Requests for declaratory rulings by state agencies; MCL 24.263 & 24.264; Challenge to a decision declining to issue a declaratory ruling; Petition for review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) or filing a new declaratory judgment action in circuit court; Human Rights Party v Michigan Corr Comm’n; School funding dispute; The State School Aid Act (SSAA); MCL 388.1606(6); Michigan Department of Education (MDE)

The court held that the lower courts erred in ruling that plaintiff-Warren Consolidated School District “was required to appeal the MDE State Superintendent’s decision declining to issue a declaratory ruling” in this school funding dispute through the APA’s petition-for-review process. It concluded that the MDE’s decision did “not preclude Warren from seeking a declaratory judgment in circuit court.” The court overruled “Human Rights Party and subsequent Court of Appeals cases that relied on its holding that an agency’s decision to decline to issue a declaratory ruling must be challenged through the APA’s petition-for-review process.” It reversed the Court of Appeals judgment that had upheld summary disposition for defendant-Hazel Park Schools, and remanded the case to the trial court. Warren alleged “that Hazel Park violated the SSAA, and specifically MCL 388.1606(6), by enrolling pupils that would have otherwise attended Warren’s schools.” The court concluded that “neither MCL 24.263 nor MCL 24.264 required Warren to appeal the MDE’s decision not to issue a declaratory ruling through a petition for review under the APA. Warren was entitled to seek declaratory relief directly in circuit court. Specifically, the State Superintendent declined Warren’s request to issue a declaratory ruling in his [1/8/20] letter. Under MCL 24.263, Warren was never required to appeal the MDE’s denial of its request for a declaratory ruling. And under MCL 24.264, Warren requested a declaratory ruling and had that request denied; thus, it satisfied that provision’s exhaustion requirement. Hazel Park might well have other defenses against Warren’s claims” but the court rejected the trial court’s stated reason for granting it summary disposition. “MCL 24.263 creates an optional procedure for regulated parties to seek declaratory rulings from administrative agencies regarding the application of a statute, rule, or order to specific facts. MCL 24.264 requires a party challenging or questioning the application of an agency rule to first seek a declaratory ruling from the agency. In either case, if the agency issues a declaratory ruling, the regulated party may appeal it through an APA petition for review. However, if the agency declines to issue a declaratory ruling, no appeal is required or available. The requesting party is free to file a declaratory judgment action in circuit court or pursue any other remedy to which they may be entitled.” As a result, the court overruled “Human Rights Party and other Court of Appeals decisions inconsistent with this holding . . . .”

The No-Fault Act (NFA); Attorney fees; MCL 500.3148; Reasonableness of the delay in payments; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Amount in controversy; Hodge v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Meisner Law Group PC v. Weston Downs Condo Ass’n

The court held that defendant-insurer “did not create a genuine issue of material fact that its delay” in making payments for medical treatment under the NFA was reasonable and thus, the trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs-providers summary disposition. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiffs attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1). Finally, it did not err by holding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant argued “that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs under MCL 500.3148 because the trial court failed to use the correct analysis and erroneously determined that defendant’s delay in making payments was unreasonable.” The court disagreed. It concluded “that the allegedly ‘conflicting’ evidence regarding coverage did not create a legitimate factual uncertainty about” the injured person’s “insurance coverage, such that it was reasonable for defendant to delay payment.” Further, it found that “nothing that defendant discovered” later created “a legitimate factual uncertainty about its obligation to issue payments.” Defendant also argued “that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim because the no-fault fee schedule limitations reduced plaintiffs’ maximum recovery to an amount below the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold of the circuit court. Additionally, at the time of the motion for summary disposition, plaintiffs admitted that less than $500 in claimed damages remained outstanding.” Defendant argued that the Hodge rule did not apply here “because it was ‘specifically addressed and rejected’ in Meisner[.]” The court concluded that this case was distinguishable from Meisner. It found that it was “clear that plaintiffs’ allegations of damages were unlike those in Meisner that could not exceed $25,000 under any legal theory. To the contrary, plaintiffs alleged that they were owed $76,796.33 on the basis of the bills it submitted to defendant, and defendant made payments toward that amount that—even when reduced according to the [NFA’s] fee schedule—exceeded the jurisdictional threshold of the circuit court. Obviously, then, plaintiffs’ allegation that their claims exceeded the circuit court’s jurisdictional threshold cannot be said to have been made with the same type of bad faith found in Meisner.” The court also found that “defendant’s payments eight months into the litigation do not have any effect on the amount that plaintiffs originally alleged in good faith in their prayer for relief.” Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. Affirmed.

Claims against a former employer under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Contractual shortened limitations period; Rayford v American House Roseville I; Rory v Continental Ins Co; Clark v DaimlerChrysler Corp

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Rayford, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff-former employee’s ELCRA claims and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Rayford framework. The trial court ruled that the claims “were time-barred under a limitations period set forth in plaintiff’s job application.” The court previously affirmed. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the court’s opinion and remanded. On remand, the court reviewed two earlier cases (Rory and Clark) as well as Rayford. It concluded that the “Supreme Court in Rayford narrowed the applicability of Rory, overruled Clark, and altered the legal landscape for reviewing motions for summary disposition with respect to shortened limitations periods in the employment context[.]” It noted that “the trial court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rayford when it ruled on defendant’s” summary disposition motion.

Due process; Police failure to investigate the case via DNA & fingerprint evidence; Failure to retain the officers’ body-camera footage of the traffic stop & defendant’s arrest; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request an adverse-inference jury instruction as to the “missing” body-camera, DNA, & fingerprint evidence; Sufficiency of the evidence; “Mere presence”; Constructive possession of a firearm

The court held that defendant-Eason was not denied his constitutional right to due process as to the police and prosecutor’s preservation of evidence. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that he constructively possessed the firearm. He “was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped by the police. A loaded firearm was found in the backseat of the vehicle.” A corrections officer at the jail later “recovered a bullet in his pocket that matched the bullets recovered from the firearm.” He was convicted of carrying a pistol in a vehicle without a concealed pistol license, FIP of a firearm and ammunition, and felony-firearm, third offense. On appeal, he challenged “the failure of the police and prosecutor to preserve body-camera footage of the traffic stop and to conduct DNA and fingerprint testing of the firearm.” The court noted that the record showed “Eason himself could have requested the footage, but he failed to do so.” Further, the court “has held that the destruction of evidence in accordance with department policy does not establish bad faith.” It found here that “the routine destruction of the body-camera footage in accordance with department policy did not constitute a due-process violation.” As to his claim related to DNA and fingerprint evidence, the record failed “to establish bad faith, misconduct, or the suppression of evidence.” As to fingerprint evidence, Eason asserted that Detective A “testified that ‘no fingerprint evidence was sought.’” But based on A’s testimony, it appeared “that the gun was tested for fingerprint evidence, but no fingerprints were recovered. In any event, the police were not required to the test the gun for fingerprints absent intentional misconduct, bad faith, or the suppression of evidence, which the record fails to establish.” The court also held that “Eason was not entitled to an adverse-inference instruction” as to the allegedly missing evidence “even if his attorney would have requested one. As such, his attorney’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.” Finally, the court held that “the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Eason constructively possessed the firearm. During the traffic stop, Eason told [Officer P] that he and [the driver of the vehicle] did not have anything in the vehicle, and he did not have anything on him, but [P] observed Eason ‘grabbing’ near his waistband and adjusting his clothing. [P] looked in the backseat and saw a pistol sitting in plain view on top of the rear seat. A magazine removed from the firearm was capable of holding 13 bullets, but only 12 bullets were in the magazine. Officer [D] found one bullet in the pocket of Eason’s shorts when [D] searched Eason upon his entry to the jail. The bullet found in Eason’s pocket was the same make and caliber and had the same color casing as the bullets in the magazine and chamber of the pistol.” Affirmed.

Ineffective assistance; People v Trakhtenberg; Value of stolen property; M Crim JI 22.1; Receiving & concealing value threshold; MCL 750.535(3)(a); Prejudice probability; Strickland v Washington

The court held that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to meaningfully contest the fair-market-value element by developing evidence and cross-examination about depreciation when the value threshold was close and the owner’s testimony concerned purchase prices from years earlier. Defendant was stopped in 2022 with a power washer and generator that had been reported stolen, and he was tried for receiving and concealing property worth “$1,000 or more but less than $20,000.” The owner testified he paid about $400 for the power washer and about $1,000 to $1,100 for the generator “sometime between 2015 and 2017,” and he acknowledged there was “most likely some depreciation” between purchase and theft. Defense counsel asked whether it was “possible that these two items today would be worth less than $1,000,” the prosecutor objected as speculative, and counsel withdrew the question without obtaining a ruling, and no evidence of the items’ fair market value at the time of the offense was introduced even though the jury was instructed on a lesser $200-to-$1,000 option. On appeal, the court emphasized that “the test for the value of property is the reasonable and fair market value of the property at the time” of the crime (M Crim JI 22.1), and it concluded that once the owner testified to older purchase prices and depreciation, counsel “should have focused the testimony and evidence on the depreciated value at the time of the theft.” The court identified reasonable steps counsel could have taken, including pressing for a ruling and rebutting the speculation objection, probing the owner’s lack of “basis in fact” to claim the combined value at the time of theft exceeded $1,000, and seeking a short continuance to obtain valuation evidence. The court found no “sound trial strategy” in relying on closing-argument assertions alone, and it found prejudice because with a threshold “close” to $1,000 and likely depreciation, there was a “reasonable probability” the jury would have convicted only of the lesser offense had it heard value-at-the-time evidence. Reversed and remanded.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move for directed verdict; Motion to substitute counsel; Good cause; Sentencing; MCL 769.34(4)(a) (intermediate sanction); Attorney fees; MCR 6.005(C); People v Jackson

Concluding that defendant did not show any errors with the conviction, sentencing, or assessment of attorney fees, the court affirmed. When he arrived on the scene to pick up the child of a woman who was being arrested for an outstanding warrant during a traffic stop, “officers attempted to arrest [him] because [he] also had outstanding warrants, resulting in a struggle between officers and defendant. He was” convicted of resisting a police officer and sentenced to 45 days in jail and 24 months of probation. He first argued “that defense counsel should have moved for a directed verdict based on the prosecutor’s failure to introduce the arrest warrants and failure to prove that defendant’s arrest was lawful.” The court noted that at “trial, the prosecutor presented testimonial evidence that the officer had reasonable cause to arrest defendant. The arresting officer testified that he relied on the LEIN system and its information that defendant had outstanding warrants when arresting defendant. Looking at this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, a rational trier of fact could find that the element of lawful action for a resisting an officer charge was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. And in fact, the jury in this case did find the element met, evidenced by the guilty verdict.” Thus, defendant did not prove “either prong for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because a motion for a directed verdict by defense counsel would have been meritless.” He next argued “that the trial court erred by denying his request for a new attorney.” He essentially argued “that there was good cause for substitution because of counsel’s refusal to file a motion to suppress evidence, misunderstanding of defendant’s bond, and insufficient trial preparation as a result of too few meetings.” It noted that whether to move to suppress is a matter of trial strategy, and whether “trial counsel understood defendant’s bond does not reflect counsel’s ability to represent [him] at trial.” Further, while “defense counsel only met with [him] twice before trial, this does not show a sufficient lack of diligence or interest to constitute good cause.” As to his sentence, the court held that the trial court did not err in sentencing him to 45 days in jail. His “minimum sentence on the sentencing range was less than 18 months, which” made MCL 769.34(4)(a) applicable. The court found that the “trial court provided reasonable grounds for its departure on the record, reasoning that defendant’s altercation with police lasted a significant period and demonstrated a lack of respect for the officers. Therefore, [it] articulated its justification for the upward departure in a manner that sufficiently explained the proportionality of defendant’s sentence.” The court held that “the trial court did not clearly err by sentencing [him] to a term of incarceration in jail rather than an intermediate sanction.”

Claims against a former employer under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Contractual shortened limitations period; Rayford v American House Roseville I; Rory v Continental Ins Co; Clark v DaimlerChrysler Corp

On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Rayford, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff-former employee’s ELCRA claims and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Rayford framework. The trial court ruled that the claims “were time-barred under a limitations period set forth in plaintiff’s job application.” The court previously affirmed. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the court’s opinion and remanded. On remand, the court reviewed two earlier cases (Rory and Clark) as well as Rayford. It concluded that the “Supreme Court in Rayford narrowed the applicability of Rory, overruled Clark, and altered the legal landscape for reviewing motions for summary disposition with respect to shortened limitations periods in the employment context[.]” It noted that “the trial court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Rayford when it ruled on defendant’s” summary disposition motion.

The No-Fault Act (NFA); Attorney fees; MCL 500.3148; Reasonableness of the delay in payments; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Amount in controversy; Hodge v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; Meisner Law Group PC v. Weston Downs Condo Ass’n

The court held that defendant-insurer “did not create a genuine issue of material fact that its delay” in making payments for medical treatment under the NFA was reasonable and thus, the trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs-providers summary disposition. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in awarding plaintiffs attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1). Finally, it did not err by holding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant argued “that the trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs under MCL 500.3148 because the trial court failed to use the correct analysis and erroneously determined that defendant’s delay in making payments was unreasonable.” The court disagreed. It concluded “that the allegedly ‘conflicting’ evidence regarding coverage did not create a legitimate factual uncertainty about” the injured person’s “insurance coverage, such that it was reasonable for defendant to delay payment.” Further, it found that “nothing that defendant discovered” later created “a legitimate factual uncertainty about its obligation to issue payments.” Defendant also argued “that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim because the no-fault fee schedule limitations reduced plaintiffs’ maximum recovery to an amount below the $25,000 jurisdictional threshold of the circuit court. Additionally, at the time of the motion for summary disposition, plaintiffs admitted that less than $500 in claimed damages remained outstanding.” Defendant argued that the Hodge rule did not apply here “because it was ‘specifically addressed and rejected’ in Meisner[.]” The court concluded that this case was distinguishable from Meisner. It found that it was “clear that plaintiffs’ allegations of damages were unlike those in Meisner that could not exceed $25,000 under any legal theory. To the contrary, plaintiffs alleged that they were owed $76,796.33 on the basis of the bills it submitted to defendant, and defendant made payments toward that amount that—even when reduced according to the [NFA’s] fee schedule—exceeded the jurisdictional threshold of the circuit court. Obviously, then, plaintiffs’ allegation that their claims exceeded the circuit court’s jurisdictional threshold cannot be said to have been made with the same type of bad faith found in Meisner.” The court also found that “defendant’s payments eight months into the litigation do not have any effect on the amount that plaintiffs originally alleged in good faith in their prayer for relief.” Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. Affirmed.

Requests for declaratory rulings by state agencies; MCL 24.263 & 24.264; Challenge to a decision declining to issue a declaratory ruling; Petition for review under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) or filing a new declaratory judgment action in circuit court; Human Rights Party v Michigan Corr Comm’n; School funding dispute; The State School Aid Act (SSAA); MCL 388.1606(6); Michigan Department of Education (MDE)

The court held that the lower courts erred in ruling that plaintiff-Warren Consolidated School District “was required to appeal the MDE State Superintendent’s decision declining to issue a declaratory ruling” in this school funding dispute through the APA’s petition-for-review process. It concluded that the MDE’s decision did “not preclude Warren from seeking a declaratory judgment in circuit court.” The court overruled “Human Rights Party and subsequent Court of Appeals cases that relied on its holding that an agency’s decision to decline to issue a declaratory ruling must be challenged through the APA’s petition-for-review process.” It reversed the Court of Appeals judgment that had upheld summary disposition for defendant-Hazel Park Schools, and remanded the case to the trial court. Warren alleged “that Hazel Park violated the SSAA, and specifically MCL 388.1606(6), by enrolling pupils that would have otherwise attended Warren’s schools.” The court concluded that “neither MCL 24.263 nor MCL 24.264 required Warren to appeal the MDE’s decision not to issue a declaratory ruling through a petition for review under the APA. Warren was entitled to seek declaratory relief directly in circuit court. Specifically, the State Superintendent declined Warren’s request to issue a declaratory ruling in his [1/8/20] letter. Under MCL 24.263, Warren was never required to appeal the MDE’s denial of its request for a declaratory ruling. And under MCL 24.264, Warren requested a declaratory ruling and had that request denied; thus, it satisfied that provision’s exhaustion requirement. Hazel Park might well have other defenses against Warren’s claims” but the court rejected the trial court’s stated reason for granting it summary disposition. “MCL 24.263 creates an optional procedure for regulated parties to seek declaratory rulings from administrative agencies regarding the application of a statute, rule, or order to specific facts. MCL 24.264 requires a party challenging or questioning the application of an agency rule to first seek a declaratory ruling from the agency. In either case, if the agency issues a declaratory ruling, the regulated party may appeal it through an APA petition for review. However, if the agency declines to issue a declaratory ruling, no appeal is required or available. The requesting party is free to file a declaratory judgment action in circuit court or pursue any other remedy to which they may be entitled.” As a result, the court overruled “Human Rights Party and other Court of Appeals decisions inconsistent with this holding . . . .”

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; Reasonable reunification efforts; A parent’s “commensurate responsibility” to participate in & benefit from services; Advice of appellate rights after removal; MCR 3.965(B)(15); In re Barber/Espinoza

The court held that clear and convincing evidence supported termination because the conditions leading to adjudication continued to exist and were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time, and that termination served the children’s best interests. The children were first removed from respondent-mother’s care because of meth use and domestic violence. They were later returned after services, and then were removed again within a year after respondent relapsed, engaged in ongoing domestic-violence dynamics with partners, self-harmed during a conflict that required stitches, and continued unsafe contact patterns that destabilized the home. The trial court terminated parental rights after hearing testimony from foster-care workers, a parenting-time supervisor, school and medical witnesses, and the foster mother about lack of benefit from services and deteriorations in the children’s behavior tied to contact with respondent. On appeal, the court affirmed under § (c)(i), emphasizing that more than 182 days had elapsed, that respondent had participated in services yet “did not benefit from them,” and that she failed to remedy domestic-violence and mental-health conditions, including by remaining in contact with abusive partners, failing to follow safety plans, and minimizing or denying the children’s reported exposure to violence and self-harm. The court noted that the DHHS must make reasonable efforts but the parent has a “commensurate responsibility” to participate and show benefit. It concluded the record supported that respondent “failed to rectify” her mental-health and domestic-violence issues and lacked a reasonable likelihood of doing so. The court also affirmed the best-interests finding because the children’s trauma-related needs required “permanency, stability, and finality,” multiple witnesses described the children’s improved behavior and emotional health when contact ended, and the foster parents consistently secured “necessary services” and safety that respondent had allowed to lapse. Finally, the court held the trial court erred by not advising respondent of the right to appeal the first removal under MCR 3.965(B)(15), but it found no prejudice because the proceedings later included proper advice at the second removal and termination resulted from her subsequent relapse, self-harm, and continued unsafe domestic-violence circumstances rather than the earlier notice defect.

Removal under MCR 3.965(C)(2) & MCL 712A.13a(9); Foster care placement; Contrary-to-welfare finding; In re Benavides; Adequacy of findings for appellate review; In re Williams; Children’s Assessment Center (CAC)

The court held that the trial court made adequate findings under MCR 3.965(C)(2) and MCL 712A.13a(9) to support removing the children from respondent-mother’s care and placing them in foster care. CPS filed a petition alleging physical abuse and neglect, including reports that respondent hit the children with her hand and a broomstick, kept them from leaving the home, and left them alone for extended periods, and the investigation revealed a strong urine odor, traces of feces, hygiene concerns, and hazards such as “holes and exposed electrical wiring” in the children’s bedroom. The record also included missed medical care, school-attendance concerns, domestic-violence reports, CAC disclosures that the children witnessed violence between the parents, and disclosures that respondent struck two children with belts. After a preliminary hearing, the trial court authorized the petition and found that “taken together as sum” the circumstances supported removal, citing “poor conditions of the home,” lack of proof of improvement, an imminent utilities cutoff, “poor supervision,” and the “failure to meet medical needs[.]” It also identified “reasonable efforts” such as the DHHS and Families First involvement, referrals, drug screens, utility-bill assistance, and meetings. On appeal, the court explained that foster-care placement requires findings that custody presents a “substantial risk of harm,” that no reasonable services or arrangements short of removal can safeguard the children, that remaining in the home is “contrary to the child’s welfare,” that reasonable efforts were made to prevent removal, and that placement conditions are adequate. The court rejected the claim that the trial court relied only on a potential utility shutoff, stating the findings were supported by the CPS specialist’s testimony about living conditions, supervision failures, medical neglect, and domestic violence. The court also held the trial court was not required to “articulate extensive findings regarding every conceivable detail” and that its oral and written findings were “minimal but adequate” to permit meaningful appellate review, including explicit findings on contrary-to-welfare and reasonable efforts. Affirmed.

Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); In re Williams; In re White; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to a witness being qualified as an expert & to investigate evidence; Factual predicate

Holding that termination was proper under §§ (c)(i) and (j), and rejecting respondent-mother’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court affirmed the order terminating her parental rights. There was no dispute the children had been out of her “care for significantly longer than 182 days. And the record clearly supported the trial court’s determination that barriers continued to exist to reunification, including domestic violence and housing stability.” The court acknowledged “that ‘it would be impermissible for a parent’s parental rights to be terminated solely because he or she was a victim of domestic violence.’” But the trial court in this case properly terminated respondent’s “parental rights on the basis of [her] actions that harmed the children or exposed them to harm.” The court noted that she “was dishonest about her relationship with” a man (B) who one of the children disclosed had thrown her across the room, and the other child reported that B “‘tried to put lava in her, and [respondent-mother] didn’t help.’ The children were indisputably afraid of” B. Respondent never showed “that she fully understood what the children had experienced or the risks to which she had exposed them.” The court also noted that their therapist (H) “and the foster parents sought court protection because they feared” respondent’s conduct. In addition, respondent “repeatedly moved and changed jobs during the proceedings and relocated again shortly before the termination hearing. As a result, domestic violence and housing instability continued to impede reunification.” In light of the fact the children had been out of respondent’s “care for nearly five years by the time of the termination hearing, there was no reasonable likelihood that [she] would be able to rectify the concerns in a reasonable time considering” their ages. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating her rights based on § (c)(i). And termination under § (j) was proper for many of the same reasons. As to her ineffective assistance claims, the court concluded that even “if it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness to fail to object” to H being qualified as an expert, respondent did not establish “that the trial court would or should have excluded [H’s] expert testimony or that [H’s] expert testimony prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings.”