Resentencing for first-degree murder committed when defendant was a juvenile; Miller v Alabama; People v Boykin; Consideration of youth as a mitigating factor; People v Snow; Proportionality & reasonableness; Alleged unconstitutional de facto life sentence; 70-year maximum sentence; MCL 769.25(9); People v Meadows; Limited scope of prior remand; Ineffective assistance of counsel

Rejecting defendant’s arguments that he was entitled to another Miller resentencing, the court affirmed his 40 to 70-year sentence. He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and murder of a peace officer for crimes committed when he was 16. He argued that the trial court at resentencing failed to “properly consider his youth as a mitigating factor at resentencing as required by Miller and” Boykin. The court found no merit in his claims. To the extent he suggested “the trial court, in imposing its term-of-years sentence, was required to make specific findings on the record regarding its consideration of the mitigating qualities of youth and each of the Snow factors, caselaw” holds otherwise. All the trial court was required to do was provide “an explanation sufficient to facilitate appellate review of the sentence and its proportionality.” The record here was “more than sufficient to facilitate such review, and makes clear that the trial court properly considered defendant’s youth in light of Miller and Snow when fashioning a sentence that was duly proportionate to the offense and the offender.” Consistent with those cases, it “duly considered defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating and properly incorporated that consideration into its determination of a proportionate sentence for this offense and offender.” The characteristics of his “youth at the time of the offense, such as impulsivity and potential for reform, led [it] to conclude that the possibility of parole should not be fully eliminated, and a very lengthy term-of-years sentence would be most suitable for defendant and his crime.” While he offered several reasons why he thought the record supported “‘a more lenient sentence’” the court noted that “the trial court did find reasons for leniency in” the considerations he cited—just not to the extent he desired. The court also rejected his de facto life sentence argument, noting that his sentence left open the possibility of parole when he is 58 years old. As to his claim that his maximum sentence exceeded a 60-year cap, “he was resentenced under MCL 769.25 rather than MCL 769.25a.” Thus, MCL 769.25(9), which provides for a maximum term of “not less than 60 years[,]” applied, not MCL 769.25a(4)(c), which provides for a maximum term of 60 years. The trial court “had discretionary authority under the statute to sentence [him] to a maximum of 70 years.”

Sentencing; Reasonableness of an upward departure from the guidelines; People v Lydic; Relevant factors; People v Dixon-Bey; Rehabilitation potential; People v Copeland; Blood alcohol content (BAC)

Holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an upward departure minimum sentence of 40 months or inadequately consider defendant’s rehabilitation potential, the court affirmed his sentence. He pled no-contest to OWI causing serious injury and failure to use due care when passing a stationary vehicle causing injury to emergency personnel after his vehicle struck two police vehicles and a deputy (P). His guidelines range was 7 to 23 months. In sentencing him to 40 to 60 months for OWI-injury, the trial court “imposed the statutory maximum for that offense. [It] articulated various considerations in imposing this sentence such as defendant’s prior OWI convictions and exhibition of remorse, but” it was clear from its discussion “that the drivers of the departure and its extent were the seriousness of defendant’s offense and the recklessness [he] exhibited in committing that offense, as well as the severity of” P’s injuries. As to the first two factors, the video from another deputy’s bodycam showed “the flashing lights on the police vehicles made apparent their location on the roadway, but defendant (driving with a BAC almost twice the legal limit) began to slow his vehicle only about two seconds before the incident, and then proceeded closely enough to the conspicuous police vehicles such that he could strike them and [P]. The trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant indeed acted extremely recklessly, without regard to the people or property he encountered. Given this evidence, according greater weight to [his] recklessness and the severity of his offense was not an abuse of discretion.” Also, P sustained “significant injuries to his leg, face, body, and head, and the trial court characterized” them as being such that he might not be able to return to his profession. While his injuries were accounted for to some degree by OVs 3 and 4, the court could not “quarrel with the trial court’s determination that these scores inadequately accounted for the severity and circumstances of defendant’s offense.” P’s extensive injuries required “surgeries and significant physical therapy, [he] was disabled completely from walking for a period of time and at sentencing was using a cane, and was under monitoring for possible additional neurological injuries caused by trauma to his head.”

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to renew a motion to suppress evidence; Search & seizure; Traffic stop; Reasonable & articulable suspicion; People v Mazzie; Effect of a canine alert on a vehicle; Probable cause; People v Clark; Post-Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marihuana Act (MARTA) effect of the smell of marijuana; People v Armstrong; Effect of officers’ subjective intentions; Prosecutorial error; Motion to consolidate cases into one trial; MCR 6.120(B)(1) & (2); Confidential informant (CI)

The court held that defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to renew a motion to suppress because such a motion would have failed given that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. It also rejected his prosecutorial error claim, noting that “the prosecution was legally permitted to move to join the cases into one trial” and concluding that the trial court did not plainly err in granting that motion. Defendant was convicted of meth possession in one of the cases on appeal and of obstruction of justice in both cases. The court held that a renewed motion to suppress lacked merit because the traffic stops were “supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, and probable cause existed, based on the totality of the circumstances, to search the vehicle for narcotics.” Before conducting the stops, “officers verified that the vehicle was uninsured and unregistered by running its license plate through LEIN. Information obtained from LEIN can provide officers with reasonable and articulable suspicion to suspect that a traffic violation has occurred.” Given that “driving an unregistered and uninsured vehicle are both traffic offenses, reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to support both traffic stops, which led to defendant being lawfully seized. After [he] was lawfully seized, the vehicle was lawfully searched following the” second traffic stop, which resulted in meth being found. The “police canine performed an exterior open-air sniff of the vehicle and alerted on [its] front passenger door. The officers searched the vehicle’s interior and discovered meth[] and drug paraphernalia in a jacket that had defendant’s identification in it, located near where [he] was seated. The officer’s search of the vehicle was lawful under the Fourth Amendment because it is well established that canine sniffs of the exterior of a vehicle are reasonable and not considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.” As to his argument based on the fact the canine “was trained to alert for marijuana,” the court held that “there was probable cause in this particular case because it was not the canine sniff alone that led to the search.” A deputy witnessed a controlled buy of narcotics between a CI and the vehicle’s driver (C) involving the vehicle, after the deputy “received information from a ‘credible and reliable [CI]’ indicating that [C] was procuring large amounts of” meth. Affirmed.

Expert testimony; Admissibility under MRE 702 & MCL 600.2955; Danhoff v Fahim; Qualifications; MCL 600.2169(2); Medical malpractice; Standard of care, breach, & causation; Rock v Crocker; Motion to strike expert’s testimony; Expert substitution after discovery; Abandonment of issue

The court held that the trial court properly struck plaintiff’s nursing expert and granted summary disposition because the expert could not reliably identify the specific breaches of the nursing standard of care or connect those alleged breaches to the decedent’s injuries, leaving plaintiff unable to prove a prima facie malpractice case. Plaintiff alleged that nursing staff at defendants-Boulevard Temple Care Center and Henry Ford entities allowed the decedent to develop and suffer worsening pressure ulcers from 2020 through 2022, causing pain, distress, loss of mobility, and deterioration in health. After discovery closed, defendants deposed plaintiff’s sole expert, a nurse (P), who could not identify “which nurses she was critical of at which facility,” “any specific nurse” or staff member who violated the standard of care, “any specific facts of assessing, diagnosing, planning, interventions and evaluations that she was actually critical of,” or any specific “place in the medical record” showing the claimed failures. On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly performed its gatekeeping role because expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable, and P’s opinions were “not based on sufficient facts and did not reflect a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of this case as required under MRE 702.” Plaintiff had “‘failed to provide any support that [her] opinions have any basis in fact[.]’” Because expert testimony was required to establish “‘the standard of care and a breach of that standard as well as causation,’” and plaintiff’s only expert was properly excluded, the court held that summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was warranted. It also declined to disturb the refusal to allow a substitute expert after discovery because plaintiff abandoned that issue and, in any event, showed no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

Expert testimony; Admissibility under MRE 702 & MCL 600.2955; Danhoff v Fahim; Qualifications; MCL 600.2169(2); Medical malpractice; Standard of care, breach, & causation; Rock v Crocker; Motion to strike expert’s testimony; Expert substitution after discovery; Abandonment of issue

The court held that the trial court properly struck plaintiff’s nursing expert and granted summary disposition because the expert could not reliably identify the specific breaches of the nursing standard of care or connect those alleged breaches to the decedent’s injuries, leaving plaintiff unable to prove a prima facie malpractice case. Plaintiff alleged that nursing staff at defendants-Boulevard Temple Care Center and Henry Ford entities allowed the decedent to develop and suffer worsening pressure ulcers from 2020 through 2022, causing pain, distress, loss of mobility, and deterioration in health. After discovery closed, defendants deposed plaintiff’s sole expert, a nurse (P), who could not identify “which nurses she was critical of at which facility,” “any specific nurse” or staff member who violated the standard of care, “any specific facts of assessing, diagnosing, planning, interventions and evaluations that she was actually critical of,” or any specific “place in the medical record” showing the claimed failures. On appeal, the court held that the trial court properly performed its gatekeeping role because expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable, and P’s opinions were “not based on sufficient facts and did not reflect a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of this case as required under MRE 702.” Plaintiff had “‘failed to provide any support that [her] opinions have any basis in fact[.]’” Because expert testimony was required to establish “‘the standard of care and a breach of that standard as well as causation,’” and plaintiff’s only expert was properly excluded, the court held that summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was warranted. It also declined to disturb the refusal to allow a substitute expert after discovery because plaintiff abandoned that issue and, in any event, showed no abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

Civil infraction enforcement; Notice requirements under International Property Maintenance Code (IPMC) §§ 106.2, 106.3, & 107.2; Ordinance interpretation; Great Lakes Soc’y v Georgetown Charter Twp; Mandatory language; Meaning of “shall” & “all”; Commission to Ban Fracking in MI v Board of State Canvassers & Reed-Pratt v Detroit City Clerk; Scope of appeal; Limited leave issues

The court held that defendants’ civil-infraction judgment had to be vacated because the city failed to provide notice “in accordance with Section 107” of the IPMC, and proper notice under that section was a prerequisite to any finding of liability. The case arose after plaintiff-Southfield cited defendants for failing to maintain a driveway allegedly containing uneven and broken slabs. But each notice of violation omitted any statement advising defendants of their right to appeal to the city’s property maintenance board of appeals. The district court nevertheless found defendants responsible for a civil infraction, and the circuit court affirmed. On appeal, the court held that the relevant ordinances and code provisions were straightforward: under IPMC § 107.2, the notice “‘shall be in accordance with all of the’” listed requirements, including that it “[i]nform the property owner or owner’s authorized agent of the right to appeal.” And under IPMC § 106.3 a person is guilty only if he or she fails to comply with “a notice of violation or order served in accordance with Section 107[.]” The court next found that there was “no dispute that the notices did not comply with IPMC, § 107.2(5),” and therefore defendants were not “served in accordance with Section 107.” It rejected the city’s argument that compliance with the other notice requirements was enough, emphasizing that “‘shall’” is ordinarily mandatory and that “‘all’ leaves no room for exceptions.” Because “a prerequisite to the determination of violation was not met,” the court held that defendants “could not be determined to have violated IPMC, § 302.3.” Vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the civil infraction.

Quiet title; Boundary dispute; Acquiescence for the statutory period; Killips v Mannisto; Property-line evidence; Deed interpretation; Sackett v Atyeo; Tacit or overt boundary agreement requirement; Houston v Mint Group

The court held that the trial court erred by quieting title in defendants under the doctrine of acquiescence because the evidence did not show that the parties’ predecessors had mutually treated the centerline of the driveway, or any other proven alternative line, as the boundary for the required statutory period. The dispute concerned adjoining lakefront properties, a driveway, and several structures that crossed the surveyed line, including a garage, shed, concrete pad, and walkway that defendants’ predecessor, nonparty-B, believed were on his side of the line based on what his predecessor told him about an ash tree marking the boundary. The trial court ruled for defendants, finding “‘clear and unequivocal evidence’” that the parties’ predecessors had treated the centerline of the driveway as the true line for well over 15 years. On appeal, the court held that this finding could not stand because the trial court “erred when it interpreted the 1907 and 1954 deeds.” It explained that the 1907 deed “does not refer to any driveway,” that in 1907 the properties were still under common ownership so any driveway was not “‘shared,’” and that the 1954 deed extended the line on the “northerly side” rather than the disputed western boundary. The court next held that the record did not establish the required agreement because acquiescence applies only when there has been “‘some agreement, whether tacit or overt, as to the location of the boundary,’” and here there was no evidence that plaintiff’s predecessor and B mutually associated “the centerline of the driveway as a reference point for their property rights.” The court also rejected the trial court’s dismissal of the later lease as “‘an ineffectual attempt’” to create a paper trail to defeat acquiescence, holding instead that the lease was relevant because it showed B acknowledged that his improvements “encroached on plaintiff’s property.” Reversed and remanded.

Refund request; Sourcing of wholesale electricity sales; Distinguishing PM One, Ltd v Department of Treasury; Abandonment & waiver of the issue of whether a Tariff governing transactions constituted a contract; “Any purchaser” (MCL 206.665(1)(a)); “Purchase”; Distinguishing Uniloy Milacron USA, Inc v Department of Treasury; Applicability of Lockheed Martin Corp v Hegar (TX); The Commerce Clause (US Const, art I, § 8, cl 3); The fairness requirement; The internal & external consistency tests; Tax Tribunal (TT); Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO)

[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 2/17/26.] The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting respondent summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “and denying petitioner’s refund request for tax years 2013 through 2016.” The court noted that petitioner “generates electricity and sells it wholesale to” a regional transmission organization, MISO, “that coordinates and controls the transmission of electricity in multiple states, including Michigan.” The transactions between them “are governed by a Tariff. Under the Tariff, petitioner is a Market Participant, and MISO is the Energy Market Counterparty[.]” Petitioner sought to amend its tax returns and obtain a partial refund. It first argued that the TT “erred by concluding that [its] wholesale electricity sales were properly sourced to Michigan.” The court disagreed. It concluded that the TT “correctly determined that petitioner’s transactions with MISO constitute sales under MCL 206.609(4) and that, ‘[b]ecause title is transferred to MISO, the sale is to MISO.’” The court found that it was “petitioner’s receipt of consideration that is pertinent under the statutory definition of ‘sale.’ The statute does not require an inquiry into the ultimate source of the funds used to pay petitioner.” While petitioner cited PM One, it was distinguishable and inapplicable to this case. Petitioner asserted that the TT “ignored the language in MCL 206.665(1)(a)[,]” which defines “any purchaser.” It also suggested “that the federally-mandated transfer of title to MISO is a mere condition of the sale that . . . must be disregarded for tax purposes.” The court found no merit in this argument, concluding that the TT “did not ignore the statutory language at issue.” Petitioner cited Uniloy. But that case was also distinguishable. It “does not alter the conclusion that petitioner’s wholesale electricity sales should be sourced to Michigan.” Petitioner also cited Lockheed Martin. “Given what the Texas court itself described as the ‘unique circumstances’ of that case, Lockheed Martin is not instructive in” this case. There was no analogous situation here. Petitioner “pointed to no evidence of an identifiable wholesale purchaser of petitioner’s electricity following delivery to MISO. After petitioner’s electricity is injected into the grid, it cannot be differentiated from electricity injected by other generators. Again, MISO is a contractual counterparty in the transactions with petitioner.” Finally, the court disagreed “that the sourcing to Michigan of all of petitioner’s wholesale electricity sales violates the Commerce Clause[.]”