Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Criminal contempt; Punishment for direct contempt; MCL 600.1711(1); People v Kurz; Remand before a different judge; In re Contempt of Scharg
Holding that defendant-attorney’s alleged contempt of court was direct, the court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a hearing before a different judge. The trial judge found defendant guilty of criminal contempt for referring to the judge as crazy. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial judge erred by presiding over the deferred contempt hearing because she was entitled to a hearing before a different judge. “This case deals with direct contempt because the conduct at issue occurred in the immediate view and presence of the trial court. The trial court opted to defer consideration of contempt regarding that conduct until a later date. Under these circumstances, ‘there [was] no need to sacrifice traditional procedural safeguards,’ and another judge was required to preside over the deferred contempt proceedings.”
Sentencing; Proportionality; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Waiting “until the morning of sentencing to file a hastily prepared sentencing memorandum”; Failure to seek an adjournment
The court held that given “the severe and brutal circumstances underlying the murder, as well as defendant’s role as the leader in its commission, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing” him to 40 to 60 years for felony murder. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant generally argued that his sentence was disproportionate, and reflected the trial court’s unsupported reasoning considering its recognition of his youth and other mitigating factors. However, the trial court’s reasoning on the record adequately supported that his sentence fell “within the range of principled outcomes.” The trial court noted his “youth as well as its doubts that, given his age, he could have properly interacted with police.” The trial court also appeared “to have accepted as true defendant’s later-introduced claims of childhood abuse, and considered [his] good behavior while incarcerated, which the trial court considered as mitigating factors.” But it “also properly considered several negative factors that supported its ultimate sentence.” It considered the aggravating circumstances. “For instance, defendant, after shooting the pregnant victim twice, left her in a secluded area where she was not discovered until the following day; she died three days later. The trial court believed there was ‘no excuse or justification for that whatsoever.’” It also “noted that defendant was the leader in this situation, reasoning that” it was his decision and idea, and he was the one who executed the victim. Affirmed.
Judicial disqualification; Motion for recusal; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) & (b); Cain v Michigan Dep’t of Corr; Right to counsel; Failure to refer defendant for a competency evaluation; Alleged Brady violation; Sentencing comments
The court affirmed the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for recusal and the order denying his motion for recusal review under MCR 2.003(D)(3)(a)(i). He argued “that the sentencing judge should be disqualified under MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) because she denied defendant’s motion for relief from judgment after he filed a notice of withdrawal of the motion, which deprived him of his right to counsel of his choice and his right to notice and an opportunity to be heard.” The court disagreed, noting that it had “reversed the trial court’s order, which provided defendant with an opportunity to renew his motion with the benefit of counsel. Further, the sentencing judge stated that she was unaware of defendant’s notice to withdraw his motion when she considered and denied his motion for relief from judgment. The sentencing judge’s erroneous denial of defendant’s motion after defense counsel filed a notice of withdraw did not demonstrate actual bias or prejudice and defendant” did not show “plain error affecting his substantial rights.” He further argued “that the judge’s failure to refer him for a competency evaluation deprived him of a fair trial and substantiated the judge’s bias against him.” He contended “that the trial judge knew that defendant suffered from a mental illness.” The court concluded he “failed to establish that the trial judge had knowledge of any irrational behavior that would have raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competence or his ability to assist in his defense.” Thus, it found that there was “no indication of actual bias or prejudice and defendant” again failed to show plain error affecting his substantial rights. He also argued “that the sentencing judge’s remarks during sentencing established her bias and antagonism against” him. A review of the record revealed “that in one instance of alleged bias, the sentencing judge merely reacted to a perceived threat against her and the prosecutor contained in defendant’s description of the crime.” Defendant further claimed that she “referred to him as a monster.” But the record reflected that she “merely agreed with the victim’s aunt, who gave an impact statement, that defendant did not look like a monster or someone who would commit murder. The judge expressed frustration and anger that a man as young and as intelligent as defendant killed two people. [Her] comments resulted from the evidence introduced at trial and defendant’s actions at sentencing. Such opinions do not constitute bias or partiality.” The judge also reacted to his “continued claims of innocence after he had been convicted of murder by two juries in two separate cases. Defendant failed to establish that the sentencing judge’s comments went beyond opinions formed during trial, and instead, exhibited a deep-seated antagonism against” him.
Duty; National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards
The court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition as to a claim of negligence, and remanded. Plaintiff-Wilcomes’ “propane that had leaked out of a corroded pipe in their attic exploded, damaging the premises.” They dedicated “one line in their complaint regarding defendant’s duty.” Specifically, they claimed defendant “had a duty to perform a leak check pursuant to [NFPA] sections 54 and 58.” In the next line, plaintiffs claimed “that defendant breached that duty by failing to conduct a leak check of” their system. “Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing plaintiffs’ complaint was deficient because duties cannot arise from the NFPA industry standards.” Plaintiffs’ complaint was “deficient because it relied exclusively on NFPA standards as the sole basis of defendant’s duty. The trial court should have granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on this basis and it erred when it concluded otherwise.”
Whether a drainage fee is an unauthorized tax under the Headlee Amendment or a valid user fee; Const 1963, art 9, § 31; The Bolt factors; Bolt v Lansing
Holding that the drainage charge at issue is a valid user fee, the court denied plaintiffs’ requests for relief under the Headlee Amendment. Plaintiffs challenged a drainage charge under the Headlee Amendment. Ultimately, the special master found they were not entitled to relief because the drainage charge is a valid user fee, not an unauthorized tax subject to the Headlee Amendment. On appeal, the court agreed with the special master and defendants and adopted “the special master’s findings and conclusions except with respect to [her] analysis of the third Bolt factor.” First, the “evidence supports the special master’s conclusion that the drainage charge serves a regulatory purpose rather than a revenue-raising purpose. The first Bolt factor thus weighs in favor of the charge being a valid user fee rather than a disguised tax.” Second, the “evidence supports the special master’s conclusion that the drainage charge is proportionate to the necessary costs of the service provided. The second Bolt factor thus weighs in favor of the charge being a valid user fee rather than a disguised tax.” Third, the court agreed with plaintiffs that, under the third Bolt factors, the drainage charge is not voluntary, but this did not change the outcome. “Overall, plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the drainage charge is a disguised tax rather than a permissible user fee. The first and second Bolt factors favor that the drainage charge is a proper user fee. Although analysis of the third Bolt factor indicates that the drainage charge is effectively compulsory, ‘the lack of volition does not render a charge a tax, particularly where the other criteria indicate the challenged charge is a user fee and not a tax.’” As such, the drainage charge is “a permissible user fee that is not subject to the Headlee Amendment.”
Validity of a will; MCL 700.2502(1); Self-proved will; MCL 700.7204; Validity of decedent’s signature; MCL 700.2502(1)(b) & (c); Validity of witness signatures; Fraud; MCR 2.112(B)(1)
The court held that the probate court did not err by finding a genuine issue of material fact did not exist as to the validity of the will at issue, which was admitted to probate. Appellant challenged the validity of his mother’s purported will, which disinherited him. The probate court granted summary disposition for appellee (appellant’s sister), finding that although the will was “not a self-proved will” it was a “properly executed will” and formally admitted it to probate. On appeal, the court rejected appellant’s argument that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the decedent’s will, including whether she signed it. The “will included the decedent’s signature on the final page. Immediately preceding [her] signature, on the third page, [she] certified and declared ‘the statements in this document are true,’ ‘that this document is my will; that I sign it willingly,’ ‘I execute it as my voluntary act,’ and ‘I am eighteen years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or undue influence.’” It was also signed by two individuals who witnessed the decedent sign it. The court also rejected appellant’s claim that because two witnesses did not recall signing the will, there remained a question of fact as to its validity. The probate court “did not err by accepting the testimony on a motion for summary disposition, which allows [it[ to consider evidence beyond the pleadings, such as depositions. In this case, due execution was proven by the testimony of” the two witnesses. Finally, the court rejected appellant’s contention that the will was fraudulent. Even if the decedent allegedly made statements about appellant’s inheritance, as he claimed, there was “no evidence that the will was rescinded or that another (more recent) will was made.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect
Concluding that § (b)(i) existed and that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child's (DB) best interests, the court affirmed. He contended “that the trial court clearly erred by terminating his parental rights to DB because there was no evidence that he abused or neglected DB.” The court noted that the trial court found that one of respondent's other children, CB, “suffered new and old nonaccidental injuries and a life-threatening injury for which respondent admitted responsibility. The court also found that [he] had not demonstrated benefit from services before voluntarily releasing his parental rights to his other children.” The record supported these findings. “The trial court further found that there was a reasonable likelihood, based on the nonaccidental life-threatening injury respondent inflicted on CB, that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent because ‘how you treat one child is evidence of how you would or could treat the other.’” Respondent argued “that no evidence was presented demonstrating that he abused or neglected DB, and that the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.” This argument was unpersuasive. “In determining whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights to DB under [§ (b)(i)], the trial court was required to determine that ‘a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury[,]’ the respondent’s ‘act caused the physical injury[,]’ and ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in [the parents]’s home.’” The court held that the “trial court’s finding that DB’s sibling, CB, suffered new and old nonaccidental injuries and a life-threatening injury for which respondent admitted responsibility was supported by the record evidence, and the trial court appropriately considered [his] responsibility for CB’s life-threatening injuries when determining that there was a reasonable likelihood that DB would be harmed in the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s home.” The court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake by finding clear and convincing evidence supported termination” of his parental rights to DB under § (b)(i).
Child’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; Reasonable reunification efforts
Concluding that the trial “court did not clearly err by finding that termination” was in the child’s (ZLR) best interests, the court affirmed. Respondent-father argued “that he should have been afforded the opportunity to complete a parent-agency treatment plan before his parental rights were terminated.” The court noted that another one of his children, JBS, “was approximately one year old when he suffered permanently disabling, nearly fatal brain injuries. The evidence presented during a prior termination proceeding led the [trial] court to find that JBS sustained his injuries while in respondent’s care as either a direct result of respondent violently shaking him or respondent’s neglect in allowing such harm to occur. Respondent was the suspected perpetrator of the abuse such that aggravated circumstances existed under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii), and DHHS was not required to make reasonable efforts to reunite respondent with ZLR.” Respondent also argued “that the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination served ZLR’s best interests, and in doing so, erroneously applied the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.” The court again disagreed. It noted that he lacked a strong bond with ZLR. Because he “had little, if any, recent contact with ZLR, the trial court appropriately weighed this factor in favor of termination.” In addition, the court held that in “weighing ZLR’s best interests, the trial court properly considered his relative placement and nonetheless concluded that termination served ZLR’s best interests.” Further, it found that “the trial court correctly applied the doctrine of anticipatory neglect in concluding that termination served ZLR’s best interests.”