The eJournal provides summaries of the latest opinions from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court. The summaries also include a PDF of the opinion and identifies the judges, key issues, and relevant practice area(s). Subscribe here.

RECENT SUMMARIES

    • Criminal Law (5)

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      e-Journal #: 86749
      Case: People v. Hatfield
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Ineffective assistance of counsel; Evidence-tampering instruction; MCL 750.483a(5)(a); M Crim JI 37.11; Knowledge of future official proceeding; People v Walker; Motion to suppress confession; Intoxication; Miranda waiver; People v Soriano; OV 3; MCL 777.33(1)(c); Life-threatening injury

      Summary:

      The court held that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the then-current standard evidence-tampering instruction, defendant validly waived his Miranda rights despite alcohol consumption, and the trial court properly assessed 25 points for OV 3. He was convicted of AWIGBH, felonious assault, and evidence tampering after cutting the victim’s throat during an altercation and cleaning blood from his home before police arrived. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence-tampering instruction improperly omitted the requirement that he knew the evidence would be offered in a present or future official proceeding. The court noted that M Crim JI 37.11 was amended in 9/26 to expressly add that element, but defendant’s trial occurred in 2024. At that time, the standard instruction had not been invalidated, and Walker had merely “‘accept[ed]’ without ‘decid[ing]’” that the statute likely included such a knowledge requirement. Critically, “Walker did not go so far as to explain that the standard jury instruction was flawed or otherwise incorrect.” Thus, counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the instruction then in effect. The court also rejected defendant’s challenge to admission of his police statements. Although he had consumed alcohol, the officers testified that he was oriented, responsive, did not slur his speech, and repeatedly indicated that he understood his rights. The trial court found after reviewing the recordings and videos that defendant “certainly had the capacity to, for the minimal purposes here, understand and knowingly waive his rights.” There also was no evidence of police coercion, making the waiver voluntary. Finally, the victim suffered a 10-centimeter neck laceration that clipped an artery, caused substantial blood loss, and required emergency surgery in which the artery was tied off. Because the blood loss and cut artery rendered the injury potentially fatal, the evidence supported the finding that it was life-threatening for purposes of OV 3. Affirmed.

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      e-Journal #: 86752
      Case: People v. Killian
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Resentencing after remand; Scope of remand; De novo resentencing; Presentence posture; Challenges to OV scoring; People v Lampe; Request for reassignment to a different judge; People v Hill

      Summary:

      The court held that the trial court erred by treating the prior remand for resentencing as limited to providing defendant an uninterrupted opportunity for allocution, but resentencing before a different judge was not required. Defendant was convicted of delivery or manufacture of meth, evidence tampering, maintaining a drug house, and resisting or obstructing police. In the first appeal, the court vacated his sentences because the trial court repeatedly interrupted his allocution and remanded “for resentencing with a full opportunity for allocution.” On remand, defendant challenged OVs 13 and 19, but the trial court ruled those challenges were beyond the scope of the remand and limited the proceeding to allocution before reimposing the same sentences. On appeal, the court concluded that this interpretation was erroneous. As in Lampe, “[b]y ordering ‘resentencing’ without any specific instructions or any prohibitions on scoring OVs, this Court returned the case to the trial court in a presentence posture, allowing the trial court to consider every aspect of defendant’s sentences de novo.” Although the prior opinion specifically identified the allocution error, it vacated the entire sentence and did not restrict the issues that could be considered at resentencing. Thus, “when a case is remanded for resentencing without specific prohibitions, the parties are placed in a presentence posture, permitting a de novo view of the defendant’s sentencing.” Thus, he may raise the OV challenges and other sentencing issues identified in his resentencing memorandum. But the court declined to order reassignment. Although this was the second sentencing error requiring remand, the trial judge complied with the earlier directive to permit meaningful allocution, her interpretation of the remand was incorrect but not unreasonable, and nothing suggested frustration, animosity, or bias. Reassignment also would create unnecessary duplication because the existing judge was familiar with the case. The court vacated defendant’s sentences and remanded for de novo resentencing before the same judge.

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      e-Journal #: 86750
      Case: People v. Laming
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Ineffective assistance of counsel; Expert testimony; MRE 702; Aiding & abetting instruction; Accomplice instructions; M Crim JI 5.4 & 5.6; Prosecutorial error; Sufficiency of the evidence; Felony murder; “Perpetration” of CSC III; People v Gillis; Motion for mistrial; Polygraph reference; Right to present a defense; Closing argument; Cumulative error

      Summary:

      The court held that defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial error, sufficient evidence supported felony murder, and the challenged trial rulings did not deny him a fair trial. He was convicted of first-degree murder under alternate premeditation and felony murder theories in a 1980 cold case in which the victim was abducted, sexually assaulted, and shot. DNA testing decades later linked defendant and accomplice H to the victim, and H testified about their joint involvement. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim arising from a medical examiner’s characterization of the crime as a “sexually-motivated homicide.” Even assuming the testimony was improper, it was not prejudicial because the circumstances already made the sexual nature of the crime apparent and “could not have informed the jury of anything novel or surprising.” Counsel also was not ineffective for failing to object to an aiding-and-abetting instruction because the jury was not required to accept either H’s claim that defendant fired the shots or defendant’s denial of all involvement. Given evidence that both men participated in the abduction and sexual assaults and were present for the murder, “the prosecution was entitled to seek a conviction based on a principal or an aiding-and-abetting theory.” Although counsel should have requested the standard accomplice instructions, there was no reasonable probability of a different result because counsel extensively exposed H’s favorable plea agreement and credibility problems, while DNA and other evidence independently implicated defendant. The prosecutor likewise did not plainly err in eliciting or referring to the medical examiner’s testimony. As to felony murder, the court found “an ‘unbroken chain of events’ between the sexual assault(s), by both defendant and [H], and the eventual murder,” satisfying the perpetration element. The singular, inadvertent reference by the victim’s former boyfriend to passing a polygraph did not require a mistrial where the answer was immediately struck and the jury was twice instructed to disregard it. The court also upheld the restriction on defense closing argument concerning the possible life sentence H had avoided because that fact had not been introduced into evidence. Finally, the cumulative effect of any possible errors did not undermine confidence in the verdict. Affirmed.

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      e-Journal #: 86746
      Case: People v. Odem
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Borrello, Bazzi, and Lievense
      Issues:

      Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to investigate & call witnesses; Prejudice; Great weight of the evidence; Alleged recantation; Other acts evidence (prior domestic violence); MCL 768.27b(1); MRE 403; Sentencing; OV 4; MCL 777.34(1)(a); Psychological injury attributable to the sentencing offense; People v Muhammad (Unpub)

      Summary:

      The court held that although trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to investigate potential defense witnesses, defendant failed to establish prejudice. It also held that his convictions were not against the great weight of the evidence, and the prior domestic-violence evidence was admissible, but OV 4 was improperly scored. He was convicted of assault by strangulation and domestic violence after the complainant testified that he strangled her until she could not breathe and later pushed her into a wall, rendering her unconscious. On appeal, the court concluded that counsel’s failure to interview several proposed witnesses “constituted ineffective assistance of counsel,” but the omitted testimony did not create a reasonable probability of a different result. Testimony that the complainant previously acted as the aggressor did not concern the charged incident, while proposed testimony about her statements that defendant had not strangled her was cumulative of evidence already presented through defendant’s half-brother. Medical evidence also documented injuries consistent with strangulation. For similar reasons, the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence despite the complainant’s purported recantation. The jury heard the recantation evidence along with testimony and photographs showing neck redness and inflammation and “decided that the text message did not negate other testimony regarding the issue of whether the complainant had been strangled.” The court further held that evidence of four prior domestic-violence incidents, three involving strangulation, was properly admitted under MCL 768.27b(1) and MRE 403. The incidents were similar, frequent, and close in time to the charged offense, making an objection futile. But the court agreed that 10 points for OV 4 were improper. The complainant described psychological harm from her relationship with defendant generally, rather than from the sentencing offense specifically. Thus, this case was similar to “Muhammad; ‘there is no specific nexus between the sentencing offense in this case and [the victim’s] general, vague statement regarding PTSD that resulted from years of being assaulted by defendant.’” Because reducing OV 4 to zero altered the guidelines range, the court affirmed the convictions, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.

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      e-Journal #: 86751
      Case: People v. Stokes
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Murray, Boonstra, and Riordan
      Issues:

      Ineffective assistance of counsel; Reference to consent in opening statement without presenting any evidence of consent at trial; Change in trial strategy; Advice in plea negotiations; Sufficiency of the evidence; Identity; CSC I; Unlawful imprisonment; Larceny in a building

      Summary:

      The court held that defense counsel was not ineffective for briefly referring to consent in the opening statement and later pursuing a different defense theory, and that defendant could not show prejudice as to his plea negotiation advice. It also held that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s convictions. He was convicted of two counts of CSC I, unlawful imprisonment, and larceny in a building after the victim testified that defendant forced her into a hotel room at knifepoint, repeatedly sexually assaulted her, stole property, forced her to clean the room, and tied her arms and legs before leaving. On appeal, defendant argued that counsel undermined the defense by initially stating that the case involved consent but presenting no consent evidence. The court disagreed. Viewed as a whole, counsel’s opening focused primarily on the victim’s credibility and whether the physical evidence corroborated her account. Cross-examination and closing argument pursued that same theory. Further, even if counsel initially intended to pursue consent, changing strategies after hearing the victim’s testimony was reasonable. A consent theory would have conceded defendant’s presence and sexual contact in the room, while the lack of DNA and fingerprint evidence permitted counsel to challenge whether defendant was there at all. “By shifting the defense from consent, defense counsel used the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony and the lack of forensic evidence to argue that the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof.” As to sufficiency, the court emphasized that “‘a complainant’s testimony regarding a defendant’s commission of sexual acts is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for’” CSC I. Her testimony also established the restraint necessary for unlawful imprisonment and the taking of property necessary for larceny in a building. Moreover, the record contained corroboration. Police recovered a serrated knife consistent with her description, observed marks on her arms and ankles consistent with being bound, obtained surveillance footage of a person matching defendant’s description, and the victim identified defendant in a photographic array. Thus, sufficient evidence established his identity as the perpetrator and supported each conviction. Affirmed.

    • Healthcare Law (1)

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      This summary also appears under Probate

      e-Journal #: 86747
      Case: In re MDM
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Borrello, Bazzi, and Lievense
      Issues:

      Petition for involuntary mental health treatment; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Londowski; Due process; Failure to certify that counsel had seen & consulted with respondent (MCL 330.1454(9)); Distinguishing In re MAT; Requirement to advocate effectively for respondent’s interests; MCR 5.732(B); “Person requiring treatment” (MCL 330.1401(1)(a) & (c)); In re Tchakarova; Principle that only one of the statutory criteria must be satisfied; Hearsay; MRE 1101(b)(10) (authorizing probate courts to consider hearsay information underlying a qualified mental health expert’s opinion)

      Summary:

      The court held that the probate court did not clearly err in determining “that respondent qualified as a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)[,]” but it remanded for an evidentiary hearing to develop the record as to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The appeal arose from a petition for mental health treatment for respondent. The court began with his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It found the record showed that his “counsel may have abdicated the fundamental responsibilities of representation guaranteed by the Michigan and United States Constitutions. Counsel’s failure to raise any arguments, present any witnesses, or meaningfully cross-examine those called by the petitioner—beyond the narrow issue of respondent’s alleged noncompliance with the treatment order—may constitute a wholesale forfeiture of advocacy. This potential abdication would not merely be a lapse in trial tactics, but a deprivation that undermines the adversarial process itself. Moreover, counsel’s potential failure to certify that he had seen and consulted with respondent, as explicitly required by MCL 330.1454(9), is not a trivial procedural misstep.” The court concluded that the absence of the certification supported “respondent’s assertion that he was unable to communicate with his attorney, thereby compounding the denial of effective representation.” It found that the “alleged oversights reflect a significant potential failure to advocate effectively for the respondent’s interests, as mandated by MCR 5.732(B).” A full factual record was necessary to determine “whether this was a case of constitutionally ineffective assistance.” But the court rejected respondent’s challenge to the probate court’s determination that he was a person requiring treatment. It held that the “probate court did not err in considering the information underlying” a psychiatrist’s (Dr. H) expert testimony, even if it included hearsay. And it concluded that Dr. H’s uncontradicted testimony satisfied each of MCL 330.1401(1)(c)’s required elements. Affirmed in part and remanded in part.

    • Probate (1)

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      This summary also appears under Healthcare Law

      e-Journal #: 86747
      Case: In re MDM
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Borrello, Bazzi, and Lievense
      Issues:

      Petition for involuntary mental health treatment; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Londowski; Due process; Failure to certify that counsel had seen & consulted with respondent (MCL 330.1454(9)); Distinguishing In re MAT; Requirement to advocate effectively for respondent’s interests; MCR 5.732(B); “Person requiring treatment” (MCL 330.1401(1)(a) & (c)); In re Tchakarova; Principle that only one of the statutory criteria must be satisfied; Hearsay; MRE 1101(b)(10) (authorizing probate courts to consider hearsay information underlying a qualified mental health expert’s opinion)

      Summary:

      The court held that the probate court did not clearly err in determining “that respondent qualified as a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)[,]” but it remanded for an evidentiary hearing to develop the record as to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The appeal arose from a petition for mental health treatment for respondent. The court began with his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It found the record showed that his “counsel may have abdicated the fundamental responsibilities of representation guaranteed by the Michigan and United States Constitutions. Counsel’s failure to raise any arguments, present any witnesses, or meaningfully cross-examine those called by the petitioner—beyond the narrow issue of respondent’s alleged noncompliance with the treatment order—may constitute a wholesale forfeiture of advocacy. This potential abdication would not merely be a lapse in trial tactics, but a deprivation that undermines the adversarial process itself. Moreover, counsel’s potential failure to certify that he had seen and consulted with respondent, as explicitly required by MCL 330.1454(9), is not a trivial procedural misstep.” The court concluded that the absence of the certification supported “respondent’s assertion that he was unable to communicate with his attorney, thereby compounding the denial of effective representation.” It found that the “alleged oversights reflect a significant potential failure to advocate effectively for the respondent’s interests, as mandated by MCR 5.732(B).” A full factual record was necessary to determine “whether this was a case of constitutionally ineffective assistance.” But the court rejected respondent’s challenge to the probate court’s determination that he was a person requiring treatment. It held that the “probate court did not err in considering the information underlying” a psychiatrist’s (Dr. H) expert testimony, even if it included hearsay. And it concluded that Dr. H’s uncontradicted testimony satisfied each of MCL 330.1401(1)(c)’s required elements. Affirmed in part and remanded in part.

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