Possession of meth; MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i); Sufficiency of the evidence; Constructive possession; Dominion or control; Knowledge; People v McKinney; People v Wolfe; Circumstantial evidence; Reasonable inferences; People v Carines; People v Hardiman

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s meth-possession conviction because the totality of the circumstances established a sufficient nexus between him and the contraband. After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of possession of meth and acquitted of delivery or manufacture. Police found him hiding in a bedroom closet, discovered meth and drug-use items in the room, and found his wallet in a backpack outside the bedroom with empty syringes similar to syringes found in the room. On appeal, the court held that the evidence allowed a rational trier of fact to find “dominion or right of control over the drug with knowledge of its presence and character.” The court reasoned that defendant was one of only two people in the bedroom, the meth and related items were accessible there, his backpack connected him to similar syringes, and his hiding in the closet supported an inference that attempts were being made to conceal the drugs. It also relied on evidence that he had previously visited the home to use drugs and admitted he was a drug user who had used meth hours before his arrest. Affirmed.

Coercion & enticement of a minor; 18 USC § 2422(b); CSC III; MCL 750.520d(1)(a); Jury instructions; Invited error; Plain error; Mens rea as to minor status; United States v Hart; United States v Deakins; United States v Buddi; Sufficiency of the evidence; Rape-shield rule; FRE 412; Online dating profile; United States v Ogden; Interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct; § 2423(b); Illicit sexual conduct; § 2423(g)(1); Sexual abuse of a minor; § 2243(a); Specific intent; United States v Murphy (2d Cir)

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the Count 1 jury instructions were legally correct and the evidence sufficient, that the district court properly excluded sexually explicit portions of the minor’s online profile, and that the instructions on Counts 2 and 3 misstated the intent required under § 2423(b). A jury convicted defendant of coercion and enticement of a minor under § 2422(b) and two counts of interstate travel with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct under § 2423(b), arising from his online communications and meetings with 15-year-old M.V. The district court excluded sexually explicit portions of M.V.’s dating profile, and declined to give defendant’s proposed affirmative-defense instruction for Counts 2 and 3. On appeal, the court first held that the Count 1 instruction was correct because the government had to prove that (1) defendant knew M.V. was under 18, and (2) that M.V. was in fact 13, 14, or 15, but did not have to prove defendant knew the specific predicate-offense age because “the underlying [state] criminal offenses are not elements of the federal offense.” The court also held that the Count 1 evidence was sufficient because M.V. testified that he was 15 and told defendant he was under 18, and additional evidence showed defendant knew facts consistent with minor status, including high school, summer classes, a curfew, and needing transportation. The court next held that FRE 412 barred the sexually explicit parts of M.V.’s profile because they were “precisely the sort of” sexual-behavior evidence the rule prohibits, and defendant’s proposed uses still asked the jury to infer sexual propensity. As to Counts 2 and 3, the separate majority held that when § 2243(a) is the predicate chapter 109A offense, § 2423(b) requires proof that defendant intended to engage in a sexual act with someone at least 12 but under 16, not merely someone under 18. Because the jury was instructed that it could convict if defendant knew, had reason to know, or thought M.V. was under 18, “a jury could have convicted Stafford for conduct that did not in fact violate § 2423(b).” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Appellate jurisdiction; Appeal of right; MCR 7.203(A); Final order; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i)

The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s appeal as one of right because the order he challenged was not a final order. The case involved a mayoral election. Plaintiff appealed as of right the trial court’s 12/29/25 “order denying his motions to proceed quo warranto and for injunctive relief.” The court noted the order stated “that the issue pending before the [trial] court was plaintiff’s motion to set aside or reconsider a prior order[,]” and that the trial court closed it “by stating that it was denying plaintiff’s ‘motions to proceed quo warranto and for injunctive relief.’ Clearly, an order denying plaintiff’s motions is not the same as adjudicating the claims in” his complaint. In addition, his “complaint raised three claims: quo warranto, declaratory judgment, and emergency injunctive relief. So even if the” order denying his “motions to proceed quo warranto and for injunctive relief could be construed as adjudicating those claims as stated in [his] complaint, the order did not resolve [his] claim for declaratory judgment.” The court added that, while the trial court stated that “the order ‘resolves the last pending matter and closes the case,’ that language” was not controlling, nor was it factually accurate. The order was “not a final order under MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i) because it did not dispose of all claims and adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all parties.” Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Injury on school property; Governmental immunity; The public building exception (MCL 691.1406); “Design defect” claim; Renny v Department of Transp; Bush v Oscoda Area Sch; Tellin v Forsyth Twp; Waiver

The court held that plaintiff’s injury while exiting a school owned by defendant did not arise out of its failure to repair and maintain a public building and thus, the public building exception to governmental immunity did not apply. Plaintiff, who was using a walker, fell when she exited after voting in the school gym. She asserted “that the cause of her fall was the drop off and the sloped sidewalk in the area outside the door.” But she conceded “there was nothing wrong with the area where she fell or the door.” In granting defendant summary disposition, the trial court held that plaintiff’s claim did not come within MCL 691.1406’s exception because she “was alleging a design defect, and such claims are not cognizable under” the statute. The court agreed “that the condition that caused plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of defendant’s failure to repair and maintain a public building.” She contended “the condition that caused her injury was the drop off and sloped landing outside of Door 15.” She did not allege “that defendant needed to restore or return the area outside of Door 15 to a different state or condition” nor did she allege “that the cause of her fall was some type of ‘malfunction, deterioration, [or] instability’ in the area” of her fall. Rather, she alleged “that the inherent characteristics of that area—the drop off and sloped landing—is what caused her injury, which is a design defect.” While she focused on the second sentence of MCL 691.1406, the Supreme Court explained in Renny that the first sentence “provides that a governmental agency owes a duty to repair and maintain public buildings under its control, and the second sentence of the statute ‘does not expand the duty beyond the repair and maintenance of a public building’ to include ‘a duty to prevent “dangerous or defective condition[s]” in public buildings . . . .’” The court added that, even if the “construction differed from the intended design,” this did “not constitute a failure to repair and maintain because a building cannot be restored or returned to a prior state or condition that it was never in.” Affirmed.

Will contest; Undue influence; Presumption of undue influence; Fiduciary relationship; Power of attorney; Opportunity to influence; In re Estate of Karmey; Burden of production to rebut; MRE 301; In re Mardigian Estate; Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia; Credibility; Weight of evidence; Harmless factual errors; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3)

The court held that the probate court did not err by finding that the 2022 will was the product of undue influence and did not abuse its discretion by denying reconsideration. The decedent had a 2016 will that left his estate to his sisters, but after he became ill, appellant-niece obtained power of attorney, began caring for him, helped prepare a 2022 will leaving her 100% of his estate, and later sought to probate that will. The probate court found a presumption of undue influence and, after an evidentiary hearing, ruled that appellant failed to rebut it. On appeal, the court held that the presumption was “brought to life” because appellant had a fiduciary relationship with the decedent, benefited from the 2022 will, and had an opportunity to influence him while living with and caring for him. The court rejected appellant’s argument that there was no direct evidence of undue influence because the relevant question was whether she rebutted the presumption. It also deferred to the probate court’s finding that appellant’s and her husband’s testimony “lacks credibility,” and held that the probate court adequately explained why it gave little weight to the recording in which the decedent said he had “decided what to do a long time ago.” The court concluded that the probate court’s two factual errors were harmless and that appellant’s reconsideration argument merely repeated rejected arguments. Affirmed.

Injury on school property; Governmental immunity; The public building exception (MCL 691.1406); “Design defect” claim; Renny v Department of Transp; Bush v Oscoda Area Sch; Tellin v Forsyth Twp; Waiver

The court held that plaintiff’s injury while exiting a school owned by defendant did not arise out of its failure to repair and maintain a public building and thus, the public building exception to governmental immunity did not apply. Plaintiff, who was using a walker, fell when she exited after voting in the school gym. She asserted “that the cause of her fall was the drop off and the sloped sidewalk in the area outside the door.” But she conceded “there was nothing wrong with the area where she fell or the door.” In granting defendant summary disposition, the trial court held that plaintiff’s claim did not come within MCL 691.1406’s exception because she “was alleging a design defect, and such claims are not cognizable under” the statute. The court agreed “that the condition that caused plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of defendant’s failure to repair and maintain a public building.” She contended “the condition that caused her injury was the drop off and sloped landing outside of Door 15.” She did not allege “that defendant needed to restore or return the area outside of Door 15 to a different state or condition” nor did she allege “that the cause of her fall was some type of ‘malfunction, deterioration, [or] instability’ in the area” of her fall. Rather, she alleged “that the inherent characteristics of that area—the drop off and sloped landing—is what caused her injury, which is a design defect.” While she focused on the second sentence of MCL 691.1406, the Supreme Court explained in Renny that the first sentence “provides that a governmental agency owes a duty to repair and maintain public buildings under its control, and the second sentence of the statute ‘does not expand the duty beyond the repair and maintenance of a public building’ to include ‘a duty to prevent “dangerous or defective condition[s]” in public buildings . . . .’” The court added that, even if the “construction differed from the intended design,” this did “not constitute a failure to repair and maintain because a building cannot be restored or returned to a prior state or condition that it was never in.” Affirmed.

Will contest; Undue influence; Presumption of undue influence; Fiduciary relationship; Power of attorney; Opportunity to influence; In re Estate of Karmey; Burden of production to rebut; MRE 301; In re Mardigian Estate; Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia; Credibility; Weight of evidence; Harmless factual errors; Motion for reconsideration; MCR 2.119(F)(3)

The court held that the probate court did not err by finding that the 2022 will was the product of undue influence and did not abuse its discretion by denying reconsideration. The decedent had a 2016 will that left his estate to his sisters, but after he became ill, appellant-niece obtained power of attorney, began caring for him, helped prepare a 2022 will leaving her 100% of his estate, and later sought to probate that will. The probate court found a presumption of undue influence and, after an evidentiary hearing, ruled that appellant failed to rebut it. On appeal, the court held that the presumption was “brought to life” because appellant had a fiduciary relationship with the decedent, benefited from the 2022 will, and had an opportunity to influence him while living with and caring for him. The court rejected appellant’s argument that there was no direct evidence of undue influence because the relevant question was whether she rebutted the presumption. It also deferred to the probate court’s finding that appellant’s and her husband’s testimony “lacks credibility,” and held that the probate court adequately explained why it gave little weight to the recording in which the decedent said he had “decided what to do a long time ago.” The court concluded that the probate court’s two factual errors were harmless and that appellant’s reconsideration argument merely repeated rejected arguments. Affirmed.