Divorce; Child support; Imputing income; Failure to follow the requirements of the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF) & MCL 552.605(2); Award of income tax exemptions for children; Marital estate division; Consideration of what property was marital & what was separate; Spousal support; MCL 552.23(1); Attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)

In this divorce case, the court held as to child support that the trial court abused its discretion in imputing income to a party without following the requirements of the MCSF and MCL 552.605(2). As to the property division, it found the trial court failed to “differentiate between marital and separate property,” or to try to determine the value of the property. Further, the issue of spousal support required remand in light of the income and property division matters. And because the trial court’s decisions on all those “issues on remand may impact its decision concerning attorney fees,” remand was also required on that issue. The court vacated the trial court’s rulings as to “(1) child support; (2) the division of the marital estate; (3) spousal support; and (4) attorney fees[,]” and remanded. It agreed with plaintiff-mother that “the trial court abused its discretion when it imputed income to her and awarded defendant a child-tax exemption despite defendant having no overnight parenting time.” She testified that she made “$30 per hour at her current job and the hours vary between 10 and 20 hours per week. The trial court used defendant’s actual income for the child support calculation. But [it] imputed income to plaintiff of $30 an hour for 40 hours per week based on [her] testimony ‘that she makes $30 per hour.’ The MCSF requires the parties’ actual net incomes be used to calculate the support obligation.” The trial court failed to “state on the record or in writing, pursuant to MCL 552.605(2), the child support amount determined by application of the child support formula or the reasons why application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in the case. [It] also failed to consult the factors listed in 2021 MCSF 2.01(G) to determine whether plaintiff had an actual ability to earn and a reasonable likelihood of earning the potential income imputed to her.” Further, it “abused its discretion in allocating the dependent tax deduction without consulting the MCSF.” In addition, because “the recalculation of plaintiff’s income might affect the trial court’s determination concerning any award of spousal support,” the court vacated its ruling that she was not entitled to spousal support. It also directed the trial court to revisit her request for attorney fees on remand “after plaintiff’s income is recalculated and the issues of spousal support and property division are settled.”

42 USC § 1981 action alleging racially discriminatory grantmaking; Standing; “Injury in fact”; Entry of judgment for defendants

The court held that plaintiff-Roberts lacked standing in this § 1981 action alleging racially discriminatory grantmaking because he failed to establish that defendants-Progressive and Circular Board caused his injuries. Rather, the court concluded that the injuries were self-inflicted. Defendants partnered to administer a grant program that helped small businesses buy commercial vehicles. Roberts started applying for a grant but did not complete the application once he learned that the program was for black owned and operated businesses. Roberts, who is white, sued under § 1981 for racial discrimination, seeking damages and injunctive relief. His complaint described “application-stage and grant-stage contracts.” The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Roberts’s lack of standing. On appeal, the court assumed that he sufficiently pled “an injury in fact for the application-stage contract. The injury in question, as alleged in the complaint and argued on appeal, is that Roberts could not enter into—and obtain the benefits conferred by—the application-stage contract.” He conceded that the complaint did “not allege an injury in fact for the grant-stage contract. Thus, Roberts must establish standing for the application-stage contract to proceed in this litigation.” He contended “that he was injured because he was denied the ability to enter into the application-stage contract with Progressive and Circular Board. But [they] did not cause Roberts’s injuries. Roberts caused them.” He made the choice to close the online grant application before completing it. Thus, his alleged injuries were “self-inflicted. A self-inflicted injury generally fails the causation prong of the standing analysis.” Given that he “chose not to enter the application-stage contract[,] . . . he never subjected himself to the allegedly discriminatory grant program.” He did not allege that defendants “ever applied, or threatened to apply, the grant’s race-based eligibility requirement to him.” And because the complaint did not “clearly allege facts showing that Progressive and Circular Board caused Roberts’s injuries, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.” The court also found that the district court did not err by granting judgment to defendants. The “district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction[,]” and the court clarified that it was without prejudice. Affirmed.

Petition for guardianship under MCL 700.5204(2)(b); Whether respondent’s constitutional rights to make decisions about the custody & care of his child were infringed; “Permit”

The court concluded that “the trial court properly found the elements of MCL 700.5204(2)(b) were met, and” as a result, respondent-father’s “constitutional rights were not infringed.” Thus, the “trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition for guardianship.” Respondent argued that it “violated his constitutional rights by granting a guardianship under MCL 700.5204(2)(b) because his parental rights had not been terminated, he had sole legal custody to his children, and he objected to petitioner” (his children’s aunt by marriage) having guardianship of his child, DPP. The court disagreed, holding that the “trial court did not violate [his] constitutional right to direct the custody and care of his child by appointing a guardian under MCL 700.5204(2)(b). [His] argument that the probate court interfered with decisions within his parental rights, such as the decision to appoint a guardian under MCL 700.5202 or delegate his authority under MCL 700.5201, is similarly without merit.” In arguing that MCL 700.5204(2)(b)’s requirements were not met, he asserted “that he did not ’permit’ DPP to reside with petitioner because he did not affirmatively consent and DPP was living in the United States against” respondent’s will and a custody order. He further argued “that he provided for DPP’s care by offering to sign a power of attorney with reasonable conditions.” The court again disagreed, concluding that “the trial court did not err by finding that the statutory requirements for a guardianship under MCL 700.5204(2)(b) were met because [he] permitted DPP to reside with petitioner within the meaning of the statute and had not provided legal authority for his care. The plain meaning of the word ‘permit’ encompasses the circumstance here in which respondent[] acquiesced or allowed his child to live with petitioner while he lived in another country, and did not provide legal authority for the child’s care at the time when the petition was filed.” Thus, the requirement “that the parent permits the child to reside with another person” was met. As to the remaining requirements, the court found that “at the time when the petition was filed, petitioner did not have legal authority to care for DPP. We look to the circumstances at the time when the petition was filed, and find that the previous power of attorney had expired nearly a year before.” The fact was “that neither petitioner nor any other relative had power to care for DPP” when the petition was filed. Thus, “the second requirement was also satisfied.” Finally, DPP was not living with respondent “at the time the petition was filed.” Despite respondent’s “desire to reunify his family, DPP had not been to Northern Ireland in two years and had resided with petitioner since [8/22]. Accordingly, the third and final requirement under MCL 700.5204(2)(b) was met.” Affirmed.

Discovery violation remedy; MCR 6.201(J); People v Elston; Missing witness instruction; M Crim JI 5.12; Due diligence; MCL 767.40a(3); People v Eccles; PSIR accuracy & striking disregarded information; MCL 771.14(6); People v Maben; Scoring of OV 7; MCL 777.37(1)(a); People v Walker; Departure sentence proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE)

The court held that: 1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in curing the prosecution’s late disclosure of the strangulation assessment and photos by delaying the SANE nurse’s testimony, 2) the prosecutor exercised due diligence so a missing-witness instruction was unwarranted, 3) OV 7 was properly scored and the departure sentence was properly imposed, and 4) the PSIR must be corrected to strike an unsubstantiated allegation the trial court deemed irrelevant to sentencing. A jury convicted defendant of CSC I, AWIGBH or by strangulation, and second-offense domestic violence after evidence was presented that the victim was dragged by her hair to a basement, raped, beaten, and strangled. DNA testing on a vulvar swab was “11 sextillion times more likely” to include defendant as a contributor. Midtrial, the prosecutor disclosed a strangulation assessment and about 50 SANE photos the defense had not previously seen. The trial court found a discovery violation under MCR 6.201(J), and it moved the SANE testimony to Monday to give the defense the weekend to prepare. On appeal, the court explained late disclosure under the court rule is not itself a constitutional violation, suppression “is a severe remedy,” and the defendant must show actual prejudice. It held that the continuance remedy fell within the range of principled outcomes because the prosecutor turned over the material immediately upon discovering it, the defense already had the original SANE report and police injury photos, and the delay in the testimony provided time to prepare cross-examination. The court also affirmed denial of a missing-witness instruction related to another witness because due diligence requires “everything reasonable, but not everything possible,” and the prosecution’s efforts included database searches, multiple visits to the last known address, calling the witness’s father, and checking local jails and hospitals. The court agreed the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike from the PSIR a victim-impact sentence alleging that “other young women” reported being forced to have sex with defendant, because the trial court effectively found the allegation “not a matter of proof” and disregarded it, which entitled defendant to have it stricken under MCL 771.14(6). The court upheld scoring OV 7 at 50 points because dragging the victim by her hair down stairs, beating her during the assault, and the extensive bruising constituted “savagery or cruelty beyond even the ‘usual’ brutality of a crime[.]” It also upheld the 15-month upward departure from the top of his CSC I minimum guidelines range as proportionate where the trial court found the conduct “shockingly brutal” and defendant “too dangerous to be around.” Affirmed and remanded for PSIR correction.

Search-warrant particularity; Place to be searched; People v Hampton; Good-faith exception; United States v Leon

The court held that the warrant failed the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement because it did not describe defendant’s residence with enough specificity to allow officers to identify the correct premises with reasonable effort and created a reasonable probability that another residence would be searched. It also held that the good-faith exception did not apply because the warrant was so facially deficient that no reasonable officer could presume it valid. Officers sought a warrant to investigate alleged jury tampering after “Jury Nullification” pamphlets appeared near a courthouse entryway, and the affidavit tied the handwriting to defendant, a convicted felon living at a specific address. The warrant authorized a search of the “residence, property, all vehicles, and out-buildings” at that address and described the residence as “several trailers behind pine[] trees” and “2 white and brown trailer style residences.” When executing the warrant, officers approached and entered the wrong trailer first, briefly detaining two occupants, before realizing the mistake and moving to a different trailer where they seized electronic devices, a “Jury Nullification” letter, and firearms and ammunition. On appeal, the court applied the two-part test that the description must enable officers to locate the intended premises with reasonable effort and must avoid a reasonable probability that another premises might be searched. It concluded the warrant’s description was inadequate because the property contained multiple distinct residences with separate addresses, the mailboxes at the driveway entrance visibly reflected that fact, and the warrant “lumped together” the trailers and left officers to guess which was defendant’s. The panel emphasized that the address alone did not cure the ambiguity when the warrant authorized a search of the entire property and described multiple trailers in a way that “essentially created a coin-flip situation,” which the execution confirmed by the initial mistaken search. The court rejected reliance on multi-unit-building cases because this involved separate structures and readily observable indicators of multiple residences. It also held Leon’s good-faith exception was unavailable because the warrant was “so facially deficient” in particularizing the place to be searched that officers could not reasonably presume it valid, especially given the missed obvious signs and the minimal investigation. Affirmed.

Divorce; Child support; Imputing income; Failure to follow the requirements of the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF) & MCL 552.605(2); Award of income tax exemptions for children; Marital estate division; Consideration of what property was marital & what was separate; Spousal support; MCL 552.23(1); Attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)

In this divorce case, the court held as to child support that the trial court abused its discretion in imputing income to a party without following the requirements of the MCSF and MCL 552.605(2). As to the property division, it found the trial court failed to “differentiate between marital and separate property,” or to try to determine the value of the property. Further, the issue of spousal support required remand in light of the income and property division matters. And because the trial court’s decisions on all those “issues on remand may impact its decision concerning attorney fees,” remand was also required on that issue. The court vacated the trial court’s rulings as to “(1) child support; (2) the division of the marital estate; (3) spousal support; and (4) attorney fees[,]” and remanded. It agreed with plaintiff-mother that “the trial court abused its discretion when it imputed income to her and awarded defendant a child-tax exemption despite defendant having no overnight parenting time.” She testified that she made “$30 per hour at her current job and the hours vary between 10 and 20 hours per week. The trial court used defendant’s actual income for the child support calculation. But [it] imputed income to plaintiff of $30 an hour for 40 hours per week based on [her] testimony ‘that she makes $30 per hour.’ The MCSF requires the parties’ actual net incomes be used to calculate the support obligation.” The trial court failed to “state on the record or in writing, pursuant to MCL 552.605(2), the child support amount determined by application of the child support formula or the reasons why application of the formula would be unjust or inappropriate in the case. [It] also failed to consult the factors listed in 2021 MCSF 2.01(G) to determine whether plaintiff had an actual ability to earn and a reasonable likelihood of earning the potential income imputed to her.” Further, it “abused its discretion in allocating the dependent tax deduction without consulting the MCSF.” In addition, because “the recalculation of plaintiff’s income might affect the trial court’s determination concerning any award of spousal support,” the court vacated its ruling that she was not entitled to spousal support. It also directed the trial court to revisit her request for attorney fees on remand “after plaintiff’s income is recalculated and the issues of spousal support and property division are settled.”

Whether the vehicle was “taken unlawfully” at the time of the accident & whether plaintiff knew or should have known that it was “taken unlawfully”; MCL 500.3113(a); Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of MI; Rambin v Allstate Ins; Ahmed v Tokio Marine Am Ins Co; Personal Protection Insurance (PIP) benefits; No-Fault Act (NFA)

The court held that because “the Court of Appeals analyzed MCL 500.3113(a) by conducting the wrong inquiry,” reversal was required. And “because the Court of Appeals inadequately considered defendant’s alternative ground for summary disposition under MCL 500.3113(a)—that plaintiff’s actions constituted an unlawful taking of the motor vehicle—” the court remanded for it to address this question. The issue was whether, at the time of the motor vehicle accident in which she was injured, plaintiff “was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and [she] knew or should have known that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully.” If so, then she is barred from recovering PIP benefits under the NFA. “Taken together, Spectrum Health and Rambin both require consideration of the circumstances at the time the vehicle was taken to determine whether the taking itself was unlawful.” The court also explained that the Court of Appeals’ error stemmed “in part” from “erroneously extending dicta” from Ahmed, and it stated, to “the extent that Ahmed concluded otherwise, it was wrongly decided.” Consistent with that point, the court held that by “holding that plaintiff’s unlawful operation of the motor vehicle barred her recovery of PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113(a), the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the statute. Whether a claimant is barred from recovery by MCL 500.3113(a) turns on whether the vehicle was taken—rather than operated or used—unlawfully and whether the claimant knew or should have known that it had been taken unlawfully. Thus, the Court of Appeals erred, and” the court reversed. The Court of Appeals failed to address the alternative ground for summary disposition raised by defendant regarding how plaintiff’s taking of the vehicle was unlawful. Thus, the court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Auto negligence; Noneconomic damages; No-fault bar for uninsured constructive owners; MCL 500.3135(2)(c); Constructive ownership; “Having the use” of for greater than 30 days; MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i); Excluded driver/uninsured vehicle; Bronson Health Care Group, Inc v State Auto Prop & Cas Ins Co; “Proprietary or possessory” use; Ardt v Titan Ins Co; Chop v Zielinski

The court held that summary disposition of plaintiff’s auto-negligence claim for noneconomic damages was improper because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she was a constructive owner of the uninsured vehicle she was driving, and the no-fault bar in MCL 500.3135(2)(c) applies only if she was operating “her own vehicle” without the security required by MCL 500.3101(1). Defendant ran a red light and struck the car plaintiff was driving. That vehicle was titled to her daughter and was covered by a no-fault automobile insurance policy, but plaintiff was “expressly listed as an excluded driver.” The trial court ruled plaintiff was a constructive owner because she had the keys, drove the vehicle regularly, and did not need permission, so she was barred from noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(2)(c). The court reiterated that “a validly excluded driver’s act of driving the insured vehicle at the time of the accident renders the vehicle uninsured.” But it explained that the “‘question of ownership is one of fact’” and that “having the use” under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i) means using the vehicle “‘in ways that comport with concepts of ownership,’” i.e., “‘proprietary or possessory usage, as opposed to merely incidental usage under the direction or with the permission of another.’” Applying Ardt and Chop, the court found that defendant’s reading, i.e., “‘unrestricted, regular daily use,’” was one of the possible interpretations of the evidence, but viewing the evidence favorably to plaintiff, a factfinder could conclude the use was limited and nonproprietary: plaintiff lived with the title owner, used the vehicle only to drop off and pick up her daughter at work, testified “she ‘never’ used it for any other purpose[,]” and kept the only set of keys simply because she had to return home after drop-off. Because these facts supported a reasonable inference of limited, daughter-benefit use rather than ownership-like control, “there is a genuine issue of material fact” on constructive ownership, making summary disposition improper. Reversed and remanded. The court noted that on remand the trial court should address threshold injury under MCL 500.3135(1).

Petition for guardianship under MCL 700.5204(2)(b); Whether respondent’s constitutional rights to make decisions about the custody & care of his child were infringed; “Permit”

The court concluded that “the trial court properly found the elements of MCL 700.5204(2)(b) were met, and” as a result, respondent-father’s “constitutional rights were not infringed.” Thus, the “trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition for guardianship.” Respondent argued that it “violated his constitutional rights by granting a guardianship under MCL 700.5204(2)(b) because his parental rights had not been terminated, he had sole legal custody to his children, and he objected to petitioner” (his children’s aunt by marriage) having guardianship of his child, DPP. The court disagreed, holding that the “trial court did not violate [his] constitutional right to direct the custody and care of his child by appointing a guardian under MCL 700.5204(2)(b). [His] argument that the probate court interfered with decisions within his parental rights, such as the decision to appoint a guardian under MCL 700.5202 or delegate his authority under MCL 700.5201, is similarly without merit.” In arguing that MCL 700.5204(2)(b)’s requirements were not met, he asserted “that he did not ’permit’ DPP to reside with petitioner because he did not affirmatively consent and DPP was living in the United States against” respondent’s will and a custody order. He further argued “that he provided for DPP’s care by offering to sign a power of attorney with reasonable conditions.” The court again disagreed, concluding that “the trial court did not err by finding that the statutory requirements for a guardianship under MCL 700.5204(2)(b) were met because [he] permitted DPP to reside with petitioner within the meaning of the statute and had not provided legal authority for his care. The plain meaning of the word ‘permit’ encompasses the circumstance here in which respondent[] acquiesced or allowed his child to live with petitioner while he lived in another country, and did not provide legal authority for the child’s care at the time when the petition was filed.” Thus, the requirement “that the parent permits the child to reside with another person” was met. As to the remaining requirements, the court found that “at the time when the petition was filed, petitioner did not have legal authority to care for DPP. We look to the circumstances at the time when the petition was filed, and find that the previous power of attorney had expired nearly a year before.” The fact was “that neither petitioner nor any other relative had power to care for DPP” when the petition was filed. Thus, “the second requirement was also satisfied.” Finally, DPP was not living with respondent “at the time the petition was filed.” Despite respondent’s “desire to reunify his family, DPP had not been to Northern Ireland in two years and had resided with petitioner since [8/22]. Accordingly, the third and final requirement under MCL 700.5204(2)(b) was met.” Affirmed.

The General Sales Tax Act (GSTA); Sales, use & withholding (SUW) tax returns; MCL 205.52; “Gross proceeds” (MCL 205.51(1)(c)); “Sales price” (MCL 205.51(1)(d)); MI Admin Code, R 205.117(3); Documentation requirements; MCL 205.68(1) & (4); Applicability of the prima facie presumption of correctness; Audit; MCL 205.21(1); MI Admin Code, R 205.2009(1); Reliance on an audit report & an audit supervisor’s affidavit; Hearsay & foundation challenges; Whether the audit report was prepared in anticipation of litigation; MCR 2.116(C)(10) standard; Procedural due process; Opportunity to be heard

Rejecting plaintiff-taxpayer’s (Sav-Time) evidentiary challenges, the court held that Sav-Time’s records failed to meet the GSTA’s “requirement for accurate and complete recordkeeping.” Thus, the evidence overwhelmingly showed no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the accuracy and consistency of its records during the audit period. The court also held that Sav-Time was not denied “an opportunity to be heard because the Court of Claims disposed of the case via summary disposition[.]” Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for defendant-Department of Treasury in this dispute arising from its audit of plaintiff’s SUW tax returns. The court first concluded that the challenged audit report and affidavit were not hearsay, Sav-Time’s argument that the affidavit lacked proper foundation was flawed, and that “the audit report and schedules were clearly not prepared in anticipation of litigation.” It also disagreed with the assertion “the Department ignored Rule 205.117 in favor of the more exacting standard” in the GSTA. It held that the GSTA controlled, “and Sav-Time was required to demonstrate that labor sales or charges were separately itemized in its financial documents or records in order to qualify for an exemption from sales tax on the labor sales.” Further, even if it were to agree “the Department ‘ignored’ its own duly promulgated Rule 205.117, the invoices that Sav-Time submitted to the auditor do not clearly itemize the cost of tangible personal property required by Rule 205.1173(3).” The court also rejected the claim that MCL 205.68(4)’s conditions precedent were not “satisfied, and that the trial court thus had no basis to apply the prima facie presumption of correctness” here. It found that “the documentation originally submitted to the auditor gave the Department reason to believe that Sav-Time’s records, or the returns it filed, were inaccurate and incomplete. Consequently, the Department’s tax assessments were ‘prima facie correct’” under the statute and Sav-Time bore “the burden of refuting them.” The court also found that Sav-Time’s “failure to provide proper documentation to the auditor, combined with the contradictory nature of its postaudit submissions and the generic nature of its ‘nontaxable’ classifications, underscores how [it] failed to meet its burden to overcome the prima facie correctness of the Department’s tax assessments. No genuine issue of fact” existed as to whether the “records were adequately itemized . . . .”

Child protective proceeding; Jurisdiction over minors; MCL 712A.2(b)(1); Domestic violence exposure; Substantial risk of harm; In re Leach; Inability/unwillingness to protect; Credibility deference; In re HRC

The court held that the trial court did not err by assuming jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) because the record supported a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were subject to a substantial risk of harm from ongoing domestic violence and respondent-mother’s inability or unwillingness to protect them. CPS received multiple complaints in early 2024 describing repeated domestic violence by the children’s father toward respondent, including incidents in which he leaned on her broken legs, spit in her face, threw a drink that also splashed a child, and returned to the home uninvited to threaten or pressure her, along with police observations that the home was a “hoarder house” and “fire hazard.” After removal, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (b)(2), and the trial court held an adjudication trial with testimony from respondent, the father, and the CPS investigator. On appeal from the jurisdiction order, the court explained the adjudicative question is whether a statutory basis existed “at the time the petition was filed” because MCL 712A.2(b) “speaks in the present tense.” The court held the trial court could credit testimony showing respondent’s “periodic” and “continuing” domestic violence history with the father, her acknowledgment that the children witnessed “some” domestic violence, and evidence that the father kept returning to the home and committing additional acts even after she claimed he moved out. The court also relied on evidence that respondent repeatedly failed to follow through on protective steps, including allowing dismissed criminal charges to remain dismissed and continuing to permit contact, and it deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations regarding respondent’s claim that the threat had ended. The panel concluded this record supported jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) based on a “substantial risk of harm” to the children’s mental well-being from exposure to ongoing domestic violence. Affirmed.

Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); Children’s best interests; Reasonable reunification efforts; Procedural & evidentiary errors

The court concluded that the trial court did not clearly err by finding § (c)(i) existed. Also, it did not err by concluding that termination was in child-WH’s best interests. However, the trial “court failed to meaningfully analyze [child-]MH’s specific circumstances.” The trial court did not err by finding that DHHS made reasonable efforts at reunification. Finally, respondent-mother had “not shown a procedural or evidentiary error requiring reversal of the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights.” As to § (c)(i), “more than 182 days elapsed since the issuance of the initial dispositional order.” The court noted that the “trial court did not find that mother lacked adequate housing or resources, but nevertheless determined that mother had not adequately rectified her issues with emotional instability and inadequate parenting skills.” As to “whether there was a ‘reasonable likelihood that the conditions would be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age,’ the trial court observed that mother had not benefited from the most recent services offered, and had likewise not benefited from ‘11 years of service delivery.’” The trial “court further noted that mother had received every service that the child-welfare system had to offer. Both children had waited for nearly two years for mother to provide them a stable environment and were facing an extended trauma-informed therapy. In light of these circumstances, the trial court found that the children had an immediate need for stability and finality that mother could not provide. In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by finding statutory grounds for termination under” § (c)(i). As to WH’s best interests, “the trial court properly considered numerous factors when making its best-interest determination regarding WH. It did not err by concluding that termination was in WH’s best interests.” However, the trial “court failed to meaningfully analyze MH’s specific circumstances[,]” constituting clear error. Thus, the court vacated “the portion of the order terminating mother’s parental rights as to MH.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

Attorney fees & costs from a trust under MCL 700.7904(1); The “American Rule”; Distinguishing Becht v Miller; Equity; In re Temple Marital Trust (Unpub)

The court held that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant-Nazem’s request for attorney fees and costs under MCL 700.7904(1). Thus, it affirmed the order denying Nazem’s petition (Nazem is the trustee’s sister and had previously served as a co-trustee). The case originated from the proposed final distribution of the trust. Nazem’s challenge resulted in the probate court substantially reducing the proposed charge against her share from $35,137.50 to $6,350.00. On appeal, the court noted that when “interpreting MCL 700.7904(1) by its plain language, it is clear that the Legislature’s intent was to provide an exception to the ‘American Rule’ of attorney fees in cases of trust administration.” It concluded the case was “distinguishable from Becht, because appellant failed to show that her actions benefited ‘the entire estate.’” Appellant argued “that she illuminated improper conduct by the Ashcraft brothers and preserved Trust property from undue depletion, thus benefiting the Trust.” The trial court disagreed and found on the record that appellant’s actions “did not meet the threshold of MCL 700.7904(1) for enhancing, preserving, or protecting Trust property when it denied her petition for attorney fees.” The trial court further noted that “‘it’s not a classic case where your efforts found property that was not in the Trust and was brought back into the Trust or you found some misappropriation of some other action that was taken by the Trustee, that enhanced or preserved the entire property.’” Appellant further contended that she was “entitled to attorney fees because she enforced the settlor’s original intent of equal distribution, but this alone is insufficient to establish that she actually enhanced, preserved, or protected Trust property.” The trial court was “similarly within its discretion to deny the petition for attorney fees and costs under the plain meaning of the statute.” Even if a petitioner “demonstrates that they have enhanced, preserved, or protected trust property, the plain language of ‘as justice and equity requires’ indicates that the Legislature intended to provide probate courts full discretion in granting or denying attorney fees under MCL 700.7904(1).” The court found “appellant failed to establish a violation of the statute, or any other error or abuse of discretion,” and was not entitled to relief.