The eJournal provides summaries of the latest opinions from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court. The summaries also include a PDF of the opinion and identifies the judges, key issues, and relevant practice area(s). Subscribe here.

RECENT SUMMARIES

    • Constitutional Law (2)

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      This summary also appears under Criminal Law

      e-Journal #: 86790
      Case: Doe A v. Whitmer
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Moore and Mathis; Concurring in part, Dissenting in part – Nalbandian
      Issues:

      Constitutional challenges under 42 USC § 1983 to Michigan’s 2021 Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA 2021); Ex Post Facto Clause; People v Smith (MI); Mootness; Substantive due process; Equal protection; Offense-based tiers; Rational relationship to recidivism reduction; Limits on some registrants’ abilities to petition for removal from the SORA’s requirements; Procedural due process; The Michigan State Police’s (MSP) treatment of individuals with non-Michigan convictions; Mathews v Eldridge; Void for vagueness challenges to education, employment, & vehicle reporting obligations

      Summary:

      [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Holding that Michigan’s “SORA 2021 rationally relates to recidivism reduction[,]” the court rejected plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection challenges to SORA 2021’s reliance on offense-based tiers. It also rejected their claim that allowing “tier I registrants—but not tier II or III registrants who remain offense-free—to petition for removal from the registry” violated the Equal Protection Clause. It further concluded that the education, employment, and vehicle reporting requirements were not facially vague. But as to the procedural due process challenge to the MSP’s treatment of individuals with non-Michigan convictions, the court agreed “with the district court that additional pre-deprivation procedures are required.” The court first addressed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs on their Ex Post Facto Clause claims. The court vacated and remanded those counts “for the district court to determine in the first instance whether” the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Smith mooted those claims. It did the same with Count VI, “plaintiffs’ retroactive-alteration-of-plea-agreements due-process claim.” But Smith did not “impact the other four counts at issue on appeal.” As to the reliance on offense-based tiers, plaintiffs’ expert’s report provided “some support for the notion that SORA 2021 reduces recidivism. This is sufficient to surmount the low bar set by rational-basis review.” And the support provided from studies of other states’ registries “for SORA 2021’s recidivism-reducing effects supplies a rational link to a nonpunitive purpose.” As to the restrictions on petitioning for removal, “Michigan could have rationally concluded that, even if tier I offenders’ and the subclass’s probabilities of reoffending converge over time, the subclass nevertheless poses a greater risk to the public.” As to plaintiffs’ claim about the treatment of juvenile registrants, “Michigan treats juvenile registrants better than other tier III registrants by allowing them to petition for removal from the registry after [25] years while generally barring adult tier III registrants from ever doing so.” But as to individuals convicted of non-Michigan offenses who are required to enroll in the registry, defendants did “not identify any interest arising from an extraordinary situation that renders post-deprivation process adequate.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

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      This summary also appears under Criminal Law

      e-Journal #: 86791
      Case: Does v. Michigan State Police
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Moore, Nalbandian, and Mathis
      Issues:

      Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA); In-person reporting requirements; Fourth Amendment seizure; Willman v Attorney Gen of United States; United States v Dionisio; Required court appearances; Malicious-prosecution seizure principles; Discrete seizure theory

      Summary:

      [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that SORA’s in-person reporting requirements do not constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs were individuals required to register under Michigan’s SORA. They challenged requirements that registrants appear in person for initial registration, periodic tier-based reporting, and reporting certain life changes, asserting that each required appearance constituted a discrete seizure because failure to comply could result in criminal penalties. On appeal, the court declined to rest solely on its prior decision in Willman, which involved federal sex-offender registration requirements, and independently concluded there was no seizure. It found Supreme Court precedent concerning grand-jury subpoenas instructive because compelled appearances differ from arrests or investigative stops. SORA reporting is not abrupt or “‘effected with force or the threat of it,’” and while sex-offender registration is stigmatizing, “the in-person reporting itself does not ‘result in’ that stigma.” The court also relied on precedent holding that being required to appear in court, without more, is not a Fourth Amendment seizure. A court summons and SORA reporting share the features plaintiffs emphasized because both compel an in-person appearance through the possibility of legal consequences for noncompliance. Yet SORA imposes even less restraint because registrants generally have flexibility within a prescribed period as to when they report. They also did not allege that once they arrived they could not leave and return later. Thus, a reasonable person would retain greater freedom to “terminate the encounter” than someone required to attend court at a fixed time. The court limited its holding to the challenged in-person requirements and did not decide whether additional liberty restrictions could amount to a seizure or whether a continuing-seizure theory is viable. Affirmed.

    • Criminal Law (5)

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      e-Journal #: 86759
      Case: People v. Coverdale
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Third-offense domestic violence; Sentence enhancement; MCL 750.81(5); Applicability of MCL 750.81b; Defective enhancement notice; Amendment of information or notice; MCR 6.112(H); Plea agreement; Prosecutorial charging authority; Withdrawal from plea agreement

      Summary:

      The court held that the trial court erred by treating an error in defendant’s third-offense domestic-violence notice as foreclosing the enhancement and by sentencing him for a lesser offense while retaining the prosecution’s concessions under the plea agreement. He pled guilty to felony third-offense domestic violence and attempted resisting or obstructing a police officer pursuant to an agreement under which the prosecution dismissed or reduced other charges and habitual-offender enhancements. Before sentencing, the prosecution discovered that one of the two prior domestic-violence convictions listed in the third-offense notice did not exist, but identified another qualifying 2019 conviction. The trial court found the notice defective and sentenced defendant for misdemeanor second-offense domestic violence. On appeal, the court declined to decide whether MCL 750.81b applies to enhancements under MCL 750.81(5), concluding that even if it did, the defect was curable by amendment under MCR 6.112(H). Substituting the 2019 conviction would not have increased the enhancement or maximum sentence, defendant received the supporting documentation more than a month before sentencing, and he did not dispute the conviction’s accuracy. “Nothing in the court rules or in MCL 750.81b provides that an error in the identification of prior convictions permanently forecloses an enhancement that the prosecution has properly noticed and proved.” Thus, the prosecution was “entitled to amend the notice to substitute the 2019 conviction.” The court further concluded that even if the enhancement were unavailable, “[h]aving concluded that the third-offense enhancement was unavailable, the trial court could not sentence defendant for a lesser offense while holding the prosecution to the concessions made in exchange for defendant’s plea to a greater offense.” Rather, the prosecution had to be permitted to withdraw from the agreement. The trial court “was not permitted to impose on the prosecution a bargain to which the prosecution had not agreed.” The court vacated the judgment of sentence in the domestic-violence case and remanded.

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      e-Journal #: 86758
      Case: People v. Foster
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Sufficiency of the evidence for an AWIGBH conviction; Intent; People v Harrington; Right to present a defense; Denial of midtrial motion to add a witness to the defense witness list; Cumulative testimony; MRE 403; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move to quash; Prejudice; MCR 6.110(F) & (H); Failure to question a juror during voir dire & to remove that juror; People v Unger

      Summary:

      The court held that the evidence of defendant’s intent was sufficient to support her AWIGBH conviction as to one of the victims (W), and it rejected her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Further, she was not denied her right to present a defense by the trial court’s denial of her midtrial motion to add W to the defense witness list. Thus, the court affirmed her AWIGBH and felony-firearm convictions. She asserted “there was no evidence that she intended to cause ‘serious injury of an aggravated nature’ to [W], emphasizing that she missed [W’s] face and struck only [W’s] shoulder, did not try to strike [W] again, and caused no injury requiring treatment.” However, the question was “not what injury defendant caused, but what injury she intended.” The court found that, viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence showed that defendant had just attacked [the other victim], leaving her on the ground with portions of her hair torn from her scalp. Defendant then turned on [W] while holding a handgun, threatened to ‘pistol whip’ her, and swung the gun at her head. Surveillance footage” corroborated the victims’ accounts and “allowed the jury to see the force and manner of that swing for itself. The jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to cause serious injury of an aggravated nature to” W when she tried to strike her “in the head with a handgun. That [she] missed her target because [W] moved does not negate her intent when she swung.” As to her request to recall W as a defense witness, this “would have produced the same testimony the jury had already heard.” The court concluded that the trial “court’s decision to exclude needlessly cumulative testimony fell within the range of principled outcomes.” Her claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the bindover as to W failed for lack of prejudice. “Nothing in the record suggests that the prosecution could not have refiled the charges and presented additional evidence at a new preliminary” exam. She also did “not overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s decision to keep Juror One was strategic” and she could not “establish prejudice because nothing in the record shows that Juror One was actually biased.”

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      e-Journal #: 86756
      Case: People v. Hill
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Young, Redford, and Feeney
      Issues:

      Ineffective assistance of counsel; Probable cause for bindover; People v Burkman; Futile motion; Failure to investigate cell phone location data; Sentencing; Notice of a fourth-offense habitual offender enhancement; MCL 769.13; MCR 6.112(F); People v Head

      Summary:

      In consolidated appeals, the court rejected defendant-Hill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and concluded that he received timely notice of the prosecution’s intent to charge him as a fourth-offense habitual offender. Thus, it affirmed his armed robbery convictions and his concurrent sentences, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, of 25 to 50 years. He first contended that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the evidence at the preliminary exams “was insufficient to establish probable cause that he was the armed robber.” But the court noted that defense counsel argued “that there was insufficient evidence to support the bindovers; counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to do that which was done.” It also rejected Hill’s claim “that defense counsel should have moved to quash the bindover orders in the circuit court.” The preliminary exam evidence “connected Hill with the robberies through [his] use of the Impala, including Hill being arrested while driving the Impala shortly after it was used in the Walgreens robbery. Although Hill suggested that the Impala was being driven by a person named ‘Cheese’ as a type of short-term rental, the fact that the driver of the Impala used Hill’s Speedway rewards card immediately after the Walgreens robbery provides a reasonable inference that Hill was, in fact, the driver and robber. Although circumstantial, this evidence was sufficient to ‘cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief in defendant’s guilt.’” Thus, the court held that the district courts did not abuse their discretion in binding him over; “a motion to quash would have been futile and defense counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to make a futile motion.” As to his claim for failing to reasonably investigate his cell phone location data, the record established that this “data would not have helped Hill.” Finally, as to the habitual-offender notice, he “could not have been arraigned on any information earlier than the conclusion of the preliminary” exam on 1/25/23. Because all the mislabeled “amended” informations were filed by 21 days after that date, the court concluded that he received timely notice in each case.

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      This summary also appears under Constitutional Law

      e-Journal #: 86790
      Case: Doe A v. Whitmer
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Moore and Mathis; Concurring in part, Dissenting in part – Nalbandian
      Issues:

      Constitutional challenges under 42 USC § 1983 to Michigan’s 2021 Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA 2021); Ex Post Facto Clause; People v Smith (MI); Mootness; Substantive due process; Equal protection; Offense-based tiers; Rational relationship to recidivism reduction; Limits on some registrants’ abilities to petition for removal from the SORA’s requirements; Procedural due process; The Michigan State Police’s (MSP) treatment of individuals with non-Michigan convictions; Mathews v Eldridge; Void for vagueness challenges to education, employment, & vehicle reporting obligations

      Summary:

      [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] Holding that Michigan’s “SORA 2021 rationally relates to recidivism reduction[,]” the court rejected plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection challenges to SORA 2021’s reliance on offense-based tiers. It also rejected their claim that allowing “tier I registrants—but not tier II or III registrants who remain offense-free—to petition for removal from the registry” violated the Equal Protection Clause. It further concluded that the education, employment, and vehicle reporting requirements were not facially vague. But as to the procedural due process challenge to the MSP’s treatment of individuals with non-Michigan convictions, the court agreed “with the district court that additional pre-deprivation procedures are required.” The court first addressed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs on their Ex Post Facto Clause claims. The court vacated and remanded those counts “for the district court to determine in the first instance whether” the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Smith mooted those claims. It did the same with Count VI, “plaintiffs’ retroactive-alteration-of-plea-agreements due-process claim.” But Smith did not “impact the other four counts at issue on appeal.” As to the reliance on offense-based tiers, plaintiffs’ expert’s report provided “some support for the notion that SORA 2021 reduces recidivism. This is sufficient to surmount the low bar set by rational-basis review.” And the support provided from studies of other states’ registries “for SORA 2021’s recidivism-reducing effects supplies a rational link to a nonpunitive purpose.” As to the restrictions on petitioning for removal, “Michigan could have rationally concluded that, even if tier I offenders’ and the subclass’s probabilities of reoffending converge over time, the subclass nevertheless poses a greater risk to the public.” As to plaintiffs’ claim about the treatment of juvenile registrants, “Michigan treats juvenile registrants better than other tier III registrants by allowing them to petition for removal from the registry after [25] years while generally barring adult tier III registrants from ever doing so.” But as to individuals convicted of non-Michigan offenses who are required to enroll in the registry, defendants did “not identify any interest arising from an extraordinary situation that renders post-deprivation process adequate.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

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      This summary also appears under Constitutional Law

      e-Journal #: 86791
      Case: Does v. Michigan State Police
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Moore, Nalbandian, and Mathis
      Issues:

      Michigan Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA); In-person reporting requirements; Fourth Amendment seizure; Willman v Attorney Gen of United States; United States v Dionisio; Required court appearances; Malicious-prosecution seizure principles; Discrete seizure theory

      Summary:

      [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that SORA’s in-person reporting requirements do not constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs were individuals required to register under Michigan’s SORA. They challenged requirements that registrants appear in person for initial registration, periodic tier-based reporting, and reporting certain life changes, asserting that each required appearance constituted a discrete seizure because failure to comply could result in criminal penalties. On appeal, the court declined to rest solely on its prior decision in Willman, which involved federal sex-offender registration requirements, and independently concluded there was no seizure. It found Supreme Court precedent concerning grand-jury subpoenas instructive because compelled appearances differ from arrests or investigative stops. SORA reporting is not abrupt or “‘effected with force or the threat of it,’” and while sex-offender registration is stigmatizing, “the in-person reporting itself does not ‘result in’ that stigma.” The court also relied on precedent holding that being required to appear in court, without more, is not a Fourth Amendment seizure. A court summons and SORA reporting share the features plaintiffs emphasized because both compel an in-person appearance through the possibility of legal consequences for noncompliance. Yet SORA imposes even less restraint because registrants generally have flexibility within a prescribed period as to when they report. They also did not allege that once they arrived they could not leave and return later. Thus, a reasonable person would retain greater freedom to “terminate the encounter” than someone required to attend court at a fixed time. The court limited its holding to the challenged in-person requirements and did not decide whether additional liberty restrictions could amount to a seizure or whether a continuing-seizure theory is viable. Affirmed.

    • Insurance (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86760
      Case: Essa v. Michigan Auto. Ins. Placement Facility
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      No-fault insurance priority dispute; PIP benefits; Policy rescission; Change in position; The “mend the hold” doctrine; Smith v Grange Mut Fire Ins Co of MI; Whether policy application inaccuracies provided a lawful basis for rescission; Innocent misrepresentation; Titan Ins Co v Hyten; Effect of signing the application; Balancing the equities; Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Wright

      Summary:

      The court held that the “mend the hold” doctrine did not preclude defendant-insurer (Progressive) from rescinding the no-fault policy it issued to plaintiff’s husband, and that the policy application’s inaccuracies provided a lawful basis for rescission. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the equities and granting Progressive rescission. After plaintiff and her husband (D) were involved in an auto accident, Progressive denied her claim for PIP benefits. She then sued defendant-MAIPF, and later amended her complaint to add Progressive. On appeal, MAIPF argued “that Progressive should be precluded from rescinding the” policy because material misrepresentation, its basis for seeking rescission, “was not the reason it initially gave for denying plaintiff’s claim.” MAIPF asserted that Progressive’s change of position violated the “mend the hold” doctrine. The court concluded that Progressive’s initial “denial on the basis of plaintiff not being a resident relative under the policy does not bar it from seeking rescission on the facts presented here. Under Smith, an insurer must ‘fully apprise the insured of all the defenses it intends to rely upon, and its failure to do so is, in legal effect, a waiver, and estops it from maintaining any defenses to an action on the policy other than those of which it has thus given notice.’ But when Progressive denied plaintiff’s claim, it had not been informed that [D] was married to plaintiff or that he and his family resided” with plaintiff and her daughters (his application listed an address in another city). The court found that the “trial court properly did not treat ‘mend the hold’ as an obstacle to granting rescission.” As to a lawful basis for rescission, the court held that all “six elements of the innocent misrepresentation test” were satisfied. As to balancing the equities, the first and fourth factors were at issue. The court concluded that, if “anything, the trial court should have found that the first factor weighed in favor of rescission.” The fourth factor was dispositive. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering that “rescission would allow plaintiff to avoid any complications caused by the one-year-back rule,” or by not addressing “the impact of the $250,000 cap” under MCL 500.3172(7)(a) on plaintiff’s ability to recover benefits. Affirmed.

    • Litigation (1)

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      This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

      e-Journal #: 86754
      Case: Gerald v. Stanton
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Extreme & outrageous conduct; Effect of prior PPO proceedings; MCR 2.116(C)(8); MRE 404(b); Legal sufficiency of the complaint; Plaintiff’s competing summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10); Mootness

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff failed to state an IIED claim based on defendant’s alleged confrontational and offensive remarks, and the trial court was not required to decide her competing summary disposition motion after properly dismissing the action under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The parties’ dispute arose from defendant-HOA president’s confrontations with plaintiff and workers she hired to remove trees from her property. Plaintiff obtained a PPO against defendant and later sued, asserting IIED and other claims. On appeal, she argued that the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to the PPO proceedings. The court disagreed, explaining that “the PPO proceedings were distinct from the instant proceedings and involved different legal questions.” Thus, the fact that plaintiff successfully obtained a PPO “did not necessarily incorporate a finding that defendant engaged in ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct for the purposes of IIED.” The court also rejected her reliance on MRE 404(b), noting that the rule concerns admissibility at trial and did not alter the legal-sufficiency analysis required by MCR 2.116(C)(8). Further, plaintiff did not actually challenge the trial court’s conclusion that her complaint was legally insufficient, thereby abandoning that issue. Even considering the merits, the allegations failed to state an IIED claim. Liability does not extend to “‘mere insults, indignities, [or] threats,’” and defendant’s alleged conduct, which included yelling, calling plaintiff a derogatory name, and making an offensive race-related remark, fell within that category. Although his comments were “certainly offensive and inappropriate,” they did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required for IIED. Finally, once defendant was properly granted summary disposition for failure to state a claim, plaintiff’s MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion became moot because she could not obtain judgment on claims that were legally insufficient. Affirmed.

    • Municipal (2)

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      This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

      e-Journal #: 86755
      Case: Estate of Hooffstetter v. City of Muskegon
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Young, Redford, and Feeney
      Issues:

      Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(2); Duty; Special relationship; Proximate cause; Proprietary function exception; MCL 691.1413; Nuisance & premises liability; Recreational Land Use Act (RUA); MCL 324.73301

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff’s claims against the individual city defendants did not overcome governmental immunity because the allegations failed to establish a duty, gross negligence, or proximate causation, but a factual question remained as to whether the proprietary function exception applied to his nuisance and premises-liability claims against defendant-City. Plaintiff’s 19-year-old son drowned while swimming in Lake Michigan at a city-operated park on a day when federal weather agencies warned of dangerous waves and currents. Plaintiff alleged several city officials and employees were grossly negligent for failing to close the beach despite those warnings. On appeal, the court first concluded that the individual defendants owed no common-law duty to the decedent. There was no special relationship because he and his friends had no contact with the officials and did not entrust themselves to their protection. Rather, the decedent “entered the water of his own volition,” and the court determined that “it is too heavy a burden to impose an affirmative duty on city officials to ensure the survival of individuals who choose to enter the water on their own volition despite a warning system advising them of a high risk due to heavy currents.” The alleged conduct also did not constitute gross negligence. The city had installed a warning-light system, assigned an officer to beach patrol, and posted weather and lake information. Those measures “contradict a finding that any defendant exhibited ‘conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.’” Further, the failure to close the beach was not “the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the drowning because defendants did not cause the decedent to enter the water and “at best, defendants merely failed to prevent it from happening.” But summary disposition was premature as to the claims against the City. Plaintiff alleged substantial parking revenue from the park, while the City’s financial materials did not establish the park’s operating costs or otherwise foreclose the proprietary function exception as a matter of law. Thus, plaintiff was entitled to discovery on that issue. The RUA also did not bar the claims because it “‘does not apply to public property.’” Affirmed as to the individual defendants, vacated and reversed as to the City, and remanded.

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      This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

      e-Journal #: 86753
      Case: Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth. v. Baldwin
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Regulatory & physical taking; Takings Clauses; Inverse condemnation; Public nuisance; Airport hazard; MCL 259.441; MCL 259.443; Timber trespass; MCL 600.2919(1)(a); Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); MCL 691.1407(1); Governmental function

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff-Airport Authority’s enforcement of an airport-hazard height restriction and removal of trees constituting a public nuisance did not amount to a compensable taking, and governmental immunity barred defendant-property owner’s timber-trespass claim. Defendant owned wooded property near Metro Airport that was subject to an airport zoning ordinance limiting trees to 50 feet above the airport’s elevation. Plaintiff sued defendant asserting a public nuisance; she counterclaimed. The parties stipulated that several trees exceeded that limit, and defendant alleged plaintiff’s employees entered her property and removed or trimmed trees without permission. On appeal, defendant argued that the ordinance and tree removal constituted a physical or regulatory taking. The court rejected the claim because the overheight trees constituted a public nuisance. It explained that “‘because no individual has the right to use his or her property so as to create a nuisance, the State has not taken anything when it asserts its power to enjoin a nuisance-like activity.’” The airport-zoning statute independently provides that maintaining an airport hazard is “a public nuisance and an injury to the community served by the airport.” Thus, because defendant allowed trees to exceed the ordinance’s safety-based height restriction, “plaintiff did not take defendant’s property by enacting the ordinance height limit or by cutting down trees on her property.” Her separate contention that plaintiff blocked access to the property also failed because the record established that the Wayne County Roads Division, not plaintiff, closed the road, and she produced no evidence plaintiff itself blocked access. The court further rejected her timber-trespass claim. The GTLA immunizes a governmental agency engaged in a governmental function, and state law expressly authorizes political subdivisions to regulate tree heights in airport-hazard areas. Because plaintiff’s enforcement actions were “authorized by both ordinance and statute, plaintiff was engaged in a governmental function when it cut down trees on defendant’s property.” Defendant identified no applicable immunity exception. Affirmed.

    • Negligence & Intentional Tort (4)

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      This summary also appears under Municipal

      e-Journal #: 86755
      Case: Estate of Hooffstetter v. City of Muskegon
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Young, Redford, and Feeney
      Issues:

      Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(2); Duty; Special relationship; Proximate cause; Proprietary function exception; MCL 691.1413; Nuisance & premises liability; Recreational Land Use Act (RUA); MCL 324.73301

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff’s claims against the individual city defendants did not overcome governmental immunity because the allegations failed to establish a duty, gross negligence, or proximate causation, but a factual question remained as to whether the proprietary function exception applied to his nuisance and premises-liability claims against defendant-City. Plaintiff’s 19-year-old son drowned while swimming in Lake Michigan at a city-operated park on a day when federal weather agencies warned of dangerous waves and currents. Plaintiff alleged several city officials and employees were grossly negligent for failing to close the beach despite those warnings. On appeal, the court first concluded that the individual defendants owed no common-law duty to the decedent. There was no special relationship because he and his friends had no contact with the officials and did not entrust themselves to their protection. Rather, the decedent “entered the water of his own volition,” and the court determined that “it is too heavy a burden to impose an affirmative duty on city officials to ensure the survival of individuals who choose to enter the water on their own volition despite a warning system advising them of a high risk due to heavy currents.” The alleged conduct also did not constitute gross negligence. The city had installed a warning-light system, assigned an officer to beach patrol, and posted weather and lake information. Those measures “contradict a finding that any defendant exhibited ‘conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.’” Further, the failure to close the beach was not “the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause” of the drowning because defendants did not cause the decedent to enter the water and “at best, defendants merely failed to prevent it from happening.” But summary disposition was premature as to the claims against the City. Plaintiff alleged substantial parking revenue from the park, while the City’s financial materials did not establish the park’s operating costs or otherwise foreclose the proprietary function exception as a matter of law. Thus, plaintiff was entitled to discovery on that issue. The RUA also did not bar the claims because it “‘does not apply to public property.’” Affirmed as to the individual defendants, vacated and reversed as to the City, and remanded.

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      This summary also appears under Litigation

      e-Journal #: 86754
      Case: Gerald v. Stanton
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Extreme & outrageous conduct; Effect of prior PPO proceedings; MCR 2.116(C)(8); MRE 404(b); Legal sufficiency of the complaint; Plaintiff’s competing summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10); Mootness

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff failed to state an IIED claim based on defendant’s alleged confrontational and offensive remarks, and the trial court was not required to decide her competing summary disposition motion after properly dismissing the action under MCR 2.116(C)(8). The parties’ dispute arose from defendant-HOA president’s confrontations with plaintiff and workers she hired to remove trees from her property. Plaintiff obtained a PPO against defendant and later sued, asserting IIED and other claims. On appeal, she argued that the trial court failed to give sufficient weight to the PPO proceedings. The court disagreed, explaining that “the PPO proceedings were distinct from the instant proceedings and involved different legal questions.” Thus, the fact that plaintiff successfully obtained a PPO “did not necessarily incorporate a finding that defendant engaged in ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct for the purposes of IIED.” The court also rejected her reliance on MRE 404(b), noting that the rule concerns admissibility at trial and did not alter the legal-sufficiency analysis required by MCR 2.116(C)(8). Further, plaintiff did not actually challenge the trial court’s conclusion that her complaint was legally insufficient, thereby abandoning that issue. Even considering the merits, the allegations failed to state an IIED claim. Liability does not extend to “‘mere insults, indignities, [or] threats,’” and defendant’s alleged conduct, which included yelling, calling plaintiff a derogatory name, and making an offensive race-related remark, fell within that category. Although his comments were “certainly offensive and inappropriate,” they did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required for IIED. Finally, once defendant was properly granted summary disposition for failure to state a claim, plaintiff’s MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion became moot because she could not obtain judgment on claims that were legally insufficient. Affirmed.

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      This summary also appears under Real Property

      e-Journal #: 86757
      Case: Hart v. North Waverly LLC
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Wallace, Cameron, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Trespass & nuisance in fact; Failure to file trial exhibits; MCR 7.210(C); Noneconomic damages; Mack v Natural Way, Inc; Economic damages; Causation; Comparative negligence; Adverse possession; Tacking; Nuisance abatement

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff established trespass and nuisance in fact arising from defendant’s concentrated water drainage, that noneconomic damages were unavailable for trespass but recoverable for nuisance, and that the economic-damages and abatement awards required modification. Defendant’s adverse-possession counterclaim failed. Plaintiff owned residential property adjoining defendant’s commercial property. She alleged defendant modified its downspouts and drainage system so that collector pipes concentrated runoff onto her land, causing years of flooding and substantial damage. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded economic and noneconomic damages and ordered nuisance abatement. On appeal, the court first noted that defendant failed to file the trial exhibits as required by MCR 7.210(C) and could not benefit from that omission. As to noneconomic damages, binding precedent established that “plaintiff’s cause of action for trespass does not support the trial court’s award of noneconomic damages.” But nuisance protects an owner’s use and enjoyment of property, and evidence showed plaintiff endured nearly seven years of interference, exhaustion, and emotional distress. Thus, “the trial court’s award of noneconomic damages under plaintiff’s nuisance in fact cause of action was not clearly erroneous.” The court also upheld causation as to the economic damages, finding the evidence “sufficient to demonstrate that focused excessive water drainage from the 1300 Property onto the 1324 Property was a cause of the resultant damages plaintiff suffered.” But the trial court clearly erred in calculating economic damages because it mistakenly treated testimony that up to $65,000 was spent repairing the house as a separate amount for the garage, with the result that its “award effectively awards those amounts twice.” The supported economic award was $65,000, reduced by 20% comparative negligence to $52,000. Defendant also failed to establish adverse possession because it offered insufficient proof permitting it to tack the prior owner’s possession onto its own and could not establish the 15-year period. Finally, nuisance abatement remained proper only to the extent the retaining wall continued to encroach on plaintiff’s property. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment.

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      This summary also appears under Municipal

      e-Journal #: 86753
      Case: Wayne Cnty. Airport Auth. v. Baldwin
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Regulatory & physical taking; Takings Clauses; Inverse condemnation; Public nuisance; Airport hazard; MCL 259.441; MCL 259.443; Timber trespass; MCL 600.2919(1)(a); Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); MCL 691.1407(1); Governmental function

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff-Airport Authority’s enforcement of an airport-hazard height restriction and removal of trees constituting a public nuisance did not amount to a compensable taking, and governmental immunity barred defendant-property owner’s timber-trespass claim. Defendant owned wooded property near Metro Airport that was subject to an airport zoning ordinance limiting trees to 50 feet above the airport’s elevation. Plaintiff sued defendant asserting a public nuisance; she counterclaimed. The parties stipulated that several trees exceeded that limit, and defendant alleged plaintiff’s employees entered her property and removed or trimmed trees without permission. On appeal, defendant argued that the ordinance and tree removal constituted a physical or regulatory taking. The court rejected the claim because the overheight trees constituted a public nuisance. It explained that “‘because no individual has the right to use his or her property so as to create a nuisance, the State has not taken anything when it asserts its power to enjoin a nuisance-like activity.’” The airport-zoning statute independently provides that maintaining an airport hazard is “a public nuisance and an injury to the community served by the airport.” Thus, because defendant allowed trees to exceed the ordinance’s safety-based height restriction, “plaintiff did not take defendant’s property by enacting the ordinance height limit or by cutting down trees on her property.” Her separate contention that plaintiff blocked access to the property also failed because the record established that the Wayne County Roads Division, not plaintiff, closed the road, and she produced no evidence plaintiff itself blocked access. The court further rejected her timber-trespass claim. The GTLA immunizes a governmental agency engaged in a governmental function, and state law expressly authorizes political subdivisions to regulate tree heights in airport-hazard areas. Because plaintiff’s enforcement actions were “authorized by both ordinance and statute, plaintiff was engaged in a governmental function when it cut down trees on defendant’s property.” Defendant identified no applicable immunity exception. Affirmed.

    • Real Property (1)

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      This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

      e-Journal #: 86757
      Case: Hart v. North Waverly LLC
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Wallace, Cameron, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Trespass & nuisance in fact; Failure to file trial exhibits; MCR 7.210(C); Noneconomic damages; Mack v Natural Way, Inc; Economic damages; Causation; Comparative negligence; Adverse possession; Tacking; Nuisance abatement

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff established trespass and nuisance in fact arising from defendant’s concentrated water drainage, that noneconomic damages were unavailable for trespass but recoverable for nuisance, and that the economic-damages and abatement awards required modification. Defendant’s adverse-possession counterclaim failed. Plaintiff owned residential property adjoining defendant’s commercial property. She alleged defendant modified its downspouts and drainage system so that collector pipes concentrated runoff onto her land, causing years of flooding and substantial damage. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded economic and noneconomic damages and ordered nuisance abatement. On appeal, the court first noted that defendant failed to file the trial exhibits as required by MCR 7.210(C) and could not benefit from that omission. As to noneconomic damages, binding precedent established that “plaintiff’s cause of action for trespass does not support the trial court’s award of noneconomic damages.” But nuisance protects an owner’s use and enjoyment of property, and evidence showed plaintiff endured nearly seven years of interference, exhaustion, and emotional distress. Thus, “the trial court’s award of noneconomic damages under plaintiff’s nuisance in fact cause of action was not clearly erroneous.” The court also upheld causation as to the economic damages, finding the evidence “sufficient to demonstrate that focused excessive water drainage from the 1300 Property onto the 1324 Property was a cause of the resultant damages plaintiff suffered.” But the trial court clearly erred in calculating economic damages because it mistakenly treated testimony that up to $65,000 was spent repairing the house as a separate amount for the garage, with the result that its “award effectively awards those amounts twice.” The supported economic award was $65,000, reduced by 20% comparative negligence to $52,000. Defendant also failed to establish adverse possession because it offered insufficient proof permitting it to tack the prior owner’s possession onto its own and could not establish the 15-year period. Finally, nuisance abatement remained proper only to the extent the retaining wall continued to encroach on plaintiff’s property. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment.

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