First-degree murder; Premeditation & deliberation; People v Plummer; Applicability of MRE 404(b)(1) to defendant’s statements; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Whether defendant experienced a complete denial of counsel; United States v Cronic; Right to a speedy trial; People v Smith; Right to a fair trial; Juror not made an alternate after falling asleep during a prosecution witness’s testimony; People v Dunigan; Brady v Maryland; Failure to disclose impeachment evidence; Prejudice; Newly discovered evidence; People v Cress

The court held that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support defendant’s first-degree murder conviction, and that his prior statements were not prior acts. Further, the facts did not establish that he “experienced a complete denial of counsel such that prejudice should be presumed under Cronic.” The court also found that he was not entitled to a new trial due to denial of his right to a speedy trial or based on newly discovered evidence. In addition, he was not “denied a fair trial because a juror was not made an alternate after she fell asleep during” a prosecution witness’s testimony, and he was not entitled to relief under Brady because the evidence at issue was not material. Thus, the court affirmed his first-degree murder and felony-firearm convictions. The trial evidence showed that the victim (R) was shot in the back, and a witness to the shooting (C) “testified that there was no fight or confrontation between defendant and [R] immediately before the shooting. Although defendant’s Facebook messages did not directly tie him to [R], they showed that defendant was on crutches, he suspected at least that someone from (or with ties to)” an apartment complex (Fox Ridge) “may have some involvement in or knowledge of the shooting in [6/19], and that he planned to kill the person who shot him. That [his] Facebook account was deleted on the day of [R’s] murder and that defendant fled the state is also evidence that [he] was conscious of guilt for his involvement in” the murder. In addition, viewing a video and another witness’s (B) “testimony together, the jury could infer that [B] testified in a manner that would minimize his involvement in the crime, but that defendant paid [B] to drive him to Fox Ridge and that [B] also intended to drive defendant away from Fox Ridge immediately after the shooting.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim “the trial court erred by admitting evidence that he was shot in [6/19], as his statements after the shooting constituted impermissible prior bad-acts evidence.” As to his speedy trial argument, the prosecution overcame “the presumption that defendant’s trial was prejudiced because of the delay in his trial, and the weight of the factors did not justify granting” him a new trial. The court also rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

Pro se post-divorce proceeding; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(8); Pleading requirements; MCR 2.111(A)(1) & 2.110(A)(1); Frivolous action sanctions; MCL 600.2591; MCR 2.625(A)(2); Signature certification; MCR 1.109(E); Judicial disqualification; MCR 2.003(D)(2)

The court held that plaintiff-ex-wife failed to state cognizable claims because her pleadings and appellate arguments were not “clear, concise, and direct,” and it upheld sanctions because the trial court did not err in finding the action “frivolous” and filed to “harass” defendant-ex-husband. Plaintiff filed a pro se civil action seeking divorce-related attorney fees, retroactive child support, unpaid rent, medical expenses, and other damages tied to domestic-assault allegations and later proceedings. Defendant moved for summary disposition and sanctions based on prior litigation and the incoherence and relitigation of claims. The court affirmed dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because MCR 2.111(A)(1) requires allegations to be “clear, concise, and direct,” and “even on appeal, it is unclear what plaintiff’s claims against defendant are.” The court deemed issues abandoned where plaintiff failed to provide authority or a developed argument. It also affirmed the attorney-fee sanction award, explaining MCL 600.2591 mandates fees when an action is “frivolous,” including when the primary purpose is to “harass, embarrass, or injure” or when the legal position is “devoid of arguable legal merit.” It held that the trial court did not err in concluding the filing violated MCR 1.109(E) because plaintiff’s signature certified the complaint was “well-grounded in fact” and “warranted by existing law,” which was not the case. The court declined to reach her request for judicial-disqualification relief because it affirmed and, in any event, plaintiff did not plead disqualification grounds “with particularity” or provide an adequate record. Affirmed.

Personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Coverage dispute; Termination of insurance; MCL 500.2123; Policy cancellation; MCL 500.3020; “Notice of cancellation”; Yang v Everest Nat’l Ins Co; Reliance on logs contained in the underwriting file; MCR 2.313(C)(1) & 2.302(A)(1)(d)

Holding that there was “no material factual dispute that the policy was cancelled by” defendant-Progressive before the accident in question and that “there was no coverage at the time of the accident,” the court affirmed summary disposition for Progressive in this coverage dispute. Plaintiffs-medical providers sought PIP benefits for services provided to a nonparty (W) who was involved in an auto accident. W obtained the policy at issue before the accident. She “paid her first and second monthly premiums using a debit card, which she had saved to her online account. The next premium owed was declined” because her “bank account ‘declined her automatic credit card premium payment.’ [W] testified she was not aware” it was declined. The court found no merit in plaintiffs’ assertion “there was no admissible evidence supporting the proof of mailing for the” ensuing cancellation notice. “Progressive offered a copy of the cancellation notice, which listed a ‘[d]ate of [m]ailing’ as [6/9/23]. The cancellation notice stated, ‘we didn’t receive your payment and, as a result, your policy will be [cancelled] at 12:01 a.m. on [6/22/23].’ To avoid cancellation, [W] was required to pay the $217.36 premium by [6/22/23]. Further, the record included customer interaction history logs and a transaction history log. The customer interaction history log reflected a notice of nonpayment was sent by USPS to” W on 6/8/23. A representative for Progressive (C) “averred the cancellation notice was sent on [6/9/23], that [W] did not timely pay the premium, and that the policy was cancelled at 12:01 a.m. on [6/22/23]. The transaction history log indicates a ‘[f]inal [c]ancel’ was entered on [6/23/23]. The accident occurred on” 7/6/23. It was reinstated eight days later after W paid her premium and “electronically signed a statement of no loss” that included a condition that if the policy was “‘reinstated, Progressive will not cover any accidents or damages between’” 6/22/23 and the date and time W signed the document. The court concluded that viewing W’s “testimony in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, it” did not establish a genuine issue of material fact whether cancellation notice was mailed. Her “assertion that she never received the mailing did not rebut the proof of mailing itself. Any contention that [W’s] testimony supports that the mail was not sent is mere speculation.”

Pro se post-divorce proceeding; Summary disposition; MCR 2.116(C)(8); Pleading requirements; MCR 2.111(A)(1) & 2.110(A)(1); Frivolous action sanctions; MCL 600.2591; MCR 2.625(A)(2); Signature certification; MCR 1.109(E); Judicial disqualification; MCR 2.003(D)(2)

The court held that plaintiff-ex-wife failed to state cognizable claims because her pleadings and appellate arguments were not “clear, concise, and direct,” and it upheld sanctions because the trial court did not err in finding the action “frivolous” and filed to “harass” defendant-ex-husband. Plaintiff filed a pro se civil action seeking divorce-related attorney fees, retroactive child support, unpaid rent, medical expenses, and other damages tied to domestic-assault allegations and later proceedings. Defendant moved for summary disposition and sanctions based on prior litigation and the incoherence and relitigation of claims. The court affirmed dismissal under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because MCR 2.111(A)(1) requires allegations to be “clear, concise, and direct,” and “even on appeal, it is unclear what plaintiff’s claims against defendant are.” The court deemed issues abandoned where plaintiff failed to provide authority or a developed argument. It also affirmed the attorney-fee sanction award, explaining MCL 600.2591 mandates fees when an action is “frivolous,” including when the primary purpose is to “harass, embarrass, or injure” or when the legal position is “devoid of arguable legal merit.” It held that the trial court did not err in concluding the filing violated MCR 1.109(E) because plaintiff’s signature certified the complaint was “well-grounded in fact” and “warranted by existing law,” which was not the case. The court declined to reach her request for judicial-disqualification relief because it affirmed and, in any event, plaintiff did not plead disqualification grounds “with particularity” or provide an adequate record. Affirmed.

Class certification; FedRCivP 23(b)(3); Whether the class members had standing; Breach of contract as a “concrete injury” for standing purposes; Whether undergoing appraisals mooted their claims; Whether the putative class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements; Whether the named plaintiff’s claims were “typical” of the class; Adequate class representative; “Predominance” prong of Rule 23(b)(3); Superiority; Rule 23’s implicit “ascertainability” requirement

In an order on petition for rehearing en banc, a majority of the judges in regular active service voted for rehearing en banc of this case, vacating the previous opinion and judgment (see eJournal #84495 in the 10/20/25 edition), staying the mandate, and restoring the case on the docket as a pending appeal.

Preliminary injunction factors; MCR 3.310(A)(4); Slis v Michigan; Likelihood of success; Housing Law claims; MCL 125.471; MCL 125.402(18); Public nuisance; Ypsilanti Charter Twp v Kircher; Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA); MCL 445.903(1); “Trade or commerce” (MCL 445.902(g)); Housing Law preemption; MCL 125.530(3); Municipal authority; MCL 125.408; MCL 125.534(8); Irreparable harm; Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v Pontiac; Equity powers; Tkachik v Mandeville

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction addressing severe housing-code violations at an apartment complex owned by defendants because plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success, “irreparable harm” to health and safety, a favorable balance of harms, and alignment with the public interest. Plaintiffs alleged that “defendants continued to solicit prospective tenants,” execute leases, and “demand or collect rent” despite condemnation and revoked certificates of compliance, while the record reflected extensive conditions including “severe and unmitigated long-term infestation of vermin,” “water damage and mold growth,” “lack of working utilities,” “damaged and/or nonfunctioning smoke detectors,” loose or exposed wiring, and unauthorized occupancy. On appeal, the court applied the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions. As to likelihood of success, it agreed it was not “‘seriously debated that the properties had fallen into a state of disrepair,’” and the affidavits supported violations of the Housing Law and a public-nuisance theory. It also rejected defendants’ preemption argument against the MCPA/rent component, explaining the Housing Law permits municipalities to impose “‘requirements higher than the minimum requirements laid down in this act,’” and expressly provides it “‘does not preempt, preclude, or interfere with’” municipal authority to protect “‘health, safety, and general welfare[.]’” The court upheld the irreparable-harm finding because the “health conditions” posed imminent risks and “there is no adequate remedy at law” to address tenant safety, even if some relief had monetary aspects. It likewise upheld the public-interest determination that tenants should not be forced to live in apartments presenting “serious health risks,” and concluded the balance of harms favored plaintiffs because the risk to tenants’ health and welfare outweighed defendants’ “purely monetary harm[.]” Finally, it held that the trial court could “‘mold its decrees to do justice’” and adapt “‘its judgment[s] to the special circumstances,’” so the injunction was not invalid merely because it did not track a single statutory remedial provision. Affirmed.

Auto negligence; “Serious impairment of body function”; McCormick v Carrier; MCL 500.3135(5); MCL 500.3135(2)(a); Objectively manifested impairments; Orvis v Moore (Unpub); Plaintiffs’ ability to lead their normal life

The court found that there were factual disputes as to “the nature and extent of the plaintiffs’ respective injuries that are material to the determination whether each of them has suffered a serious impairment of body function.” Thus, it held that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendants-Black Tiger Trucking, LLC and Baba in this third-party auto negligence case. Plaintiffs-Vaag and Carolina contended “the trial court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that neither of them sustained serious impairment of body function as a result of their minivan being rear-ended by the semi-trailer truck” driven by Baba on Black Tiger’s behalf, and granting defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The court concluded “that ample evidence was presented to the trial court establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiffs each suffered objectively manifested impairments.” It disagreed with the trial court and found “that, viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in the non-movant’s favor, there is a question of material fact whether Vaag suffered an objectively manifested impairment of his head and brain.” As in Orvis, in this “case, record evidence establishes that a medical provider diagnosed him with a closed head injury and concussion, which establishes another genuine issue of material fact as to whether he sustained an additional objectively manifested impairment as a result of his brain injury.” The court likewise found “a question of material fact as to whether Carolina suffered an objectively manifested impairment of her head and brain function based on her ‘actual symptoms [and] conditions that someone other than the injured person would observe or perceive as impairing a body function,’ including the evidence of concussion-related vision issues.” Finally, as to whether their general ability to lead their normal lives was affected by their respective impairments of body function, the court found “that the deposition testimony of plaintiffs, as well as the medical record evidence contained in the lower court record, when considered as a whole, create questions of material fact.” Reversed and remanded.

Preliminary injunction factors; MCR 3.310(A)(4); Slis v Michigan; Likelihood of success; Housing Law claims; MCL 125.471; MCL 125.402(18); Public nuisance; Ypsilanti Charter Twp v Kircher; Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA); MCL 445.903(1); “Trade or commerce” (MCL 445.902(g)); Housing Law preemption; MCL 125.530(3); Municipal authority; MCL 125.408; MCL 125.534(8); Irreparable harm; Pontiac Fire Fighters Union Local 376 v Pontiac; Equity powers; Tkachik v Mandeville

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a preliminary injunction addressing severe housing-code violations at an apartment complex owned by defendants because plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success, “irreparable harm” to health and safety, a favorable balance of harms, and alignment with the public interest. Plaintiffs alleged that “defendants continued to solicit prospective tenants,” execute leases, and “demand or collect rent” despite condemnation and revoked certificates of compliance, while the record reflected extensive conditions including “severe and unmitigated long-term infestation of vermin,” “water damage and mold growth,” “lack of working utilities,” “damaged and/or nonfunctioning smoke detectors,” loose or exposed wiring, and unauthorized occupancy. On appeal, the court applied the four-factor test for preliminary injunctions. As to likelihood of success, it agreed it was not “‘seriously debated that the properties had fallen into a state of disrepair,’” and the affidavits supported violations of the Housing Law and a public-nuisance theory. It also rejected defendants’ preemption argument against the MCPA/rent component, explaining the Housing Law permits municipalities to impose “‘requirements higher than the minimum requirements laid down in this act,’” and expressly provides it “‘does not preempt, preclude, or interfere with’” municipal authority to protect “‘health, safety, and general welfare[.]’” The court upheld the irreparable-harm finding because the “health conditions” posed imminent risks and “there is no adequate remedy at law” to address tenant safety, even if some relief had monetary aspects. It likewise upheld the public-interest determination that tenants should not be forced to live in apartments presenting “serious health risks,” and concluded the balance of harms favored plaintiffs because the risk to tenants’ health and welfare outweighed defendants’ “purely monetary harm[.]” Finally, it held that the trial court could “‘mold its decrees to do justice’” and adapt “‘its judgment[s] to the special circumstances,’” so the injunction was not invalid merely because it did not track a single statutory remedial provision. Affirmed.

Jurisdiction; Removal; Constitutional rights; Due process; Equal protection; Judicial prejudice; Misrepresentations

The court rejected respondent-father’s claim, “that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he was not served with the petition before the preliminary hearing.” It also rejected his “cursory arguments alleging that his constitutional rights were violated[.]” Respondent argued “that the trial court erred by failing to find clear and convincing evidence that removal was necessary, but the clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard applies to termination decision rather than to the initial removal of a child.” For ordinary “removal proceedings, the evidentiary standard to authorize a petition is merely probable cause.” The court found that in “light of the evidence of respondent’s past abuse, the son’s fear of further abuse, and respondent’s refusal to cooperate, that standard was clearly met.” Respondent contended “that the son spoke under duress, but, to the minimal extent the record could possibly support that contention, we defer to the trial court’s superior ability to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.” The court concluded that the “trial court did not clearly err by finding that the son was without proper custody or guardianship,[] and that the home ‘by reason of neglect, cruelty, . . . criminality, or depravity’ by respondent made it unfit for the son to live in. Its order removing the son was proper.” Next, respondent argued “that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by continuing the proceedings after he filed his claim of appeal. Although the trial court was prohibited by MCR 7.208(A) from setting aside or amending the removal order that respondent appealed, it did not attempt to set aside or amend that order. And, to the extent that the proceedings continued in the probate court, the court was authorized ‘to decide other matters pertaining to the proceeding from which [the] appeal was filed,’ and because we denied respondent’s request for a stay, the order appealed was not suspended.” Affirmed.