Attorney fees, postjudgment; MCR 3.206(D); Richards v Richards; Spousal support modification; Changed circumstances; Luckow v Luckow; Summary disposition procedure; MCR 2.116(C)(8)–(10); Lockwood v Twp of Ellington

The court held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s postjudgment requests for attorney fees and for additional spousal support because (1) summary disposition was not available on the procedural posture asserted, (2) she failed to substantiate fees under MCR 3.206(D), and (3) she failed to show a postjudgment change in circumstances warranting modification of the parties’ modifiable 10-year support agreement. The parties divorced in 2012 after a 23-year marriage, with a judgment incorporating a separation agreement requiring $3,000 monthly spousal support for 10 years, modifiable in amount and duration. The trial court denied plaintiff’s later petitions for interim support, additional support after expiration, and attorney fees. On appeal, the court first rejected plaintiff’s oral summary-disposition theory, explaining MCR 2.116(C)(8) did not apply because defendant “was not stating any claim,” and (C)(9) and (C)(10) were inapplicable because defendant appeared at hearings and “expressly disputed” the factual allegations, making summary disposition improper where factual issues remained. The court next held plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D) because she did not supply billing statements, affidavits, itemizations, or other documentation showing the “necessity and reasonableness” of fees. She also did not demonstrate fees were incurred because of defendant’s alleged noncompliance with an order. It also noted she represented herself on the petitions at issue and did not show a need for prospective fees to “carry on” litigation. As to spousal support, the court held plaintiff bore the burden to show “new facts or changed circumstances” after the prior order. It found no error where she relied on defendant’s employment change without evidence of his overall financial condition, on missed payments that had been fully cured by lump-sum satisfaction, and on property issues previously litigated, including a prior judgment. Affirmed.

First-degree murder; MCL 750.316; Identity; People v Hardiman; Conspiracy intent; MCL 750.157a; People v Mass; Right to a fair trial; Improper vouching; Investigative steps testimony; MRE 701; People v Lowrey

The court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder arising from a gang-related shooting, and that a detective’s testimony describing the investigation did not constitute improper vouching warranting relief. At a 2019 fireworks event, the victim and his girlfriend drove through a parking area and encountered a group of 10 to 15 men believed to be Latin Kings gang members. Two armed men approached the driver’s side in traffic and multiple shots were fired, killing the victim and injuring the girlfriend. The prosecution presented bystander descriptions of a Hispanic shooter in a “plain white T-shirt” at the driver’s side, and surveillance video showing a similarly dressed man fleeing immediately after the gunfire. Further, there was testimony from Latin Kings members and associates that defendant was in the group, pursued the vehicle, and fired at close range toward the driver’s side, with one witness describing defendant later acknowledging involvement. The court held that identity may be proven by circumstantial evidence and that the jury could credit the gang witnesses and reconcile lineup issues where defendant was not initially a suspect and resembled early lineup selections. It also held that defendant’s flight to Guatemala and later extradition supported “consciousness of guilt.” On conspiracy, the court held that a jury could infer a “tacit agreement” from the coordinated pursuit, shared gang affiliation, and collective participation in the shooting. It noted conspiracies rarely have direct proof and do not require an explicit discussion of murder. Finally, reviewing an unpreserved issue for plain error, the court held that a detective’s testimony was a permissible narrative of investigative steps and he did not opine that witnesses were truthful or that defendant was guilty, so it did not invade the jury’s role. Affirmed.

Motion for discovery of the complainant’s psychological records; People v Davis-Christian; People v Stanaway; People v Caruso

On remand from the Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for discovery of the complainant’s (CS) psychological records, and that an in camera review of the records was appropriate. Thus, it reversed and remanded for an in camera review of the records. The parties analogized the case to Stanaway and its companion case, Caruso. The court found that the facts here were “closer to Caruso than Stanaway. Defendant sought discovery because the prosecution introduced CS’s mental status into the case although it was not relevant to an element of the charged offenses. CS has been evaluated multiple times and has not been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder. Nonetheless, his mother told the police that he was ‘on the spectrum.’” A doctor’s (W) “2016 psychological report states that CS’s need for SSI benefits had recently ‘been called into question,’ and she wanted CS’s ‘difficulties documented so that he may again receive assistance.’ In contrast to [W’s] 2016 evaluation, her 2023 letter was a short, one-paragraph document, and was rather general, leaving CS’s current level of functioning a matter of debate. In addition, [W’s] 2016 evaluation referenced several previous evaluations, and [W] stated in her 2023 letter that CS was her client, and she had been working with him on a regular basis since 2016.” The court determined that, considering “the prosecution’s intent to use evidence of CS’s mental state to establish his purported susceptibility to victimization, defendant has shown a reasonable probability that the records at issue contain information material to his defense, particularly since the 2016 report is ten years old and the 2023 letter sheds little light on whether CS is particularly susceptible to victimization.”

Sufficiency of the evidence; Stalking; MCL 750.411h; Harassment

Concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant-McClellan’s stalking conviction, the court affirmed. After the victim (RT) obtained a PPO against defendant, he contacted her by phone, text message, and e-mail. The court held that the “prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish that McClellan’s actions constituted a willful course of conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment.” McClellan contended “that although his actions annoyed RT, they would not have caused a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.” In one of the “text messages sent to RT, he mentioned that he had an AR-15. Another text message was sexually explicit, and several of the messages were nonsensical. In addition to those particularly concerning text messages, McClellan telephoned RT ‘hundreds’ of times between” 3/12/23 and 5/2/23. “The overwhelming amount of unconsented contact and the troubling nature of some of the messages would cause a reasonable person ‘to be subject to great mental strain or difficulties.’” Moreover, the court found that “McClellan failed to rebut the statutory presumption that his continued efforts to contact RT after she obtained a PPO against him caused her ‘to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.’” Further, it concluded that “the prosecution presented evidence that RT in fact experienced great mental strain or difficulties as a result of McClellan’s conduct. She testified that she was ‘scared to go anywhere’ and was unable to sleep. She also testified that, after receiving McClellan’s message referencing the AR-15, she felt nervous and scared and was afraid she ‘might get hurt[.]’”

Sufficiency of the evidence for a CSC I conviction under MCL 750.520b(1)(a); “Sexual penetration” (MCL 750.520a(r)); Failure to instruct the jury on CSC II; Whether CSC II is a necessarily lesser included offense of CSC I; People v Nyx

The court held that the child victim’s “testimony was not inherently incredible” and, considering it in the proper light, there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant-Seegar’s CSC I conviction. He also was not entitled to relief on the basis the trial court did not instruct the jury on CSC II given that Nyx held that CSC II “‘is not a necessarily included lesser offense of’” CSC I. Thus, the court affirmed his conviction. Seegars argued that there was “insufficient evidence of sexual penetration” to support his conviction. The court disagreed, noting that the child “testified that Seegars used his fingers to touch the outside and the inside of her ‘middle area.’ She further stated that during the assault his fingers were ‘spreading apart’ or ‘opening’ her ‘middle area.’ She identified her vagina as her ‘middle area.’ In light of her testimony that there was touching inside and outside of her vagina, there was sufficient evidence of sexual penetration.” Seegars noted “weaknesses in the DNA evidence, cites his trial lawyer’s argument that there was only touching on the ‘outside’ of the vagina, and indicates and it ‘made no sense’ for him to sexually assault the girl within minutes after the girl’s mother and her girlfriend returned to the house.” As a result, he asserted that “the testimony supporting the conviction is ‘inherently incredible’ and should not be considered.” But the court disagreed, noting that in considering a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, it “‘reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and considers whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Sufficiency of the evidence for kidnapping, extortion, & unlawful imprisonment convictions; Aiding & abetting; People v Robinson

Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Williams’s convictions of kidnapping, extortion, and unlawful imprisonment under an aiding and abetting theory, the court affirmed. It first found that “the prosecution established that a kidnapping was committed.” A codefendant (T) restrained the victim’s (KB) “movements by force and threat of force without KB’s consent or any legal authority. [T’s] intent to hold KB for ransom can be inferred based upon his demand that KB’s mother give him $2,000 to secure KB’s release. The prosecution also presented sufficient evidence to establish that Williams performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted in the commission of the kidnapping.” She contended “she was merely present at the house. However, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, her actions ‘had the effect of inducing the crime.’ The jury could infer that she sent text messages to KB to entice him to come to the house to retrieve his possessions. Moreover, in a phone call with KB’s mother, Williams stated, ‘we got his dumb ass back over here.’ The jury could infer that this was an admission that Williams assisted in the commission of the kidnapping because it shows that her actions intentionally led to KB’s presence outside the house where his freedom and movement were initially restrained and that she was aware of the effects of her actions.” Finally, there was sufficient evidence that she “intended the commission of the kidnapping or had knowledge that [T] intended its commission at the time that Williams provided him with aid and encouragement.” In response to police questioning about why they didn’t let KB leave, she stated that they “‘wanted to call his momma and get our belongings back’” that KB allegedly stole. This and another statement she made showed “that she not only was an enthusiastic participant in restraining KB, but also that she likewise wanted to restrict KB’s freedom and movement until she got her belongings back.” The court also concluded that “there was sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of extortion” and unlawful imprisonment under an aiding and abetting theory.

Employment claims; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Fraud; Tortious interference; Summary disposition evidence; MCR 2.116(C)(10) & (G)(6); Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Eng’g, Inc; Hearsay; Airgas Specialty Prods v MIOSHA; Business-records exception; MRE 803(6)

The court held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant-former employer (MGM) because MGM supported its motion with substantively admissible evidence, including nonhearsay investigative records and business records admissible under MRE 803(6), so plaintiff’s hearsay-based evidentiary attack failed. Plaintiff, a longtime casino cage cashier, alleged coworkers encouraged patrons to harass her, that MGM promised a “thorough and fair” investigation but instead conducted a “‘sham and fraudulent investigation,’” and that MGM personnel later made statements to her subsequent employer, a credit union, causing it to terminate her after performance issues. She filed suit alleging claims under the ELCRA and other statutes as well as fraud and tortious-interference claims. The trial court dismissed her claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10) after concluding she had no admissible evidence and that defendants “‘did the work to show that none of this happened.’” On appeal, plaintiff argued MGM’s motion should have been denied because it relied on inadmissible hearsay, so she claimed she had no obligation to respond. The court rejected that premise, explaining that “‘a statement that is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay.’” And MGM relied on its investigative records to show it conducted an investigation, not to prove the truth of the underlying allegations. The court further held the records were admissible under the business-records exception because they were made “‘at or near the time’” of the complaints, kept as a “‘regular practice’” in MGM’s complaint investigations, and plaintiff did not show “‘a lack of trustworthiness.’” The court likewise concluded the credit union’s personnel records were admissible business records. Finally, it emphasized that at the summary-disposition stage evidence must be substantively admissible but “does not have to be in admissible form,” so affidavits and memoranda could be considered where the authors could testify at trial, including the credit union’s branch manager’s affidavit stating she never spoke with anyone at MGM. Affirmed.

Attorney fees, postjudgment; MCR 3.206(D); Richards v Richards; Spousal support modification; Changed circumstances; Luckow v Luckow; Summary disposition procedure; MCR 2.116(C)(8)–(10); Lockwood v Twp of Ellington

The court held that the trial court properly denied plaintiff’s postjudgment requests for attorney fees and for additional spousal support because (1) summary disposition was not available on the procedural posture asserted, (2) she failed to substantiate fees under MCR 3.206(D), and (3) she failed to show a postjudgment change in circumstances warranting modification of the parties’ modifiable 10-year support agreement. The parties divorced in 2012 after a 23-year marriage, with a judgment incorporating a separation agreement requiring $3,000 monthly spousal support for 10 years, modifiable in amount and duration. The trial court denied plaintiff’s later petitions for interim support, additional support after expiration, and attorney fees. On appeal, the court first rejected plaintiff’s oral summary-disposition theory, explaining MCR 2.116(C)(8) did not apply because defendant “was not stating any claim,” and (C)(9) and (C)(10) were inapplicable because defendant appeared at hearings and “expressly disputed” the factual allegations, making summary disposition improper where factual issues remained. The court next held plaintiff was not entitled to attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D) because she did not supply billing statements, affidavits, itemizations, or other documentation showing the “necessity and reasonableness” of fees. She also did not demonstrate fees were incurred because of defendant’s alleged noncompliance with an order. It also noted she represented herself on the petitions at issue and did not show a need for prospective fees to “carry on” litigation. As to spousal support, the court held plaintiff bore the burden to show “new facts or changed circumstances” after the prior order. It found no error where she relied on defendant’s employment change without evidence of his overall financial condition, on missed payments that had been fully cured by lump-sum satisfaction, and on property issues previously litigated, including a prior judgment. Affirmed.

No-fault action to obtain personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Insurer priority; Domicile; Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exch; Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co

The court agreed “that the trial court erred when it resolved the factual question of plaintiff’s domicile and concluded that defendant was not the highest priority insurer responsible for paying plaintiff PIP benefits.” Thus, it reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal and remanded. The court held that the “trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address on the relevant date and granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The affidavit, which supplements rather than contradicts plaintiff’s deposition testimony, raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s domicile, which should be determined by a jury.” The court held that the Workman and Dairyland frameworks do “not weigh in favor of finding that plaintiff is domiciled with his sister at the Judd address. Two Workman factors, intent and residence on the same premises, clearly weigh against a finding plaintiff is domiciled at the Judd address, and the other two Workman factors, informality of relationship and existence of another place of lodging, do not militate strongly in favor of either conclusion. The only Dairyland factors favoring defendant’s position relate to plaintiff’s use of the address for mail, his identification, and other important documents. At best, four of nine factors suggest plaintiff was domiciled with his sister, but with two Workman factors being ambiguous, the total is perhaps closer to only two of nine factors.” Thus, the court found that “a conclusion that plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address is not well-supported by the evidence and thus the trial court erred in concluding plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address given the lack of an alternative.” Also, the affidavit presented “alternative resolutions to the factual question of plaintiff’s domicile, and summary disposition was inappropriate. If plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address for a mere three months 17 years ago, the move to the Seymour address may have extinguished that domicile and established a new one. Alternatively, he may have never been domiciled at the Judd address given his stated intent never to remain there, and the Seymour address may have been his last specified domicile before becoming homeless. In general, domicile determinations are questions of fact for the jury, unless the underlying material facts are not in dispute.” The court found that the “affidavit supplements plaintiff’s testimony and creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s domicile that should be determined by a jury.” As such, it concluded “that the trial court erred when it found plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address and granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant.”

Employment claims; The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); Fraud; Tortious interference; Summary disposition evidence; MCR 2.116(C)(10) & (G)(6); Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Eng’g, Inc; Hearsay; Airgas Specialty Prods v MIOSHA; Business-records exception; MRE 803(6)

The court held that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant-former employer (MGM) because MGM supported its motion with substantively admissible evidence, including nonhearsay investigative records and business records admissible under MRE 803(6), so plaintiff’s hearsay-based evidentiary attack failed. Plaintiff, a longtime casino cage cashier, alleged coworkers encouraged patrons to harass her, that MGM promised a “thorough and fair” investigation but instead conducted a “‘sham and fraudulent investigation,’” and that MGM personnel later made statements to her subsequent employer, a credit union, causing it to terminate her after performance issues. She filed suit alleging claims under the ELCRA and other statutes as well as fraud and tortious-interference claims. The trial court dismissed her claims under MCR 2.116(C)(10) after concluding she had no admissible evidence and that defendants “‘did the work to show that none of this happened.’” On appeal, plaintiff argued MGM’s motion should have been denied because it relied on inadmissible hearsay, so she claimed she had no obligation to respond. The court rejected that premise, explaining that “‘a statement that is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay.’” And MGM relied on its investigative records to show it conducted an investigation, not to prove the truth of the underlying allegations. The court further held the records were admissible under the business-records exception because they were made “‘at or near the time’” of the complaints, kept as a “‘regular practice’” in MGM’s complaint investigations, and plaintiff did not show “‘a lack of trustworthiness.’” The court likewise concluded the credit union’s personnel records were admissible business records. Finally, it emphasized that at the summary-disposition stage evidence must be substantively admissible but “does not have to be in admissible form,” so affidavits and memoranda could be considered where the authors could testify at trial, including the credit union’s branch manager’s affidavit stating she never spoke with anyone at MGM. Affirmed.

Auto negligence; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Governmental immunity; Motor-vehicle exception; Breach; Proximate cause; Gross-negligence exception; Oakland County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD)

Upon de novo review, the court agreed with the trial court that defendant-Deputy Dean was entitled to summary disposition under the GTLA but disagreed that summary disposition was appropriate as to defendant-Oakland County and OCSD. The court found that the first and third elements to establish a prima facie case of negligence did “not appear to be in dispute on appeal—plaintiff suffered damages; and Deputy Dean, as a driver of a motor vehicle, owed plaintiff and others using the roadways a duty ‘to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and caution’ in his operation of the vehicle under the circumstances.” Defendants disputed “the second (breach) and fourth (causation) elements of plaintiff’s claim.” But the court concluded “that both involve questions of fact that must be decided by a jury.” It was “not persuaded by defendants’ argument that the evidence of Dean’s due care generates no question of fact for the jury.” The evidence did show that Dean “activated his emergency lights and siren and that he slowed down as he approached the intersection, but a question of fact remains whether he acted with reasonable care and caution to ‘ensur[e] that any cross-traffic has observed [him] and stopped.’” After initially slowing down, Dean “accelerated into the intersection and the front of his car struck the driver-side door of plaintiff’s vehicle.” At his deposition, Dean “testified that he never saw plaintiff’s car before the collision. A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that Dean did not look to his right to ensure that all eastbound traffic had stopped, and in failing to do so breached his duty of care.” The court held that there was” evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff was negligent by failing to yield as required by MCL 257.653(1)(a).” From all the “evidence a reasonable jury could also conclude that plaintiff was not negligent, or alternatively that he was negligent but not more than 50 percent at fault. Accordingly, whether and how much plaintiff was at fault for the accident is a question of fact, so the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Oakland County and OCSD.” There was no dispute that Dean “was acting within the scope of his authority and engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” So in order to hold Dean “liable, plaintiff had to plead and be able to prove that Dean’s conduct amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the injuries at issue.” The court held that “even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that Deputy Dean’s conduct did not rise to the level of gross negligence.” Plaintiff initially alleged in his complaint that Dean “entered the intersection without activating his emergency lights and siren, but the record clearly reflects—and plaintiff admitted at his deposition—that Dean did have his emergency lights and siren activated.” The evidence also showed that Dean “slowed down as he approached the intersection, and he proceeded into the intersection after a number of other vehicles had passed or stopped.” Thus, it could not “be said that Deputy Dean acted with ‘a willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend to safety and a singular disregard for substantial risks,’ and we do not believe any reasonable jury could find that his conduct was ‘so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results[.]’” Although the evidence established “a question of fact as to ordinary negligence, that is not enough to establish a question of fact as to gross negligence.” As a result, Dean was “entitled to governmental immunity under the GTLA,” so the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in his favor. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Auto negligence; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Governmental immunity; Motor-vehicle exception; Breach; Proximate cause; Gross-negligence exception; Oakland County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD)

Upon de novo review, the court agreed with the trial court that defendant-Deputy Dean was entitled to summary disposition under the GTLA but disagreed that summary disposition was appropriate as to defendant-Oakland County and OCSD. The court found that the first and third elements to establish a prima facie case of negligence did “not appear to be in dispute on appeal—plaintiff suffered damages; and Deputy Dean, as a driver of a motor vehicle, owed plaintiff and others using the roadways a duty ‘to exercise ordinary and reasonable care and caution’ in his operation of the vehicle under the circumstances.” Defendants disputed “the second (breach) and fourth (causation) elements of plaintiff’s claim.” But the court concluded “that both involve questions of fact that must be decided by a jury.” It was “not persuaded by defendants’ argument that the evidence of Dean’s due care generates no question of fact for the jury.” The evidence did show that Dean “activated his emergency lights and siren and that he slowed down as he approached the intersection, but a question of fact remains whether he acted with reasonable care and caution to ‘ensur[e] that any cross-traffic has observed [him] and stopped.’” After initially slowing down, Dean “accelerated into the intersection and the front of his car struck the driver-side door of plaintiff’s vehicle.” At his deposition, Dean “testified that he never saw plaintiff’s car before the collision. A reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that Dean did not look to his right to ensure that all eastbound traffic had stopped, and in failing to do so breached his duty of care.” The court held that there was” evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff was negligent by failing to yield as required by MCL 257.653(1)(a).” From all the “evidence a reasonable jury could also conclude that plaintiff was not negligent, or alternatively that he was negligent but not more than 50 percent at fault. Accordingly, whether and how much plaintiff was at fault for the accident is a question of fact, so the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to Oakland County and OCSD.” There was no dispute that Dean “was acting within the scope of his authority and engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” So in order to hold Dean “liable, plaintiff had to plead and be able to prove that Dean’s conduct amounted to gross negligence that was the proximate cause of the injuries at issue.” The court held that “even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we conclude that Deputy Dean’s conduct did not rise to the level of gross negligence.” Plaintiff initially alleged in his complaint that Dean “entered the intersection without activating his emergency lights and siren, but the record clearly reflects—and plaintiff admitted at his deposition—that Dean did have his emergency lights and siren activated.” The evidence also showed that Dean “slowed down as he approached the intersection, and he proceeded into the intersection after a number of other vehicles had passed or stopped.” Thus, it could not “be said that Deputy Dean acted with ‘a willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend to safety and a singular disregard for substantial risks,’ and we do not believe any reasonable jury could find that his conduct was ‘so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results[.]’” Although the evidence established “a question of fact as to ordinary negligence, that is not enough to establish a question of fact as to gross negligence.” As a result, Dean was “entitled to governmental immunity under the GTLA,” so the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition in his favor. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Children’s best interests; Guardianships; Relative placement

Concluding that the trial court did not err by holding that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed. Although she “had a bond with the children, she was no closer to having them returned to her care at the end of the proceeding than she was at the beginning of the proceeding. The children had been in care for two years and five months at the time of the best-interests hearing, and respondent’s parenting time had not progressed to unsupervised. In fact, she had not visited any of [them] for eight months and failed to attend the best-interests hearing.” Respondent contended “a guardianship, rather than termination, would have been in the children’s best interests.” The court noted that, initially, “AA’s grandmother had guardianship of AA, and ARC’s grandfather had a power of attorney for ARC, but both eventually lapsed. Although the grandparents preferred guardianships early in the proceeding and hoped that respondent would at some point be able to care for the children, at the time of the best-interests hearing, both grandparents preferred to adopt the children. The trial court recognized at the best-interests hearing that the grandparents no longer preferred guardianships instead of termination.” It considered “guardianships but concluded that they would not be in the children’s best interests[.]” Thus the record demonstrated “that the trial court considered guardianships and determined that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests so that the grandparents caring for the children could adopt them.” Respondent failed to establish that the trial court’s determination was erroneous.

Child’s best interests; Parent-agency agreement (PAA)

The court held that in light of respondent-father’s “history of violence, inconsistent engagement with his [PAA], and alcohol use,” the trial court did not err in finding that termination of his parental rights was in the child's (MRM) best interests. Respondent and MRM “had a bond, but it did not seem to be that of a parent and child. [His] parenting ability was questionable. He had taken MRM from supervised visits without DHHS’s permission, which does not show good decision-making skills or a regard for MRM’s safety.” Respondent also “struggled to meet MRM’s needs, such as providing appropriate food. Because of MRM’s special needs, respondent would likely need to spend more time and effort to meet MRM’s needs. Respondent did not appear willing to do this. Though he stated he thought he would be able to meet MRM’s needs, he did not demonstrate an ability to do so throughout the case and also claimed that he was unaware of MRM’s special needs.” The court noted that MRM “was doing well in his placement and was receiving services for his special needs. MRM’s placement indicated she was willing to adopt MRM, which would provide stability and a home with his sister. MRM’s placement is considered a relative because she adopted MRM’s sister.” MRM’s placement “weighed against the termination of respondent’s parental rights, which the trial court appropriately considered.” However, the court noted that “the trial court acknowledged this and still found that termination was in MRM’s best interests. In light of respondent’s history of violence, inconsistent engagement with his [PAA], and alcohol use,” the trial court did not “err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in MRM’s best interests.” Affirmed.