; Livonia Bldg Materials Co v Harrison Constr Co (MI Ct App); Extrinsic evidence; Stranger-to-the-contract exception; Shay v Aldrich (MI); Mutual release; Conversion damages; Contract-title interpretation; Smith v Smith (MI Ct App); Property recovery; § 550; In re AMC Mtg Co; Proposed order

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the bankruptcy court properly found a constructively fraudulent transfer and did not abuse its discretion by ordering appellant to return the paid-off property to the bankruptcy estate. Before debtor filed Chapter 7, he transferred three properties to appellant (his mother) in exchange for release of mortgage and note debt. The bankruptcy court found he transferred property worth $893,000 for $737,516 in debt relief, so he received less than reasonably equivalent value. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the court first held that the courts below correctly refused to treat a business loan from appellant to debtor’s company as personally guaranteed by debtor. Applying Michigan contract law, it reasoned that the body of the agreement made “just one entity liable: Wylie’s Rentals,” the word guaranty did not appear, and the single signature block did not show personal liability. The court next held that the mutual release did not satisfy appellant’s conversion claim based on debtor’s earlier taking of $33,000 from her bank account because the release covered claims “related to the Mortgages and Promissory Notes,” and the conversion “does not fit the bill.” The court also deferred to the bankruptcy court’s credibility findings rejecting testimony and later documents suggesting a broader release. The court further held that the bankruptcy court acted within its “broad discretion” under § 550 by awarding the trustee the paid-off property rather than only the value difference because the statute permits recovery of “the property transferred” or its value, and appellant had not preserved a contrary objection. Finally, the court rejected her challenge to use of the trustee’s proposed order because that practice does not “automatically sink to reversible error.” Affirmed.

Constructively fraudulent transfer; 11 USC § 548(a)(1)(B)(i); Reasonably equivalent value; Contract interpretation; Michigan law; Personal guaranty; Signature blocks; Livonia Bldg Materials Co v Harrison Constr Co (MI Ct App); Extrinsic evidence; Stranger-to-the-contract exception; Shay v Aldrich (MI); Mutual release; Conversion damages; Contract-title interpretation; Smith v Smith (MI Ct App); Property recovery; § 550; In re AMC Mtg Co; Proposed order

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the bankruptcy court properly found a constructively fraudulent transfer and did not abuse its discretion by ordering appellant to return the paid-off property to the bankruptcy estate. Before debtor filed Chapter 7, he transferred three properties to appellant (his mother) in exchange for release of mortgage and note debt. The bankruptcy court found he transferred property worth $893,000 for $737,516 in debt relief, so he received less than reasonably equivalent value. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the court first held that the courts below correctly refused to treat a business loan from appellant to debtor’s company as personally guaranteed by debtor. Applying Michigan contract law, it reasoned that the body of the agreement made “just one entity liable: Wylie’s Rentals,” the word guaranty did not appear, and the single signature block did not show personal liability. The court next held that the mutual release did not satisfy appellant’s conversion claim based on debtor’s earlier taking of $33,000 from her bank account because the release covered claims “related to the Mortgages and Promissory Notes,” and the conversion “does not fit the bill.” The court also deferred to the bankruptcy court’s credibility findings rejecting testimony and later documents suggesting a broader release. The court further held that the bankruptcy court acted within its “broad discretion” under § 550 by awarding the trustee the paid-off property rather than only the value difference because the statute permits recovery of “the property transferred” or its value, and appellant had not preserved a contrary objection. Finally, the court rejected her challenge to use of the trustee’s proposed order because that practice does not “automatically sink to reversible error.” Affirmed.

Motion to dismiss; Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA); “Processing” marijuana; MCL 333.27953(x); MRTMA immunity; MCL 333.27955(1)(b); Butane extraction; MCL 333.27954(1)(d); People v Korkigian; Inconsistent laws; MCL 333.27954(5); People v Hess; Involuntary manslaughter; MCL 750.321; People v Mendoza; Third-degree child abuse; MCL 750.136b(5)(b); People v Lawhorn

The court held that butane extraction is “processing” under the MRTMA, requiring dismissal of the marijuana charge, but that MRTMA immunity did not bar prosecution for involuntary manslaughter or third-degree child abuse. Defendant was charged after he used butane extraction to make marijuana concentrate in a bathroom, causing an explosion and fire that killed his fiancé and severely burned his child and himself. The trial court denied his motion to dismiss, ruling under Korkigian that butane extraction was not protected processing under the MRTMA. On appeal, the court held that butane extraction falls within MCL 333.27953(x) because the statutory definition broadly includes “extract” and “otherwise mak[ing] or prepar[ing] marihuana concentrate.” It also reasoned MCL 333.27954(1)(d) “itself suggests that butane extraction is immune activity when it occurs in a protected place,” because it excludes public places, motor vehicles, and residential curtilage, but not the inside of a residence. Thus, the marijuana charge was barred by MRTMA immunity. But the court held that the manslaughter and child-abuse charges could proceed because the MRTMA does not immunize criminal negligence. The court reasoned those statutes were not “inconsistent with” the MRTMA because involuntary manslaughter may rest on a “lawful act, negligently performed,” and third-degree child abuse may rest on an act that poses an unreasonable risk to a child. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Motion to suppress; Search warrant; Fourth Amendment; Probable cause; Confidential informant; MCL 780.653(b); Independent investigation; People v Waclawski; Franks v Delaware hearing; Material omission; People v Mullen; Sentencing; OV 14; Leadership in multiple offender situation; MCL 777.44(1)(a); People v Dickinson; Acquitted conduct; People v Beck; Rational-jury standard; People v Brown; Possession with intent to deliver; MCL 333.7401; People v Wells; Simple possession; MCL 333.7403; Resentencing; Guidelines scoring error; People v Francisco

The court held that the search warrant affidavit established probable cause and did not warrant a Franks hearing, but resentencing was required because the trial court relied on acquitted conduct to score OV 14. Defendant was convicted of meth and amphetamine possession after police executed a warrant at his mother’s apartment. The trial court assessed 10 points for OV 14 at sentencing, raising his guidelines range. On appeal, the court first held that the affidavit supported probable cause because it identified a reliable informant whose information had proven “current and accurate,” linked defendant to Grandview Towers through Secretary of State records and surveillance, and described two controlled buys after which officers saw him return to the complex. It also held that the alleged omission about Officer S’s visit to the apartment was not material under Franks because the affidavit established probable cause that evidence would be found in the apartment whether or not that information was added. The court reasoned the affidavit “did not need to establish that defendant was present there.” But the court held that OV 14 was improperly scored. The jury acquitted defendant of possession with intent to deliver, and under Beck and Brown, the trial court could not rely on intent to deliver or a supposed delivery after the jury rejected that conduct. The trial court did exactly that, stating “there was a delivery, even though the jury disagreed,” when finding defendant was a leader in a multiple-offender situation. Because correcting OV 14 changed the minimum guidelines range, defendant was entitled to resentencing under Francisco. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Exclusion of evidence; Admissibility of text messages under MRE 803(3); People v Moorer; MRE 403; Whether error was outcome-determinative

The court held that the text messages defendant sought to admit fell squarely within MRE 803(3) and thus, the trial court erred in excluding them. Further, they “were highly probative of the central issue of the case,” and the court concluded that their exclusion “more probably than not was outcome determinative and” undermined the verdict’s reliability. Thus, it vacated his CSC III convictions and sentences, and remanded. The complainant (M) sent defendant the messages “contemporaneously with the alleged” offenses. In the messages, she “expressed great satisfaction with the couple’s sexual activity.” The court determined that they fell within the MRE 803(3) hearsay exception in light of “the nature of the allegations against defendant, the nature of the” messages M sent him “during the time frame that the charged conduct was alleged to have occurred, and the purpose for the proposed admission of the evidence, i.e., showing [M’s] then-existing state of mind[.]” Further, the central issue in this case was whether he “used force or coercion to engage in sexual penetration of” M. The court found that her “text messages that ‘we have the best sex and I will never be happier with my sex life than I am with ours,’ that she is passionately in love with defendant, that she wants to marry [him], have children with [him], and grow old with [him], refute the primary evidence offered by the prosecution, being [M’s] testimony that during the relationship she was frequently forced or coerced by defendant to have sex without her consent.” As to whether the error was outcome-determinative, the text messages stood “in stark contrast to [M’s] allegations, made the day after the couple ended the relationship, that defendant repeatedly sexually assaulted her.” The court also noted “that during deliberations, the jury requested to see” the text messages, “which the trial court denied because [they] were not in evidence, suggesting that the jury would have considered” their content if they had not been excluded. And after initially reporting that they were deadlocked, the jury later returned a guilty verdict “on two counts while remaining deadlocked on” the third.

Sufficiency of the evidence for a voluntary manslaughter conviction; Self-defense; People v Dupree; The Self-Defense Act; MCL 780.972(1)(a); Sentencing; Scoring of OV 5; MCL 777.35(1)(a)

The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s voluntary manslaughter conviction because a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecution disproved his self-defense claim. It also upheld the 15-point score for OV 5. The case arose from the shooting death of victim-S. The court concluded the record did “not support that defendant ‘honestly and reasonably believe[d] that the use of deadly force [was] necessary to prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself . . . or to another individual’ such that insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict.” It noted that he testified “he initially left the area, and later he did nothing when [S] ran by his family members while leaving the immediate area even though he thought [S] still had a gun. Then, with the situation apparently stable and no obvious imminent danger, defendant testified that he followed [S] and shot [him] again, supposedly because [S] started to raise his gun toward him. Defendant then returned to his house while his family members remained in the parking lot where [S] still had access to a gun and defendant not knowing if [S] was dead. A rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty based on these facts.” The court also noted that “the jury was in the best position to consider conflicting testimony and assess the credibility of the witnesses, some of whom it could have found less credible.” In addition, it saw a surveillance video that showed defendant approaching S, “defendant shooting him the first time while [S] was seated on the ground, [S] standing up and running away from defendant and his family members, defendant pursuing [him], and defendant shooting [S] a second time, though the view of the second shooting was obstructed.” While he testified that he shot S “to protect himself and his family, a rational juror could infer that he was acting out of passion after being provoked when [S] shot his daughter[.]” As to the scoring of OV 5, while “professional treatment had not yet been sought, the nature and description of the psychological effect of [S’s] death on his family members indicated that [it] ‘may be necessary in the future.’” Affirmed.

Prosecutorial error; Witness questioning; Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701; Closing argument; Burden of proof; Vouching; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM); Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Hallak; Unreasonable search; Scoring of OV 12; MCL 777.42(1)(a) & (2)(a); People v Carter; Right to resentencing

The court rejected defendant’s prosecutorial error and related ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It also found that his constitutional challenges to imposition of LEM for his CSC II conviction involving a victim under age 13 failed under Hallak. But it held that 25 points were improperly scored for OV 12 and that this error entitled him to resentencing. Thus, it affirmed his conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. As to his prosecutorial error claims, the court first found that defendant mischaracterized the record in asserting that a witness (C) “expressed an opinion on defendant’s guilt, as a review of” her testimony showed “that she did not opine that the victim was telling the truth. [C’s] testimony merely provided background . . . and context for defendant’s request that [C] provide information about the victim’s mother and grandmother to support his case. [C’s] testimony did not include an opinion that the victim was telling the truth or even discuss the victim’s specific allegations.” Defendant did not establish that the prosecutor plainly erred in questioning C. The court also determined that the prosecutor’s closing argument “statements did not distort the burden of proof by requiring the jury to find that the prosecutor’s witnesses were lying to acquit defendant. Rather, the prosecutor ‘merely attacked the credibility of a theory defendant advanced at trial[.]’” Further, the prosecutor did not vouch for the victim’s credibility. As to defendant’s claims that LEM constituted cruel or unusual punishment or an unreasonable search as applied to him, he did not offer “a legally relevant basis to distinguish his case from Hallak.” But in regard to OV 12, as in Carter, the prosecution here “proved defendant’s intent by arguing that all acts of touching constituted the sentencing offense, and no one otherwise attempted to distinguish any of the acts of touching.” The court concluded “that the trial court clearly erred by treating three of the touchings as separate contemporaneous felonious criminal acts for” OV 12 purposes. And defendant was entitled to resentencing because reducing his OV score by 25 points altered the recommended minimum guidelines range.

Habeas corpus; 28 USC § 2254; Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); Exhaustion of state remedies; § 2254(b); Procedural default; Cause & prejudice; Coleman v Thompson; Breach of plea agreement; Prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Sixth Amendment; Strickland v Washington; Strickland prejudice; Sentencing impact

The court held that petitioner failed to show the ineffective assistance of counsel prejudice needed to excuse his procedural default of a habeas claim based on the prosecutor’s breach of his plea agreement. Petitioner pled guilty in Ohio state court after the state agreed to “make no sentencing recommendation,” but at sentencing the prosecutor urged the court to impose a “very, very substantial sentence,” and counsel did not object. The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor breached the agreement but found no error, and the district court denied habeas relief because petitioner could not excuse his procedural default. On appeal, the court held that ineffective assistance could supply cause only if petitioner established deficient performance and prejudice. The state did not meaningfully dispute deficient performance, but petitioner had to show a “substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result.” He failed to do so because the state in the plea agreement had reserved the right to be heard at sentencing, the proper comparison was not silence by the prosecutor but the same speech minus two improper recommendation statements, and the record showed the sentencing judge relied on other grounds. The court noted the judge downplayed the prosecutor’s argument as “just argument at sentencing,” then heard from defense counsel, witnesses, and petitioner, engaged petitioner in an independent colloquy, and never mentioned the recommendation when imposing a sentence below the potential maximum. Because the improper statements “played, at best, a minor role,” petitioner did not undermine confidence in the sentence. Affirmed.

Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) claims; Court of Claims Act (COCA); Notice requirement; MCL 600.6431(1); Claims against the state; MCL 600.6419(7); Retroactivity; Christie v Wayne State Univ; Flamont v Department of Corrs; Community colleges; Doan v Kellogg Cmty Coll; Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act; MCL 691.1407; Political subdivision; MCL 691.1401(e); Pohutski v Allen Park

The court held that plaintiffs’ ELCRA claims against defendant-community college district were not barred by the COCA notice requirement because defendant is not the state or a state arm or agency. Plaintiffs sued defendant and its security director, alleging sex-based disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing in part that plaintiffs failed to timely file a written claim or notice of intent in the Court of Claims under MCL 600.6431(1). The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that Christie applies retroactively, noting Flamont held that Christie “corrected a misinterpretation of MCL 600.6431.” But the court held that the notice requirement still did not apply because defendant did not fall within the statutory definition of “the state or any of its departments or officers.” Relying on Doan, the court reasoned community colleges are “local in nature” because they are locally created, locally governed, locally financed, and primarily serve the community. It rejected defendant’s reliance on governmental immunity because a community college district may be a governmental agency for tort-immunity purposes, but only as a “political subdivision,” and “‘governmental agency and state are not synonymous.’” Thus, plaintiffs were not required to comply with the COCA notice provision. Affirmed.

Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA) claims; Court of Claims Act (COCA); Notice requirement; MCL 600.6431(1); Claims against the state; MCL 600.6419(7); Retroactivity; Christie v Wayne State Univ; Flamont v Department of Corrs; Community colleges; Doan v Kellogg Cmty Coll; Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act; MCL 691.1407; Political subdivision; MCL 691.1401(e); Pohutski v Allen Park

The court held that plaintiffs’ ELCRA claims against defendant-community college district were not barred by the COCA notice requirement because defendant is not the state or a state arm or agency. Plaintiffs sued defendant and its security director, alleging sex-based disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing in part that plaintiffs failed to timely file a written claim or notice of intent in the Court of Claims under MCL 600.6431(1). The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that Christie applies retroactively, noting Flamont held that Christie “corrected a misinterpretation of MCL 600.6431.” But the court held that the notice requirement still did not apply because defendant did not fall within the statutory definition of “the state or any of its departments or officers.” Relying on Doan, the court reasoned community colleges are “local in nature” because they are locally created, locally governed, locally financed, and primarily serve the community. It rejected defendant’s reliance on governmental immunity because a community college district may be a governmental agency for tort-immunity purposes, but only as a “political subdivision,” and “‘governmental agency and state are not synonymous.’” Thus, plaintiffs were not required to comply with the COCA notice provision. Affirmed.

Medical malpractice; Wrongful death; Wrongful Death Act (WDA); MCL 600.2921; MCL 600.2922(6); Loss of household & caretaking services; Loss-of-services damages; Daher v Prime Healthcare Servs-Garden City, LLC; Demott v VHS Harper-Hutzel Hosp, Inc

The court held that the WDA permits recovery for loss-of-services damages and that the trial court erred by barring plaintiff’s claim for the value of decedent’s household and caretaking services. Plaintiff sued for wrongful death based on alleged medical malpractice in treating decedent’s atrial fibrillation with Coumadin. The trial court granted defendant partial summary disposition, concluding under Daher that MCL 600.2922(6) did not authorize damages for lost household services. On appeal, the court held that the trial court read Daher too broadly. It explained that Daher rejected recovery for lost future earnings under the current WDA, but “loss-of-services” damages are distinct from “damages for lost future earnings.” Relying on Demott, the court held “loss-of-services damages remain available under the WDA following Daher,” as they have since Michigan’s death act was enacted in 1848. The court further noted the Supreme Court “has never held that loss-of-services damages are unavailable under the WDA,” and Daher did not address that issue. Thus, plaintiff was not prohibited from seeking damages for the loss of decedent’s services. Reversed in part and remanded.

Medical malpractice; Wrongful death; Wrongful Death Act (WDA); MCL 600.2921; MCL 600.2922(6); Loss of household & caretaking services; Loss-of-services damages; Daher v Prime Healthcare Servs-Garden City, LLC; Demott v VHS Harper-Hutzel Hosp, Inc

The court held that the WDA permits recovery for loss-of-services damages and that the trial court erred by barring plaintiff’s claim for the value of decedent’s household and caretaking services. Plaintiff sued for wrongful death based on alleged medical malpractice in treating decedent’s atrial fibrillation with Coumadin. The trial court granted defendant partial summary disposition, concluding under Daher that MCL 600.2922(6) did not authorize damages for lost household services. On appeal, the court held that the trial court read Daher too broadly. It explained that Daher rejected recovery for lost future earnings under the current WDA, but “loss-of-services” damages are distinct from “damages for lost future earnings.” Relying on Demott, the court held “loss-of-services damages remain available under the WDA following Daher,” as they have since Michigan’s death act was enacted in 1848. The court further noted the Supreme Court “has never held that loss-of-services damages are unavailable under the WDA,” and Daher did not address that issue. Thus, plaintiff was not prohibited from seeking damages for the loss of decedent’s services. Reversed in part and remanded.

Principal residence exemption (PRE); Effect of initially filing a nonresident tax return & later filing an amended resident tax return; MCL 211.7cc(3)(c); “Has filed”; Comparing the exception in MCL 211.7cc(3)(a); Campbell v Department of Treasury; Waiver of an issue; Tax Tribunal (TT)

In an issue of first impression, the court held that “MCL 211.7cc(3)(c) does not prohibit property owners from obtaining a PRE when they have amended an erroneously-filed nonresident tax return to reflect resident status.” Thus, it affirmed the TT’s judgment, which reversed respondent’s denial of petitioners’ claimed PRE. MCL 211.7cc(3)(c) provides that “a property owner generally may not qualify for an exemption if they have ‘filed a nonresident Michigan income tax return.’” The issue before the court was “whether a property owner may claim a PRE when they initially filed a nonresident” return but later filed an amended resident return. It concluded that the statute permits them to do so. In interpreting the provision, the dispute turned on whether “has filed” in the statute “refers to the physical act of filing a return, as respondent urges, or to the operative return in question, as petitioners urge.” After considering how amended tax returns work, the court determined that, “just as a litigant is bound by their most recently filed amended pleading, which supersedes the original pleading, an amended return effectively replaces the original return. The Legislature was presumably aware that taxpayers are permitted to amend their returns after filing when it drafted the exception.” Thus, the court saw “no reason why an amended state return should not be treated as superseding and replacing the initially filed return for purposes of MCL 211.7cc(3)(c).” As a result, the exception refers “to the taxpayer’s operative return, which includes an amended return, if applicable.” The court noted that its interpretation was also supported by MCL 211.7cc(3)(a)’s language, which the Legislature amended to forbid “property owners from amending an out-of-state tax return to obtain a tax benefit[.]” The absence of this language in MCL 211.7cc(3)(c) suggested it “did not intend to automatically disqualify property owners who amend an erroneously-filed nonresident Michigan tax return.” Because petitioners filed an amended return to correct petitioner-Sue Anne’s residency status, that was the operative return.

Child protective proceedings; Jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); No-contest plea; MCR 3.971; In re Ferranti; Preponderance of the evidence; In re Kellogg; Criminality; In re MU; Second-degree child abuse; MCL 750.136b(3); Anticipatory neglect; In re LaFrance Minors

The court held that the trial court did not err by assuming temporary jurisdiction over respondent-father’s children under MCL 712A.2(b)(2). After respondent removed one of his children (MND) from school, physically abused her in his truck, and allegedly told her “I really want to kill you right now,” DHHS filed a petition. The trial court entered a removal order, respondent pleaded no contest to using the petition as the factual basis, and the trial court took jurisdiction over MND and another child, CMD. On appeal, the court first rejected his assertion that the “clear and convincing evidence” standard applied, explaining DHHS only had to establish one jurisdictional ground by a preponderance. It next held that the petition supported jurisdiction over MND under § 2(b)(2). Although respondent argued the petition did not allege home conditions, the court reasoned the statute covers an unfit “environment” as well as a home, and criminality “does not directly implicate home conditions.” The petition alleged respondent’s cruelty and criminality, including acts supporting second-degree child abuse by “knowingly or intentionally commit[ting] an act likely to cause serious physical or mental harm to a child” or “an act that is cruel to a child regardless of whether harm results.” The court further held that jurisdiction over CMD was proper under anticipatory neglect because respondent’s abuse of MND was “probative evidence of how he would treat CMD,” who lived in the same household and was younger and more susceptible. Affirmed.

Assumption of jurisdiction; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); In re MU

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in assuming jurisdiction over respondent-mother’s children under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), the court affirmed. Pursuant to that subsection, a “trial court has jurisdiction over a juvenile ‘[w]hose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent, . . . is an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.’” Respondent contended that the trial court erred in finding jurisdiction based on this provision “because the petition made no mention of the children’s home conditions.” But the court found that this subsection does not impose any “such specific requirement. It provides for jurisdiction when a ‘home or environment’ is an unfit place for a juvenile to live in because of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent.” Respondent pled “to the allegations in the petition that pertained to her.” Those allegations/admissions “included: a 2023 incident during which she shoplifted using” one child’s (LB) “stroller while LB was in it, being the perpetrator of domestic violence, significant drug use, recent incarceration, a strong inference of depravity (if not criminality) relating to the potential adoption of” another of the children, and evidence of neglect as to LB and the third child “given she had no knowledge of where they were at the time of her [6/25] incarceration. The fact that she may not have been convicted of each listed crime” did not undermine the trial “court’s finding as to jurisdiction.” Pursuant to MU, the DHHS does not need to prove that a respondent was convicted of a crime in “‘order for the trial court to assume jurisdiction over the’” children based on criminality. Rather, it only has to establish by a preponderance of the evidence “‘that the respondent engaged in criminal behavior.’”