Petition seeking review of an administrative order; Motion to dismiss due to the lack of a final order; Presumption of required finality; Bell v New Jersey; Whether Congress rebutted the presumption when it enacted the Mine Safety & Health Act; 30 USC § 816(a)(1); § 816(b); Whether the Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission’s remand order satisfied the finality requirement; Finality’s requirements; Bennett v Spear; Administrative law judge (ALJ)

In an order, the court held that “Congress did not rebut the presumption of finality when it enacted the Mine Safety and Health Act and authorized review of the agency’s decisions.” Thus, because the administrative order for which petitioner-Cargill sought review was not a final one, it granted respondent-Secretary’s motion to dismiss the petition. An inspector from the Mine Safety and Health Administration cited “Cargill for a ‘significant and substantial’ violation” of the Act. Cargill contested it before an ALJ. The ALJ vacated the citation. The Secretary petitioned for review before respondent-Commission, which reversed and remanded to the ALJ with instructions to “determine the appropriate penalty amount after resolving any outstanding issues, such as the ‘significant and substantial’ nature of the violation.” Instead of waiting for the ALJ to do so, Cargill petitioned for review. The court noted that unless Congress directs otherwise, it “may review administrative decisions only after the agency process results in a final order.” And Congress did not rebut the presumption of finality here. The Act gives the court “authority to review an appeal of ‘[a]ny person adversely affected or aggrieved by’” a Commission order. “Mere permission to review ‘an order’ by the agency does not alter the background imperative of finality.” The court noted that “every circuit to consider this issue has concluded that the Act does not rebut Bell’s strong finality presumption.” While Cargill pointed “to an express finality requirement in § 816(b) when the Secretary files an appeal[,]” the court found that simply using “‘final’ elsewhere in the same statute does not suffice to alter the customary reading of ‘order’ in administrative-review provisions.” And it concluded that “Congress wanted to specify the Secretary as an additional holder of the review right, not to impose a materially different condition on that right.” The court also rejected Cargill’s argument “that, even if § 816(a)(1) requires finality, the Commission’s remand order” satisfied it. There are two conditions for finality, and it has “long recognized that orders remanding for further administrative proceedings do not satisfy” them.

Fourth Amendment; Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Investigatory stop; Terry stop; Terry v. Ohio; Anonymous tip; Reasonable suspicion; Patdown search; People v Custer; Armed & dangerous; Body-camera footage

The court held that police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and also lacked reasonable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous sufficient to justify a patdown search. Police responded to an anonymous report that “juvenile,” “mixed males” were waving guns outside on the street. Officers later encountered defendant and another adult Black male who said they had come from that street. During an initially consensual encounter, defendant expressly refused an officer’s request to search him. The officer nevertheless grabbed him, another officer restrained his other hand, and he then disclosed that he had a weapon. Police searched him and recovered a firearm. The trial court denied his suppression motion. On appeal, the court held the officers could approach the men consensually, but the information known before the seizure “did not provide the officers with an objectively reasonable particularized suspicion that defendant was ‘engaged in, or about to be engaged in, criminal activity.’” The anonymous tip described juveniles and did not match defendant and his companion in several respects, and the later discovery of the gun could not retroactively establish reasonable suspicion. The court separately held that the patdown was unjustified, emphasizing that “‘there is no firearm exception to the Terry analysis’” and that “‘a tip alleging an illegal gun by itself is not sufficient to justify a stop and frisk.’” The body-camera footage also contradicted testimony that defendant had his hands in his pockets or was retreating before officers attempted the search. Thus, “there is no evidence that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed or dangerous before they physically restrained him.” Reversed and remanded.

Motion to suppress defendant’s police statements; Waiver of the right to counsel; Invocation of the right; Comparing People v Burnett; Motion to quash bindover

The court held that defendant never clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and thus, his waiver was valid and his motion to suppress his police statements was properly denied. It also upheld the denial of his motion to quash the charges against him, which was based on his claim that the district court could not consider those statements in making its probable cause determination. He argued his waiver was invalid because he had earlier “clearly and unequivocally invoked” the right during his interview. The court disagreed. As to the statements made during his smoke break, he asserted “he first invoked his right to counsel when he asked, ‘Can we have a lawyer, too, present?’ and then he invoked it again when, moments later, he said, ‘I’d like to have a lawyer—if we—if we could do this quick.’” He likened these statements to Burnett. But the court found that comparison “inapt,” finding that his first statement reflected “an inquiry into how the questioning would be conducted when” they returned from the break, and that the second “was no more clear or unequivocal[.]” It noted that, “in virtually his next breath, [he] said, ‘I’ll tell you everything’ before ultimately concluding with ‘I don’t know.’” An officer (K) acknowledged that defendant stated he wanted a lawyer after they returned to the interview room. But “considering the ambiguity and forward-looking nature of defendant’s smoke-break statements, it” was unsurprising that K “would attempt to follow up on that prior exchange now that questioning was about to begin, to determine whether defendant did, in fact, have a present desire for counsel at that point. Such clarifying questions are permissible and do not themselves render defendant’s prior statements any more clear or unequivocal.” As to his alleged third invocation, while “he referred to wanting a lawyer, he did so in the past tense, speaking to why he had previously expressed interest in potentially having the assistance of counsel during questioning. And then, rather than state a present interest in such counsel, [he], unprompted, invited his interrogators to question him.” Affirmed.

Termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i); Continuing conditions; In re Jackish/Stamm-Jackish; Housing & financial instability; Children’s best interests; Foster placement benefits; Individualized findings; In re White

The court held that § (c)(i) supported termination of respondents-parents’ rights based on their continuing housing and financial instability, and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The children were removed after years of concerns involving homelessness, financial instability, and unmet needs. Respondents later obtained housing but remained thousands of dollars behind on rent, lacked stable income, and continued to spend limited resources on drugs and pets. On appeal, the court agreed that the trial court improperly considered domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental-health concerns under § (c)(i) because those matters “were not among the ‘conditions that led to the adjudication.’” But the error was harmless because “the conditions to which respondents did plead—housing and financial instability—still existed and were unlikely to be rectified in a reasonable time.” Considering their unstable housing, lack of savings, longstanding employment problems, and inability to meet basic financial obligations, the court held that “the trial court did not clearly err by finding statutory grounds for termination existed under” § (c)(i). As to best interests, the court held that “the evidence overwhelmingly supported” termination because the foster parents provided “love, safety, stability, and discipline,” met the children’s behavioral, educational, and medical needs, and intended to adopt all four children. The court also rejected respondents’ individualized-findings argument because the children “were not differently situated” and the trial court nevertheless addressed each child individually. Affirmed.