Motion to suppress evidence; The inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule; People v Hyde; People v Mahdi

Holding that the prosecution failed to show that the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applied, the court affirmed the order granting defendant-Galloway’s motion to suppress. There have been multiple appeals in this case. Defendant is charged with the first-degree premeditated murder of a woman (S) who disappeared in 2016. At issue here was his successful motion to suppress evidence about “his TCF Bank account and his purchase of a new comforter” two days after S’s disappearance. The prosecution argued “that the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule should apply here.” In Mahdi, the court listed several factors to be considered “in determining whether the inevitable-discovery rule applies[.]” Applying them here, the court was “unable to conclude that Galloway’s TCF Bank account and his transaction at Bed Bath & Beyond would have inevitably been discovered independently of any constitutional violation.” It noted that the prosecution did not identify “evidence that the police were engaged in a canvassing of financial institutions” or any evidence supporting “a conclusion that the police would have inevitably discovered Galloway’s financial records with TCF Bank, which would have led to evidence of the Bed Bath & Beyond transaction.” The court determined that the prosecution instead relied “on speculative assertions, which are insufficient to satisfy” its burden to establish “by a preponderance of evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”

Whether the Speedy Trial Act was violated, 18 USC § 3161(c)(1); Whether pretrial motions “stopped the clock”; Speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment; Challenge to search warrant affidavits; Right to self-representation; Cross-examination of a government witness about a Seventh Circuit case; FRE 403; Right of confrontation; Sentencing; Substantive reasonableness; Motion to supplement counsel’s briefing

The court held that defendant-Richards’s right to a speedy trial was not violated where the 70-day time limit was properly paused based on the filing of pretrial motions. His related Sixth Amendment claim also failed. Further, the district court did not err in denying his motion to suppress based on the search warrant affidavits or his mid-trial motion to represent himself. It also did not abuse its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of a government witness under FRE 403, and the court rejected his substantive reasonableness challenge to his sentence. A jury convicted Richards of trafficking minors, sexually exploiting children, and FIP. He argued that he was denied a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The court explained that the Act provides that certain events may stop the 70-day clock. In this case, it stopped upon the filing of his motion to suppress and did not restart until 30 days after the parties submitted post-hearing briefs. The district “court had a ‘preference’ for post-hearing briefs that it would consider and ‘then’ rule on. . . . And it certainly didn’t abuse its discretion by tolling the clock while it was waiting for those briefs.” The clock stopped again when the district court took a motion for a status conference under advisement. Richards argued that the motion was improperly filed because it failed to comply with local rules. But the court held that “the Act doesn’t require motions to be ‘properly filed’ to stop the clock. It merely requires ‘filing[,]’” which takes place “when a court officer accepts a document for entry into the record.” After the clock resumed, 38 days remained, and the trial began 32 days later. His argument under the Sixth Amendment also failed where delay caused by the defendant “doesn’t count for purposes of calculating overall delay[,]” and the delay here was not “‘uncommonly long.’” As to the search warrant affidavits, the court held that he was not entitled to a Franks hearing where he could not show that his allegations about alleged falsehoods were “‘critical to the finding of probable cause.’” It further held that his right to cross-examination was not violated where he sought to cross-examine the witness “about an old and unrelated” Seventh Circuit case. As to his below-Guidelines 480-month sentence, his claim that the district court’s downward variance did not go far enough had no merit. Finally, the court denied his delayed motion to supplement his counsel’s briefing. Affirmed.

Joint legal custody; MCL 722.26a(1)(b); Kuebler v Kuebler; Fisher v Fisher; Best interests; MCL 722.23; Established custodial environment (ECE); Sabatine v Sabatine; Burden of proof; Kessler v Kessler

The court held that the trial court’s best-interest findings and its decision to award defendant-mother sole legal custody were supported. But the trial court erred by failing to state whether the change would alter the child’s ECE and, thus, which burden of proof applied, requiring remand for articulation of those findings and whether the burden was satisfied. The parties previously shared joint legal and physical custody under the divorce judgment. After “protracted litigation” the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted defendant sole legal custody while continuing joint physical custody. It found the child’s special needs “and the absolute inability of the parties to make joint decisions about his care require that one person has the opportunity to do so,” and it concluded defendant “needs that opportunity.” On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly evaluated joint legal custody under MCL 722.26a(1)(b) because “‘in order for joint custody to work, parents must be able to agree with each other on basic issues,’” and the record “overwhelmingly supported” the conclusion that the parties having joint legal custody was not warranted. It also upheld the contested best-interest findings, concluding that the findings on factors (c), (j), and (l) were not against the great weight of the evidence where the record showed persistent distrust and that both parents “‘struggle to see each other’s value in the children’s lives.’” But it found legal error because the trial court did not say whether shifting from joint to sole legal custody altered the ECE or which standard applied. If the change would modify the custodial environment “‘the burden is on the parent proposing the change to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the change is in the child’s best interests.’” Failing to make the necessary findings as to the effect on the ECE and the applicable burden constituted error. Thus, the court affirmed the findings under the best-interest factors and MCL 722.26a(1)(b), but remanded for the trial court to state whether the change altered the ECE and, if so, whether the decision was based on clear and convincing evidence. Affirmed in part and remanded.

No-fault insurer’s action for declaratory relief; Claim for a deduction or set off of worker’s compensation benefits; MCL 500.3109(1); Specht v Citizens Ins Co of Am; The trial court’s jurisdiction; The Worker’s Disability Compensation Agency’s (WDCA) exclusive jurisdiction; MCL 418.841(1); Michigan Prop & Cas Guar Ass’n v Checker Cab Co

The court held that the trial court properly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to grant defendant-no-fault insurer’s (State Farm) requested declaratory relief and that the WDCA had exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendants-insured (Leonard) and his employer (Detroit) summary disposition. Leonard, a police officer, was injured in an auto accident involving his patrol vehicle. State Farm paid “first-party no-fault benefits either to Leonard or to his medical providers[.]” It later filed this action seeking declaratory relief, asserting that it “was entitled to a deduction or set off of all workers compensation benefits Leonard may be entitled to pursuant to MCL 500.3109” and that “‘Detroit (i.e., workers compensation) is responsible for payment of any and all benefits, except a small portion of potential wage loss.’” The trial court ruled “that it lacked jurisdiction because the WDCA had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over Leonard’s pending worker’s compensation claims pursuant to MCL 418.841(1).” A claimant’s entitlement “to worker’s compensation benefits is an issue within the” WDCA’s exclusive jurisdiction. As a result, whether “Detroit is responsible for paying worker’s compensation benefits is also an issue that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the WDCA, because whether Detroit is responsible for paying worker’s compensation benefits depends on whether Leonard is entitled to receive those benefits.” While State Farm “would be entitled to a setoff or reimbursement for the no-fault benefits it paid to Leonard if [he] receives worker’s compensation benefits for the same injuries under MCL 500.3109(1) [it] is unable to prove its entitlement to a setoff or reimbursement because [his] worker’s compensation claim was still pending at the time of the trial court’s ruling.” Case law requires that, to protect its reimbursement interest while the WDCA claim is pending, State Farm must “intervene in the claim before the WDCA[,]” as no-fault insurers have a right to do.

Subject matter jurisdiction; MCR 2.116(C)(4); Amount in controversy; Core Values Constr, LLC v Sheehan’s on the Green, Inc; Meisner Law Group, PC v Weston Downs Condo Ass’n; Claims subject to arbitration; MCR 2.116(C)(7); Motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9); MCR 2.111(F)(2); Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)

The court held that because plaintiff failed to present “any evidence to substantiate that damages in this case exceeded $25,000, the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his case and properly dismissed it under MCR 2.116(C)(4).” Even if his “motion could survive MCR 2.116(C)(4) on the basis of his complaint and settlement offer alone, this case was still properly dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(7).” Further, his motion under MCR 2.116(C)(9) was properly denied. The court noted that “plaintiff’s complaint stated broadly that he ‘suffered damages in excess of $25,000’ on the breach of contract and civil conspiracy claims, and asked that the circuit court award him the costs and legal fees incurred. But like Core Values Constr and Meisner, his subsequent pleadings do not establish how breaching the Settlement Agreement, which puts the amount in controversy at no more than $10,000, cost him an additional $15,000 in damages.” In a settlement offer to defendants in 11/24, he “sought $75,000 in damages for ‘ailments and hospitalization during the period [p]laintiff was trying to get justice,’ but did not submit any medical records to the circuit court in response to” defendant-AFSCME’s (C)(4) motion, “or in any supplemental pleadings. Plaintiff also failed to file initial disclosures which could have substantiated his alleged damages. As the circuit court stated, plaintiff failed to come forward with any facts supporting his claim of over $25,000 in damages. Although ‘courts do not require absolute certainty from the parties when calculating the amount in controversy,’ and ‘the amount in-controversy calculation is simply a reasonable estimate based on the parties’ pleadings,’” the court found that “nothing in the record substantiates $15,000 in additional damages” to allow his “breach-of-contract claim to reach the circuit court’s jurisdictional threshold.” Also, because “the clear and unambiguous language of the Settlement Agreement evidences an agreement to arbitrate, and a decision on whether the agreement was breached could only arise from interpretation of the agreement, plaintiff’s remedy is arbitration. The IIED and civil conspiracy claims were also based on [his] allegation that defendants breached the settlement agreement, and are claims related to the matters contained in [it]. Thus, the circuit court did not err in dismissing all of plaintiff’s claims under MCR 2.116(C)(7).” Affirmed.

No-fault insurer’s action for declaratory relief; Claim for a deduction or set off of worker’s compensation benefits; MCL 500.3109(1); Specht v Citizens Ins Co of Am; The trial court’s jurisdiction; The Worker’s Disability Compensation Agency’s (WDCA) exclusive jurisdiction; MCL 418.841(1); Michigan Prop & Cas Guar Ass’n v Checker Cab Co

The court held that the trial court properly ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to grant defendant-no-fault insurer’s (State Farm) requested declaratory relief and that the WDCA had exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order granting defendants-insured (Leonard) and his employer (Detroit) summary disposition. Leonard, a police officer, was injured in an auto accident involving his patrol vehicle. State Farm paid “first-party no-fault benefits either to Leonard or to his medical providers[.]” It later filed this action seeking declaratory relief, asserting that it “was entitled to a deduction or set off of all workers compensation benefits Leonard may be entitled to pursuant to MCL 500.3109” and that “‘Detroit (i.e., workers compensation) is responsible for payment of any and all benefits, except a small portion of potential wage loss.’” The trial court ruled “that it lacked jurisdiction because the WDCA had exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over Leonard’s pending worker’s compensation claims pursuant to MCL 418.841(1).” A claimant’s entitlement “to worker’s compensation benefits is an issue within the” WDCA’s exclusive jurisdiction. As a result, whether “Detroit is responsible for paying worker’s compensation benefits is also an issue that is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the WDCA, because whether Detroit is responsible for paying worker’s compensation benefits depends on whether Leonard is entitled to receive those benefits.” While State Farm “would be entitled to a setoff or reimbursement for the no-fault benefits it paid to Leonard if [he] receives worker’s compensation benefits for the same injuries under MCL 500.3109(1) [it] is unable to prove its entitlement to a setoff or reimbursement because [his] worker’s compensation claim was still pending at the time of the trial court’s ruling.” Case law requires that, to protect its reimbursement interest while the WDCA claim is pending, State Farm must “intervene in the claim before the WDCA[,]” as no-fault insurers have a right to do.

Standing; Nuisance arising from the violation of a zoning ordinance; Damages of a special character; Federal Communication Commission (FCC)

Finding that the trial court did not err in determining plaintiffs did not have standing, the court affirmed “the trial court’s orders granting summary disposition to defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7) (governmental immunity) and (C)(8) (failure to state a claim).” But because “the trial court’s orders did not properly address some of the defendants” in this case, it remanded for the trial court to do so. The case involved “plaintiffs’ challenge to a contract between T-Mobile Central LLC and the Wyandotte School District. The contract allowed T-Mobile to lease space on the Washington Elementary School building and install a wireless communications facility. Plaintiffs, who live near the school, objected to the installation. They believed exposure to wireless radiation could cause or exacerbate medical problems and diseases, and alleged that the equipment interfered with their quiet enjoyment of their properties and decreased the values of their homes. Plaintiffs eventually filed suit alleging nuisance per se and private nuisance.” To demonstrate that they could show “damages of a special character,” plaintiffs focused “on the alleged health risks caused by radio frequency radiation.” In this respect, they relied on an FCC “wireless radiation exposure emission limit was too low. But plaintiffs, on appeal, ‘stress that they do not challenge the adequacy of the FCC emission guidelines for wireless radiation[.]” Plaintiffs could not “concede that the FCC guidelines are adequate while simultaneously claiming special damages by way of radio frequency radiation from a facility that adheres to those same guidelines. As for the other alleged damages plaintiffs raised below regarding aesthetics and property value depreciation, they make no arguments relating to either of these points on appeal.” Consequently, they abandoned these arguments. “Plaintiffs have not identified any other ‘damages of a special character’ that would endow them with standing.” Because they “lacked standing, the trial court correctly dismissed the case.”

Trustee removal; MCL 700.7706(2); In re Pollack Trust; Trustee duties; Administration in good faith; MCL 700.7801; Beneficiary information & annual reporting; MCL 700.7814; Former trustee property; Reasonable steps; MCL 700.7813(1)

The court held that the probate court abused its discretion by removing the trustee because the record did not support any statutory ground for removal under MCL 700.7706(2). The trustor created the Plank Trust in 2002, and after a prior trustee resigned and was later convicted of embezzling trust funds, the trustor’s other daughter served as trustee until she died. After that death, the probate court appointed the new trustee and ordered her to “notify the parties as soon as practicable of the remaining assets owned by the Trust,” while also requiring her to refrain from spending trust funds before providing that notice. Beneficiaries sought her removal after complaining she had not provided a “full accounting and investigation,” and the probate court replaced her, stating she did very little and asking, “What would be the harm, if you’re claiming there’s only $2,000 left in the trust, you know, somebody else to get in there and see what happened . . . .” On appeal, the court held that a probate court “may remove a trustee only in accordance with MCL 700.7706(2),” and removal is not permitted for “any good cause.” It found the probate court failed to “provide a factual basis to support any of the statutory reasons for trustee removal,” and although the lower court’s reasoning most closely resembled § 7706(2)(c), the record did not yet show “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to administer the trust effectively.” The court emphasized the trustee served only about three months, the parties and the court acknowledged the complications created by the earlier embezzlement, and the probate court had not actually ordered a formal accounting, distinguishing an “annual report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements” from the narrower directive to notify parties of remaining assets. It concluded the trustee “substantially complied” when she emailed a summary showing $2,059.94 remained, and it rejected unsupported allegations of missing “$1.2 million” as a basis for removal. Vacated and remanded.

Jurisdiction over a challenged property tax assessment; MCL 205.735a(3) & (6); Sixarp, LLC v Township of Byron

Holding that the Tax Tribunal (TT) did not err by finding that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioner’s challenge to the 2023 property tax assessment, the court affirmed the TT’s order dismissing the claim. She identified “certain exceptions to the statutory requirement that a challenge to a property tax assessment first be protested to the Board of Review, allowing instead for direct appeal to the [TT] in certain circumstances.” But she did not show “that the facts of this case fall within the statutory exceptions identified, nor is there any indication that petitioner complied with the filing requirements applicable to those exceptions,” or that she “even raised this argument before the” TT. Similarly, she stated the standard that the TT “is to apply when considering a motion for reconsideration, but does not demonstrate that the [TT] in this case failed to properly consider petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.” The court found no error in the TT’s “determination that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioner’s challenge to the 2023 tax assessment.” The record indicated that she “did not timely protest the 2023 assessment to the Board of Review, thereby depriving the [TT] of jurisdiction under MCL 205.735a(3) and (6).” In addition, she did not show that the TT’s failure “to exercise jurisdiction in this case deprived her of her right to due process.” The court also agreed with the TT “that the record indicates that petitioner does not dispute the reduced valuation applied to the property by the 2024 Board of Review.” Because there was “no dispute regarding the reduced 2024 assessment, the [TT] did not err by dismissing petitioner’s claim regarding the 2024 tax assessment.”

Child’s best interests

The court held that the trial court did not err by finding that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights to the child, JA, was in the child’s best interests. “When making the determination as to JA’s best interests, the trial court considered several of the relevant factors. The trial court determined that there was very little bond, if any, between JA and respondent because JA was removed to foster care when he was only seven months old. The trial court considered that JA was doing well in foster care and his condition had improved significantly after being removed from respondent’s care.” It also “considered that JA’s foster family was approved as an adoptive family.” Further, it “emphasized respondent’s history as a perpetrator of domestic violence, and generally violent history.” Although he “participated in a parenting class and expressed the desire to be a good father, the trial court did not err by determining that the preponderance of the evidence nonetheless demonstrated that termination of [his] parental rights was in JA’s best interests.” Also, a preponderance of the evidence supported “the trial court’s determination that termination of respondent’s parental rights is in JA’s best interests. Respondent admitted his criminal history of violent offenses, and did not dispute the events that led to his arrest and conviction of domestic violence against JA’s mother. Respondent also did not contest the deplorable condition of the home, that the home had been condemned, nor the neglected condition in which JA was found. There also was evidence that respondent sexually assaulted JA’s half-sister[, SV].” The court concluded “that the trial court did not err by considering SV’s statements among the other factors considered by the trial court when determining JA’s best interests, nor did the trial court clearly err by determining that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in JA’s best interests.” Affirmed.

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re White; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; Disability accommodations; In re Frey; Child’s best interests; In re Rippy

The court held that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, § (c)(i) was met, and termination served the child’s best interests. The child tested positive for cocaine and methadone at birth, respondent-mother admitted using drugs in the days before the birth, and the DHHS filed a petition that resulted in the child’s placement in foster care. The trial court later terminated the mother’s parental rights under §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) after she largely failed to participate in services. She attended only 2 of 77 offered drug screens and 10 of 45 offered parenting times, missed 21 visits without calling or appearing, and then allowed parenting time to be suspended without seeking reinstatement, while also missing hearings and losing contact with the agency. On appeal, the court held that reasonable efforts were made despite the absence of a new psychological evaluation because the mother already had a psychological evaluation from a prior termination case, the results were available to the caseworker, and the caseworker discussed a “psych eval” and offered help setting one up, but the mother “refused this help each time.” It also emphasized that reunification requires participation, citing the DHHS’s “affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify a family” while recognizing “a commensurate responsibility on the part of [a] respondent[] to participate in the services that are offered.” It found the record showed the mother “did not engage with the services that were offered,” particularly by failing to attend screens that were necessary even to begin counseling. The court next found that § (c)(i) was established because the conditions included substance abuse and an unstable home situation, and the mother did not address them, relying on the principle that termination is appropriate “when the conditions that brought the children into foster care continue to exist despite time to make changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services.” It concluded the mother’s lack of engagement, her failure to screen, and her statements that tests would be positive supported that the conditions continued and were unlikely to be rectified within a reasonable time. The court also held that termination served the child’s best interests because evidence showed the bond with the mother was limited, while the child had a strong bond with the foster family, referred to the foster parents as “mom and dad,” had been in foster care for “roughly one and one-half years,” and the foster family met the child’s needs and was willing to adopt. Affirmed.

Children’s best interests; Guardianship alternative to termination; MCL 712A.19a(9)

Holding that a preponderance of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in his children’s best interests, the court affirmed the termination order. He contended that the trial court did not adequately consider their bond with him, their “placement with a relative, and the possibility of a guardianship in lieu of termination.” The court disagreed, finding that the trial court considered each of these matters. The court noted that respondent, “allegedly while under the influence of substances, quarreled and fought with another man at respondent’s home while the children were present in the home, allegedly killing the other man and resulting in respondent being charged with second-degree murder. Even if [he] were to prevail in the criminal charges against him, it is unlikely that respondent would provide the children with stability and permanence. Before the children were removed from his care, respondent did not provide [them] with safe and suitable housing; respondent’s home lacked basic necessities, such as water, sewer, and heat, and holes in the roof and windows let the elements into the home. The children reported not having adequate food and did not consistently attend school.” As to the possibility of a guardianship, “a trial court may appoint a guardian only if a guardianship is in the child’s best interests” and it was not shown to be so in this case. Thus, the trial court did not err in rejecting a guardianship here.

Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; Disability accommodations; Due process; In re Contempt of Pavlos-Hackney; Transcript deficiencies; People v Craig; Child’s best interests; In re Mota

The court held that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, due process was not denied by transcript deficiencies, §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) were met, and termination served the child’s best interests. The child was removed two days after birth after concerns about respondent-mother’s compliance with care for mental-health issues, respondent-father’s lack of insight into how those issues affected the mother’s parenting, their failure to sufficiently feed the child at the hospital, and the father’s cocaine use, including a positive test. The trial court terminated their parental rights under §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j). On appeal, the court held that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to accommodate the mother’s intellectual-capacity and mental-health disabilities because it attempted assessments and tailored programming, but she “refused to participate in IQ evaluations until late in the case” and she did not “engage with the services that were provided.” It next held that due process was not impaired by transcript problems because the record was “sufficient for appellate review,” the “audio drop” and “unintelligible” notations were “largely limited to single words or syllables,” and “it is easy to determine the missing words from context,” and the mother “has not identified any way in which she was prejudiced by this issue.” The court further found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) because the father’s primary barrier to reunification was his decision to remain in a relationship with the mother despite knowing she “could not provide for the child,” and although he testified he was willing to separate, “the record did not support that he was actually willing to do so.” The opinion also relied on the father’s continuing cocaine use and lack of insight, noting he tested positive, admitted using cocaine “a couple of days before the first termination hearing,” and missed screens and declined peer support. The court also held that termination served the child’s best interests because she had spent “almost her entire life in foster care,” was thriving in a stable placement with a foster family willing to adopt, and needed “permanency, stability, and finality[.]” Affirmed.

Trustee removal; MCL 700.7706(2); In re Pollack Trust; Trustee duties; Administration in good faith; MCL 700.7801; Beneficiary information & annual reporting; MCL 700.7814; Former trustee property; Reasonable steps; MCL 700.7813(1)

The court held that the probate court abused its discretion by removing the trustee because the record did not support any statutory ground for removal under MCL 700.7706(2). The trustor created the Plank Trust in 2002, and after a prior trustee resigned and was later convicted of embezzling trust funds, the trustor’s other daughter served as trustee until she died. After that death, the probate court appointed the new trustee and ordered her to “notify the parties as soon as practicable of the remaining assets owned by the Trust,” while also requiring her to refrain from spending trust funds before providing that notice. Beneficiaries sought her removal after complaining she had not provided a “full accounting and investigation,” and the probate court replaced her, stating she did very little and asking, “What would be the harm, if you’re claiming there’s only $2,000 left in the trust, you know, somebody else to get in there and see what happened . . . .” On appeal, the court held that a probate court “may remove a trustee only in accordance with MCL 700.7706(2),” and removal is not permitted for “any good cause.” It found the probate court failed to “provide a factual basis to support any of the statutory reasons for trustee removal,” and although the lower court’s reasoning most closely resembled § 7706(2)(c), the record did not yet show “unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to administer the trust effectively.” The court emphasized the trustee served only about three months, the parties and the court acknowledged the complications created by the earlier embezzlement, and the probate court had not actually ordered a formal accounting, distinguishing an “annual report of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements” from the narrower directive to notify parties of remaining assets. It concluded the trustee “substantially complied” when she emailed a summary showing $2,059.94 remained, and it rejected unsupported allegations of missing “$1.2 million” as a basis for removal. Vacated and remanded.