Action by a state prisoner under the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, & 42 USC § 1983; Whether the court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claims against defendants-prison chaplain & warden; Whether the RLUIPA authorized money damages against the prison officials; Redressability; Mootness; Haight v Thompson; Tanzin v Tanvir; Whether plaintiff could support a RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief against defendant-activities coordinator

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court joined other circuits by holding that the RLUIPA does not authorize a claim for money damages against officials in their individual or official capacities. It also dismissed plaintiff-Ali’s claims for injunctive relief where he could obtain relief by signing up for the available vegan meal plan or an alternative plan. He also did not plead a cognizable RLUIPA claim against defendant-MDOC or a cognizable money-damages claim against two of the prison officials under the Free Exercise Clause and § 1983. Ali, a Muslim and a state prisoner, sued the prison warden, chaplain, activities coordinator, and the MDOC under the RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, and § 1983, for failing to supply him with a halal diet. He also must “avoid certain foods, like pork, and meats slaughtered in a manner inconsistent with Islamic law.” Ali went through the steps he believed were necessary to obtain his alternative menu, including first applying for vegan meals, but his request was denied where the activities coordinator learned that Ali had purchased pork at the prison commissary. The district court dismissed the claims against the MDOC and granted the other defendants summary judgment. The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims for injunctive relief against the warden and chaplain where “relief will not redress his injury. Only the special activities coordinator may approve requests for vegan meals. And only a ‘Deputy Director’ may approve requests for alternative menus, such as those containing halal meat.” Additionally, Ali is no longer in the same facility, so this claim against those two defendants was moot. And the special activities coordinator no longer works for MDOC. The court next concluded that the RLUIPA does not authorize a money-damages claim against the officials in their official or individual capacities. Along with its sister circuits, it held that “RLUIPA’s spending power underpinnings convey a narrower scope to ‘appropriate relief’ that excludes damages, given Congress’s failure to say otherwise unambiguously.” It also held that Ali failed to state a claim for relief under the RLUIPA against the MDOC because he did “not identify a policy that violates RLUIPA.” As to his claim for injunctive relief, the fact that he had “not re-applied for a vegan meal in seven years—despite this ready alternative to eating cross-contaminated food—undermines his request for relief from this court.” Finally, as to his money-damages claim against the chaplain and the activities coordinator under the Free Exercise Clause and § 1983, they were entitled to qualified immunity because he could not show they violated his clearly established rights. The court dismissed his appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the rest of the district court’s decision.

Tax foreclosure under Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (the GPTA); Whether defendant-county violated plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment constitutional rights by retaining excess foreclosure funds; Tyler v Hennepin Cnty.; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty (MI); Hall v Meisner; Nelson v City of NY; Whether plaintiff followed the necessary procedures under the GPTA; MCL 211.78t(2); Whether a 5% sales commission was reasonable

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that because plaintiff-taxpayer (Howard) never undertook the Michigan GPTA’s procedures to recover the surplus from the sale of her foreclosed property in excess of her unpaid taxes on it, she forfeited her claim. Howard failed to pay her property taxes, and defendant-county foreclosed. She claimed that it kept the money from the sale that was over and above what she owed, and she sued alleging a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court noted that in 2020 “the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Rafaeli “that Michigan’s failure to compensate property owners for the gap between their tax debts and the price realized from foreclosure sales of their property violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution.” And the court later held in Hall “that the same law violated the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.” Michigan amended the GPTA to allow taxpayers to recover “any surplus value in their foreclosed properties.” In this case, defendant complied with the required notice and followed the required procedures. The court concluded that because Howard never undertook the statutory procedure to claim surplus proceeds set forth in MCL 211.78t(2), she “forfeited her claim to” them. The court also found that the “key question implicated by the 5% sales commission” that is subtracted from the surplus “is not whether it deprives the owner of just compensation; it is whether the amount gives the State more than its due. It does not.” It determined that nothing in the complaint showed that this 5% commission was “anything more than a reasonable fee to compensate the county for this real estate work or to incentivize the county to sell the property at the highest price possible. The fee also finds company among historical and modern precedents.” Affirmed.

Action by a state prisoner under the Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause, & 42 USC § 1983; Whether the court had jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claims against defendants-prison chaplain & warden; Whether the RLUIPA authorized money damages against the prison officials; Redressability; Mootness; Haight v Thompson; Tanzin v Tanvir; Whether plaintiff could support a RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief against defendant-activities coordinator

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court joined other circuits by holding that the RLUIPA does not authorize a claim for money damages against officials in their individual or official capacities. It also dismissed plaintiff-Ali’s claims for injunctive relief where he could obtain relief by signing up for the available vegan meal plan or an alternative plan. He also did not plead a cognizable RLUIPA claim against defendant-MDOC or a cognizable money-damages claim against two of the prison officials under the Free Exercise Clause and § 1983. Ali, a Muslim and a state prisoner, sued the prison warden, chaplain, activities coordinator, and the MDOC under the RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, and § 1983, for failing to supply him with a halal diet. He also must “avoid certain foods, like pork, and meats slaughtered in a manner inconsistent with Islamic law.” Ali went through the steps he believed were necessary to obtain his alternative menu, including first applying for vegan meals, but his request was denied where the activities coordinator learned that Ali had purchased pork at the prison commissary. The district court dismissed the claims against the MDOC and granted the other defendants summary judgment. The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the claims for injunctive relief against the warden and chaplain where “relief will not redress his injury. Only the special activities coordinator may approve requests for vegan meals. And only a ‘Deputy Director’ may approve requests for alternative menus, such as those containing halal meat.” Additionally, Ali is no longer in the same facility, so this claim against those two defendants was moot. And the special activities coordinator no longer works for MDOC. The court next concluded that the RLUIPA does not authorize a money-damages claim against the officials in their official or individual capacities. Along with its sister circuits, it held that “RLUIPA’s spending power underpinnings convey a narrower scope to ‘appropriate relief’ that excludes damages, given Congress’s failure to say otherwise unambiguously.” It also held that Ali failed to state a claim for relief under the RLUIPA against the MDOC because he did “not identify a policy that violates RLUIPA.” As to his claim for injunctive relief, the fact that he had “not re-applied for a vegan meal in seven years—despite this ready alternative to eating cross-contaminated food—undermines his request for relief from this court.” Finally, as to his money-damages claim against the chaplain and the activities coordinator under the Free Exercise Clause and § 1983, they were entitled to qualified immunity because he could not show they violated his clearly established rights. The court dismissed his appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the rest of the district court’s decision.

Separate hearing to determine if defendant was “sexually delinquent” under MCL 767.61a; Double jeopardy; Convictions of indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person & aggravated indecent exposure; Sentencing

The court held that because defendant-Gray “did not plead guilty or no contest and because the question as to whether he was a sexually delinquent person was determined by the jury, the trial court did not err by not holding a separate hearing on the matter.” In the wake of the prosecution’s concession that a double jeopardy violation occurred, the court rejected its argument that “the sentencing enhancement applied to the indecent exposure conviction for being a sexually delinquent person should be applied to Gray’s conviction for aggravated indecent exposure.” He first argued that the trial court erred in not conducting “a separate hearing to determine if he was ‘sexually delinquent’ under MCL 767.61a.” The court noted the “statute expressly provides that when a defendant pleads guilty to both the underlying sexual offense and the charge of being a sexually delinquent person, the trial court must ‘conduct an examination of witnesses relative to the sexual delinquency of such person and may call on psychiatric and expert testimony.’” It must also do so when a “defendant pleads no contest to both charges.” The trial court here “did not hold a separate hearing” but the record showed “the jury was instructed to determine both his guilt as to the underlying sexual offense and to the charge that he was a sexually delinquent person.” As to double jeopardy, the prosecution conceded on appeal that his indecent exposure conviction should be vacated. But it suggested that applying the sentencing enhancement was appropriate. The court noted that “the felony complaint clearly lists two offenses: indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person and aggravated indecent exposure. Further, the jury was presented with” these two counts. Thus, the record clearly showed “that the sexual-delinquency sentencing enhancement was tied to the charge of indecent exposure, not the charge of aggravated indecent exposure. Because the charge to which the indecent exposure conviction was attached must be vacated in order to remedy the double-jeopardy violation, there is no conviction to which the sexual-delinquency sentencing enhancement may now be applied.” The court vacated his indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person conviction but otherwise affirmed.

Interpretation of MCL 750.543m (making a terrorism threat); Consideration of MCL 750.543z; The constitutional-doubt canon; Consideration of whether it is appropriate to adopt a limiting construction of MCL 750.543m to remedy any remaining constitutional deficiency; Dismissal without prejudice while an application for leave to appeal was pending with the court

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83167 in the 2/14/25 edition for the published opinion) and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration. It did not express an opinion as to “whether MCL 750.543m violates constitutional free-speech protections by imposing criminal liability without proof ‘that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence.’” It directed the Court of Appeals on remand to “address the proper interpretation of MCL 750.543m in light of: (1) MCL 750.543z, which provides that ‘a prosecuting agency shall not prosecute any person or seize any property for conduct presumptively protected by the’” First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “‘in a manner that violates any constitutional provision’; and (2) the constitutional-doubt canon[.]” In addition, it is to “address: (3) whether it is appropriate to adopt a limiting construction of MCL 750.543m to remedy any remaining constitutional deficiency, . . . (4) if so, what that limiting construction should be; and (5) whether the [trial court] abused its discretion by dismissing the case without prejudice on” the date that it did “where doing so necessarily implicated ‘aspects of the case involved in the interlocutory appeal’ while an application for leave to appeal remained pending with” the court.

Rescission; Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Wright; Balancing the equities; Whether the policy should have been reformed as to the amounts of coverage; MCL 500.3009(1)(a); Progressive Marathon Ins Co v Espinoza-Solis; The court’s jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(A)(1)

The court held that the trial court “properly considered the specific facts of this case when it determined that rescission was not appropriate.” And it concluded that “the trial court did not err when it found that the liability limits were $250,000 per individual and $500,000 per accident.” Defendant-MemberSelect argued “that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to rescind the insurance policy.” The court held that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that rescission was not appropriate.” Although MemberSelect argued “that the trial court failed to consider all of the proper factors, and relied on other factors that were not relevant to the analysis, the equitable remedy of rescission is ‘adaptive to the circumstances of each case.’” The court noted that “the trial court did not find that equity balanced in favor of MemberSelect when the third parties, who had nothing to do with [its insured, defendant-Gates’s] misrepresentations, were seriously harmed.” Further, there was “nothing in the record to suggest that the third parties had any fault in the collision.” The court held that the “trial court properly balanced the equities, and its ‘analysis was specific to the facts and circumstances of the case and went no further than what was equitable.’” The court also rejected MemberSelect’s argument that “even if rescission is inappropriate, the trial court erred by declining to reform the policy to reflect coverage of $50,000 per person and $100,000 per occurrence.” The court held in Espinoza-Solis that the “‘statutorily required minimum residual liability insurance for policies issued after [7/1/20], is $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, pursuant to MCL 500.3009(1)(a) and (b), unless the proper steps are followed to exercise the options of selecting a lower coverage amount under MCL 500.3009(5).’” The court noted that “Gates never made an election to lower her minimum coverage, particularly considering her policy limit was $250,000/$500,000.” Affirmed.

Personal protection insurance benefits action; Appellate jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(A)(1); “Final judgment or final order”; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i); Appeal from a consent judgment; Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 80948 in the 1/29/24 edition for the published opinion) and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration. It noted that the Court of Appeals convened a conflict panel to address the conflict between the judgment entered in this case and Jaber. “The conflict panel held that ‘an aggrieved party may raise on appeal issues arising from an earlier order relating to one party even if a later, stipulated final order of dismissal as to another party does not contain a reservation of the right to claim an appeal from the earlier order,’ and concluded that this case was incorrectly decided.”

Personal protection insurance benefits action; Appellate jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(A)(1); “Final judgment or final order”; MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i); Appeal from a consent judgment; Jaber v P & P Hospitality, LLC

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 80948 in the 1/29/24 edition for the published opinion) and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration. It noted that the Court of Appeals convened a conflict panel to address the conflict between the judgment entered in this case and Jaber. “The conflict panel held that ‘an aggrieved party may raise on appeal issues arising from an earlier order relating to one party even if a later, stipulated final order of dismissal as to another party does not contain a reservation of the right to claim an appeal from the earlier order,’ and concluded that this case was incorrectly decided.”

Quiet title action; Fraud

Holding that the trial court did not “clearly err by finding that plaintiff failed to establish fraud[,]” the court affirmed the dismissal of her quiet title action. “Plaintiff is defendant’s aunt. Mary Mathews, who died in 1984, was plaintiff’s mother and defendant’s grandmother. Doris Oldham, who died in 2022, was defendant’s mother and plaintiff’s sister. In 1983, plaintiff and Mary purchased a home. In 1984, Mary purportedly conveyed her interest in the home to Doris by quitclaim deed.” In the trial court, plaintiff claimed that she “lived in the home until 1989, at which point she went to a treatment center and then returned to live with Doris through the 1990s and into the 2000s. Defendant claimed to have lived with Doris in the house since 1989, when plaintiff deeded her interest in the home to Doris, and Doris evicted plaintiff. A 1989 quitclaim deed shows that plaintiff conveyed her interest in the house to Doris. Finally, by a quitclaim deed executed in [3/22], a few months before Doris died, Doris conveyed her interest in the house to herself and defendant as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship.” In 2023, plaintiff filed this action. She argued that the trial court erred in “dismissing her claims when defendant and Doris conspired to steal the property from” her. She contended “she did not sign the 1989 quitclaim deed that transferred her interest in the property to Doris, and there was evidence that Doris suffered from dementia around the time of the 2022 quitclaim deed.” But the court concluded that “the quitclaim deeds evidenced the transfer of property ownership” and that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that plaintiff failed to establish that they were fraudulent.

Surplus proceeds from a foreclosure sale; General Property Tax Act (GPTA); MCL 211.78t; In re Muskegon Cnty Treasurer for Foreclosure

The court held that “plaintiff failed to enforce his right to any surplus proceeds from the foreclosure sale, and the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants.” The underlying facts were not in dispute. “Plaintiff owned property that was foreclosed upon in” 3/22. In 10/22, “defendants sold the property at auction to a third party. Plaintiff did not follow the procedure in MCL 211.78t for claiming proceeds from the sale of foreclosed property, and, instead, sued defendants in” 9/23 for the proceeds. Plaintiff relied “on his belief that our Supreme Court would reverse this Court’s decision in Muskegon[,]” in which the court “held that the respondents failed to avail themselves of the procedure under MCL 211.78t, and, therefore, forfeited their right to proceeds. Our Supreme Court has since denied leave to appeal.” Thus, the court was bound by Muskegon. Plaintiff argued “that the statute denied [him] due process, and he asks that this Court hold that MCL 211.78t ‘is unconstitutional for the reasons stated in the appellants’ argument in Muskegon County.’ Beyond asserting that MCL 211.78t constitutes a taking, however, plaintiff does not specify any alleged errors in the reasoning underlying the Muskegon Court’s conclusions, does not cite any authority contradicting the Muskegon Court’s conclusions, and does not attempt to distinguish the present case from Muskegon.” Affirmed.

Tax foreclosure under Michigan’s General Property Tax Act (the GPTA); Whether defendant-county violated plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment constitutional rights by retaining excess foreclosure funds; Tyler v Hennepin Cnty.; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty (MI); Hall v Meisner; Nelson v City of NY; Whether plaintiff followed the necessary procedures under the GPTA; MCL 211.78t(2); Whether a 5% sales commission was reasonable

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that because plaintiff-taxpayer (Howard) never undertook the Michigan GPTA’s procedures to recover the surplus from the sale of her foreclosed property in excess of her unpaid taxes on it, she forfeited her claim. Howard failed to pay her property taxes, and defendant-county foreclosed. She claimed that it kept the money from the sale that was over and above what she owed, and she sued alleging a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court noted that in 2020 “the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Rafaeli “that Michigan’s failure to compensate property owners for the gap between their tax debts and the price realized from foreclosure sales of their property violated the Takings Clause of the Michigan Constitution.” And the court later held in Hall “that the same law violated the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.” Michigan amended the GPTA to allow taxpayers to recover “any surplus value in their foreclosed properties.” In this case, defendant complied with the required notice and followed the required procedures. The court concluded that because Howard never undertook the statutory procedure to claim surplus proceeds set forth in MCL 211.78t(2), she “forfeited her claim to” them. The court also found that the “key question implicated by the 5% sales commission” that is subtracted from the surplus “is not whether it deprives the owner of just compensation; it is whether the amount gives the State more than its due. It does not.” It determined that nothing in the complaint showed that this 5% commission was “anything more than a reasonable fee to compensate the county for this real estate work or to incentivize the county to sell the property at the highest price possible. The fee also finds company among historical and modern precedents.” Affirmed.

Reasonable reunification efforts; § 19b(3)(c)(i)

The trial court did not commit plain error affecting respondent-father’s substantial rights when it determined the DHHS made reasonable efforts to facilitate reunification. Also, § (c)(i) existed as to both respondents. He argued the DHHS “failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification because it did not ensure that the . . .  service providers were complying with the recommendations contained in his psychological and substance abuse evaluation.” Specifically, he asserted that there was “no indication his counselors followed the recommendation to encourage him to open up and stop engaging in denial.” Although the record reflected “that only one of his many counselors was provided with copies of the evaluations, given the record in this case, it is apparent that his participation with each service provider was sporadic and short-lived. The caseworker was not always able to communicate freely with the counselors and information on his progress was not always available because [the father] did not sign the appropriate paperwork. Moreover, even if the recommendations had been given to each of the providers, there is nothing on this record suggesting that respondent-father’s history of changing providers and failure to demonstrate any meaningful benefit from the counseling would have been different.” As to § (c)(i), the court found that “the conditions that led to adjudication continued to exist. Moreover, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent-father would be unable to rectify his issues with domestic violence within a reasonable time considering the minor child’s age.” At the time of termination, the “child was 6 ½ years old, had extensive special needs, and had been out of [the father’s] care for most of his life. Despite having received reunification services aimed at rectifying his issues with domestic-violence for over two years, [the father] made no significant progress. He was still engaging in domestic-violence with the child’s mother.” Also, while “respondent-mother seemed to have ended her relationship with [the father] at the time of the May 2024 termination, [she] still refused to engage in domestic violence services.” Affirmed.