FIP under MCL 750.224f(1)(a); People v Hughes; Facial & as-applied Second Amendment challenge; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen & United States v Rahimi; Felony-firearm; Dismissal of related charge; MCL 750.227b

The court held that the trial court erred by dismissing the FIP and felony-firearm charges because MCL 750.224f(1)(a)’s requirement that a felon pay all fines before firearm rights are restored does not facially or as applied violate the Second Amendment. Defendant had prior felony convictions from 2015, initially received youthful trainee status, lost that status after a probation violation, and in 2024 was charged with FIP and felony-firearm after allegedly shooting his sister in the hand. The trial court dismissed those two charges after concluding that the statute was unconstitutional because it tied firearm rights restoration to unpaid fines. On appeal, the court held that the constitutional challenge failed because the statute “does not prohibit firearm possession for persons who have not paid fines; rather, it withholds restoration of rights until three years after” the person has paid fines, completed imprisonment, and successfully completed probation or parole. The court next held that Hughes controlled because Michigan may constitutionally restrict firearm possession by felons, including nonviolent felons, and that if the state may “permissibly prohibit a nonviolent felon from possessing a firearm forever, it is logically permissible to impose a requirement for restoration of rights[.]” The court further reasoned that it “is a privilege for a felon to have their right to possess a firearm reinstated” and that it is “reasonable for a felon to have to prove that they are rehabilitated, have paid their debt to society, and are worthy of the privilege” before regaining firearm rights. Because the trial court wrongly dismissed the FIP count, it also wrongly dismissed the related felony-firearm count. Reversed and remanded.

Breach of a construction contract; Third-party beneficiary to a subcontract; MCL 600.1405; “Directly”; Kisiel v Holz; Liability for failing to construct perimeter partition walls as required by the subcontract; Contract interpretation; Parties’ intent; Manifest injustice; Qualification of an expert; MRE 702; Motion for directed verdict; Damages; Waiver

The court held that the trial court did not err in granting defendant/counterplaintiff-High Top Buds (HTB) summary disposition on the basis that HTB was a third-party beneficiary to a subcontract on a construction project. It also rejected plaintiff-Pearson’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling “holding Pearson liable for its failure to construct perimeter partition walls as required by the subcontract.” Further, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying HTB’s liability expert as an expert witness or in denying Pearson’s motion for a directed verdict. It also found no manifest injustice. Thus, it affirmed the judgment for HTB. Defendant-Dailey Company was the general contractor on the project. HTB contracted with Dailey “for the construction of a commercial cannabis grow facility. In turn, Dailey and Pearson entered into a subcontract for Pearson to do carpentry work on the project. The subcontract included the installation of fiberglass reinforced plastic (FRP) walls.” Pearson filed this suit after finishing its work on the project, alleging an unjust enrichment claim against HTB, which “filed a countercomplaint against Pearson for breach of duty, both under the common law and as a third-party beneficiary to the subcontract,” As to the third-party beneficiary issue, the court agreed with the trial court that while HTB was “not a party to the subcontract, Pearson made direct promises to HTB as ‘owner’ of the property through clear contractual language. First, the subcontract named the project ‘High Top Buds – Labar Dr.’” In addition, “in several different provisions, Pearson, as the ‘subcontractor’ adopts duties owed directly to the project’s ‘owner,’ listed as HTB.” In particular, “§ 17.1 states, ‘Subcontractor warrants to Contractor and Owner that all material and equipment furnished shall be new unless otherwise specified, and that all of the Subcontract Work shall be of good quality, free from faults and defects and in conformance with the Contract Documents[.]’” As to liability for failing to construct the perimeter partition walls, the court noted that parol “‘evidence of contract negotiations, or of prior or contemporaneous agreements that contradict or vary the written contract, is not admissible to vary the terms of a contract which is clear and unambiguous,’” as this subcontract was.

Breach of a construction contract; Third-party beneficiary to a subcontract; MCL 600.1405; “Directly”; Kisiel v Holz; Liability for failing to construct perimeter partition walls as required by the subcontract; Contract interpretation; Parties’ intent; Manifest injustice; Qualification of an expert; MRE 702; Motion for directed verdict; Damages; Waiver

The court held that the trial court did not err in granting defendant/counterplaintiff-High Top Buds (HTB) summary disposition on the basis that HTB was a third-party beneficiary to a subcontract on a construction project. It also rejected plaintiff-Pearson’s challenge to the trial court’s ruling “holding Pearson liable for its failure to construct perimeter partition walls as required by the subcontract.” Further, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying HTB’s liability expert as an expert witness or in denying Pearson’s motion for a directed verdict. It also found no manifest injustice. Thus, it affirmed the judgment for HTB. Defendant-Dailey Company was the general contractor on the project. HTB contracted with Dailey “for the construction of a commercial cannabis grow facility. In turn, Dailey and Pearson entered into a subcontract for Pearson to do carpentry work on the project. The subcontract included the installation of fiberglass reinforced plastic (FRP) walls.” Pearson filed this suit after finishing its work on the project, alleging an unjust enrichment claim against HTB, which “filed a countercomplaint against Pearson for breach of duty, both under the common law and as a third-party beneficiary to the subcontract,” As to the third-party beneficiary issue, the court agreed with the trial court that while HTB was “not a party to the subcontract, Pearson made direct promises to HTB as ‘owner’ of the property through clear contractual language. First, the subcontract named the project ‘High Top Buds – Labar Dr.’” In addition, “in several different provisions, Pearson, as the ‘subcontractor’ adopts duties owed directly to the project’s ‘owner,’ listed as HTB.” In particular, “§ 17.1 states, ‘Subcontractor warrants to Contractor and Owner that all material and equipment furnished shall be new unless otherwise specified, and that all of the Subcontract Work shall be of good quality, free from faults and defects and in conformance with the Contract Documents[.]’” As to liability for failing to construct the perimeter partition walls, the court noted that parol “‘evidence of contract negotiations, or of prior or contemporaneous agreements that contradict or vary the written contract, is not admissible to vary the terms of a contract which is clear and unambiguous,’” as this subcontract was.

FIP under MCL 750.224f(1)(a); People v Hughes; Facial & as-applied Second Amendment challenge; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen & United States v Rahimi; Felony-firearm; Dismissal of related charge; MCL 750.227b

The court held that the trial court erred by dismissing the FIP and felony-firearm charges because MCL 750.224f(1)(a)’s requirement that a felon pay all fines before firearm rights are restored does not facially or as applied violate the Second Amendment. Defendant had prior felony convictions from 2015, initially received youthful trainee status, lost that status after a probation violation, and in 2024 was charged with FIP and felony-firearm after allegedly shooting his sister in the hand. The trial court dismissed those two charges after concluding that the statute was unconstitutional because it tied firearm rights restoration to unpaid fines. On appeal, the court held that the constitutional challenge failed because the statute “does not prohibit firearm possession for persons who have not paid fines; rather, it withholds restoration of rights until three years after” the person has paid fines, completed imprisonment, and successfully completed probation or parole. The court next held that Hughes controlled because Michigan may constitutionally restrict firearm possession by felons, including nonviolent felons, and that if the state may “permissibly prohibit a nonviolent felon from possessing a firearm forever, it is logically permissible to impose a requirement for restoration of rights[.]” The court further reasoned that it “is a privilege for a felon to have their right to possess a firearm reinstated” and that it is “reasonable for a felon to have to prove that they are rehabilitated, have paid their debt to society, and are worthy of the privilege” before regaining firearm rights. Because the trial court wrongly dismissed the FIP count, it also wrongly dismissed the related felony-firearm count. Reversed and remanded.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Motion to suppress firearm; People v Traylor; Failure to object to prosecutor’s argument; Vouching; People v Bahoda; Due process; Failure to preserve 911 recordings; People v Anstey; Adverse-inference jury instruction; People v Cress; Sufficiency of the evidence; Felonious assault; MCL 750.82; People v Nix; Identity; Evidence; Corpus delicti rule; People v Washington; Concealed Pistol License (CPL)

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, her due-process rights were not violated by the loss of 911 recordings, and sufficient evidence supported her felonious assault conviction. The case arose from a road-rage incident in which the victim testified that the driver of a tan Equinox pulled alongside her vehicle, waved a gun, pointed it at her, and caused her to fear for her life. The jury convicted defendant of felonious assault. She appealed on ineffective-assistance, due-process, and sufficiency grounds. The court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to move earlier to suppress the gun because the record showed he did move to suppress it once the prosecutor sought admission, and decisions about which motions to file are matters of trial strategy. The court next held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object during closing and rebuttal because the prosecutor did not improperly vouch, but instead argued from the evidence that the victim “didn't make it up, she’s telling the truth,” and the CPL remarks were responsive to the defense theory. The court also held that no due-process violation occurred because the “‘police have no constitutional duty to assist a defendant in developing potentially exculpatory evidence[,]’” and no adverse-inference instruction was warranted absent bad faith, especially where the recordings were purged under a routine 90-day policy. Finally, the court held that the victim’s testimony and defendant’s admissions sufficiently established felonious assault and identity, and that the corpus delicti rule did not bar her statements because they were “merely admissions,” not a confession. Affirmed.

First-party no-fault action; Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Applicability of a no-fault policy; MCL 500.3114(1); “Domicile”; Grange Ins Co of MI v Lawrence; Resident relative; Mapp v Progressive Ins Co; Hearsay

The court held that, given the conflicting evidence as to whether the injured person (nonparty-Kevin Jr.) and defendant’s insured (nonparty-Sharmaine) “lived together at the time of the accident, a genuine issue of material fact” existed as to whether Kevin Jr. was a resident relative covered under the policy. Thus, the court reversed the circuit court opinion affirming a district court order granting defendant summary disposition in this first-party action for PIP benefits. The court noted in Mapp that a no-fault “‘policy may provide broader coverage than that mandated by the no-fault act,’ including by extending coverage not just to ‘relatives domiciled in a named insured’s household,’ but to ‘relatives residing in a named insured’s household.’” The parties argued that in disputing whether Kevin Jr. was a resident relative, the other was relying on hearsay. But the court noted that, at this stage of the litigation, “whether the statements in their currently offered form constitute hearsay is not determinative.” Although trial courts “may consider only substantively admissible evidence, ‘a party does not have to lay the foundation for evidence submitted in support of or opposition to a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).’” Both parties relied “on claim notes or other written documentation to support their respective positions regarding where Sharmaine lived. The substance of this evidence, to the extent not already admissible in its current form, could be presented at trial through testimony from Sharmaine herself. Accordingly, even if the evidence was submitted in an inadmissible form, it remains substantively admissible.” Given the conflicting evidence here, which created a genuine issue of material fact, “summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was improper.” Remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Deferring a ruling on a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity until after the close of ordered discovery; FedRCivP 56(d); Summers v Leis

The court vacated the district court’s order delaying a ruling on qualified immunity, concluding it could not find the district court correctly determined that a ruling on the summary judgment motion could not be made without further discovery. Because the error effectively denied qualified immunity, the court had jurisdiction to correct it. Plaintiff-Smith’s son (Irwin) urinated in public after leaving a hospital. Defendant-Officer Davis pursued and tackled him, resulting in Irwin’s permanent incapacitation. Smith (Irwin’s guardian) sued alleging excessive force and Ohio state-law torts. Although Davis answered the complaint, neither he nor his employers responded to Smith’s discovery requests. Rather, they immediately moved to stay discovery and for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the stay, “ordered further discovery, and deferred ruling on the summary judgment motion until after the close of discovery.” The court noted the summary judgment record contained a video (without audio) and an affidavit from Davis explaining his version of events. It also noted that district courts cannot avoid ruling on a qualified immunity motion “‘by simply ordering further discovery. … If qualified immunity is properly raised prior to discovery, the district court has a duty to address it.’” A delay on the motion for summary judgment is proper after the district court reviews the record and determines that further discovery is warranted because material disputed facts exist. Here, while “the district court identified ‘some differences’ between the parties’ accounts of the interaction, it expressly disclaimed finding or intending to find any genuine dispute of material fact. And it appeared to consider only some of the facts available to it. In particular, its order makes no mention of the video evidence. That” was significant for the court’s decision “because unambiguous videos can prevent a district court from finding that a genuinely disputed material fact makes summary judgment inappropriate.” The court declined Davis’s request to reach the merits of his qualified immunity claim. Remanded.

Quiet title action over a section of road right of way; Abandonment; Ambs v Kalamazoo Cnty Rd Comm’n; Villadsen v Mason Cnty Rd Comm’n; Applicability of the definitions in MCL 247.660c

Concluding that the record supported the trial court’s ruling that plaintiffs did not prove abandonment of any portion of the road at issue, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants-road commission (RC) and township of plaintiffs’ quiet title claim. At issue was “the ownership of an approximately 330-foot section of a 66-foot right of way for Harrington Road” in the township. The road “becomes a gravel road for several hundred feet before it reaches a guardrail with a stop sign and a no parking sign.” The road is neither paved nor gravel east of the guardrail. Lake Huron is 330 feet east of the guardrail. Plaintiffs asserted they were entitled to quiet title to the road “east of the guardrail because under Michigan’s common law the [RC] abandoned Harrington Road east of the guardrail.” They argued that the RC’s intent to abandon it was shown by its “failure to certify the easternmost 204.6 feet of Harrington Road.” The trial court reasoned that the RC “would not have been likely to keep the eastern portion of Harrington Road certified after the enactment of Act 51 because the [RC] would not have intended to use collected taxes to maintain that portion of” the road for vehicular use. Thus, the trial court found that the RC’s “non-certification of the 204.6 feet at the easternmost edge of Harrington Road did not demonstrate intent to abandon the eastern portion of” the road. The court agreed, concluding the “fact that the non-certified 204.6 feet primarily consists of beach reflects the nature of the land at issue rather than any intent to abandon it.” As to plaintiffs’ failure to maintain argument, the RC’s “act of placing the guardrail and stop sign at the end of the gravel portion of Harrington Road constituted adequate care of the roadway beyond the guardrail under the circumstances because it prevented vehicular use beyond the guardrail while not preventing pedestrian traffic.” In addition, the RC’s inaction as to the boulders placed by private citizens “to prevent motorcycle and ATV traffic” did not reveal “an intent to abandon the eastern portion of Harrington Road, but is instead consistent with the intended use of the road.” Further, the record supported “the trial court’s finding that public use of the eastern portion of Harrington Road has been consistent seasonal use.”

Quiet title; Chain of title & deed interpretation; Race-notice; MCL 565.29; Michigan Dep’t of Natural Res v Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc; Easement; Access easement appurtenant v easement in gross; Penrose v McCullough; Slander of title; Malice under MCL 565.108; Wells Fargo Bank v Country Place Condo Ass’n; Trespass; Exclusive possession; Terlecki v Stewart

The court held that title to the subject property was properly quieted in defendant-Kano because, when the 2013 deed was read together with the incorporated addenda and related documents, the property was never conveyed to a nonparty referred to as the GWCDC. Further, the neighboring property remained subject to an access easement benefiting the subject property. The dispute concerned two adjoining parcels, the “subject property” at 6437 East Palmer and the “neighboring property” at 1625 East Grand Boulevard, both originally acquired by defendant-Simonetta’s father, Antonio, in 1996, after which competing chains of title developed from later deeds, addenda, and trust transfers. The trial court quieted title to the subject property in Kano and to the neighboring property in appellant, subject to an access easement. On appeal, the court held that “the plain language of” the 2013 deed “included ‘Parcel 1 and 2’” (the subject property and the neighboring property), but that the deed also “expressly references the first addendum[.]” Thus, the deed had to be read with the incorporated documents because a deed “must be read as a whole in order to ascertain the grantor’s intent” and incorporated writings “should be read together.” The court next held that the first and second addenda made clear the intended “gift” was only “1625 E. Grand Blvd” (parcel ID 15000591), so “the subject property was never conveyed to the GWCDC.” It also held that the access easement survived because the easement expressly related to ingress and egress “to and from the” subject property and, since “Michigan law favors easements appurtenant,” it ran with the land rather than belonging personally to Antonio. Finally, the court held that defendant-OBI was entitled to summary disposition on the slander of title claim because there was no evidence it acted with malice, and that the trespass claim failed because appellant had no right to exclusive possession of the subject property. Affirmed.

Quiet title action over a section of road right of way; Abandonment; Ambs v Kalamazoo Cnty Rd Comm’n; Villadsen v Mason Cnty Rd Comm’n; Applicability of the definitions in MCL 247.660c

Concluding that the record supported the trial court’s ruling that plaintiffs did not prove abandonment of any portion of the road at issue, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants-road commission (RC) and township of plaintiffs’ quiet title claim. At issue was “the ownership of an approximately 330-foot section of a 66-foot right of way for Harrington Road” in the township. The road “becomes a gravel road for several hundred feet before it reaches a guardrail with a stop sign and a no parking sign.” The road is neither paved nor gravel east of the guardrail. Lake Huron is 330 feet east of the guardrail. Plaintiffs asserted they were entitled to quiet title to the road “east of the guardrail because under Michigan’s common law the [RC] abandoned Harrington Road east of the guardrail.” They argued that the RC’s intent to abandon it was shown by its “failure to certify the easternmost 204.6 feet of Harrington Road.” The trial court reasoned that the RC “would not have been likely to keep the eastern portion of Harrington Road certified after the enactment of Act 51 because the [RC] would not have intended to use collected taxes to maintain that portion of” the road for vehicular use. Thus, the trial court found that the RC’s “non-certification of the 204.6 feet at the easternmost edge of Harrington Road did not demonstrate intent to abandon the eastern portion of” the road. The court agreed, concluding the “fact that the non-certified 204.6 feet primarily consists of beach reflects the nature of the land at issue rather than any intent to abandon it.” As to plaintiffs’ failure to maintain argument, the RC’s “act of placing the guardrail and stop sign at the end of the gravel portion of Harrington Road constituted adequate care of the roadway beyond the guardrail under the circumstances because it prevented vehicular use beyond the guardrail while not preventing pedestrian traffic.” In addition, the RC’s inaction as to the boulders placed by private citizens “to prevent motorcycle and ATV traffic” did not reveal “an intent to abandon the eastern portion of Harrington Road, but is instead consistent with the intended use of the road.” Further, the record supported “the trial court’s finding that public use of the eastern portion of Harrington Road has been consistent seasonal use.”