Legal malpractice; Simko v Blake; Causation; Boyle v Odette; Mitchell v Dougherty; Excessive fees claim; Summary disposition before discovery; Motion for reconsideration

Holding that the trial court correctly concluded plaintiff (Sarah) did not establish that defendants-attorneys and law firms’ alleged malpractice caused her alleged injuries, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. The case arose from their representation of plaintiff in a divorce from her then-husband (S). Plaintiff alleged “that defendants failed to conduct any meaningful discovery, failed to take steps to enforce the parties’ status quo in the divorce, and charged excessive legal fees.” She further alleged that due to their “malpractice, she received a smaller property distribution and she had to expend over $50,000.” The record showed that she retained successor counsel (nonparty-J) on 4/22/22. J filed her appearance on 5/5/22. “Defendants remained involved in the matter until the stipulated orders allowing them to withdraw were entered on [5/27/22]. Until those orders were entered, [they] continued to owe Sarah a duty ‘to act as an attorney of ordinary learning, judgment, or skill would under the same or similar circumstances.’” The court concluded that the record showed they “continued to work on discovery issues and ensure that the parties’ financial status quo was maintained during the transition period. After defendants withdrew, Sarah and [S] agreed to binding arbitration in lieu of a trial. The arbitrator held hearings” in 8/22 and 11/22. “Under MCL 600.5074(2) and (3), the arbitrator had the power to issue subpoenas and order discovery, including sworn statements, on contested issues. [J] had at least four months to identify and remedy any perceived discovery deficiencies and pursue any necessary action to enforce the financial status quo.” The court also noted there was no evidence that J “was hindered during the arbitration proceedings by any alleged misconduct of defendants. Sarah and [S] both testified at the hearing and presented expert testimony. [J] had an opportunity to cross-examine [S] and his expert, and to present any other witnesses that may have been necessary.” In addition to agreeing with the trial court’s causation ruling, the court also agreed “that defendants were entitled to summary disposition on Sarah’s claims for excessive fees because Sarah failed to address any of defendants’ arguments on these claims in her response to their motions for summary disposition.” Summary disposition was not premature, and her motion for reconsideration was also properly denied.

Wrongful termination; Whether plaintiff’s claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act were time-barred under a limitations period in her job application; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 79181 in the 3/31/23 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Rayford.

Breach of contract; Standing; Real party in interest; MCR 2.201(B); In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust; Sufficiency of evidence; Bench trial findings & conclusions; Chelsea Inv Group, LLC v City of Chelsea; Abandonment of appellate issue; In re Warshefski

The court held that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that plaintiff-Huntington Bank was the real party in interest entitled to enforce the promissory note, and that defendant-attorney was liable to it for breach of contract. Defendant defaulted on a commercial promissory note executed in favor of Chemical Bank, which later merged into TCF Bank and then into Huntington. After a bench trial the trial court entered judgment for Huntington. On appeal, defendant argued that Huntington failed to prove it was a party to the contract because it did not produce the merger agreements. The court rejected that claim, explaining that in a merger “one entity merely steps into the shoes of the other and there is no need to transfer assets,” and that ownership of the note passed “by operation of law.” Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the court emphasized that the asset recovery officer testified she worked for Chemical Bank at origination, remained through both mergers, and was assigned responsibility for defendant’s note. The trial court reasonably found that the absence of the actual merger documents was “of no consequence due to the credibility of” that witness’s testimony. Because the evidence supported the finding that Huntington acquired and continued to service the loan, the court was not left with “a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” The court also declined to review defendant’s challenge to the rejection of his breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against his former partner, concluding the issue was abandoned where he offered only a single conclusory sentence with no supporting law or analysis, noting that issues given only “cursory treatment” are deemed abandoned. Affirmed.

Breach of contract; Whether a joint venture was created; Agreement termination; Accounting; Common-law fraud; Defamation; Lawrence v Burdi; Expressions of opinion; Tortious interference with a business relationship; Breach of a fiduciary duty; Conversion; Civil conspiracy & concert of action; Expert Vehicle Solutions, LLC (EVS)

The court held that whether the parties formed a joint venture was “immaterial to plaintiffs’ post-termination breach-of-contract claims” and that the trial court properly limited their recovery to damages for contract breach arising from unpaid profit distributions through 6/20/22. It further held that their “claims for an accounting, fraud, defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, breach of fiduciary duty, common-law conversion, statutory conversion, civil conspiracy, and concert of action” were properly dismissed. The case arose from the parties’ agreement to operate a business (EVS) providing vehicles and related logistics for automotive clients. The crux of plaintiffs’ argument on appeal related to their breach of contract claim was their contention that a 2021 Agreement created a joint venture. The court determined that a factfinder could conclude that it did, but that this did not change the outcome of the case. Text messages exchanged in 6/22 between plaintiff-Kaiser and defendant-Langan showed “a clear breakdown in their business relationship. After that exchange, Kaiser informed Volkswagen that she and her company had ‘separated from’ EVS but were still ‘ready to manage the projects we have priced and discussed with you’ under the new business name of Integrity Vehicle Solutions. These communications objectively reflect termination of the 2021 Agreement on or about” 6/20/22. Thus, the trial court “properly concluded that plaintiffs’ contractual rights to a 40% share of EVS’s net profits ended with the termination of the agreement. Plaintiffs were properly awarded damages only for [5/1 to 6/20/22], the period during which defendants admitted that no distributions were made. Plaintiffs failed to establish any breach before” or after those dates. “The fact that defendants continued operating EVS after termination did not entitle plaintiffs to a share of subsequent profits, as those projects were performed after the agreement was terminated.” Further, plaintiffs did not establish the elements of a common-law fraud claim or of tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. They also “failed to establish that any of the alleged statements met the requirements for defamation.” And their fiduciary duty claim failed because they did not identify any “independent duty arising outside the contract[.]” Affirmed.

Reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for a driver operating while intoxicated (OWI); MCL 257.625(1); People v Rizzo; Totality of the circumstances

The court held that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion because the officer’s observations of defendant’s intoxication less than an hour earlier, combined with seeing a vehicle registered to him being driven, “furnished the officer with reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle[.]” Defendant was charged with OWI, but the trial court suppressed evidence and dismissed after concluding the stop lacked “probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” The circuit court denied leave, agreeing that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. On appeal, the court applied the governing standard that “‘[a] traffic stop is justified if the officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is subject to seizure for a violation of law.’” It emphasized the inquiry is “fact specific” and based on “‘commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.’” The court next explained that reasonable suspicion “‘entails something more than an inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch,’” but remains a low threshold because “‘the reasonable suspicion inquiry falls considerably short of 51% accuracy,’” and “‘to be reasonable is not to be perfect . . . .’” The court also rejected the premise that erratic driving is required, relying on the rule that a “‘strong odor of intoxicants on a motorist’s breath, standing alone, can provide a police officer with a reasonable, articulable, particularized suspicion’” of intoxicated driving, and that police need not “‘visibly observe indications’” such as swerving or crossing lane markers to develop reasonable suspicion. The court then held that the earlier observations (bloodshot, watery eyes, strong odor, and admission of drinking) within 45 to 60 minutes supported reasonable suspicion and that the trial court erred by misstating the timing and by treating the stop as based only on an abrupt turn rather than the “totality of the circumstances.” Reversed and remanded.

Due process; Motion for a new trial based on failure to correct testimony; Brady v Maryland violations; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to consult with defendant during jury selection; Failure to challenge certain jurors for bias; Failure to impeach witnesses; Failure to have defendant’s mother testify

[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 11/17/25.] The court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial based on its conclusion that witness-L’s testimony was not substantially false. It also agreed with defendant that “the prosecution suppressed the benefit [L] received in exchange for testifying, and also suppressed [L’s] prior conviction for a crime of dishonesty, in violation of Brady.” But it found that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Thus, the court vacated his convictions (which included one for first-degree home invasion) and remanded for a new trial. L “testified that he pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor and implied that he had already served a six-month jail sentence as a result of that conviction. This was false because [L] had not pleaded guilty to any crime. Instead, all of his charges stemming from the home invasion were completely dismissed, albeit without prejudice. The prosecutor knew this testimony was false because she filed the motion to dismiss [L’s] case, which was granted nine months before defendant’s trial.” Thus, defendant met his burden to prove L’s “testimony was false, the prosecutor knew the testimony was false, and the trial court clearly erred in finding otherwise.” Any ambiguity regarding whether L “had actually pleaded guilty was clarified, albeit untruthfully, on cross-examination.” The court noted that the prosecutor “had four opportunities to correct the false testimony that [L] had pleaded guilty[.]” Because the false testimony related to his “agreement to testify, the prosecutor had an affirmative duty to specifically correct his testimony regarding that agreement.” The court found that regardless “of the prosecutor’s intent to refile the charges against [L], at the time of trial, it was incorrect to state that he had already pleaded guilty.” Further, there was “a reasonable likelihood the prosecution’s failure to correct the false testimony affected the judgment of the jury, and therefore violated defendant’s right to due process.” The court also found that his “right to due process was violated by the prosecution’s suppression of . . . evidence under Brady. The trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial based on the Brady violations.”

Plea withdrawal; Interest of justice; MCR 6.310(B)(1); People v Guyton; Knowing & voluntary no-contest plea; MCR 6.302(A); People v Cole; Ineffective assistance during plea negotiations; People v White

The court held that defendant was entitled to withdraw his no-contest plea because counsel’s objectively unreasonable guidelines misadvice rendered the plea not understanding and voluntary, and it vacated the sentences, reversed the denial of plea withdrawal, and remanded. Defendant pled no contest to two counts of CSC III and, under a Killebrew agreement, was told he would receive the bottom of the guidelines, which the parties estimated as “either 30 months or 45 months,” but the PSIR later showed a 72-to-150-month minimum range and the trial court denied withdrawal and sentenced him at 72 months. On appeal, the court concluded the inducement was not merely an inaccurate prediction but a legal impossibility, stating, “The minimum sentence that induced defendant to plead no contest was factually impossible for him to have received under the guidelines,” and explaining that “the 45-month minimum sentence quoted to defendant was never possible in light of the information about defendant’s criminal history known to the parties at the time of his plea.” The panel rejected counsel’s “juvenile convictions” explanation as not supported by the guidelines and emphasized there “is a meaningful difference between failing to predict what the court might do and failing to correctly apply known facts to the statutory sentencing framework.” Because the misinformation prevented an informed bargain, the court noted that a plea cannot be “understanding or knowingly entered into” when induced by “an inaccurate understanding of the minimum and maximum possible prison sentence,” and held that “defense counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable,” the plea was not “understandingly, knowingly, voluntarily, and accurately made,” and “the interest of justice requires that defendant be permitted to withdraw his plea.”

Anonymous jury; People v Hanks; People v Williams; Supplemental jury instruction; People v Gaydosh; Scoring of OV 5; MCL 777.35; People v Calloway; Sentence reasonableness & proportionality; People v Posey

The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims challenging the numbered jury, the trial court’s response to the deliberating jury’s question, the scoring of OV 5, or the proportionality of his within-guidelines minimum sentence. Defendant was convicted of OUIL causing death and reckless driving causing death arising from a road-rage crash in which he brake-checked the other driver and had a 0.124% blood alcohol level. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 86 to 180 months. On appeal, the court held that he failed to show error from the numbered jury because, “similar to Hanks, the record reflects that both parties were able to extensively question the potential jurors during voir dire, and the record does not suggest that the jurors determined that there was any particular significance to the trial court referring to the jurors by number rather than name.” This case was also analogous to Williams “because there was no suggestion that defendant’s trial was being handled in a special way, nor was there any implication arising from the use of numbers that defendant was dangerous or guilty as charged.” On the jury-question issue, the court held the supplemental instruction did not direct a verdict where the trial court told jurors that “all the evidence that you believe should be considered” and that “if you believe it shows willful or wanton disregard,” then it was “proper” to use intoxication evidence, while reminding them it was their job to decide the facts. As to OV 5, the court held the record supported serious psychological injury that “may require professional treatment,” citing statements describing a “daily struggle,” “sleepless nights,” anxiety, and evidence the victim’s child died by suicide 39 days later, concluding there was “ample evidence of the seriousness of the injuries and their long-lasting effects to support” the 15-point score. Finally, the court held defendant did not overcome the presumption of proportionality for a within-guidelines sentence, reiterating that such a sentence is “presumed to satisfy the principle of proportionality” and noting the trial court relied on the reckless, intoxicated brake-checking and defendant’s lack of acceptance of full responsibility. Affirmed.

Ineffective assistance of counsel; Decision to not call defendant to testify; Self-defense; People v Hoskins

Holding that trial counsel’s decision to not call defendant to testify was not objectively unreasonable, the court rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The court found that he failed to “overcome the strong presumption that his trial counsel made a reasonably strategic decision when advising him not to testify. First, defendant’s testimony was not required to establish self-defense. Michigan law is clear that a defendant can ‘show his state of mind by circumstantial evidence to establish that he acted in self-defense’ and that he ‘need not take the stand and testify.’” The court added that “requiring a defendant to testify, even when claiming self-defense, would violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the defendant’s ‘right to have the prosecutor prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting in self-defense.’” The court also concluded trial “counsel had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the evidence he introduced, if taken by the trier of fact to be true, was sufficient to establish self-defense.” There was testimony that the victim (G) “was irate with defendant, and began cussing and yelling at him. [G] then threw the first punch and asked [witness-H] for a gun during the fight. At some point, [G] threatened defendant by saying that he’s ‘been waiting on to get him.’ This testimony provided sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant feared for his life or great bodily harm during the fight, without [his] testimony.” His argument hinged on the lack of evidence about “his state of mind at the time of the stabbing. The jury heard a recording of defendant telling someone that he was unaware if the victim or [H] had a gun during the fight.” While he claimed in his Standard 4 brief that G had a gun during the fight, the trial evidence and his prior statement did not support that. If he “had testified, he risked contradicting his prior statement and being impeached, which could have undermined the circumstantial evidence that supported his self-defense theory.” Affirmed.

Motion for directed verdict; Sufficiency of the evidence; Assaulting or obstructing a police officer; Privilege from service of process; MCL 750.479(1)(a); Distinguishing People v Moreno; Jury instruction; Waived issue

The court concluded that because “a factual question existed on which reasonable minds could differ, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict.” Additionally, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction of assaulting or obstructing a police officer. Defendant contended Chief A’s (who was at the courthouse attempting “to serve defendant papers for an alleged violation of a personal protection order”) actions were not lawful because A “violated MCL 600.1835(1) by serving defendant as he was leaving a court proceeding.” Defendant cited “no authority to support failure to comply with MCL 600.1835(1) per se constitutes a criminal or unlawful act, entitling him to behave in a combative manner to avoid service of process.” The facts in this case were unlike Moreno, “where the defendant resisted an unlawful arrest after law enforcement unlawfully entered his home.” Although defendant argued “the prosecution failed to present evidence [A] was even aware of MCL 600.1835(1), defendant does not cite authority to support one must be aware of a specific civil statute to be acting lawfully.” His argument was not dispositive. Affirmed.

Motion for compassionate release under 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A); “Extraordinary & compelling circumstances” warranting release; Medical condition; USSG § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C)

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-Williams’s motion for compassionate release where his health problems were considered when he was sentenced and “unchanged factual circumstances” could not establish “extraordinary and compelling” reasons to support his release. And he failed to show “that he was receiving insufficient treatment and thus at risk of a serious deterioration in health.” He pled guilty to several drug offenses, FIP, and money laundering. He was sentenced to 198 months. Almost 10 years later, he moved for compassionate release based on prison officials’ allegedly inadequate treatment of his serious medical conditions, thrombophilia and recurrent deep vein thrombosis. Both these conditions existed when he was initially sentenced. They required continued blood monitoring, and he was designated a “Care Level 3” inmate. Williams claimed that after he was transferred to his current prison, the personnel were “not testing his blood frequently enough to properly monitor his warfarin dosage, putting him at risk of blood clots and ensuing complications.” The district court denied his motion, ruling that the treatment he was currently receiving “was not ‘so deficient as to warrant intervention,’” and that even if he “could show extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the sentencing factors did not support his release.” The court looked to the Sentencing Commission policy statement Williams relied on (§ 1B1.13(b)(1)(C)) to determine what constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release and explained that it provides that they exist “when the ‘defendant is suffering from a medical condition that requires long-term or specialized medical care that is not being provided and without which the defendant is at risk of serious deterioration in health or death.’” The court noted that “Williams’s thrombophilia diagnosis was known at sentencing, so he prudently does not rely on it alone. Instead, he argues that, although his health has not deteriorated, he is ‘at risk’ of deterioration or death from the alleged lack of adequate treatment” at his new prison. While the “district court was ‘sympathetic’ to any ‘isolated’ delays in treatment,” it found he did not meet the second and third steps of the § 1B1.13(b)(1)(C) analysis. The court held that the record supported “the district court’s factfinding.” Williams’s medical records showed the prison “has provided ongoing treatment for his thrombophilia” and its Clinical Director indicated that his condition was “‘stable and can be fully managed’” at the facility. Affirmed.

Wrongful termination; Whether plaintiff’s claims under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act were time-barred under a limitations period in her job application; Rayford v American House Roseville I, LLC

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 79181 in the 3/31/23 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Rayford.

The No-Fault Act; Healthcare provider action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; The one-year-back rule (MCL 500.3145); Claims assignment; Applicability of the misnomer doctrine; Motion for a directed verdict

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated as premature the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83484 in the 4/22/25 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. It directed that court to address: (1) whether “defendants created the one-year-back argument through false answers to requests for admissions; (2) whether the insureds assigned their claims to” plaintiff-healthcare provider “in a consolidated action against both of the defendants; (3) whether the misnomer doctrine should apply; and (4) whether the directed verdict motion was procedurally improper and unsupported by evidence.”

The No-Fault Act; Healthcare provider action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; The one-year-back rule (MCL 500.3145); Claims assignment; Applicability of the misnomer doctrine; Motion for a directed verdict

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated as premature the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 83484 in the 4/22/25 edition) and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals. It directed that court to address: (1) whether “defendants created the one-year-back argument through false answers to requests for admissions; (2) whether the insureds assigned their claims to” plaintiff-healthcare provider “in a consolidated action against both of the defendants; (3) whether the misnomer doctrine should apply; and (4) whether the directed verdict motion was procedurally improper and unsupported by evidence.”

PIP benefits; Rescission; Bazzi v Sentinel Ins Co; Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Wright balancing test; Real party in interest; MCR 2.201(B)(1); Applicability of res judicata; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Survivor’s benefits; MCL 500.3108; Jurisdiction & mootness

The court concluded “that the trial court committed no reversible error” and affirmed the (1) 11/4/21 order granting summary disposition to defendant-USA Underwriters, (2) 5/31/23 order granting defendant-Farmers partial summary disposition, (3) 8/22/23 order denying plaintiffs-children’s motion to reinstate the USA policy, and (4) 1/12/24 order granting Farmers summary disposition. The case arose “from the death of the decedent, Brianna C. Hendrix, and the subsequent attempt to recover no-fault benefits by plaintiff estate and the decedent’s surviving minor children, AMC, AMH, and ADH (collectively, ‘surviving children’ or ‘plaintiff children’).” The estate and the children challenged the trial court’s 11/4/21 order and the 8/22/23 order, “arguing that the trial court was required to apply the Pioneer balancing test before deciding whether to rescind the decedent’s auto-insurance policy.” The court held that under the “circumstances, it was permissible for USA to void the policy ab initio based on the fraudulent manner in which it was acquired.” The court held that because “the decedent would not be entitled to benefits from USA had she survived, plaintiff children are not eligible for survivor’s benefits under the USA policy. [They] are not an innocent third party under Bazzi and Pioneer, and the trial court did not err by granting USA’s motion for summary disposition and denying plaintiff children’s motion to reinstate the USA policy.” It next found that “the trial court did not err when it determined that plaintiff children—and not plaintiff estate—were the proper party to pursue survivor’s benefits under MCL 500.3108.” The court noted that res judicata clearly did not apply here. Thus, the “estate’s contention that the trial court was bound by its prior decision” was meritless. The court concluded that given “plaintiff children acknowledged their receipt of social security benefits, which are required to be set off from payable survivor’s benefits under the no-fault act, the trial court did not err in determining that Farmers was entitled to a setoff in the amount of $32,024.” It also found that “Farmers’ good-faith payment of survivor’s benefits to plaintiff estate for the benefit of plaintiff children discharged its liability to pay survivor’s benefits.” Finally, the court held that ultimately, “plaintiff children failed to support their claims for additional survivor’s loss benefits with documentary evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact. The trial court did not err by granting” Farmers summary disposition.

Insurance contract; Subrogation action by an insurer; “Domicile”; Grange Ins Co of MI v Lawrence; “Insured person”; “Reside”

In this subrogation case, the court held that “the trial court erred by not interpreting the term ‘domiciled’ by its recognized meaning under Michigan law.” Defendant, the non-party-insured’s (P) “grandson, accidentally started a fire in the basement of” her home. Plaintiff issued P a homeowner’s policy. There was no dispute that a “custody order awarded physical custody of defendant to his father, who did not live at” P’s home. The court noted that the “term ‘domicile,’ as it pertains to a minor of divorced parents, has a definite legal meaning: the minor is domiciled with the parent who has court ordered physical custody. Defendant thus was domiciled at his father’s home, not” P’s. Defendant argued that Grange did not apply “to his case because its holding interpreted the term ‘domicile’ contained in § 3114 of” the No-Fault Act (NFA), and this case did not involve the NFA. “But Grange involved examining the meaning of a minor’s domicile outside the context of the [NFA] and adopting that analysis to define the term in the statute. Grange is therefore relevant to examining the definition of ‘domicile’ here.” Because the policy contract here did “not provide its own definition of ‘domiciled,’ we must give the term its recognized legal meaning at the time of the accident. Under recognized Michigan law, defendant was domiciled at his father’s home pursuant to the custody order then in effect.” Defendant also argued “that, because the term ‘domiciled’ is an undefined term contained in a contract, as opposed to a term contained in a statute that is subject to statutory interpretation, it should be given its ordinary nontechnical meaning, which [he] alleges to be synonymous with the term ‘residing,’ based upon certain dictionaries” he cited. But because the term “has a definite legal meaning, both for adults and for minors, the parties are presumed to have intended such terms to have their proper legal meaning.” The court found that its “reading of the contract term ‘domiciled’ is consistent with the intent of the parties.” It concluded that “reading the insurance policy as a whole, the intention of the parties is clear—whereas the named insured is covered by the policy as long as they reside at the dwelling, a relative is only covered by the policy if they are domiciled in the household of the named insured or resident spouse.” Were the court “to read the terms ‘reside’ and ‘domiciled’ synonymously, [it] would be improperly negating the recognized meaning of the term ‘domiciled,’ and the” parties’ intent. It held that defendant “was not ‘domiciled’ at [P’s] home at the time of the fire, and therefore, he was not an ‘insured person’ within the meaning of” the policy. Because defendant was “not an insured, the subrogation provision in [P’s] policy that does not allow plaintiff to bring a subrogation action against its insured does not apply to defendant. As a result, the” trial court erred in granting him summary disposition. Reversed and remanded.

Policy cancellation notice by mail; MCL 500.3020; Causin v Auto Club Ins Ass’n

The court held that because defendant-insurer (State Farm) did not notify plaintiff-Pellot of “cancellation by mailing a written notice to the address last known to defendant, as required by MCL 500.3020,” the cancellation was ineffective under Michigan case law. Pellot was injured in an accident and sought no-fault benefits from his one-time insurer, State Farm. He argued “that the cancellation that defendant issued was ineffective because it did not comply with MCL 500.3020.” The court agreed. The issue was controlled by Causin. “There, the plaintiff fell behind on premium payments.” On 7/8/88, “the insurer’s Dearborn office generated a cancellation notice, but that same day the plaintiff submitted a change of-address form to the insurer’s Flint office. The Dearborn office mailed the cancellation notice to the plaintiff’s former address on [7/11]. Although the plaintiff later obtained actual notice of the cancellation, this Court held that the mailing was defective and the cancellation ineffective.” It explained that “‘[t]he statute plainly indicates that the insurer is obliged to mail the notice of cancellation to the most current address known to either the insurer or its authorized agent’ and that ‘defects in mailing are not cured by the insured’s receipt of the cancellation notice.’” The same reasoning applied here. “Defendant’s records reflected plaintiff’s new address when the cancellation notice was mailed. The fact that it may have taken several weeks for corporate processing is immaterial; Causin held that once the insurer or its agent has knowledge of a new address, subsequent mailings to the former address do not satisfy the statute.” The facts here were “even less favorable to defendant than in Causin, where the insurer’s error could be attributed to pre-Internet mail delays.” Further, it did not “matter whether plaintiff received actual notice of cancellation or ‘should have’ realized that nonpayment would result in termination. Under Causin, a defective mailing renders the cancellation ineffective per se, regardless of receipt or foreseeability.” Defendant contended “that the parties mutually agreed to electronic communications, including text-message notices, and that nothing in MCL 500.3020 expressly prohibits such an arrangement.” The court disagreed. “The statute provides that a policy ‘shall not be issued or delivered in this state’ unless it contains the mailing provision. If the parties could later contract around this requirement, they would, in effect, create a new insurance policy that omits a term the Legislature has deemed mandatory. Because ‘it is to be presumed that the parties contracted with the intention of executing a policy satisfying the statutory requirements,’ the policy is read ‘as though the statutes were a part of the contract.’” Thus, the mailing requirement is “an unalterable term of the insurance policy.” The court reversed summary disposition for State Farm and remanded.

Auto negligence; Respondeat superior; Rogers v JB Hunt Transp, Inc; Bryant v Brannen; Distinguishing Byzewski v Aerotek, Inc (Unpub); Dual-purpose rule; Kester v Mattis, Inc; Motion to compel complete discovery responses; Augustine v Allstate Ins Co; MCR 2.302(B)(1)

The court held that defendant-Kamax was properly granted summary disposition of plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim in this auto negligence case. Further, the trial court did not err in denying in part their motion to compel insofar as they sought to have Kamax produce its employee’s (defendant-Wright) unredacted e-mails and text messages. The case arose after Wright struck plaintiff-Diane Henderson as she was crossing an intersection in the crosswalk. “Wright was working remotely from his home office” that day. He had taken a short lunch break and “drove to pick up his dry cleaning.” He testified that this trip “was ‘not work[-]related,’ but he took his work phone with him because it was his habit. [He] did not make any stops on the way” before the accident. The record showed that he “did not send or receive any e-mails between when he stopped working for lunch and when the accident occurred. [He] also did not make or receive any phone calls during this time, other than to call 911 and call his wife. [His] trip to the dry cleaners was ‘intended solely to further the employee’s individual interests[.]’” Thus, the evidence did not support that the trip “was accomplished ‘in furtherance, or the interest, of the employer’s business.’” Plaintiffs did not offer “any evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding the scope of Wright’s employment at the time of the accident.” The unpublished decision they relied on, Byzewski, was distinguishable. And regardless of whether some of the clothing was “work attire, there was no evidence presented that Kamax ordered Wright to pick up this clothing, or have it dry cleaned. The evidence also established the only meeting” he had scheduled that day “took place remotely in the morning before [he] picked up his dry cleaning.” The court held that Kamax was “not liable under the dual-purpose rule because the accident did not occur while Wright was ‘going to or coming from work,’ and did not involve ‘a service of benefit to the employer.’” His going to pick “up his dry cleaning was for a private purpose and outside the scope of his employment. Because Wright was ‘acting to accomplish some purpose of his own,’ this issue was properly ‘decided as a matter of law.’” As to plaintiffs’ request to compel, the “mere conjecture Wright was distracted while driving because of a crisis at work is insufficient to allow discovery of the unredacted e-mails.” Affirmed.

Legal malpractice; Simko v Blake; Causation; Boyle v Odette; Mitchell v Dougherty; Excessive fees claim; Summary disposition before discovery; Motion for reconsideration

Holding that the trial court correctly concluded plaintiff (Sarah) did not establish that defendants-attorneys and law firms’ alleged malpractice caused her alleged injuries, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. The case arose from their representation of plaintiff in a divorce from her then-husband (S). Plaintiff alleged “that defendants failed to conduct any meaningful discovery, failed to take steps to enforce the parties’ status quo in the divorce, and charged excessive legal fees.” She further alleged that due to their “malpractice, she received a smaller property distribution and she had to expend over $50,000.” The record showed that she retained successor counsel (nonparty-J) on 4/22/22. J filed her appearance on 5/5/22. “Defendants remained involved in the matter until the stipulated orders allowing them to withdraw were entered on [5/27/22]. Until those orders were entered, [they] continued to owe Sarah a duty ‘to act as an attorney of ordinary learning, judgment, or skill would under the same or similar circumstances.’” The court concluded that the record showed they “continued to work on discovery issues and ensure that the parties’ financial status quo was maintained during the transition period. After defendants withdrew, Sarah and [S] agreed to binding arbitration in lieu of a trial. The arbitrator held hearings” in 8/22 and 11/22. “Under MCL 600.5074(2) and (3), the arbitrator had the power to issue subpoenas and order discovery, including sworn statements, on contested issues. [J] had at least four months to identify and remedy any perceived discovery deficiencies and pursue any necessary action to enforce the financial status quo.” The court also noted there was no evidence that J “was hindered during the arbitration proceedings by any alleged misconduct of defendants. Sarah and [S] both testified at the hearing and presented expert testimony. [J] had an opportunity to cross-examine [S] and his expert, and to present any other witnesses that may have been necessary.” In addition to agreeing with the trial court’s causation ruling, the court also agreed “that defendants were entitled to summary disposition on Sarah’s claims for excessive fees because Sarah failed to address any of defendants’ arguments on these claims in her response to their motions for summary disposition.” Summary disposition was not premature, and her motion for reconsideration was also properly denied.

Auto negligence; Respondeat superior; Rogers v JB Hunt Transp, Inc; Bryant v Brannen; Distinguishing Byzewski v Aerotek, Inc (Unpub); Dual-purpose rule; Kester v Mattis, Inc; Motion to compel complete discovery responses; Augustine v Allstate Ins Co; MCR 2.302(B)(1)

The court held that defendant-Kamax was properly granted summary disposition of plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim in this auto negligence case. Further, the trial court did not err in denying in part their motion to compel insofar as they sought to have Kamax produce its employee’s (defendant-Wright) unredacted e-mails and text messages. The case arose after Wright struck plaintiff-Diane Henderson as she was crossing an intersection in the crosswalk. “Wright was working remotely from his home office” that day. He had taken a short lunch break and “drove to pick up his dry cleaning.” He testified that this trip “was ‘not work[-]related,’ but he took his work phone with him because it was his habit. [He] did not make any stops on the way” before the accident. The record showed that he “did not send or receive any e-mails between when he stopped working for lunch and when the accident occurred. [He] also did not make or receive any phone calls during this time, other than to call 911 and call his wife. [His] trip to the dry cleaners was ‘intended solely to further the employee’s individual interests[.]’” Thus, the evidence did not support that the trip “was accomplished ‘in furtherance, or the interest, of the employer’s business.’” Plaintiffs did not offer “any evidence establishing a genuine issue of material fact regarding the scope of Wright’s employment at the time of the accident.” The unpublished decision they relied on, Byzewski, was distinguishable. And regardless of whether some of the clothing was “work attire, there was no evidence presented that Kamax ordered Wright to pick up this clothing, or have it dry cleaned. The evidence also established the only meeting” he had scheduled that day “took place remotely in the morning before [he] picked up his dry cleaning.” The court held that Kamax was “not liable under the dual-purpose rule because the accident did not occur while Wright was ‘going to or coming from work,’ and did not involve ‘a service of benefit to the employer.’” His going to pick “up his dry cleaning was for a private purpose and outside the scope of his employment. Because Wright was ‘acting to accomplish some purpose of his own,’ this issue was properly ‘decided as a matter of law.’” As to plaintiffs’ request to compel, the “mere conjecture Wright was distracted while driving because of a crisis at work is insufficient to allow discovery of the unredacted e-mails.” Affirmed.

Breach of contract; Whether a joint venture was created; Agreement termination; Accounting; Common-law fraud; Defamation; Lawrence v Burdi; Expressions of opinion; Tortious interference with a business relationship; Breach of a fiduciary duty; Conversion; Civil conspiracy & concert of action; Expert Vehicle Solutions, LLC (EVS)

The court held that whether the parties formed a joint venture was “immaterial to plaintiffs’ post-termination breach-of-contract claims” and that the trial court properly limited their recovery to damages for contract breach arising from unpaid profit distributions through 6/20/22. It further held that their “claims for an accounting, fraud, defamation, tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy, breach of fiduciary duty, common-law conversion, statutory conversion, civil conspiracy, and concert of action” were properly dismissed. The case arose from the parties’ agreement to operate a business (EVS) providing vehicles and related logistics for automotive clients. The crux of plaintiffs’ argument on appeal related to their breach of contract claim was their contention that a 2021 Agreement created a joint venture. The court determined that a factfinder could conclude that it did, but that this did not change the outcome of the case. Text messages exchanged in 6/22 between plaintiff-Kaiser and defendant-Langan showed “a clear breakdown in their business relationship. After that exchange, Kaiser informed Volkswagen that she and her company had ‘separated from’ EVS but were still ‘ready to manage the projects we have priced and discussed with you’ under the new business name of Integrity Vehicle Solutions. These communications objectively reflect termination of the 2021 Agreement on or about” 6/20/22. Thus, the trial court “properly concluded that plaintiffs’ contractual rights to a 40% share of EVS’s net profits ended with the termination of the agreement. Plaintiffs were properly awarded damages only for [5/1 to 6/20/22], the period during which defendants admitted that no distributions were made. Plaintiffs failed to establish any breach before” or after those dates. “The fact that defendants continued operating EVS after termination did not entitle plaintiffs to a share of subsequent profits, as those projects were performed after the agreement was terminated.” Further, plaintiffs did not establish the elements of a common-law fraud claim or of tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. They also “failed to establish that any of the alleged statements met the requirements for defamation.” And their fiduciary duty claim failed because they did not identify any “independent duty arising outside the contract[.]” Affirmed.

Best-interests determination; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re White; Effect of parental incarceration on best interests; MCL 712A.19b(3)(h); In re Jenks

The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Respondent, the legal father of MRGD, was incarcerated for the vast majority of the child’s life following convictions including assault with intent to commit sexual penetration, and his parental rights had previously been terminated to another child based on prolonged incarceration. At the best-interests hearing, the evidence showed respondent had never met MRGD in person, had limited and inconsistent phone contact while incarcerated, failed to visit or provide support during a brief parole period, and remained unable to provide care or custody within a reasonable time. The trial court found no meaningful bond, noting respondent had been incarcerated for approximately 90% of the child’s life and that MRGD referred to him by his first name while calling her foster father “dad.” On appeal, the court reiterated that “the focus of the best-interest determination is on the child, not the parent,” and that a child’s interest in permanency, stability, and finality is paramount once statutory grounds are established. Although incarceration alone does not mandate termination, the court explained that the length and impact of incarceration are proper considerations, particularly where the parent cannot provide a normal home within the foreseeable future. The court emphasized that MRGD was doing very well in foster care, had expressed a desire to remain there, and had a strong likelihood of adoption, while respondent’s anticipated release did not outweigh the child’s need for immediate permanence. Because the trial court weighed the relevant factors and its findings were supported by the record, the court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made. Affirmed.

Best-interests determination on remand; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re White; Relative placement consideration; MCL 712A.13a(1)(j); In re Olive/Metts

The court held that the trial court did not err in concluding, after remand, that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. This appeal followed a prior remand directing the trial court to conduct a fuller best-interests analysis after statutory grounds for termination were affirmed, and on remand the trial court held a hearing and again found termination appropriate. On appeal, the court emphasized that “the focus of the best-interests inquiry is on the child, not the parent,” and that a trial court may consider factors including “the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality,” as well as the advantages of the child’s placement. The court held that the trial court properly considered the child’s placement with his mother as “an explicit factor to consider,” along with the child’s well-being in that placement and respondent’s inability to provide permanence due to his conduct and incarceration. Addressing respondent’s argument that his bond with the child precluded termination, the court concluded that the record supported the finding that the bond had weakened over time and explained that “even if the trial court clearly erred in finding deterioration of the bond, that factor alone is not dispositive.” The panel further held that the trial court appropriately weighed the danger respondent posed to the child in light of respondent’s sexual abuse of the child’s sibling and respondent’s guilty pleas to CSC II and child sexually abusive material offenses, which resulted in lengthy prison sentences directly bearing on respondent’s capacity to provide stability and finality. Because the trial court considered “a wide range of factors, all of which are supported by the record,” and respondent did not dispute the evidentiary support for those findings, the court concluded that the best-interests determination was not erroneous and affirmed.

Termination under § 19b(3)(g)

Holding that § (g) existed, the court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to her biological child. The record showed that the mother “was unable to provide proper care and custody for the child.” She tested positive for meth “when CPS initially visited the house, and she appeared to be intoxicated on the day that the child was removed. It was reported that respondent-mother was intoxicated to the point where the CPS workers were concerned for the child’s safety around” the mother. Nevertheless, she continued to use meth throughout the case. “Although the parent agency treatment plan offered appropriate services and referrals, respondent did not meaningfully participate in or benefit from them. [She] declined recommended inpatient treatment, submitted inconsistent and positive drug screens, failed to attend her scheduled psychological evaluation, and did not sufficiently engage in counseling so that service providers could confirm any progress.” Further, her parenting times were suspended because she “was intoxicated and acting erratically at a supervised visitation.” Overall, the evidence on the record showed that the mother “failed to provide proper care and custody for the child because of her drug use. Given the absence of sustained participation or demonstrated benefit, the [trial] court found that respondent was unable to provide proper care and custody and that there was no reasonable expectation [she] would be able to do so within a reasonable time.”