Tax foreclosure; The General Property Tax Act (GPTA); Notice requirements; MCL 211.78i(7)(c); Smith v Cliffs on the Bay Condo Ass’n (On Remand); Error in the property’s street address; Effect of failing to comply with the statutory notice requirements; MCL 211.78i(10); Due process; Sidun v Wayne Cnty Treasurer; Dow v State; Jones v Flowers; Wayne County Treasurer (WCT); The National Change of Address (NCOA) database

The court held that defendant-WCT’s service of notice in the underlying tax foreclosure proceedings complied with the requirements of minimum due process, “so its inadvertent violation of the GPTA was not fatal to” those proceedings. Thus, there was no basis here to set aside the judgment of foreclosure, and MCL 211.78l(1) barred plaintiff’s quiet title action. The court assumed “without deciding that (1) plaintiff never received actual notice of the proceedings until after the trial court had entered the judgment of foreclosure, and (2) the notice was never actually delivered to the ‘19935 Hoover’ or ‘46913 Fields’ addresses.” The required notice varies with the circumstances, “and WCT was required ‘to consider unique information about an intended recipient.’ In this case, the NCOA database indicated that plaintiff’s family had moved to 70290 Laurel Creek. There was no evidence that WCT was aware of [his] divorce or had any reason to doubt that” he lived there when “it mailed notice to that address. Considering this unique information, delivery to the Fields address arguably was no longer reasonably calculated to reach plaintiff, and the Laurel Creek address was more appropriate.” While the notice was received by the wrong person, WCT “could have reasonably assumed that the ‘K Raptoplous’ who signed for the delivery was plaintiff’s wife or another family member who would have” given it to him. The court agreed “checking for typographical errors and resending the notice to 19935 Hoover would have been a reasonable” step, but it was not “the only reasonable” one. That property is industrial, not a residence, and owned by an individual. Under the “circumstances, it was reasonable for WCT to focus its efforts on finding alternative home addresses for plaintiff instead of revisiting its attempts at service to the property subject to foreclosure.” It sent copies of the notice “via both certified and first-class mail to two other addresses that were possibly associated with” him, and published notice. Given this publication, combined with the mailings, the court held “that WCT took reasonable steps to serve the notice. That plaintiff did not receive actual notice until after the foreclosure did not render it constitutionally deficient.” The court affirmed summary disposition for WCT.

Diminished-capacity defense; People v Madison

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated Part II of the judgment of the Court of Appeals (see eJournal # 82048 in the 8/13/24 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court's decision in Madison.

Diminished-capacity defense; People v Madison

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the part of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 84467 in the 10/14/25 edition) addressing the diminished capacity defense, and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of the court’s decision in Madison. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining question presented.

Waiver of counsel; Validity; People v Anderson; Advice required by MCR 6.005(E); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Search warrant authorizing a forensic examination of defendant’s electronic devices; People v Carson; People v Hughes; Good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule; United States v Leon; People v Goldston; Admission of an unavailable witness’s preliminary exam testimony; MRE 804(a)(4) & (b)(1); Confrontation Clause

The court held that defendant validly waived his right to counsel, and rejected his claim that his prior counsel (S) rendered ineffective assistance. As to his challenge to the search warrant for his electronic devices, the court concluded that even if it was insufficiently particular, the resulting evidence was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Finally, the admission of an unavailable witness’s preliminary exam “testimony did not violate MRE 804(b)(1) or the Confrontation Clause.” Thus, in these consolidated cases it affirmed his convictions of AWIGBH, felony-firearm, extortion, using a computer to commit a crime with a maximum penalty of 20 years, using a computer to commit a crime with a maximum penalty of 4 years, and unlawful posting of a message with aggravating circumstances. On appeal, he first asserted that his counsel waiver was not valid because a fee dispute with S “effectively forced him to represent himself.” He further asserted that the trial court did not provide the advice required by MCR 6.005(E) each day of trial. The court found that the record established “a valid initial waiver. After jury selection, defendant told the [trial] court that he had studied court procedures and believed that he could present a better defense than” S. The trial court advised him “that one charge carried a 20-year maximum sentence and warned that self-representation increased the likelihood of conviction. Defendant confirmed that he understood those risks and nevertheless wished to proceed. [S] remained present and available to advise him.” The court concluded that he did “not identify any deficiency in that colloquy under MCR 6.005(D) or Anderson.” In addition, the asserted fee dispute did not “render the waiver involuntary.” Based on the record, defendant did not show “that a fee demand compelled his decision or that the trial court plainly erred by accepting his unequivocal request.” As to MCR 6.005(E), any departure from the rule did “not require reversal. The renewed-waiver requirement is not itself constitutional, and noncompliance is reviewed under the plain-error rule.” The court noted that the rule “does not expressly treat every day of a continuous trial as a separate proceeding. More importantly, the record leaves no reasonable question that defendant remained aware of his right to counsel and continued to reject it.”

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to subpoena a witness; Prejudice; Failure to impeach a witness; Trial strategy; Failure to consult with & call a firearms expert; Adequacy of counsel’s review of a forensic interview; Failure to use the interview during cross-examination

The court held that defendant failed to overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s decisions as to subpoenaing a witness, impeaching a witness, and whether to “call a firearms expert were matters of trial strategy.” While defense counsel should have asked to use forensic interview transcripts before trial, the court found that this “mistake did not prejudice the defense.” Thus, it affirmed defendant’s first-degree premeditated murder and felony-firearm convictions. As to the failure to subpoena a witness (B) sooner, the initial decision not to do so “was not objectively unreasonable because defense counsel reasonably relied on [B’s] representations that she was willing to testify—she was defendant’s friend and she had gone out of her way to contact defense counsel and ask to testify. When defense counsel learned that [B] was in jail, he attempted to subpoena her and to locate her after she was released.” The court found that it “would not be reasonable to expect defense counsel to hire an investigator over the weekend to locate [B] in addition to the efforts he personally made to locate her.” Further, defendant did not show that B’s absence prejudiced the defense. She had made a statement the prosecution would likely have used to impeach her, and given what her testimony would have been, there was not a reasonable probability that it would have changed the outcome of the trial. As to the failure to cross-examine witness-M with her police statement, she did not change “her story; she simply included an additional detail.” And she admitted in the “statement and during cross-examination that she did not see a gun in defendant’s hands[.]” The court next concluded that the “missing murder weapon and video evidence justified a defense based on the prosecution’s failure to present any physical or testimonial evidence that defendant had been holding a gun instead of a defense based on highly technical expert testimony about ballistics reports.” Finally, while the court found that defense counsel was deficient related to a child witness’s (AG) forensic interview, his failure to use it “on cross-examination did not prejudice the defense.” A jury would likely have concluded “that AG actually saw defendant holding a black revolver, but in the heat of the moment and with her limited experience with handguns, she mistakenly believed it to be [B’s] pistol because both guns were small and black.”

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a voluntary-manslaughter jury instruction; Whether the evidence supported the instruction; People v Yeager; Failure to explain voluntary manslaughter to defendant; Deficient advice as to sentencing exposure; Prejudice; Whether the lack of the instruction was harmless; People v Joesel

Holding that defendant-Terry’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient and prejudiced him, the court concluded that he was entitled to a new trial. He was convicted of second-degree murder, FIP, and two counts of felony-firearm arising from “a proverbial ‘love triangle’” involving Terry, the victim (G), and a woman (H). Terry was charged with first-degree murder. His trial counsel (B) “testified at the evidentiary hearing that his primary trial strategy was self-defense” and a lack of deliberation and premeditation. “Because the jury was instructed on second-degree murder, as a lesser included offense of first-degree murder, self-defense was not an ‘all-or-nothing’ strategy. [B] testified he believed a second-degree murder instruction was required whenever a defendant is charged with first-degree murder. [B’s] belief was legally erroneous.” And under the circumstances, his “failure to request a voluntary-manslaughter instruction was not objectively reasonable.” The evidence supported the instruction. “The trial court’s determination that the evidence was not indicative of a ‘love triangle’ was clearly erroneous.” The court found that a jury could reasonably find, based on the “circumstances, that Terry shot [G] in the heat of passion caused by adequate provocation. The tension between [them] culminated in an encounter in which [G] walked in on Terry and [H], neither of whom was fully dressed.” The fact that G left his child in his truck indicated G “was aware that something might occur that he did not want the child to witness. [G] was also aware that someone was in the home with [H] because Terry’s vehicle was parked in” the driveway. The shooting occurred within “seconds, and the jury could reasonably determine that there was not ‘a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control their passions.’” Further, given “the substantial difference in Terry’s possible sentence, [B’s] representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness to the extent that he failed to investigate and convey to Terry his sentencing exposure if” he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. As to prejudice, as in “Joesel, the fact that the jury convicted Terry of second-degree murder sheds little light on what it would have decided if it was given a voluntary-manslaughter option.” The court reversed Terry’s second-degree murder and related felony-firearm conviction, and remanded.

Postjudgment custody dispute; Grandmother’s motion to intervene; Standing; In re Anjoski; The Child Custody Act (CCA); MCL 722.26b; Distinguishing Howard v Howard; Limitation on who may initiate a custody action; MCL 722.26c; “Third person” (MCL 722.22(k)); Effect of a pending custody dispute; MCL 722.27(1)(a)

The court held that the trial court reached the correct result in denying appellant-grandmother’s motion to intervene in this postjudgment custody dispute because she did not establish standing under MCL 722.26b or 722.26c. While neither parent opposed her motion, the trial court denied it on the basis that she did not meet “the requirements of MCL 722.26c(1)(a) and (1)(b).” On appeal, the court noted that “MCL 722.26c governs when a third person may initiate custody proceedings.” But when a custody dispute is already pending, “MCL 722.27(1)(a) authorizes the [trial] court to award custody to a third person.” Reading the provisions together, they “serve different functions. MCL 722.26c limits who may initiate a custody action, while MCL 722.27(1) governs the court’s authority to place a child with a third party once a custody dispute is properly before it. A third party’s inability to satisfy MCL 722.26c therefore bars the party from initiating a custody action. It does not preclude a trial court from resolving a pending custody dispute by awarding custody to a third person.” The court found that “the trial court’s stated rationale for denying the motion was imprecise” but that this did not “resolve whether grandmother was entitled to intervene.” As the court concluded in Anjoski, the CCA limits standing for third parties to two circumstances. As she was not the child’s guardian, MCL 722.26b did “not confer standing on her.” And she did not “dispute that she cannot satisfy MCL 722.26c(1)(a) or (b).” She did not challenge the trial court’s findings in that regard on appeal. While “MCL 722.27(1)(a) authorizes a trial court to award custody to a third party—irrespective of the third party’s standing—if it determines that doing so is in the child’s best interests, a third party who seeks to become a party to a pending custody dispute must nonetheless establish standing under MCL 722.26b or MCL 722.26c.” Under Anjoski, absent “standing, ‘a third party . . . cannot become a party to a custody dispute,’ even one already pending between proper parties.” The court noted that its conclusion did not “preclude the trial court from awarding grandmother custody under MCL 722.27(1)(a) if it determines that doing so is in” the child’s best interests. Affirmed.

Tax foreclosure; The General Property Tax Act (GPTA); Notice requirements; MCL 211.78i(7)(c); Smith v Cliffs on the Bay Condo Ass’n (On Remand); Error in the property’s street address; Effect of failing to comply with the statutory notice requirements; MCL 211.78i(10); Due process; Sidun v Wayne Cnty Treasurer; Dow v State; Jones v Flowers; Wayne County Treasurer (WCT); The National Change of Address (NCOA) database

The court held that defendant-WCT’s service of notice in the underlying tax foreclosure proceedings complied with the requirements of minimum due process, “so its inadvertent violation of the GPTA was not fatal to” those proceedings. Thus, there was no basis here to set aside the judgment of foreclosure, and MCL 211.78l(1) barred plaintiff’s quiet title action. The court assumed “without deciding that (1) plaintiff never received actual notice of the proceedings until after the trial court had entered the judgment of foreclosure, and (2) the notice was never actually delivered to the ‘19935 Hoover’ or ‘46913 Fields’ addresses.” The required notice varies with the circumstances, “and WCT was required ‘to consider unique information about an intended recipient.’ In this case, the NCOA database indicated that plaintiff’s family had moved to 70290 Laurel Creek. There was no evidence that WCT was aware of [his] divorce or had any reason to doubt that” he lived there when “it mailed notice to that address. Considering this unique information, delivery to the Fields address arguably was no longer reasonably calculated to reach plaintiff, and the Laurel Creek address was more appropriate.” While the notice was received by the wrong person, WCT “could have reasonably assumed that the ‘K Raptoplous’ who signed for the delivery was plaintiff’s wife or another family member who would have” given it to him. The court agreed “checking for typographical errors and resending the notice to 19935 Hoover would have been a reasonable” step, but it was not “the only reasonable” one. That property is industrial, not a residence, and owned by an individual. Under the “circumstances, it was reasonable for WCT to focus its efforts on finding alternative home addresses for plaintiff instead of revisiting its attempts at service to the property subject to foreclosure.” It sent copies of the notice “via both certified and first-class mail to two other addresses that were possibly associated with” him, and published notice. Given this publication, combined with the mailings, the court held “that WCT took reasonable steps to serve the notice. That plaintiff did not receive actual notice until after the foreclosure did not render it constitutionally deficient.” The court affirmed summary disposition for WCT.