Felony murder; Pre-People v Aaron felony murder; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP); Cruel or unusual punishment; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; People v Hall; People v Lorentzen; People v Bullock; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D); Good cause; Actual prejudice; Malice; Burden shifting; Parole eligibility
 

The court held that mandatory LWOP for pre-Aaron felony murder is cruel or unusual punishment if the jury was not instructed on Aaron malice and the prosecution cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have found it. Defendant was convicted in 1976 of first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory and sentenced to mandatory LWOP. The trial court later denied relief from judgment. On appeal, the court first held that he showed good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3) because “the legal basis for his sentencing argument was not reasonably available on direct appeal or for decades to come,” particularly given later LWOP cases moving away from mandatory punishment not tailored to culpability. The court next held that actual prejudice turned on whether the sentence was invalid. Applying the Lorentzen-Bullock factors, it concluded mandatory LWOP was grossly disproportionate where a jury never found malice as later defined in Aaron. It reasoned that it would be “‘profoundly unfair to impute full personal responsibility and moral guilt’” to an offender who did not intend to kill, intend great bodily harm, or act with wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood of death or great bodily harm. The court adopted a burden-shifting test: the defendant must first show the jury was not instructed on Aaron malice, and then “the burden shifts to the prosecution” to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it from the trial evidence. The court rejected a Sixth Amendment challenge because this fact-finding would not increase the sentence, and the Amendment “‘does not prohibit fact-finding that reduces a defendant’s sentence.’” It declined to overrule Hall, noting this case involved only a “relatively small subset of sentences.” It also held that the remedy for a qualifying defendant is to strike the no-parole portion of the sentence because that remedy “‘requires the least judicial rewriting of the statute.’” As to defendant, the court found the “might have been expected to happen” instruction was “vague and passive” and did not require Aaron malice, but remand was required to allow the prosecution to meet its new burden. Vacated in part and remanded.

Chief Justice Cavanagh concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed defendant showed good cause and that mandatory LWOP without a jury finding of Aaron malice was grossly disproportionate, but disagreed with allowing the prosecution to prove malice to a judge on remand. She reasoned that a pre-Aaron defendant “had no motivation to dispute malice” at trial, and she would have followed Bullock by simply striking the no-parole portion of the sentence.

Justice Zahra dissented. He would have held the motion was procedurally barred because the court already rejected defendant’s instructional challenge by reinstating his conviction after Aaron, and because he failed to show good cause. He viewed the majority as “effectively applying retroactively” Aaron and repackaging an attack on the conviction as a sentencing claim. He also would have found malice clearly established because defendant and the principal “acted in concert to commit an armed robbery.”

Felony murder; Pre-People v Aaron felony murder; Mandatory life without parole (LWOP); Cruel or unusual punishment; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; People v Hall; People v Lorentzen; People v Bullock; Motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D); Good cause; Actual prejudice; Malice; Burden shifting; Parole eligibility
 

The court held that mandatory LWOP for pre-Aaron felony murder is cruel or unusual punishment if the jury was not instructed on Aaron malice and the prosecution cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have found it. Defendant was convicted in 1976 of first-degree felony murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory and sentenced to mandatory LWOP. The trial court later denied relief from judgment. On appeal, the court first held that he showed good cause under MCR 6.508(D)(3) because “the legal basis for his sentencing argument was not reasonably available on direct appeal or for decades to come,” particularly given later LWOP cases moving away from mandatory punishment not tailored to culpability. The court next held that actual prejudice turned on whether the sentence was invalid. Applying the Lorentzen-Bullock factors, it concluded mandatory LWOP was grossly disproportionate where a jury never found malice as later defined in Aaron. It reasoned that it would be “‘profoundly unfair to impute full personal responsibility and moral guilt’” to an offender who did not intend to kill, intend great bodily harm, or act with wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood of death or great bodily harm. The court adopted a burden-shifting test: the defendant must first show the jury was not instructed on Aaron malice, and then “the burden shifts to the prosecution” to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it from the trial evidence. The court rejected a Sixth Amendment challenge because this fact-finding would not increase the sentence, and the Amendment “‘does not prohibit fact-finding that reduces a defendant’s sentence.’” It declined to overrule Hall, noting this case involved only a “relatively small subset of sentences.” It also held that the remedy for a qualifying defendant is to strike the no-parole portion of the sentence because that remedy “‘requires the least judicial rewriting of the statute.’” As to defendant, the court found the “might have been expected to happen” instruction was “vague and passive” and did not require Aaron malice, but remand was required to allow the prosecution to meet its new burden. Vacated in part and remanded.

Chief Justice Cavanagh concurred in part and dissented in part. She agreed defendant showed good cause and that mandatory LWOP without a jury finding of Aaron malice was grossly disproportionate, but disagreed with allowing the prosecution to prove malice to a judge on remand. She reasoned that a pre-Aaron defendant “had no motivation to dispute malice” at trial, and she would have followed Bullock by simply striking the no-parole portion of the sentence.

Justice Zahra dissented. He would have held the motion was procedurally barred because the court already rejected defendant’s instructional challenge by reinstating his conviction after Aaron, and because he failed to show good cause. He viewed the majority as “effectively applying retroactively” Aaron and repackaging an attack on the conviction as a sentencing claim. He also would have found malice clearly established because defendant and the principal “acted in concert to commit an armed robbery.”

CSC I; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Cross-examination; Custody-dispute theory; Bill of particulars; Prosecutorial misconduct; False testimony; “Reasonable assistance” to locate & serve defense witnesses; MCL 767.40a(5); Counseling records; In camera review; Psychologist-patient privilege; People v Stanaway; Speedy trial

The court held that defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal, error in denying in camera review of counseling records, or a speedy-trial violation. He was convicted of CSC I for sexually assaulting a minor family member. On appeal, the court first held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to more aggressively pursue a theory that the allegations were fabricated during a custody dispute because counsel elicited testimony suggesting an improper motive while avoiding details that could portray defendant as violent. It reasoned that this was “a matter of trial strategy, not deficient performance.” The court also found counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a bill of particulars because the preliminary examination adequately apprised defendant of the charges, and “time is not of the essence” in child CSC cases. The court next held that the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct by failing to correct alleged false testimony because the challenged statements were minor, immaterial, or elicited by defense counsel, and a prosecutor “‘need not correct every instance of mistaken or inaccurate testimony.’” It also rejected defendant’s claim about witness-location assistance because no written request under MCL 767.40a(5) appeared in the record, and the parties instead reached “an informal agreement.” The court further held that the trial court properly denied in camera review of the victim’s counseling records because defendant offered only a generalized theory that the records might contain impeachment material, which amounted to a speculative “fishing expedition.” Finally, balancing the speedy-trial factors, the court found that defendant was not denied a speedy trial because much of the delay was attributable to defendant or neutral circumstances, and he did not show that his defense was prejudiced. Affirmed.

CSC I & II; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Alibi defense; MCL 768.20; Alibi instruction; M Crim JI 7.4; Competency evaluation; MCL 330.2020; MCR 6.125(D); Forensic interview expert; Distinguishing In re Casto; Medical records discovery; Privileged records; MCR 6.201(C); People v Stanaway; Cumulative error

The court held that defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial. He was convicted of multiple CSC offenses involving an adopted child. The trial court denied his posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance. On appeal, the court first found counsel was not ineffective for failing to present an alibi defense because the wife’s testimony that she did not recall waking to find defendant absent from bed “does not amount to evidence of an alibi” and was instead used to show defendant’s physical limitations. The court also reasoned he was not prejudiced because the testimony was admitted, and the jury was instructed that he was “not required to prove his innocence or to do anything.” The court next rejected defendant’s competency claim because counsel requested an evaluation after his brain surgery, the parties stipulated to competence, and he identified no evidence that his condition affected his ability to understand the proceedings or assist in his defense. It also found no deficient performance in counsel’s failure to consult a forensic interview expert because no direct statements from the forensic interview were admitted, the interview played a minor role, and the testimony and DNA evidence would likely have produced the same result. Finally, the court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek the victim’s medical records because defendant offered only speculation that they might reveal another sexual partner, and such a request would have been a “mere fishing expedition.” Affirmed.

Motion to exclude alleged hearsay; Statements about the identity of the alleged assailant; Hearsay exception for statements made for medical treatment or diagnosis (MRE 803(4)); People v Meeboer (After Remand); People v LaLone; Applicability to nonsexual assault cases; Distinguishing People v Jones; MRE 807 (residual exception)

Holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to suppress hearsay statements without first conducting “an evidentiary hearing sufficient to apply the required Meeboer factors[,]” the court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded. Defendant was charged for allegedly pushing his girlfriend (WP) down a flight of stairs. At issue was “what the paramedic and ER doctor who treated WP can testify to regarding what WP told them, and, more specifically, whether the identity of her alleged assailant is admissible under MRE 803(4).” The court determined that the available record was “insufficient to support either the trial court’s reasoning or the prosecution’s arguments.” It noted that “Meeboer has not been extended to nonsexual assault cases involving adults, as the prosecution” sought to do here. And while the prosecution relied on Jones, a child abuse case without sexual assault allegations, the court found that case distinguishable. In contrast to Jones, here there was “no available testimony from the paramedic or ER doctor regarding what they might actually testify to, and so the trial court’s analysis of trustworthiness and reasonable necessity to medical diagnosis and treatment did not satisfy the Meeboer factors.” The court also noted that “the connection between the identity of WP’s assailant (either directly or indirectly) and the paramedic and ER doctor’s diagnosis and treatment may not be the same as in a sexual abuse case, which was the basis for admitting the evidence in Meeboer[.]” In addition, the court concluded that, based on the available record, the prosecution failed to establish that the doctor and paramedic’s expected testimony was admissible under MRE 807.

Search & seizure; Landlord’s authority to consent; Lease provision allowing entry without notice in “the event of emergencies”; Imposition of a jail sentence for a misdemeanor; MCL 769.5; Proportionality; People v Mason

The court held that defendant’s “Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when her landlord consented to allow an animal control officer to enter her apartment, and” that her 93-day jail sentence for misdemeanor animal cruelty was proportionate. After receiving a call from another tenant, the landlord (T) called Animal Control and reported concerns about defendant's dog. T allowed an Animal Control officer (Q) to enter the apartment with the maintenance manager. Defendant argued that T did not have “the authority to consent to entry.” The court disagreed. Defendant’s lease gave the landlord the right to enter the apartment “without notice ‘[i]n the event of emergencies.’” The lease did not define the word “emergencies.” After reviewing a dictionary definition, the court held that the evidence supported the existence of an emergency here. Due to “concerns about the dog’s welfare, the odor and constant barking that created a possible nuisance to another tenant, and the likelihood of damage from water, urine, and feces,” it concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding that an emergency existed under the lease. “That emergency gave the landlord and his agents the authority to enter defendant’s apartment without notice to address the emergency, which required bringing in an animal control officer to safely remove the dog. Under these circumstances, [T’s] consent to allow [Q] to enter the apartment was within his contractual authority. Because a person with proper authority consented to the search, [Q’s] entry into defendant’s home did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” The court also held that “the district court sufficiently articulated facts that justified” defendant’s jail sentence, “despite the statutory presumption of a nonjail or nonprobation sentence. It acknowledged that jail was not an ordinary sentence for this type of offense but highlighted several circumstances that took this particular case outside the realm of the ordinary animal cruelty case[,]” including that “defendant showed a ‘total lack of remorse,’” had not complied with court orders, and violated her bond conditions. Affirmed.

CSC II; MCL 750.520c(1)(b); Domestic violence; MCL 750.81(2); Other acts evidence; Listed offense; MCL 768.27a; MRE 403; People v Watkins; MRE 404(b); Harmless error; Sufficiency of the evidence; Sexual contact; MCL 750.520a; Impeachment evidence exclusion

The court held that most challenged testimony was properly admitted, that any error in admitting other testimony was harmless, and that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s CSC II convictions. He was convicted after evidence showed he touched his stepdaughters’ upper inner thighs and engaged in other inappropriate conduct. The court first held that testimony that defendant touched the victims’ inner thighs and lifted one victim’s shirt was admissible because it directly related to the charged CSC II and domestic-violence offenses. It also found testimony that defendant touched another minor’s buttock and breast was admissible under MCL 768.27a because it involved CSC IV, a listed offense, and its “propensity inference” weighed in favor of probative value under Watkins. But the court noted that testimony stating defendant barged into the girls’ bedroom and put donuts into their mouths while they wore towels was improperly admitted because those acts were not listed offenses and risked “‘an impermissible character-to-conduct inference.’” The error was not outcome determinative because the admissible testimony from the victims and another witness supplied ample evidence that defendant touched intimate parts for a sexual purpose. The court next held that sufficient evidence supported CSC II because the victims testified defendant grabbed and squeezed their inner thighs near the hipbone, did not touch the boys that way, and gradually moved closer to one victim’s vaginal area. Finally, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding social-media photographs offered to impeach one victim because their probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Affirmed.

Admission of handgun magazine evidence; Relevance; Harmless error; Sentencing; Proportionality; Below-guidelines sentence; Sentence disparity; Unlawful driving away of an automobile (UDAA)

The court held that even if the challenged evidence was not relevant, any error in admitting it was harmless as defendant failed to show prejudice. It also held that his below-guidelines sentence was proportionate. He was convicted of armed robbery, AWIGBH, UDAA, and receiving and concealing a stolen vehicle. He was sentenced to 8 to 20 years for armed robbery, 19 months to 10 years for AWIGBH, and 240 days in jail for each of the other convictions. He argued he was denied his “right to a fair trial because the jury heard inadmissible testimony that a handgun magazine was found in his possession” when he was arrested. He asserted this evidence was inadmissible because it was irrelevant. But the court concluded that even if it “was not relevant, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless. The testimony about the handgun magazine was brief and isolated, minimizing any potential prejudicial effect. Moreover, there was no other testimony or argument indicating that defendant used a firearm to commit his crimes. There was, however, ample testimony from the victim describing in detail that defendant held him at knifepoint during the stabbing and robbery.” The court next held that his “sentence was proportionate to the seriousness of his crimes and circumstances. [He] lured the victim into a dangerous situation by inviting him over despite barely knowing him. During the attack, he taunted” him at knifepoint while one of his friends (R) “stabbed the victim and” another friend (K) “stole the victim’s wallet, keys, and cell phone. After his arrest, defendant repeatedly lied to law enforcement about his involvement.” He contended his sentence was disproportionate because K received a shorter one even though, according to defendant, K was more culpable. But the court found that the record did not support this assertion. Further, K’s sentence reflected “that he received a benefit for having pled nolo contendere before trial. Defendant” declined the same offer and went to trial. “A defendant who rejects a plea offer and chooses to proceed to trial assumes the risk of receiving a more severe sentence following a conviction at trial.” Affirmed.

Appellate jurisdiction; MCL 600.308(1); Final order; Receivership order in a divorce action; Appointment of receiver; MCR 2.604(B); Appeal of right; Leave to appeal

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over defendant-ex-husband’s appeal because the order appointing a receiver was not a final order. In a prior appeal in the parties’ divorce action, the court affirmed the trial court’s determination that a parcel of real property belonged in the marital estate. The trial court later appointed a receiver to list and sell the property so the parties could share the proceeds equally. On appeal, the court held that the receiver order was not appealable by right because it expressly stated that it “does not resolve the last pending claim or close the case.” The court also noted that the trial court did not exercise its discretion under MCR 2.604(B) to deem the order final in the receivership proceeding. Because an appeal from a nonfinal order requires an application for leave rather than an appeal of right, the court lacked jurisdiction. Dismissed.

Medical malpractice; Immunity under the Pandemic Healthcare Immunity Act (PHCIA); MCL 691.1475; Franklin v McLaren Flint; Skipper-Baines v Board of Hosp Managers for City of Flint; Jokinen v Beaumont Hosp Troy; Enforcement of scheduling orders; Cleveland v Hath; Motion for reconsideration

Holding that defendants failed to show they were entitled to PHCIA immunity, the court reversed summary disposition in their favor and remanded. Plaintiff’s decedent died in 2020 after being admitted and treated by defendants-Beaumont Hospital Farmington Hills, Hartford Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, and Mission Point of Detroit. The trial court treated two defendants’ summary disposition motions as unopposed due to plaintiff’s failure to file a response, and granted the motions. It also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating the motions as unopposed, or in denying the motion for reconsideration. But it reviewed the decision to grant the unopposed motions de novo to determine if they were sufficient to establish “defendants’ entitlement to immunity under the PHCIA as a matter of law.” Applying MCL 691.1475 as interpreted by Franklin, Skipper-Baines, and Jokinen, it concluded it was clear that they were not. “Beaumont failed to identify, in plaintiff’s allegations or otherwise, the legally requisite connection between [its] pandemic-related services and the negligence alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. Apart from the temporal relationship between plaintiff’s claims and the time during which Beaumont generally provided pandemic-related care, Beaumont made no argument and submitted no evidence that showed there was a nexus between the pandemic and the alleged negligence.” While records that were not properly before the court showed that the decedent was evaluated and tested for COVID-19 upon her admission, the court could not consider this evidence. It added that it did “not see how the mere fact of COVID-19 testing upon admission, with nothing more, would provide proof of any connection between the pandemic and the alleged negligence in this case.” The court found Hartford’s motion, which likewise relied on the temporal overlap, “similarly deficient.” As Mission Point simply concurred in its codefendants’ motions, it also was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Set aside of a default; Improper service of process on a corporate defendant; MCL 600.1920; Proof of service; MCR 2.104(A)(1)

Holding that the trial court properly set aside the default entered against defendant-Hercules due to improper service of process, the court affirmed. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in doing so without requiring Hercules to show good cause. The court disagreed. “A plaintiff may effect service of process on a corporate defendant by: ‘(1) leaving a summons and a copy of the complaint with any officer or the resident agent, or (2) leaving a summons and a copy of the complaint with any director, trustee, or person in charge of any office . . . and sending a summons and a copy of the complaint by registered mail . . . .’” The trial court did not err in determining that “plaintiff failed to properly serve Hercules with his original summons and complaint. Plaintiff’s process server attempted to leave the summons and original complaint with” Hercules’s general counsel (G), but G “did not accept service on Hercules’s behalf. The process server ultimately left the summons and complaint on a receptionist’s desk. Because the summons and complaint were not left with one of Hercules’s officers or resident agents, service of process was not proper under MCL 600.1920. Even if [G] was an officer or resident agent of Hercules, he did not sign or date the proof of service as required by MCR 2.104(A)(1). Because plaintiff did not properly serve his original complaint on Hercules, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Hercules when it entered the default.”

Appellate jurisdiction; MCL 600.308(1); Final order; Receivership order in a divorce action; Appointment of receiver; MCR 2.604(B); Appeal of right; Leave to appeal

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over defendant-ex-husband’s appeal because the order appointing a receiver was not a final order. In a prior appeal in the parties’ divorce action, the court affirmed the trial court’s determination that a parcel of real property belonged in the marital estate. The trial court later appointed a receiver to list and sell the property so the parties could share the proceeds equally. On appeal, the court held that the receiver order was not appealable by right because it expressly stated that it “does not resolve the last pending claim or close the case.” The court also noted that the trial court did not exercise its discretion under MCR 2.604(B) to deem the order final in the receivership proceeding. Because an appeal from a nonfinal order requires an application for leave rather than an appeal of right, the court lacked jurisdiction. Dismissed.

Medical malpractice; Immunity under the Pandemic Healthcare Immunity Act (PHCIA); MCL 691.1475; Franklin v McLaren Flint; Skipper-Baines v Board of Hosp Managers for City of Flint; Jokinen v Beaumont Hosp Troy; Enforcement of scheduling orders; Cleveland v Hath; Motion for reconsideration

Holding that defendants failed to show they were entitled to PHCIA immunity, the court reversed summary disposition in their favor and remanded. Plaintiff’s decedent died in 2020 after being admitted and treated by defendants-Beaumont Hospital Farmington Hills, Hartford Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, and Mission Point of Detroit. The trial court treated two defendants’ summary disposition motions as unopposed due to plaintiff’s failure to file a response, and granted the motions. It also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the court first held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating the motions as unopposed, or in denying the motion for reconsideration. But it reviewed the decision to grant the unopposed motions de novo to determine if they were sufficient to establish “defendants’ entitlement to immunity under the PHCIA as a matter of law.” Applying MCL 691.1475 as interpreted by Franklin, Skipper-Baines, and Jokinen, it concluded it was clear that they were not. “Beaumont failed to identify, in plaintiff’s allegations or otherwise, the legally requisite connection between [its] pandemic-related services and the negligence alleged in plaintiff’s complaint. Apart from the temporal relationship between plaintiff’s claims and the time during which Beaumont generally provided pandemic-related care, Beaumont made no argument and submitted no evidence that showed there was a nexus between the pandemic and the alleged negligence.” While records that were not properly before the court showed that the decedent was evaluated and tested for COVID-19 upon her admission, the court could not consider this evidence. It added that it did “not see how the mere fact of COVID-19 testing upon admission, with nothing more, would provide proof of any connection between the pandemic and the alleged negligence in this case.” The court found Hartford’s motion, which likewise relied on the temporal overlap, “similarly deficient.” As Mission Point simply concurred in its codefendants’ motions, it also was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Reunification efforts; MCL 712A.19a(2); In re Barber/Espinoza; Waiver

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Part II of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 85448 in the 4/2/26 edition) and remanded the case to the trial court. It held that the trial court plainly erred in terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights without requiring the DHHS to engage in reasonable reunification efforts. As noted by the Court of Appeals dissent, “respondent did not waive this argument by entering a no-contest plea regarding jurisdiction and statutory grounds for termination because the plea colloquy did not discuss the relinquishment of her statutory right to assert that DHHS had failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her child, including through the development of a case service plan.” The court found that the “Court of Appeals further erred by holding that respondent abandoned this argument when she addressed the issue in supplemental briefing at the Court of Appeals’ invitation.”

Child protective proceedings; Removal; MCR 3.965(C); MCL 712A.13a(9); Waiver; Contrary-to-the-welfare finding; Reasonable efforts; Anticipatory neglect; Special-needs children; Recanted allegations

The court held that respondent-father waived any challenge to one child’s (KC) removal and that the trial court did not err by removing the other two (SC and TC) from his care. DHHS petitioned for removal after KC reported that respondent locked him in his bedroom, forcing him to use a jug as a bathroom. The trial court ordered all three children removed after the preliminary hearing. On appeal, the court first found respondent waived any challenge as to KC because counsel stated there was no objection to KC’s removal, and respondent could not “harbor error as an appellate parachute.” As to SC and TC, the court concluded removal was supported by anticipatory neglect because respondent’s treatment of KC was probative of risk to his nonverbal daughters with special needs, who might not be able to seek help or describe their care. The court reasoned that respondent’s conduct created a substantial risk of harm and that remaining in the home was contrary to the children’s welfare. It also found reasonable efforts were made, including a team decision meeting, a safety plan, law-enforcement cooperation, a medical evaluation, interviews, and prior services. Finally, the court rejected respondent’s reliance on KC’s interruption of the Zoom hearing because the statement was unsworn and did not disprove the hearing testimony. Affirmed.