Whether dismissal of a claim based on failure to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) must be with prejudice; MCL 600.5507(3)(b); “Prisoner” status; MCL 600.5531(e); The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81665 in the 6/6/24 edition) and remanded, holding “that the PLRA does not require dismissal with prejudice when a plaintiff fails to comply with the statute’s procedural requirements for filing suit.” It also found a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of the plaintiffs was a “prisoner” under the PLRA when the complaint was filed. Plaintiffs (current and former Wayne County Jail inmates) alleged “that defendants created a sexually hostile prison environment in violation of” the ELCRA. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition against all but one plaintiff based on failure to comply with the PLRA’s requirements. It dismissed them with prejudice. The Court of Appeals ruled that because they “failed to comply with the PLRA disclosure requirements, their claims must be dismissed with prejudice.” The court disagreed, finding that nothing in the PLRA’s language “directs the trial court to dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to comply with the PLRA’s procedural requirements.” The court concluded the “Court of Appeals erred by holding that because MCL 600.5507(3)(b) uses the mandatory term ‘shall,’ instead of a discretionary term, the dismissal must be with prejudice. Reading the mandatory dismissal language in MCL 600.5507(3)(b) to require mandatory dismissal with prejudice inserts an additional requirement into the statute that the Legislature did not include.” The court noted that nothing in its order “affects a trial court’s discretionary authority to dismiss a claim with prejudice when the circumstances justify such a sanction[.]” Next, it noted that the lower courts failed to consider whether plaintiff-Anson “was ‘subject to’ incarceration or detention at the time that the underlying complaint was filed, thus subjecting her to the” PLRA’s requirements. She was booked into the jail the same day the complaint was filed. It “was filed at 1:25 p.m., while the booking sheet indicates Anson was booked at 8:43 p.m. However, nothing in the record indicates the time she was initially subject to incarceration or detention.” The court directed the trial court to resolve this issue on remand.

The Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA); Constitutional challenge to MCL 691.1755(13) (the WICA reimbursement provision); “Void for vagueness” doctrine; Statutory challenges; “An award of compensation;” Attorney fees; MCL 691.1755(2)(c)(iv); “Damages obtained”; “Any other person”; MCL 691.1755(8); “Is subject to”

The court held that the WICA’s reimbursement provision (MCL 691.1755(13)) “is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiff, but is in fact clear and unambiguous as to what it” required. The statute “requires reimbursement of (or setoff from) the entire WICA judgment when the plaintiff (and not any other individual) recovers compensation from any other person (including individual police officers) arising from the same wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Because plaintiff received compensation from another source, MCL 691.1755(13) required defendant to be reimbursed from the amount plaintiff recovered in the federal award.” Thus, the Court of Claims did not err in ordering reimbursement or setoff here. The sole issue was “whether WICA requires plaintiff to reimburse defendant the amount of the WICA judgment because of the $7.5 million federal award arising from the same wrongful conviction and imprisonment.” Under MCL 691.1755(13), he “must reimburse defendant for the state award because he received the federal award for the same wrongful conviction and imprisonment. This provision is not subject to any other reasonable understanding.” But plaintiff argued “the subsection is vague and ambiguous because several terms are undefined and susceptible to different meanings. MCL 691.1752 outlines the definitions used in WICA, but does not define certain terms and phrases, such as ‘award of compensation,’ ‘is subject to,” or “any other person.’ Although the Legislature provided no definitions for these phrases,” the court found that “their meaning is not ambiguous.” Under MCL 691.1755(2)(c)(iv), “the award of attorney fees is treated as a separate award that cannot reduce the compensation awarded to plaintiff under MCL 691.1755(2)(a) and (b). It is therefore clear that ‘an award of compensation’ refers only to the WICA judgment awarded to plaintiff, and not the separate WICA attorney-fee award.” The court found that the Court of Claims permissibly inferred that the amount plaintiff retained from the federal award was “‘more than double the amount he received from the state in this WICA action.’” Thus, it held that “regardless of whether all, some, or none of the attorney fees plaintiff paid are properly considered ‘damages obtained’ for purposes of MCL 691.1755(13), the statute is clear that [he] must reimburse the full amount of his state award from the damages he obtained through the federal award.” Further, the court concluded that “the phrase ‘any other person’ is not vague.” Finally, it found that reading “the provisions of MCL 691.1755 in harmony, . . . supports defendant’s argument that the phrase ‘is subject to’ is mandatory in nature.” Affirmed.

Negligence; Duty & breach; MCL 330.1401; Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC; Proximate cause & foreseeability; MCL 330.1141; Ray v Swager; Breach of contract; Workmanlike performance; Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens Constr, Inc

The court held that plaintiffs presented sufficient factual allegations and record evidence to proceed on both negligence and breach-of-contract theories, so summary disposition for defendant was improper. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant overfilled their 275-gallon above-ground oil tank while on a keep-full program, causing oil to spill through a displaced gauge and flood their home. On appeal, the court held that suppliers of dangerous commodities owe a duty “commensurate with the danger of the product,” and that foreseeability existed because failing to respond to the absence of a whistle, a known warning sign, could lead to overfilling and property damage. It found a factual dispute where experts testified that the driver was required to stop immediately if no whistle was heard, calling this “fuel delivery 101,” while the driver claimed the slow fill masked the whistle. The court also found sufficient evidence of causation because a jury could infer “a logical sequence of cause and effect” connecting defendant’s conduct to the spill. As to contract, the court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged an agreement to deliver oil in a reasonably skillful manner and that conflicting testimony about the delivery created a jury question. Finally, plaintiffs were not entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) because material factual disputes remained. The court reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion, affirmed denial of plaintiffs’ request for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2), and remanded.

Breach of contract counterclaims; Agency; DBD Kazoo LLC v Western MI LLC; Whether an individual had actual or apparent authority to bind plaintiffs; Compliance with the Garage Keeper’s Lien Act; MCL 570.305(2); “Public sale”; Whether the trial court had the authority to void title to the vehicles after an auction; Joy Oil Co v Fruehauf Trailer Co

The court held that while plaintiffs’ employee (nonparty-K) was their agent, he lacked either actual or “apparent authority to enter the repair contracts” with defendants on plaintiffs’ behalf. Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling “that defendants were not entitled to damages for work performed on the” vehicles in question or for parts purchased for repairs. The court also rejected their argument that the trial court erred in finding that they did not comply with the Garage Keeper’s Lien Act and in ordering them “to return the vehicles and equipment to plaintiffs.” The case involved plaintiffs’ “claims against defendants for taking a personal vehicle and heavy business equipment and refusing to return them.” Defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract, “alleging the parties entered into a contract” for defendants to make “necessary repairs to the personal truck and heavy business equipment and plaintiffs failed to pay for” the repairs. Defendants argued the trial court erred in denying their counterclaims related to a “Silverado truck, Freightliner, and trailer” and in denying them “damages for parts purchased because [K] was authorized to enter the repair agreements on behalf of plaintiffs.” The court disagreed, noting plaintiffs “were not aware of the repair contracts [K] entered for the Silverado truck, Freightliner, or trailer, and did not authorize [K] to enter them. Beyond that, the trial court made additional determinations that repairs to the Silverado truck did not occur and that defendants failed to establish damages for the purchase of parts from external suppliers.” As to the Garage Keeper’s Lien Act, the court held that defendants failed to comply with MCL 570.305’s requirements. And the court rejected their argument that the trial court lacked “authority to void the title to the vehicles after the auction.” It found the Supreme Court’s analysis in Joy Oil applied. The “repairs on the Silverado truck, Freightliner, and trailer were” made without plaintiff-Connie’s “knowledge or consent. Moreover, the trial court determined that the auction at which defendants sold these items to themselves was a farce.” They did not offer any “explanation why they should retain title to these vehicles and equipment when they did not execute a proper lien or properly transfer title in a public sale. The trial court acted within its equitable authority to return property plaintiffs rightfully owned . . . .” Affirmed.

Whether dismissal of a claim based on failure to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) must be with prejudice; MCL 600.5507(3)(b); “Prisoner” status; MCL 600.5531(e); The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81665 in the 6/6/24 edition) and remanded, holding “that the PLRA does not require dismissal with prejudice when a plaintiff fails to comply with the statute’s procedural requirements for filing suit.” It also found a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of the plaintiffs was a “prisoner” under the PLRA when the complaint was filed. Plaintiffs (current and former Wayne County Jail inmates) alleged “that defendants created a sexually hostile prison environment in violation of” the ELCRA. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition against all but one plaintiff based on failure to comply with the PLRA’s requirements. It dismissed them with prejudice. The Court of Appeals ruled that because they “failed to comply with the PLRA disclosure requirements, their claims must be dismissed with prejudice.” The court disagreed, finding that nothing in the PLRA’s language “directs the trial court to dismiss a case with prejudice for failure to comply with the PLRA’s procedural requirements.” The court concluded the “Court of Appeals erred by holding that because MCL 600.5507(3)(b) uses the mandatory term ‘shall,’ instead of a discretionary term, the dismissal must be with prejudice. Reading the mandatory dismissal language in MCL 600.5507(3)(b) to require mandatory dismissal with prejudice inserts an additional requirement into the statute that the Legislature did not include.” The court noted that nothing in its order “affects a trial court’s discretionary authority to dismiss a claim with prejudice when the circumstances justify such a sanction[.]” Next, it noted that the lower courts failed to consider whether plaintiff-Anson “was ‘subject to’ incarceration or detention at the time that the underlying complaint was filed, thus subjecting her to the” PLRA’s requirements. She was booked into the jail the same day the complaint was filed. It “was filed at 1:25 p.m., while the booking sheet indicates Anson was booked at 8:43 p.m. However, nothing in the record indicates the time she was initially subject to incarceration or detention.” The court directed the trial court to resolve this issue on remand.

The Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA); Constitutional challenge to MCL 691.1755(13) (the WICA reimbursement provision); “Void for vagueness” doctrine; Statutory challenges; “An award of compensation;” Attorney fees; MCL 691.1755(2)(c)(iv); “Damages obtained”; “Any other person”; MCL 691.1755(8); “Is subject to”

The court held that the WICA’s reimbursement provision (MCL 691.1755(13)) “is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiff, but is in fact clear and unambiguous as to what it” required. The statute “requires reimbursement of (or setoff from) the entire WICA judgment when the plaintiff (and not any other individual) recovers compensation from any other person (including individual police officers) arising from the same wrongful conviction and imprisonment. Because plaintiff received compensation from another source, MCL 691.1755(13) required defendant to be reimbursed from the amount plaintiff recovered in the federal award.” Thus, the Court of Claims did not err in ordering reimbursement or setoff here. The sole issue was “whether WICA requires plaintiff to reimburse defendant the amount of the WICA judgment because of the $7.5 million federal award arising from the same wrongful conviction and imprisonment.” Under MCL 691.1755(13), he “must reimburse defendant for the state award because he received the federal award for the same wrongful conviction and imprisonment. This provision is not subject to any other reasonable understanding.” But plaintiff argued “the subsection is vague and ambiguous because several terms are undefined and susceptible to different meanings. MCL 691.1752 outlines the definitions used in WICA, but does not define certain terms and phrases, such as ‘award of compensation,’ ‘is subject to,” or “any other person.’ Although the Legislature provided no definitions for these phrases,” the court found that “their meaning is not ambiguous.” Under MCL 691.1755(2)(c)(iv), “the award of attorney fees is treated as a separate award that cannot reduce the compensation awarded to plaintiff under MCL 691.1755(2)(a) and (b). It is therefore clear that ‘an award of compensation’ refers only to the WICA judgment awarded to plaintiff, and not the separate WICA attorney-fee award.” The court found that the Court of Claims permissibly inferred that the amount plaintiff retained from the federal award was “‘more than double the amount he received from the state in this WICA action.’” Thus, it held that “regardless of whether all, some, or none of the attorney fees plaintiff paid are properly considered ‘damages obtained’ for purposes of MCL 691.1755(13), the statute is clear that [he] must reimburse the full amount of his state award from the damages he obtained through the federal award.” Further, the court concluded that “the phrase ‘any other person’ is not vague.” Finally, it found that reading “the provisions of MCL 691.1755 in harmony, . . . supports defendant’s argument that the phrase ‘is subject to’ is mandatory in nature.” Affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request the jury instruction on the possessory-interest exception under MCL 750.227 (CCW); M Crim JI 11.11; People v Marrow

The court held that to qualify for the possessory-interest exception under the CCW statute, “the defendant must have a legal property interest in the land. Habitation alone is insufficient.” Because the evidence here did not support giving the jury instruction on the exception, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to request it. Thus, the court affirmed defendant’s CCW convictions. The case arose “from the discovery of multiple firearms in defendant’s vehicle at a house that [he] was squatting in.” He argued that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request M Crim JI 11.11, the instruction on the possessory-interest exception to the CCW statute. He claimed he was entitled to the instruction “because the house that he was squatting in was his ‘dwelling house.’ Under defendant’s interpretation of the law, the exception only requires physical possession, not lawful possession.” The court disagreed. Under Morrow, for the “exception to apply, the defendant must have a ‘possessory interest’ in the dwelling-house, place of business, or other land.” The court noted there are “exceptions to the exception” and that they all “share a common underlying principle: a person does not have a possessory interest in land if he has no right to exclude others from that land.” In this case, defendant was staying “in the house without the homeowner’s consent. Because the evidence does not support the theory that defendant carried the pistols on land that he possessed, the trial court would not have been required to” give M Crim JI 11.11 had defense counsel requested it. Further, defense “counsel focused on the argument that there was reasonable doubt whether defendant knowingly possessed the firearms.” In contrast, a “defense based on the possessory-interest exception would imply that defendant admitted that he knowingly possessed the firearms. . . . Instructing the jury on an exception that was inconsistent with the primary defense theory could confuse the jury and weaken both defenses.” Deciding to avoid this “by not requesting the instruction was a matter of sound trial strategy.” The court added that defendant failed to show prejudice.

Sufficiency of the evidence; Operating while intoxicated (OWI) causing death within seven years of a prior conviction (MCL 257.625(4)(b)); OWI causing serious impairment within seven years of a prior conviction (MCL 257.625(5)(b)); Proximate cause; People v Schaefer; A victim’s gross negligence; Sentencing; Proportionality; Consideration of mitigating factors; Rebuttable presumption that a within-guidelines sentence was proportionate; Blood alcohol level (BAL)

Concluding that a rational jury could have found victim-B’s “conduct, while negligent, was not grossly negligent or a superseding cause of the accident,” the court held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s OWI convictions under MCL 257.625(4)(b) and (5)(b). Further, he did not “overcome the rebuttable presumption that his within-guidelines sentence was proportionate, and” thus reasonable. He was convicted of OWI causing death within seven years of a prior conviction and OWI causing serious impairment within seven years of a prior conviction. He was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to 20 to 40 years for the former and 9 to 20 years for the latter, to be served consecutive to any sentence he may receive for parole violation. The case arose from an auto collision that took B’s life and severely injured his wife. Defendant argued that B’s conduct “was grossly negligent and therefore a superseding cause that relieved defendant of criminal liability.” The court disagreed. The exact speed at which B “was driving was never conclusively established at trial. To be sure, responding officers who reviewed the video from the day of the accident testified that [B] was ‘going fast’ and ‘moving.’ However, audio from that same video footage suggests that [B] was no longer accelerating the motorcycle as he approached the intersection. And while the view of the accident provided by the video is distant, oblique, and obscured, the accident’s sole eyewitness testified that: she had a ‘clear view’ of the accident, [B] slowed his vehicle as he approached the intersection, he looked to see if traffic was clear, and defendant entered the intersection without stopping at his stop sign, at which time his vehicle struck the motorcycle. The witness also said that she did not see defendant’s vehicle slow down or brake at all.” Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the court found that it could not be said that B “was traveling fast enough to support a finding of gross negligence. Further, while the residential setting of the intersection collision is relevant, that fact is insufficient to transform otherwise ordinary negligence into gross negligence.” And although B’s BAL “was above the legal limit, defendant’s [BAL] was more than double the legal limit.” Affirmed.

Restitution for extradition costs; Imposition of costs as a condition of probation; MCL 771.3(2)(c) & (5); Michigan’s Uniform Criminal Extradition Act; Actual & reasonable costs; MCL 780.23a(a); Judgment of sentence (JOS)

The court “declined to address defendant’s argument that the trial court erred” in ordering him to pay restitution for extradition costs incurred by the county sheriff’s department (BCSD) under the restitution statutes. It noted that even if it accepted his argument, the trial court had the statutory authority to impose the costs “as a condition of probation or under Michigan’s Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” Defendant pled guilty to CSC IV. The trial court sentenced him to “365 days of incarceration for each count and imposed costs, including restitution in the amount of $1,245 for expenses incurred by the” BCSD in securing his extradition from Tennessee. The “trial court imposed $1,245 in restitution ‘for the benefit and use of the victim [BCSD]’ as a condition of probation and included it in the [JOS]. Defendant did not object to the restitution in the trial court.” Rather, he signed the order of probation, expressly agreeing to pay the $1,245 in costs to the department as a probation condition. The department had to extradite him to Michigan in order to prosecute him. Thus, “the extradition costs are ‘expenses specifically incurred in prosecuting the defendant.’” Pursuant to MCL 771.3(2)(c) and (5), “the trial court had authority to order [him] to pay the extradition costs because the amount the BCSD spent on [his] extradition was an expense specifically incurred in the process of prosecuting him.” Further, under MCL 780.23a, a “trial court ‘may order an individual who is extradited to [Michigan] for committing a crime and who is convicted of a crime to pay the actual and reasonable costs of that extradition’” and those costs include but are “‘not limited to . . . [t]ransportation costs.’” Thus, the trial court was statutorily authorized under MCL 780.23a to order him “to pay $1,245 to the BCSD for the costs of his extradition to Michigan as the actual and reasonable costs of his extradition.” Affirmed.

Due process; Prearrest delay; People v Woolfolk; 180-day rule trigger; MCL 780.131; People v Lown

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying dismissal because the defendant failed to show actual prejudice from any prearrest delay and the statutory detainer timelines were never properly triggered. The record showed an armed robbery investigated through surveillance video, phone records, and social media identification, followed by a delayed arraignment while the defendant was in federal custody. On appeal, the court rejected the prearrest-delay claim because defendant did not prove “actual and substantial prejudice, not mere speculation,” and the supposedly missing witness in fact testified at trial without any shown impairment. The court also held the 180-day rule did not apply because the statute requires certified-mail notice to the prosecuting attorney, and “the 180-day rule was never triggered” where notice went elsewhere.

Time to respond to a FOIA request; Reasonableness; MCL 15.231(2); MCL 15.233(3); MCL 15.234(8)

The court affirmed the circuit court order granting defendant-city summary disposition in this FOIA dispute because to adopt plaintiffs’ position “would have the effect of the judiciary rewriting a properly enacted statute.” The appeal arose from a dispute over the amount of time the city estimated it would take to respond to a 3/20/23 FOIA request. The court found that plaintiffs did not cite, nor did it find, “any binding authority addressing the time within which a public body must fulfill a request for public records under Michigan’s FOIA.” Plaintiffs did not allege “that defendant acted arbitrarily and capriciously. As plaintiffs readily conceded in the trial court, there is no express provision in Michigan’s FOIA that gives public bodies a specific time limit within which to fulfill requests.” The court found “no error in the circuit court’s determination that the public policy articulated in MCL 15.231(2) stresses that eligible persons are entitled to the full and complete disclosure of nonexempt public records, but it does not indicate a time frame within which those records must be disclosed.” It also agreed “that MCL 15.233(3) did not apply to plaintiffs’ request.” The court has interpreted the statute “to apply to the time allowed and the setting provided for the personal inspection, examination, and copying of public records.” The court noted that plaintiffs “did not request to inspect, examine, or copy records in an environment provided by and controlled by defendant. [Their] request did not trigger a concern addressed in MCL 15.233(3). Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding” it did not apply. The court found that the “only provision addressing a time frame for fulfillment of a FOIA request that will cost more than $50 is MCL 15.234(8). When a public body’s fulfillment of a record request exceeds $50, MCL 15.234(8) authorizes the public body to request a good-faith deposit of half the estimated cost, and it requires the public body to provide a nonbinding, good-faith ‘best efforts estimate’ of the ‘time frame it will take the public body to comply with the law in providing the public records to the requestor.’” There was “no dispute that defendant followed this procedure.” Plaintiffs assumed “that FOIA implies legislative intent for requests to be fulfilled within a reasonable time, i.e., ‘promptly.’” They urged the court to ‘“establish a rebuttable presumption that a public body fulfill—or at least begin fulfilling—a FOIA request within 30 days of the requestor’s deposit in order to provide requestors a “reasonable opportunity” to access public records and participate in’ the democratic process.” But given that the FOIA does not “contain a deadline within which public bodies must fulfill FOIA requests, and considering that plaintiffs have identified no ambiguities in the statutory language that require clarification,” they essentially asked the court “to disregard MCL 15.234(8) and to impose deadlines that the Legislature has not seen fit to impose.”

Mental-health treatment; Mental Health Code; Timeliness of petition & clinical certificates; MCL 330.1438; Harmless error; In re Eddins; In re Jestila; “A person requiring treatment”; MCL 330.1401(1)(a) & (1)(c)

The court concluded “that the trial court complied with the Mental Health Code and correctly determined that respondent was a person in need of treatment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err by entering the” 2/4/25 mental-health order. Respondent first argued the trial court erred by entering the 2/4/25 “order because the hospital failed to comply with the statutory requirements for clinical certificates and hearings.” Although he “was not discharged as the trial court’s dismissal order required,” the court concluded “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the” 2/4/25 order. The court noted that 1/28/25, was “the date on which the petition and certificates were received,” and the trial court conducted a hearing within seven days, on 2/4/25. Thus, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the petition and entering the” 2/4/25 order. “To the extent the trial court’s decision did not strictly comply with the statutory requirements of MCL 330.1438, [the court concluded] such noncompliance does not warrant relief in this case.” Rather, the court noted that it “has applied harmless-error review to consider whether instances of statutory noncompliance with the Mental Health Code necessitated relief.” The court found that respondent did “not expand his due-process argument beyond his assertion that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under MCL 330.1452(1)(a).” It concluded that “any noncompliance with MCL 330.1438 does not necessitate relief.” The court found that from the record “the probate court safeguarded respondent’s rights from any noncompliance during his hospitalization and respondent is not entitled to relief.” Also, the “evidence clearly and convincingly supported a finding that respondent was ‘a person requiring treatment under’” both MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (1)(c). As to (1)(a), the court concluded that given “the escalation, the hallucinations, and ongoing medical refusal, clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that respondent will, intentionally or unintentionally, cause serious physical injury to himself or others in the near future and that [he] qualified as a person requiring treatment.” As to (1)(c), “the trial court had clear and convincing evidence demonstrating respondent’s ‘unwillingness to voluntarily participate in or adhere to treatment.’” Also, respondent “admitted to multiple previous hospitalizations and acknowledged signing a stipulation for mental-health treatment in 2022.” These admissions, together with a licensed psychiatrist’s “opinion that respondent’s delusions place him at high risk of harming himself or others, establish impaired judgment, ‘lack of understanding of the need for treatment,’ unwillingness to accept necessary care, and ‘a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm’ to himself or others.” Affirmed.

Person requiring treatment; MCL 330.1401(1); In re Portus; Reasonable effort for exam; MCL 330.1434; In re MAT; Protective order limits; MCL 700.5401; Swain v Morse

The court held that the probate court properly denied respondent’s request for a protective order but erred by approving an examination and transport petition because the record did not support statutory findings required by the Mental Health Code. The proceedings involved repeated family petitions over many years, culminating in a 2/25 petition alleging respondent was hearing voices, talking to herself, and fighting with family members. The court emphasized that civil-commitment procedures must be strictly followed and that the Code’s safeguards are “not mere technicalities.” It found the probate court’s risk-of-harm determination unsupported because the petition and hearing lacked developed facts tying any alleged conduct to a near-future risk of serious physical injury. And once the petitioner said the respondent was “not a harm, she’s not danger,” the trial court should have inquired further. The court also reversed because the petition’s one-word explanation (“Refused”) for the lack of a clinical certificate did not establish reasonable efforts to obtain an examination, and the probate court did not elicit the concrete steps required to satisfy the statute. Separately, the court affirmed denial of respondent’s protective order request because the relief sought was unavailable under MCL 700.5401, and the record contained no findings of misconduct that would justify invoking inherent sanction authority to restrict future filings.

Allowing counsel to withdraw; Good cause to withdraw; Failure to administer an oath to start a summary disposition motion hearing; Grant of summary disposition; Sanctions; MCR 2.625(A)(2); “Frivolous” action; MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(i)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff-Ottobre’s counsel’s motion to withdraw. Further, plaintiff did not identify any court rule or other authority requiring the trial court to administer an oath at the start of a summary disposition motion hearing. He also failed to show any basis for reversing summary disposition for defendants due to the lack of evidence connecting his “alleged injury to the claimed negligence.” Finally, the court concluded “the trial court did not clearly err by finding” his complaint frivolous and imposing sanctions under MCL 600.2591. Plaintiff sued defendants for trespass, nuisance, and negligence after he fell over a wire while walking. “The location in which Ottobre alleged to have fallen has been the subject of contentious litigation between the parties.” He acted in propria persona on appeal. As to his counsel’s withdrawal, the court noted that the “trial court was provided with evidence of a total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and Ottobre did not indicate that he objected to counsel’s removal. Further, there were no immediate proceedings for which Ottobre was left to represent himself without the opportunity to retain new counsel.” And he failed to otherwise identify “how he could have been prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to withdraw. From this record, the trial court’s decision was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” As to the award of sanctions to defendants, it was clear from the record that the parties had “a lengthy history of contentious litigation revolving around the boundary-line dispute, and Ottobre continues to believe that he owns the property. These facts, combined with the timing of [his] personal-injury complaint and the multiple complaints and police report [he] filed against defendants, support the trial court’s determination that [he] filed this complaint to harass defendants.” The court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that” the trial court made a mistake in imposing sanctions. Affirmed.

Negligence; Duty & breach; MCL 330.1401; Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC; Proximate cause & foreseeability; MCL 330.1141; Ray v Swager; Breach of contract; Workmanlike performance; Miller-Davis Co v Ahrens Constr, Inc

The court held that plaintiffs presented sufficient factual allegations and record evidence to proceed on both negligence and breach-of-contract theories, so summary disposition for defendant was improper. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant overfilled their 275-gallon above-ground oil tank while on a keep-full program, causing oil to spill through a displaced gauge and flood their home. On appeal, the court held that suppliers of dangerous commodities owe a duty “commensurate with the danger of the product,” and that foreseeability existed because failing to respond to the absence of a whistle, a known warning sign, could lead to overfilling and property damage. It found a factual dispute where experts testified that the driver was required to stop immediately if no whistle was heard, calling this “fuel delivery 101,” while the driver claimed the slow fill masked the whistle. The court also found sufficient evidence of causation because a jury could infer “a logical sequence of cause and effect” connecting defendant’s conduct to the spill. As to contract, the court held that plaintiffs adequately alleged an agreement to deliver oil in a reasonably skillful manner and that conflicting testimony about the delivery created a jury question. Finally, plaintiffs were not entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) because material factual disputes remained. The court reversed the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion, affirmed denial of plaintiffs’ request for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2), and remanded.

Personal protection order (PPO); Due process; Standard of proof for criminal contempt; Beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard; “Willful”

The court held that “respondent’s argument that the trial court violated his right to due process by failing to find the ‘willful’ element of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt” was without merit. “Viewed in the light most favorable to petitioner, the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that respondent violated the PPO and was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” On appeal, he asked the court “to vacate his criminal-contempt conviction, arguing that the trial court violated his due-process rights by applying an incorrect standard of proof to criminal contempt before finding him guilty.” Specifically, he contended “that the trial court failed to find the ‘willful’ element of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The evidence supported “the trial court’s finding that respondent willfully disregarded or willfully disobeyed a court order, i.e., the PPO, beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent admitted that after the original PPO was issued, he contacted petitioner by telephone, entered petitioner’s property, and appeared on her property in the doorbell camera recording. The PPO expressly prohibited respondent from contacting petitioner by telephone, entering petitioner’s property, or sending any communications to petitioner.” The court held that “respondent’s admissions, combined with the doorbell recording and texts admitted at trial, establish multiple PPO violations.” The court noted that he “testified that he did not know about the PPO at the time he committed this conduct.” Although he “denied any knowledge of the PPO, the trial court did not find this testimony credible.” The court does “not weigh the credibility of the witnesses that appear before the trial court in determining whether there is evidence to support the trial court’s findings.” Other evidence refuted his “argument that he lacked notice of the PPO. Petitioner testified that a process server served the PPO on respondent on [4/24/21]. That process server filed a proof of service of affidavit, and respondent did not object when the trial court took judicial notice of that filing. The same day the PPO was served on respondent, petitioner received text messages from respondent, in which respondent referred to the PPO. Petitioner also testified that respondent referred to 'that fake PPO' during a phone call, in which petitioner reminded respondent of the PPO and told him not to call her. In its findings of fact, the trial court emphasized the doorbell recording, noting that respondent’s act of putting his fingers over the doorbell camera was ‘very suspect’ and demonstrated that respondent entered petitioner’s property with knowledge that the PPO had been issued and that he was not supposed to be on petitioner’s property. From this evidence, the trial court could conclude that respondent had notice of the PPO and willfully disregarded or disobeyed the PPO when he contacted petitioner and entered her property.” As such, “sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court’s finding that respondent was guilty of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Mental-health treatment; Mental Health Code; Timeliness of petition & clinical certificates; MCL 330.1438; Harmless error; In re Eddins; In re Jestila; “A person requiring treatment”; MCL 330.1401(1)(a) & (1)(c)

The court concluded “that the trial court complied with the Mental Health Code and correctly determined that respondent was a person in need of treatment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err by entering the” 2/4/25 mental-health order. Respondent first argued the trial court erred by entering the 2/4/25 “order because the hospital failed to comply with the statutory requirements for clinical certificates and hearings.” Although he “was not discharged as the trial court’s dismissal order required,” the court concluded “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering the” 2/4/25 order. The court noted that 1/28/25, was “the date on which the petition and certificates were received,” and the trial court conducted a hearing within seven days, on 2/4/25. Thus, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the petition and entering the” 2/4/25 order. “To the extent the trial court’s decision did not strictly comply with the statutory requirements of MCL 330.1438, [the court concluded] such noncompliance does not warrant relief in this case.” Rather, the court noted that it “has applied harmless-error review to consider whether instances of statutory noncompliance with the Mental Health Code necessitated relief.” The court found that respondent did “not expand his due-process argument beyond his assertion that he was denied his right to a speedy trial under MCL 330.1452(1)(a).” It concluded that “any noncompliance with MCL 330.1438 does not necessitate relief.” The court found that from the record “the probate court safeguarded respondent’s rights from any noncompliance during his hospitalization and respondent is not entitled to relief.” Also, the “evidence clearly and convincingly supported a finding that respondent was ‘a person requiring treatment under’” both MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (1)(c). As to (1)(a), the court concluded that given “the escalation, the hallucinations, and ongoing medical refusal, clear and convincing evidence supported a finding that respondent will, intentionally or unintentionally, cause serious physical injury to himself or others in the near future and that [he] qualified as a person requiring treatment.” As to (1)(c), “the trial court had clear and convincing evidence demonstrating respondent’s ‘unwillingness to voluntarily participate in or adhere to treatment.’” Also, respondent “admitted to multiple previous hospitalizations and acknowledged signing a stipulation for mental-health treatment in 2022.” These admissions, together with a licensed psychiatrist’s “opinion that respondent’s delusions place him at high risk of harming himself or others, establish impaired judgment, ‘lack of understanding of the need for treatment,’ unwillingness to accept necessary care, and ‘a substantial risk of significant physical or mental harm’ to himself or others.” Affirmed.

Person requiring treatment; MCL 330.1401(1); In re Portus; Reasonable effort for exam; MCL 330.1434; In re MAT; Protective order limits; MCL 700.5401; Swain v Morse

The court held that the probate court properly denied respondent’s request for a protective order but erred by approving an examination and transport petition because the record did not support statutory findings required by the Mental Health Code. The proceedings involved repeated family petitions over many years, culminating in a 2/25 petition alleging respondent was hearing voices, talking to herself, and fighting with family members. The court emphasized that civil-commitment procedures must be strictly followed and that the Code’s safeguards are “not mere technicalities.” It found the probate court’s risk-of-harm determination unsupported because the petition and hearing lacked developed facts tying any alleged conduct to a near-future risk of serious physical injury. And once the petitioner said the respondent was “not a harm, she’s not danger,” the trial court should have inquired further. The court also reversed because the petition’s one-word explanation (“Refused”) for the lack of a clinical certificate did not establish reasonable efforts to obtain an examination, and the probate court did not elicit the concrete steps required to satisfy the statute. Separately, the court affirmed denial of respondent’s protective order request because the relief sought was unavailable under MCL 700.5401, and the record contained no findings of misconduct that would justify invoking inherent sanction authority to restrict future filings.

Termination at initial disposition; MCL 712A.19a; In re Hicks; Aggravated circumstances; Permanency planning hearing compliance; In re Rood; Best interest factors; Relative placement consideration; MCL 712A.19b; In re Gonzales/Martinez; Relative-placement investigation duty; MCL 722.954a

The court held that the trial court did not err by proceeding to terminate parental rights at the initial disposition stage or by finding termination was in the children’s best interests. The case began after one child was hospitalized with severe burns over roughly 16% to 17% of her body, and a second child was removed shortly after birth given the prior injuries and respondent-mother’s domestic-violence history. The trial court ordered reunification services while criminal charges were pending, and respondent participated within those constraints, later pleading guilty to first-degree child abuse and receiving a prison sentence. On appeal, the court rejected a procedural challenge based on aggravated circumstances and permanency planning because reasonable efforts were not withheld, hearings were held within the statutory framework, and the record made aggravated circumstances apparent in light of the felony conviction tied to serious injury. The court also declined a timing argument about initial-disposition termination where the rule’s substantive prerequisites were satisfied. On best interests, the court emphasized the child-centered focus, the need for permanency and safety, the limited bond with the younger child, and the conclusion that maintaining a bond with the injured child was not realistically achievable given the admitted abuse. The court further held the trial court considered relative placement and sibling-relationship implications, and the agency’s early relative outreach met statutory expectations on this record. Affirmed.

Relative placement; Child’s best interests; Power of attorney (POA)

Concluding that (1) “because respondent did not seek to place the child with any acceptable relatives, the trial court did not err by declining to order the child placed with any relatives” and (2) the trial court did not clearly err by holding that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed. Respondent-father primarily argued, “as he did throughout the proceedings, that this case should not have been commenced against him because he delegated his parental authority to his mother, who he now admits was an impermissible placement because she lived with a registered sex offender.” He appeared to challenge the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction. “The trial court assumed jurisdiction as to respondent under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) (failure to provide proper or necessary support or care) and MCL 712A.2(b)(2) (home or environment is unfit because of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity by parent).” Respondent challenged “those findings on the theory that he did provide proper care and custody to the child by delegating his parental authority to the paternal grandmother.” The court has already rejected that argument. In his previous appeal, the court “explained that the POA was irrelevant because the touchstone for unfitness was the situation at the time the initial petition was filed, at which time no POA existed.” The court “did not address the trial court’s assumption of jurisdiction because only the child’s removal was at issue previously. However, the same principle applies here because, for purposes of assuming jurisdiction, the trial court must likewise ‘examine the child’s situation at the time the petition was filed.’” In any event, even if the court “were to accept respondent’s argument that the situation should have been considered as of the date of the most-recent petition before the adjudication trial, that would still not help [him]. By the time the most-recent petition had been filed, [he] had executed the POA, but petitioner had already determined that the paternal grandmother and respondent’s cousin were unacceptable placements.” The record showed “that, even assuming that the trial court erred by failing to consider the situation as it was when the most-recent petition was filed, no such fit and appropriate relative existed.”

Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; In re Mason; The DHHS’s statutory duty to create & update a case service plan (CSP); Parent Agency Treatment Plans (PATPs)

Holding that the trial court clearly erred in determining that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts in this case, the court reversed the order terminating respondent-father’s parental rights and remanded. There was “no record evidence that the DHHS even attempted to facilitate or coordinate services with the federal prison” where he was incarcerated. While “no Michigan case requires the DHHS to provide services directly to respondent, failure to provide direct services is evidence that the DHHS did not make reasonable efforts.” The record did not indicate that it provided “services directly to respondent. In fact, a DHHS foster-care specialist affirmed that she did not send [him] workbooks, supplements, or packets regarding parenting skills because of her belief that [he] was not eligible for additional services until he was a full participant in the drug-related program offered by the prison.” In addition, the DHHS failed to “outline what services would be ‘provided’ to respondent,” or what steps it “would take to facilitate reunification in either the” PATPs or CSPs. The court further found that, “in practice, the DHHS did not ‘provide services necessary for [respondent] to be reunified with his child[].’” After he was moved to his current facility, the DHHS contacted his “prison case manager by phone, and the prison case manager spoke freely about respondent. However, even in those phone contacts, the DHHS showed no effort to coordinate services. Instead, [it] called only to verify what respondent had been able to accomplish.” Here, as in Mason, the record was “‘largely undeveloped’ because of the DHHS’s failure to provide respondent with the services necessary to achieve reunification.” Thus, it was unclear how he “was expected to achieve the steps necessary for reunification while waitlisted for federal prison services and when provided no additional services by the DHHS.” Given that the DHHS did not provide him “with the services necessary for reunification, it did not fulfill its statutory duty.” As a result, the trial court clearly erred in terminating his “parental rights for failure to comply with the service plan when the DHHS failed to provide the necessary services for reunification.”

Unfit home or environment; MCL 712A.2(b)(2); In re MU; Failure to provide proper care; MCL 712A.2(b)(1); In re LaFrance

The court held that the trial court did not err by assuming jurisdiction over the newborn in question under MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2) because a preponderance of the evidence showed an unfit environment and a failure to provide proper care at the time the petition was filed. The petition followed the child’s birth with significant drug exposure, including positive toxicology of the umbilical cord and treatment for withdrawal symptoms. Evidence showed respondent-father was present at the hospital amid concerns of active drug use, including testimony about a needle, a digital scale, and a pill described as fentanyl found in the room. Although he denied current drug use and claimed surprise at the child’s condition, the trial court credited contrary testimony from hospital staff and caseworkers, noting that he had an extensive drug history, tested positive for cocaine and methadone a few months after the birth, and refused further testing. The court emphasized credibility findings, explaining that inconsistencies and minimization of substance-abuse risks undermined respondent’s testimony. While acknowledging that prenatal drug exposure alone does not establish neglect, the court agreed that ongoing substance use, denial of its impact, and the presence of paraphernalia supported a finding that the home environment was unfit. The court also affirmed jurisdiction under MCL 712A.2(b)(1), concluding that unstable housing at the time of filing, combined with substance-abuse concerns and the child’s medical fragility, showed an inability to provide proper or necessary care. Affirmed.